UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199

Report No.: 50-261/95-13

Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
P. O. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602

Docket No.: 50-261 License No.: DPR-23

Facility Name: H. B. Robinson Plant Unit 2

Inspection Conducted: April 17-21 and May 15-19, 1995

Inspector: _____ June 1, 1995
William P. Kleinsorge P.E. Date Signed
Reactor Inspector

Approved by: _____ 6/13/95
Jerome J. Blake, Chief Date Signed
Materials and Process Section
Engineering Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of Inservice Inspection (ISI), Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC), 'C' Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) main flange stud degradation, and licensee actions on previous inspection findings.

Results:

ISI program and procedures were well written and appropriate for their intended application. ISI records support the conclusion that examinations were conducted in accordance with applicable procedures and regulatory commitments.

Enclosure 2

The current FAC program, based on EPRI's CHECMATE, was first implemented during the last refueling outage. The program shows great promise for maintaining high energy carbon steel piping systems within acceptable wall thickness limits. Time is necessary for the fulfillment of that promise.

A weakness was identified related to the control of metallurgical failure analysis specimens.

The licensee failed to provide work instructions requiring direct or indirect visual inspection of the C RCP main flange studs after the removal of the boric acid residue and the associated corrosion products. This failure permitted degraded studs to remain in the RCP without an evaluation of operability.

In the areas inspected, one violation was identified concerning a failure to provide adequate work instructions for the inspection of degraded RCP studs. No deviations were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

*M. Brown, Manager, Design Engineering
*G. Castleberry, Manager, Plant Electrical Engineering
*W. Clark, Manager, Maintenance
*R. Crook, Senior Specialist, Licensing/Regulatory Compliance
*W. Dorman, Quality Control Supervisor
*A. Garrow, Acting Manager, Licensing/Regulatory Programs
*C. Hinnant, Vice President, Robinson Nuclear Project
*R. Krich, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
*B. Meyer, Manager, Operations
*J. Moyer, Manager, Nuclear Assessment Section
*E. Rossman, Engineer
*D. Taylor, Plant Controller
*R. Wardern, Manager, Plant Support Nuclear Assessment Section
*R. Webber, Senior Specialist
*T. Wilkerson, Manager, Environmental Control
*S. Williams, Senior Engineer
*D. Young, Plant General Manager

NRC Personnel:

*C. Ogle, Resident Inspector
*W. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector

*Attended exit interview

Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.

2. Inservice Inspection (ISI) (73753)

The inspector reviewed documents and records, and observed activities, as indicated below, to determine whether ISI was being conducted in accordance with applicable procedures, regulatory requirements, and licensee commitments.

The applicable code for ISI, for Unit 2 is the ASME B&PV Code, Section XI, 1986 Edition with no Addenda (86NA). Unit 2 is in refueling outage (RFO) 16, the third outage of the first 40-month period of the third ten-year interval (O3, P1, I3) ending February 19, 2002. Unit 2 was granted a construction permit July 12, 1966, received its Operating License on July 31, 1970, and commenced commercial operations on March 7, 1971.

During RFO 15 (O2,P1 I3), Nuclear Energy Services (NES) nondestructive examination (NDE) personnel, were performing liquid penetrant (PT),

magnetic particle (MT), ultrasonic (UT), and visual (VT) examinations under the umbrella of the NES Quality Assurance (QA) Program.

During RFO 16, (O3, P1, I3), Westinghouse Company (W) NDE personnel, were performing UT examinations under the umbrella of the W QA Program. CP&L NDE personnel were performing VT and MT examinations under the envelope of the CP&L QA Program.

a. ISI Program Review, Unit 2

The inspector reviewed the following documents relating to the ISI program to determine whether the plan had been approved by the licensee and to assure that procedures and plans had been established for the applicable activities.

