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ACCESSION NBR: 8009150289 DOC.DATE: 80/09/10 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET # FACIL:50-261 H. B. Robinson Plant, Unit 2, Carolina Power and Ligh 05000261 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION STARKEY, R.B. -Carolina Power & Light Co. RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

Region 2, Atlanta, Office of the Director

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SEP 16 1980

SUBJECT: LER 80-018/03L=0:on 800811, w/unit in refueling shutdown condition & while performing refueling period test CPL-PT-2.1, valve PCV-1716 failed to close due to isolation override switch being on.Cause not determined.

NOTES:

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NEC FORM/366 (7.77) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) CONTROL BLOCK: (1)- 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 0 570101010 0 S | C | H | B |  $|\mathcal{O}|$ LICENSE NUMBER LICENSEE CODE CON'T L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 1 7 0 8 1 1 8 0 8 0 9 1 0 8 REPORT 0 1 SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) At 2016 hours on August 11, 1980, with the unit at refueling shutdown condition, while | 0 2 performing Refueling Periodic Test CPL-PT-2.1 which confirms Containment Isolation 0 3 Phase A, Valve PCV-1716 (instrument air to containment) failed to close due to the 0 4 Investigation revealed that due to a lack of isolation override feature being on. 0 5 adequate administrative controls the valve could have been in override during power 0 6 This constitutes a reportable occurrence per Technical Specification opperation. 0 7 paragraph 6.9.2.b.3. 0 8 COMP VALVE SUBCODE SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT-CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE CODE CODE D (16)  $L \mid V \mid E \mid X \mid (14)$ E (15) Z (13) (12)vi A D D S (11) 0 9 18 13 10 REVISION OCCURRENCE SEQUENTIAL REPORT ČODĖ TYPE NO REPORT NO. EVENT YEAR LER/RO 0 0 3 (17) 8 0 0 1 8 Ľ REPORT NUMBER 32 30 28 22 22 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER PRIME COMP. NPRD-4 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED SHUTDOWN METHOD ACTION FUTURE FFFECT HOURS (22) FORM SUB. SUPPLIER ON PLANT Y (23) N (24) N (25) G 2 5 5 (26 <u>H</u> 18 G 19 0 Z (21) 0 0 0 <u>Z</u> (20) 35 36 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) It could not be determined when or for what reason the valve was placed in override. 1 0 The override control is located in the reactor auxiliary building out of the control 1 1 Although its operation is addressed in Emergency Instructions, it was room (CR). 1 2 The override will be relocated on the not addressed in normal operating procedures. 1 3 RTGB in the CR and procedures will be revised to adequately reflect its operation prior to power operation. 1 4 80 9 METHOD OF OTHER STATUS FACILITY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) DISCOVERY % POWER B (31) Conducting Refueling Test CPL-PT-2.1 H (28) 0 (29) NA 0 0 5 80 9 10 ACTIVITY CONTENT 12 13 LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) RELEASED\_OF RELEASE NA Z (33) <u>Z</u>(34) 'NA 80 10 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (39) TYPE NUMBER 0 0 0 (37) Z (38) NA 7 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION (41) NUMBER NA 0 0 0 (40) 8 80 12 11 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) · • • • ۰. DESCRIPTION NA 1 9 Z (42) 80 10 PUBLICITY NRC USE ONLY 8009150289 DESCRIPTION (45) ISSUED <u>N (</u>44) 0 68 69 10 YJAMA (803) 383-4524 B. Starkey, ′J**ŕ** R. PHONE: NAME OF PREPARER

## SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

## FOR

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 80-018

 <u>Cause Description and Analysis</u>: On August 11, 1980, at 2016 hours, with the unit at refueling shutdown condition, while performing Refueling Periodic Test CPL-PT-2.1 which confirms Containment Isolation Phase A, valve PCV-1716 (instrument air to containment) failed to close due to the isolation override feature being turned to the "ON" position.

Investigation revealed that due to a lack of adequate administrative controls for the normal use of this override switch which is located in the reactor auxiliary building out of the control room, the valve could have been in the override condition during operation. Under that condition; therefore, the valve would not have closed for containment isolation. This constitutes a reportable occurrence in accordance with Technical Specification paragraph 6.9.2.b.3.

There was no threat to the health and safety of the public as a result of this occurrence because the unit was in a refueling condition at the time. In addition, the Instrument Air System normally maintains a pressure of 85 to 100 PSI which is greater than the accident pressure conditions of containment (42 PSI). A check valve in the line downstream of PCV-1716 serves as back-up to the isolation valve.

- 2. Corrective Actions: The override switch was placed in the proper position and additional testing verified PCV-1716 operability. An unsuccessful investigation was initiated to determine when and why the switch was placed in override. During this investigation the apparent lack of adequate administrative controls was identified.
- 3. <u>Corrective Action to Prevent Further Occurrence</u>: The control circuit of the isolation valve for instrument air to containment will be modified to relocate the isolation override switch to the control room (RTGB) and procedures will be revised to adequately reflect its operations prior to power operation following refueling.

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