

# REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8004140413 DOC.DATE: 80/04/14 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #  
 FACIL:50-261 H. B. Robinson Plant, Unit 2, Carolina Power and Light 05000261  
 AUTH.NAME: AUTHOR AFFILIATION  
 UTLEY,E.E. Carolina Power & Light Co.  
 RECIP.NAME: RECIPIENT AFFILIATION  
 SCHWENCER,A. Operating Reactors Branch 1

SUBJECT: Submits addl info re implementation of Task Force short-term Lessons Learned requirements. Discusses replacement of switch for radiation monitors R-11 & R-12 circuits & mod to power operated relief valve position indication.

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 TITLE: Resp to Lesson Learn Task Force - Westinghouse

NOTES: \_\_\_\_\_

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		LTTR	ENCL		LTTR	ENCL
ACTION:	10 BC <b>ORB#1</b>	7	7			
INTERNAL:	<b>01 REG FILE</b>	1	1	02 NRC PDR	1	1
	05 OLSHINSKI, J.	1	1	06 KERRIGAN, J.	1	1
	07 BURDION, J.	1	1	08 WILLIS, C.	1	1
	17 I & E	2	2	20 CORE PERF BR	1	1
	21 ENG BR	1	1	22 REAC SFTY BR	1	1
	23 PLANT SYS BR	1	1	24 EEB	1	1
	25 EFLT TRT SYS	1	1	ANDERSON, N.	1	1
	FIELDS, M.	1	1	O'REILLY, P.	1	1
	OELD	1	0	TELFORD, J.T.	2	2
EXTERNAL:	03 LPDR	1	1	04 NSIC	1	1
	26 ACRS	16	16			

APR 17 1980



Carolina Power & Light Company

April 4, 1980

File: NG-3514(R)

Serial No.: NO-80-548

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
Attention: Mr. Albert Schwencer, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch No. 1  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2  
DOCKET NO. 50-261  
LICENSE NO. DPR-23  
SHORT TERM LESSONS LEARNED REQUIREMENTS

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

On April 2, 1980, conversations were held with members of your staff with regard to our letter of March 31, 1980 which provided additional information concerning our implementation of Short Term Lessons Learned items at H. B. Robinson. As requested by your staff, the following additional information is provided:

1. A sketch of the circuitry associated with the switch for radiation monitors R-11 and R-12 is attached.
2. If power was lost to all the contacts in the above circuit, it would be possible to open the valves, if power was available to open the valves. However, to lose power to all the contacts would require loss of power to both safety trains. This is not credible under the design criteria the plant was designed and built to. In addition, if power was lost to both safety trains, it is not credible that power would be available to open the valves.
3. The switch for the above circuit will be replaced with a single failure proof switch during the next refueling outage.
4. The switch and circuitry associated with the containment purge valves V12-6, V12-7, V12-8 and V12-9 are single failure proof.

Mr. Albert Schwencer

-2-

5. The PORV position indication will be modified to include an alarm which will alert the operator that the PORV does not indicate fully shut. This modification will be completed by the end of the next refueling outage. In the meantime, the PORV block valves will be maintained in the shut position by administrative control. The operator, however, will be allowed to open the block valves, if required, for pressure control.

If you have any further questions on this subject, please contact our staff.

Yours very truly,


*M a M. D. Utley*  
*for* E. E. Utley

Executive Vice President  
Power Supply and Customer Services

JJS/jcb

Attachment

cc: Mr. J. D. Neighbors (NRC)



CS/RMS is a rotary operated crossbar switch whose contacts are normally shut when the R-11 / R-12 monitors are aligned to sample the containment atmosphere and open when the R-11 / R-12 monitors are aligned to sample the stack.

$T_A$  and  $T_B$  are Phase "A" Containment Isolation Signal contacts for protection trains "A" and "B" respectively. Electrical independence is guaranteed as contacts  $T_A$  and  $T_B$  are in separate protective trains.

PS-1 and PS-2 are contacts which are operated by mechanical pressure switches. PS-1 closes as the interspace pressure between valves RMS 1 and RMS 2 increases to 2 psi indicating that the penetration has been pressurized by the penetration pressurization system. PS-2 will close when the interspace pressure between RMS 3 and RMS 4 has increased to 2 psi.