Documents Reviewed

ID	Rev.	Title
- 2/10/94	1	Carolina Power and Light Company H. B. Robinson Nuclear Project Third Ten Year Interval Examination Program Plan
-	-	Examination Program Plan For Carolina Power And Light Company H.B. Robinson Unit #2 Inservice Inspection Interval-3 Period-1 Outage-3

These documents were well written and appropriate for their intended application.

b. Review of NDE Procedures, Units 1 and 2

The inspector reviewed the procedures listed below to determine whether these procedures were consistent with regulatory requirements and licensee commitments. The procedures were also reviewed for technical content.

Procedures Examined

ID	Rev.	Title/Subject
CP&L ETS-083 2/15/95	12	Inservice Inspection Pressure Testing of Reactor Coolant System (Refueling Shutdown Interval)
CP&L OST-052 3/14/91	8	RCS Leakage Test and Examination Prior to Startup Following an Opening Of The Primary System (Refueling and/or Startup Interval)

Procedures Examined

ID	Rev.	Title/Subject
CP&L PLP-040 7/19/95	5	Program for Prevention of Boric Acid Corrosion of RCS Carbon Steel Bolting
CP&L PLP-037 2/15/95	4	Conduct of Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions
CP&L AP-006 6/24/94	6	Procedure Use and Adherence
NES 80A9053 CP&L SP-1235 9/1/93	9 0	Ultrasonic Instrument Linearity Verification
NES 83A6071 CP&L SP-1224 8/10/93	1 0	Ultrasonic Sizing of Planer Flaws
NES 83A6161 CP&L SP-1237 9/3/93	2 0	VT-1 Visual Examination of Nuclear Power Plant Components
NES 83A6164 CP&L SP-1292 8/31/93	1 0	Ultrasonic Examination of Steam Generator Feedwater Nozzle Inner Radius Area
NES 80A9055 CP&L SP-1216 8/17/93	5 0	Calibration of Thermometers
NES 83A6165 CP&L SP-1228 8/31/93	1 0	Ultrasonic Examination of Steam Generator Main Steam Nozzle Inner Radius Area
NES 83A6166 CP&L SP-1226 8/10/93	1 0	Manual Examination of Wrought Stainless Steel Reactor Coolant Pipe Welds and Primary Loop Cast Stainless Steel Elbow Longitudinal Welds
NES 83A6083 CP&L SP-1225 8/12/93	0 3	Ultrasonic Examination of Bolting Material
NES 80A9068 CP&L SP-1221 8/17/93	10 0	Procedure for Certifying Nondestructive Examination Personnel
NES 83A6101 CP&L SP-1217 10/1/93	2 1	Liquid Penetrant Examination Procedure

Procedures Examined

ID	Rev.	Title/Subject
NES 83A6131 CP&L SP-1219 8/12/93	0 0	Ultrasonic Examination of Component Welds in Ferritic and Austenitic Materials
NES 83A6111 CP&L SP-1218 9/3/93	0 0	Magnetic Particle Examination
NES 83A6061 CP&L SP-1223 8/17/93	1 0	Ultrasonic Examination of Piping
NES 83A6163 CP&L SP-1230 8/31/93	3 0	VT-3 Visual Examination of Nuclear Power Plant Components
NES 83A6091 CP&L SP-1220 8/17/93	1 0	PSI/ISI Examination Areas and Volumes
NES 83A6031 CP&L SP-1222 8/12/93	1 0	Ultrasonic Examination of Vessel Welds Greater Than Two Inches in Thickness
NES 83A6041 CP&L SP-1239 9/14/93	1 0	Ultrasonic Examination Procedure for Pressurizer Nozzles Inner Radius Areas
W 93-QA-1092 11/9/94	3	Qualification and Certification of Personnel in Nondestructive Examination
W CPL-ISI-10 CP&L SP-1339 4/14/95	0 0	Qualification of Ultrasonic Manual Equipment
W CPL-ISI-55 CP&L SP-1343 4/14/95	0 0	Manual Ultrasonic Examination for the Reactor Vessel Threads in Flange
W CPL-ISI-247 CP&L SP-1344 4/14/95	0 0	Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Feedwater Extension Piece
W CPL-ISI-115BH CP&L SP-1331 4/14/95	0 0	Ultrasonic Examination of Studs From the Bore Hole

The procedures were well written and appropriate for their intended application.

c. Observation of Work and Work Activities, Unit 2

The inspector observed work activities, reviewed certification records of NDE equipment and materials, and reviewed NDE personnel qualifications for personnel who had been utilized in the ISI examinations during this outage. The observations and reviews conducted by the inspector are documented below.

