

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8012090462 DOC. DATE: 80/12/05 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-261 H. B. Robinson Plant, Unit 2, Carolina Power and Light 05000261
 AUTH. NAME: STARKEY, R.B. AUTHOR AFFILIATION: Carolina Power & Light Co.
 RECIP. NAME: RECIPIENT AFFILIATION: Region 2, Atlanta, Office of the Director

SUBJECT: LER 80-027/01T-0: on 801122, reactor protection relay RT-9 in reactor protection train A failed. Caused by de-energized relay coil resulting in continuous reactor trip signal. Relay replaced.

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	CHEM ENG BR 16	1	1	CONT SYS BR 17	1	1
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	EQUIP QUALI BR25	1	1	GEOSCIENCES 26	1	1
	I&C SYS BR 29	1	1	I&E 05	2	2
	JORDAN, E./IE	1	1	LIC GUID BR 30	1	1
	LIC QUALI BR 31	1	1	MATL ENG BR 32	1	1
	MECH ENG BR 33	1	1	MPA	3	3
	NRC PDR 02	1	1	OP EX EVALI BR34	3	3
	OR ASSESS BR 35	1	1	POWER SYS BR 36	1	1
	RAD ACCESS BR39	1	1	REACT SYS BR 40	1	1
	REG FILE 01	1	1	RELI & RISK A 41	1	1
	SFTY PRDG EVA42	1	1	STRUCT ENG BR44	1	1
	SYS INTERACI B45	1	1			
EXTERNAL:	ACRS 46	16	16	LPDR 03	1	1
	NSIC 05	1	1	TERA: DOUG MAY	1	1

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (1) _____

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

7 8 9 **S C H B R 2** (2) **0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0** (3) **4 1 1 1 1** (4) _____ (5)
8 9 14 15 25 26 57 58

CON'T
7 8 9 **REPORT SOURCE L** (6) **0 5 0 0 0 2 6 1** (7) **1 1 2 2 8 0** (8) **1 2 0 5 8 0** (9)
60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
0 2 | At approximately 1000 hours on November 22, 1980, Reactor Protection Relay RT-9 in
0 3 | Reactor Protection Train "A" failed. This failure occurred during the periodic test
0 4 | of the Reactor Protection Logic. This constitutes a reportable occurrence per
0 5 | Technical Specification Section 6.9.2.a.9. The relay had failed in the safe
0 6 | configuration. Thus, no increase in risk to the health and safety of the public
0 7 | resulted.
0 8 | _____

0 9 | **S** (11) **C** (12) **A** (13) **R E L A Y X** (14) **A** (15) **Z** (16)
9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20
SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER (18) **8 0** (19) **0 2 7** (20) **0 1** (21) **T** (22) **0**
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.

(23) **C** (24) **C** (25) **Z** (26) **Z** (27) **0 0 0 0** (28) **Y** (29) **Y** (30) **N** (31) **W 1 2 0** (32)
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
1 0 | The failed and replacement relays are Westinghouse Model Nbfd-31 S, style 5072A49G03
1 1 | with 125 to 130 volt coils. The relay coil was found de-energized which caused a
1 2 | continuous reactor trip signal. The relay was replaced with an identical unit and
1 3 | tested satisfactorily.
1 4 | _____

(33) **E** (34) **1 0 0** (35) **NA** (36) **B** (37) **Periodic Test** (38)
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80
FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION

(39) **Z** (40) **Z** (41) **NA** (42) **NA** (43)
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80
ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE

(44) **0 0 0** (45) **NA** (46) **NA** (47)
7 8 9 11 12 13 80
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION

(48) **0 0 0** (49) **NA** (50) **NA** (51)
7 8 9 11 12 13 80
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION

(52) **Z** (53) **NA** (54) **NA** (55)
7 8 9 10 80
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION

(56) **N** (57) **NA** (58) _____ (59) _____ (60) _____ (61) _____ (62) _____ (63) _____ (64) _____ (65) _____ (66) _____ (67) _____ (68) _____ (69) _____ (70) _____ (71) _____ (72) _____ (73) _____ (74) _____ (75) _____ (76) _____ (77) _____ (78) _____ (79) _____ (80) _____
7 8 9 10 68 69 80
PUBLCITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION NRC USE ONLY

8012090462
NAME OF PREPARER: **R. B. Starkey, Jr.** PHONE: **(803) 383-4524**
W.S. Zimmerman for R.B. Starkey, Jr.

Supplemental Information

for

Licensee Event Report 80-027

1. Cause Description and Analysis: On November 22, 1980, at approximately 1000 hours, with the plant at 100% power, Reactor Protection Relay RT-9 in Reactor Protection Train "A" failed to re-energize during the periodic test of the Reactor Protection Logic. The relays are installed in a fail safe configuration (normally energized); therefore, no loss of safety function resulted or would have resulted from their failure to re-energize.

The failure appears to be the result of a shorting condition where the lead wires connect to the coil wires. This has been confirmed by a manufacturer investigation of the coil failures.

This is the same condition as reported previously on LER 80-006, LER 80-015, and LER 80-025.

2. Corrective Action: The failed relay was replaced with an identical unit and the Periodic Test was completed satisfactorily.
3. Corrective Action to Prevent Further Occurrence: An investigation by the manufacturer of the failed relay coils has confirmed the failures to be caused by an insulation breakdown at the point where the lead wire is soldered to the coil wire. Sharp edges left on this connection during the manufacturing process contribute to the failure which apparently occurs when the voltage to the relay coil is interrupted. The collapsing electrical field under this condition generates an instantaneous reverse voltage of more than 2000 volts. CP&L was told that the manufacturing process on these relays will be changed to better insulate these coil connections.

Due to the number of failures at the Robinson Plant and the apparent lack at other facilities, it appears that a particular Robinson Plant order of Nbfd-31 S relays was a defective batch. Therefore, new relays manufactured under the improved process will be obtained and installed in the Reactor Protection System as soon as practicable. Until such time that they are replaced, current periodic surveillance and the fail-safe application of these relays is sufficient to maintain safe operation of the plant. When a schedule for replacement of these relays is determined, a supplement to this LER will be submitted.