REGULATORY FORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYS

ACCESSION NBR:8011170444 DOC.DATE: 80/11/13 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET # FACIL:50-261 H. B. Robinson Plant, Unit 2, Carolina Power and Ligh 05000261 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION STARKEY,R.B. Carolina Power & Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Region 2, Atlanta, Office of the Director

SUBJECT: LER 80-026/01T-0:on 801030,valve SI+892A found shut.Caused by normally locked-open spray additive tank educator feed isolation valve mistaken for valve on operating work procedure & inadvertently closed.Procedure will be revised.

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NOTES:

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ACTION:	VARGA,S. 0	4	3	3			
INTERNAL:	A/D COMP&STRUO	6	1	1	A/D ENV TECH 07	1	1
	A/D MATL & QUO	8	1	1	A/D OP REACTO09	1	1
	A/D PLANT SYS1	0	1	1	A/D RAD PROT 11	1	1
	A/D SFTY ASSE1	2	1	1	A/D TECHNOLOG13	1	1
	ACC EVAL BR 1	4	1	1	AEOD	2	5
	ASLBP/J.HARD		1	1	AUX SYS BR 15	1	1
	CHEM ENG BR 1	6	1	1	CONT SYS BR 17	1	1
	CORE PERF BR 1	8	1	1	D/DIR,HUM FAC19	1	1
	DIR, ENGINEERI2	0	1	1	DIR,HUM FAC S21	1	1
	DIR, SYS INTEG2	2	1	1	EFF TR SYS BR23	1	1
	EQUIP QUAL BR2	5	1	1	GEOSCIENCES 26	1	1
	I&C SYS BR 2	9	1	1	1&E. 05	2	2
	JORDAN, E./IE		1	1	LIC GUID BR 30	1	1
	LIC QUAL BR 3	1	1	1	MATL ENG BR 32	1	1
	MECH ENG BR 3	3	1	1	MPA	3	3
	NRC PDR 0	5	1	1	OP EX EVAL BR34	3	3
	OR ASSESS BR 3	5	1	1	POWER SYS BR 36	1	1
	RAD ASSESS BR3	9	1	1	REACT SYS BR 40	1	1
	REG FILE 0	1	1	1	REL & RISK A 41	1	1
	SFTY PROG EVA4	5	1	1	STRUCT ENG BR44	1	1
	SYS INTERAC 64	5	1	1			
EXTERNAL:	ACRS 4	6	16	16	LPDR 03	1	1
	NSIC 0	5	1	1	TERA:DOUG MAY	1	1

NRC FOR	U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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	CONTROL BLOCK:
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CON'T	REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 1 7 1 0 3 0 8 0 8 1 1 1 1 3 8 0 9 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80
02	EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) At 2004 hours on October 30, 1980, while returning "B" containment spray pump to
0 3	normal lineup per Operating Work Procedure (OWP-CS-2), valve SI-892A was found shut.
04	Valve SI-892A is the common isolation valve for the sodium hydroxide addition line.
05	The plant was operating at 68% power and isolation of the sodium hydroxide system,
06	under this plant condition, is contrary to Technical Specification 3.3.2.1.e which is
07	reportable pursuant to 6.9.2.a(2).
08 78	9 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE
09 78	$ \underbrace{ S \ B \ 10}_{9 \ 10}  11 \ A \ 12 \ A \ 12 \ A \ 13 \ V \ A \ L \ V \ E \ X \ 14 \ F \ 15 \ D \ 16 \ 20 \ 16 \ 20 \ CUBRENCE \ REPORT \ REVISION $
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	During the isolation of containment spray pump "B", the normally locked open spray
11	additive tank educator feed isolation valve SI-892A was mistaken for a valve on the
1 2	OWP and inadvertently closed. This discrepancy was identified and corrected at 2004
13	hours on October 30, 1980. The procedure will be revised to incorporate double
14	valve lineups. 80
7 8	$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $
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1 7 7 8	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 39 0 0 0 37 Z 38 80 9
1 8	PERSONNEL INJURIES     Description (41)       NUMBER     DESCRIPTION (40)       9     11       12     80
19 78	LOSS OF OH DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)   TYPE DESCRIPTION   9 10. 80   9 10. 80   B0 B1
20	PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION $45$ $12$ $26$ $17$ $10$ $10$ $10$ $10$ $10$ $10$ $10$ $10$
	NAME OF PREPARER R. B. Starkey, Jr. PHONE: (803) 383-4524

## SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

## FOR

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 80-026

1. <u>Cause Description and Analysis</u>: On October 30, 1980 at 2004 hours while returning containment spray pump "B" to normal lineup as per Operating Work Procedure, OWP-CS-2, valve SI-892A was found to be shut. This closed valve caused isolation of the Sodium Hydroxide Addition Tank which is contrary to Technical Specification 3.3.2.1.e and is reportable pursuant to 6.9.2.a(2). The plant was operating at 68% power and startup physics testing following refueling was in progress.

"B" containment spray pump had been declared inoperable and isolated for repair using OWP-CS-2 at 0420 hours on October 30, 1980. This procedure requires the normally locked open containment spray pump "B" educator suction valve SI-892G to be closed. However, the normally locked open spray additive tank feed isolation valve SI-892A (common to both pumps) was inadvertently closed instead of SI-892G. This resulted in the isolation of the Sodium Hydroxide Spray Additive Tank from the operable "A" containment spray pump for fifteen hours and forty-four minutes. These two valves are similar two inch globe valves located in close proximity to one another. No adverse consequences resulted from this misalignment and the system was restored to full operability when valve SI-892A was reopened at 2004 hours on October 30, 1980.

- 2. <u>Corrective Action</u>: When SI-892A was found shut, it was reopened, thereby regaining automatic sodium hydroxide addition to "A" containment spray pump.
- 3. Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence: The plant procedures will be revised to require double valve lineup verification on all Operating Work Procedures associated with safety systems. This redundancy should provide for immediate identification of this type of event. The appropriate revisions to the applicable procedures will be implemented by January 31, 1981.

In addition, the operator involved in this error has been admonished and the circumstances surrounding this incident and the lessons to be learned have been reviewed in detail with all operations personnel as further action to preclude recurrence.