Activities Observed

Liquid Penetrant Examination (PT)

The inspector observed PT examinations of the welds listed below. Welds marked (†) were examined by document review. The observations were compared with the applicable procedures and the Code.

Liquid Penetrant Examinations Observed

Weld No.	Drawing No.	System
25† (RFO 15)	CPL-122A	Chemical and Volume Control
28† (RFO 15)	CPL-122A	Chemical and Volume Control
42A† (RFO 15)	CPL-122A	Chemical and Volume Control
2† (RFO 15)	CPL-141	High Head Injection
3† (RFO 15)	CPL-141	High Head Injection
18† (RFO 15)	CPL-141	High Head Injection
2† (RFO 15)	CPL142	High Head Injection
3† (RFO 15)	CPL-142	High Head Injection
14† (RFO 15)	CPL-143	High Head Injection

The examinations were performed satisfactorily.

The inspector reviewed the certification documentation for the PT cleaner, developer and penetrant (See Table 1 below).

The inspector reviewed the certification, qualification, and visual acuity documentation for the PT examiners (See Table 2 below).

Magnetic Particle Examination (MT)

The inspector observed MT examinations of the component listed below. Welds marked (†) were examined by document review. The observations were compared with the applicable procedures and the Code.

Magnetic Particle Examinations Observed

Component No.	Drawing No	System
A† (RFO 16)	CPL-215	Feedwater
RCP Stud 13† (RFO 16)	RCP C	Reactor Coolant
RCP Stud 8† (RFO 16)	RCP C	Reactor Coolant
6†‡ (RFO 15)	CPL-205	Steam Generator
7†‡ (RFO 15)	CPL-205	Steam Generator

The examinations were performed satisfactorily.

The inspector reviewed the certification documentation for the magnetic particles, the yoke, and the 10 Lbs. test weight (See Table 1 below).

The ten LBS test weight certificates were not linked to data sheet for the examinations marked (‡) or the MT yoke calibration certificate.

The inspector reviewed the certification, qualification, and visual acuity documentation for the MT examiners (See Table 2 below).

Ultrasonic Examination (UT)

The inspector observed UT examinations of the welds listed below. Welds marked (†) were examined by document review. The observations were compared with the applicable procedures and the Code.

Ultrasonic Examinations Observed

Weld No.	Drawing No	System
A† (RFO 16)	CPL-215	Feedwater
1† (RFO 16)	CPL-215	Feedwater
2† (RFO 16)	CPL-215	Feedwater
1† (RFO 16)	CPL-216	Feedwater

The examinations were performed satisfactorily.

The inspector reviewed the certification documentation for the UT instruments, transducers, calibration blocks, and couplant (See Table 1 below).

The inspector reviewed the certification, qualification, and visual acuity documentation for the UT examiners (See Table 2 below).

Visual Examination (VT)

The inspector observed VT examinations of the components listed below. Items marked (†) were examined by document review. The observations were compared with the applicable procedures and the Code.

Visual Examinations Observed

Component No.	Drawing No	System
RCP Stud 8† (RFO 16)	RCP C	Reactor Coolant
RCP Nut 13† (RFO 16)	RCP C	Reactor Coolant

Visual Examinations Observed

Component No.	Drawing No	System
RCP Stud 13† (RFO 16)	RCP C	Reactor Coolant

The examinations were performed satisfactorily.

The inspector reviewed the certification, qualification, and visual acuity documentation for the VT examiners (See Table 2 below).

Table 1
NDE Equipment and Consumables Records Examined

Equipment/Consumables	Serial No/ Heat No./ Lot No./ Batch No.
PT Cleaner	92D02P
PT Developer	92A01P
PT Penetrant	93E01K
MT Red No. 8A particles	83L067
MT 10 Lbs. Test Weight	SRO-MT-001 and CPL 5343B
MT Yoke	423 ‡ and QC-11
UT Calibration blocks	CPL-54 and CPL-57
UT Instruments	136-472F
UT Transducers	42890, 138314, 138311 and 43987
Thermometers	2278
UT Couplant	092311

The ten Lbs test weight certificates were not linked to the data sheet for the examinations, or to the calibration certificate for MT yoke marked (‡).

ASME B&PV Code Section V 86NA paragraph T-625(b) states: "When examining austenitic stainless steel or titanium, all materials shall be analyzed **individually** for chlorine and fluorine contents..." T-625 further requires that the analysis for chlorine be accomplished in accordance with ASTM D 808 or SE-165 annex 2 and the analysis for fluorine be accomplished in

accordance with SE-165 annex 3, both reported as a percentage of the residue by weight. The certification documentation, provided by the licensee, reported the contaminants in the PT consumables as total halogens only. From the report provided the inspector, it could not be determined whether the PT consumables were consistent with the 86NA Edition of ASME B&PV Code Section V. The licensee is in the process of changing their purchase specification to require individual analysis for both chlorine and fluorine. Another utility has submitted an inquiry to the ASME B&PV Code Section V committee for clarification in this matter. An assessment of the certification documentation for the PT materials used in previous outages, will be made based on the answer to the Code inquiry.

Table 2
Qualification, Certification, and Visual Acuity Records Examined

Examiner	Method-Level			
JWB	T	VT-II	T	T
TAS	MT-II		PT-II	UT-II
PAW	MT-III	VT-111	PT-III	UT-III
KAD	MT-II			
TJO	MT-II		PT-II	UT-II
CAA	MT-III	VT-II	PT-III	UT-III
CDJ			PT-II	UT-II
GSL	MT-III		PT-III	UT-III

ISI program and procedures were well written and appropriate for their intended application. ISI records support the conclusion that examinations were conducted in accordance with applicable procedures and regulatory commitments.

Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.

3. Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) (49001)

During the last refueling outage, RFO 15, in the fall of 1993, the licensee implemented a FAC inspection program which implements the CHECMATE® (Chexal Horowitz Erosion/Corrosion Methodology for Analyzing Two-phase Environment) EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute) computer code, industry experience, and previous inspection data as predictive tools for determining and prioritizing inspection locations. Previous

to RFO 15 the licensee used engineering judgement to select components for examination. The inspector conducted interviews with licensee personnel and reviewed records as indicated below to evaluate the FAC Program.

The licensee is in the process of converting their data to CHECWORKS® (Chexal Horowitz Engineering Corrosion WorkStation) EPRI computer code, which operates in the Windows® environment. The licensee anticipates using CHECWORKS® for the next inspection opportunity, RFO 17.

Observations/Findings

During RFO 16, the licensee planned to examine 237 locations in their FAC program. Of the 237 locations selected, 102 locations had been previously examined. There are approximately 2800 inspection locations identified in the Robinson FAC Program. The licensee expanded the sample by eight locations for a total sample size, this outage, of 245 locations. These examinations necessitated the replacement of five components. Replacements were made prior to the components reaching their minimum wall thickness.

Procedures Examined

ID	Rev.	Title/Subject
CP&L PLP-051 1/15/95	2	Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) Monitoring Program
CP&L TSG-210 2/10/95	3	FAC Program Implementation and External Inspections Of Carbon Steel Piping
CP&L VII.5 2/14/95	2	Design Guide: Corporate Flow Accelerated Corrosion Program
CP&L TP-304 9/28/94	0	FAC Process Control
CP&L NDEP-1012 9/28/94	1	Gridding of Components for Erosion/Corrosion
CP&L NDEP-427 3/28/94	1	Digital Ultrasonic Thickness Measurement (Panametrics Model 26DL Plus) for Erosion/Corrosion Detection and Monitoring
EPRI NSAC/2021 11/93	-	Recommendations for an Effective Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program

Procedures Examined

ID	Rev.	Title/Subject
ASME Code Case N-480 5/10/90	-	Examination Requirements for Pipe Wall Thinning Due to Single Phase Erosion and Corrosion Section XI, Division 1
CP&L 7/15/94	-	H B Robinson Plant FAC Monitoring Program RO-15 Inspection Report

The inspector reviewed the Wall Thickness Engineering Evaluations made during Unit 2 RFO 15 for the below listed components.

Wall Thickness Engineering Evaluations Examined

Inspection Point Identification	Component Type	System	Disposition
H 59-8	8" Pipe	Heater Drain	Replaced
H 55-08	6" 90° Elbow	Heater Drain	Replaced
H 55-27	6" 90° Elbow	Heater Drain	Replaced
CD 82-21	22" Tee	Condensate	Acceptable for continued service.
CD 12-03	16" 90° Elbow	Condensate	Acceptable for continued service. Evaluate piping down stream.
B1A-09	3" Tee	Steam Generator Blowdown	Acceptable for continued service.
B41-6	2"Tee	Steam Generator Blowdown	Reinspect RFO 17

The licensee had an independent assessment conducted of their FAC program,which indicated weaknesses in the following areas: selection of examination locations not consistent with EPRI guidelines and in some cases the assumed original wall thickness was not conservative. The licensee has adequately addressed these issues.

The current FAC program, based on EPRI's CHECMATE®, was first implemented during the last refueling outage. The program shows great promise for maintaining high energy carbon steel piping systems within

acceptable wall thickness limits. Time is necessary for the fulfillment of that promise.

Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.

4. C Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Main Flange Stud Degradation

During a plant walkdown, the licensee discovered that the C RCP high pressure tap flange gasket had failed. This failure resulted in a spray of reactor coolant (high temperature borated water) into the annulus between the underside of the main flange and the pump casing, impinging on the shanks of a number of studs. The licensee video taped the as found condition, and then swept, wire brushed and vacuumed the annulus area. A verbal request was made to the CP&L Harris Energy and Environmental Center (HE&EC), near New Hill NC, to evaluate the extent of corrosion damage to the studs due to borated water, and to provide recommendations.

A representative of the CP&L Laboratory Services Section Metallurgical Unit (LSSMU) visually and tactilely examined the accessible portions of stud Nos 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. The LSSMU report indicated that stud Nos. 20, 21, 22, 7, 8 and 9 appeared to exhibit no metal loss. Figure 2, attached to the LSSMU report, indicated that stud Nos. 20, 21, 22, 7, 8 and 9 were "OK". The LSSMU report recommended that stud Nos. 23, 24, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, which exhibited obvious metal loss, be replaced. The LSSMU report warned that if the remaining boric acid residue become wet by other sources, there could be further corrosion of carbon steel or low alloy steel components. The LSSMU report recommended that the remaining boric acid residue be removed. The licensee subsequently pressure washed the pump main flange area to remove the remaining boric acid residue. The licensee removed and replaced stud Nos. 23, 24, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 with spares, one at a time.

To evaluate the licensee's actions related to the C RCP main flange stud degradation issue, the inspector interviewed licensee personnel, examined removed studs, visually and tactilely examined the accessible portions of installed stud Nos 22, 7 and 8.

The LSSMU requested that stud No. 2, the most severely degraded stud, be sent to the HE&EC for metallurgical evaluation. Upon his arrival at the site, the inspector was informed that the studs removed from the C RCP were in the Hot Machine Shop (HMS). The licensee indicated that stud No. 2 had been marked "save" per the system engineer, pending its shipment to HE&EC. When the inspector accompanied by the licensee went to the HMS to examine the studs, only one stud, of the eight removed, could be found. Stud No. 2 was subsequently found, decontaminated by sand blasting, in a trailer destined for burial at the low level

radioactive waste disposal facility at Barnwell SC. The sand blasting had removed the corrosion product/base material interface, thereby rendering the stud of little value for metallurgical evaluation. Eventually a total of four studs were located. The licensee was able identify stud No. 2 because of the degree of wastage exhibited. The remaining three could not be correlated with respect to their removal location, with any degree of certainty, because they were not marked after pressure washing and before removal from the pump. The above demonstrates a weakness in the control of metallurgical failure analysis specimens.



Figure 1 Stud No 2

Figure 1 above shows the wastage on stud No 2 after sand blasting. The wastage is located on the stud at the stud lower thread/pump body interface.

The inspector reviewed Engineering Service Request (ESR) 9500433, Revision 0, Reactor Coolant Leakage on C RPC Studs and noted the following:

- Root cause determination of the thermal barrier pressure tap flange gasket was absent. The thermal barrier pressure tap flange gasket was identified as the proximate cause of the leakage, but the cause of the gasket failure was not discussed.

- A discussion of the inspections performed by the licensee on the RCP studs pursuant to the W Technical Bulletin on the subject of RCP stud degradation was absent.

The licensee indicated that Revision 1 to ESR 9500433 will address the above issues.

The inspector conducted a walkdown inspection of C RCP. Examination of stud Nos. 22 and 7 (the studs immediately adjacent to the replaced studs), revealed a significant amount of wastage. It should be noted that the wastage was not visable without the aid of a mirror or other indirect viewing device.

After some investigation, it appears that the licensee accepted at face value, that the eight degraded studs required replacement and the remainder of the studs were acceptable ("OK") based on the tactile examination conducted by the LSSMU prior to pressure washing. The licensee subsequently pressure washed the area to remove the potential threat of renewed boric acid wastage. This washing removed additional boric acid and corrosion products, from the studs, revealing additional wastage, on the studs adjacent to the studs previously identified as degraded. This degradation was in areas not accessible to direct view. The eight previously identified degraded studs were replaced. No further visual examination, of a type that would have detected the degradation on stud Nos 22 and 7, was attempted or planned for the remaining studs. Absent the NRC intervention, the plant would have returned to operation at the close of the outage with at least two degraded studs in place in C RCP without an evaluation of operability.

TS 6.5.1.1, Procedures, Tests, and Experiments, requires in part that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering activities recommended in appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Rev. 2, 1978 including procedures for inspections. The licensee failed to establish adequate work instructions (procedures) requiring direct or indirect visual inspection of the C RCP studs after the removal of the boric acid residue and corrosion products. This failure permitted degraded studs to remain in the RCP without an evaluation of operability. This failure to provide adequate procedures will be identified as: **Violation 50-261/95-13-01: "Failure to Provide Adequate Work Instruction for Degraded Stud Inspection."**

5. Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings

a. (Closed) Violation 50-261/93-25-01: "Missing Welds at Supports FW-6B-73 and FW-6C-109"

This violation concerned missing welds on two pipe supports. The NRC reviewed the licensee's letters of response dated September 16, 1993 and January 27, 1994 and found them acceptable. The licensee's reasons for the violation, corrective steps taken and results achieved, and corrective steps to be taken to avoid recurrence were examined on site August 15-19, 1995 and reported in NRC Inspection Report 50-261/94-21 dated August 31, 1994.

At the close of NRC Inspection 50-261/94-21, the licensee decided to perform additional hardware inspections to verify that their previous document reviews were correct and that the condition was isolated, as their review indicated. The licensee initiated ESR 9500224, Weld Inspections Regarding NRC Inspection 93-25 to address this issue. The ESR identifies eleven new and reworked pipe supports of a configuration similar to the complex configuration of the supports identified in the violation. To date the licensee has inspected five of the eleven supports, indicated above, and has identified no missing welds.

In view of the following facts: the licensee's actions regarding this violation were found acceptable with the exception of the hardware inspections; the licensee has established an inspection plan to assure that the entire sample of eleven will be inspected; no missing welds were identified in the supports inspected to date; and the ESR program will assure any discrepancies will be appropriately pursued, this item is considered closed.

b. (Closed) Violation 50-261/94-21-02: "Failure To Sign Off VT Hold Points"

This violation concerned the licensee's failure to sign off a Hold Point for a final visual examination. The inspector of record for NRC Inspection Report 50-261/94-21, verified that the visual examinations had in fact been accomplished but had not been documented.

The NRC has reviewed the licensee's September 27, 1994 response to the August 31, 1994 Inspection Report, and found it acceptable. The licensee acknowledged the violation and attributed it to an isolated personnel error.

The licensee performed a review of a sample of 37 Weld Data Reports to confirm that the identified occurrence was isolated.

To prevent recurrence the licensee's inspection organization, the QC inspector and the ISI reviewer were counselled on the need to provide sufficient attention to detail. The Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector (ANII) and his supervision were notified of the concern to emphasize the ANII's responsibility for thurough review of ASME Section XI work. Full compliance was achieved by the date stated in the licensee's September 27, 1994 response letter.

The inspector is satisfied that the licensee has corrected the specific discrepant conditions, and performed the necessary survey to determine the full extent of the problem. The inspector examined the licensee's corrective actions as described in their letter of response, and determined that the licensee has taken appropriate actions to prevent recurrence. This matter is considered closed.

c. (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-261/94-21-01: "ASME Section XI Suitability Evaluations for Replacements"

This matter is related to the resolution of the ANII's concerns associated with the documentation of ASME Section XI suitability evaluations for replacements as discussed in ANII Audit HSP 94-01 dated July 19, 1994.

The licensee has revised the below listed procedures to include suitability of replacement evaluations.

Procedures Revised

Identification	Rev.	Title
PLP-025 11/15/94	7	Inservice Inspection Program
TMM-015 1/12/95	20	Inservice Repair and Replacement Program
MMM-003 3/4/95	43	Maintenance Work Requests
MMM-003 Appendix A 5/13/95	44	Maintenance Work Requests

The inspector reviewed the above procedures and had no further questions. This issue is considered closed.

6. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and results were summarized, on May 19, 1995, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas inspected and the findings listed below. Although reviewed during this inspection, proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.

Violation 50-261/95-13-01: Failure to Provide Adequate Work Instruction for Degraded Stud Inspection.

5. Acronyms and Initialisms

ANII	-	Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector
ASME	-	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
B&PV	-	Boiler and Pressure Vessel
CHECMATE	-	Chexal Horowitz Erosion/Corrosion Methodology for Analyzing Two-phase Environment
CHECWORKS	-	Chexal Horowitz Engineering Corrosion WorkStation
CP&L	-	Carolina Power and Light
DPR	-	Demonstration Power Reactor
EPRI	-	Electric Power Research Institute
ESR	-	Engineering Service Request
FAC	-	Flow Accelerated Corrosion
HE&EC	-	Harris Energy and Environmental Center
HMS	-	Hot Machine Shop
ID	-	Identification
ISI	-	Inservice Inspection
LSSMU	-	Laboratory Services Section Metallurgical Unit
MT	-	Magnetic Particle
NC	-	North Carolina
NDE	-	Nondestructive Examination
NES	-	Nuclear Energy Services
No.	-	Number
NRC	-	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P.E	-	Professional Engineer
PSI	-	Preservice Inspection
PT	-	Liquid Penetrant
QA	-	Quality Assurance
RCS	-	Reactor Coolant System
Rev.	-	Revision
RFO	-	Refueling Outage
SC	-	South Carolina
T.S.	-	Technical Specification
UT	-	Ultrasonic
VT	-	Visual
W	-	Westinghouse