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Docket No. 50-261 License No. DPR-23

Carolina Power and Light Company
ATTN: Mr. C. R. Dietz
Vice President
H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant
Unit 2
P. O. Box 790
Hartsville, SC 29550-0790

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: REVIEW OF REVISIONS 24 AND 25 TO EMERGENCY PLAN FOR H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT 2, DOCKET NO. 50-261

Our review of the subject submittals has determined that Revision 24 contains changes that appear to decrease the effectiveness of your Emergency Plan, contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q). That regulation specifies that a nuclear power plant licensee shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and that the licensee may make changes to these plans without NRC approval only if the changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans.

The enclosure to this letter delineates the specific areas of change that decrease the effectiveness of your Plan, according to our review and analysis. Both of the changes in question were identified in the Emergency Action Level (EAL) Flowchart, which consists of two pages designated EAL-1 and EAL-2. The changes in question appear in Revision 5 (originally in Revision 4) to the EAL Flowchart, dated January 1, 1993 and issued as part of Revision 24 to your Emergency Plan, which was effective on the same date. As communicated on December 14, 1993 during a telephonic conference involving members of our respective staffs, you must not continue to implement the changes deemed by the NRC to have decreased the effectiveness of your Plan. Please modify your EAL Flowchart to appropriately address the concerns described in the enclosure. We request that these modifications be provided to us in final form within 45 days of the date of this letter.

The significant decreases in the effectiveness of your Plan, engendered by the two changes delineated in the enclosure, raise a concern regarding the adequacy of your review process to assure compliance with 10 CFR 50.54(q). At least one of these changes appears to be readily recognized as causing a decrease in the effectiveness of your Plan. Therefore, you may wish to review the process used to approve Plan changes in order to assure that future changes are thoroughly considered.

IRSC

With respect to Revision 25 of the Emergency Plan, our review has concluded that the changes therein meet the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.

Please be reminded that 10 CFR 50.54(q) requires that proposed changes which decrease the effectiveness of your Emergency Plan shall not be implemented without application to and approval by the Commission. However, changes may be made without Commission approval if such changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the Plan, and the Plan, as changed, continues to meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. If a change is made without approval, you should furnish copies in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q). Also, any changes to the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures should be made in accordance with the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.

Should you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact Mr. Kenneth P. Barr of our staff on 404-331-0335.

Sincerely,

CONTINUE SIGNED BY WILLIAM E. CLINE

William E. Cline, Chief Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

cc w/encl:
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KBarr 12/16/93 HChristensen

ENCLOSURE

CHANGES THAT DECREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE H. B. ROBINSON EMERGENCY PLAN, REVISION 24

1. <u>EAL-1</u>: Security Events (chart location G-8 through G-10)

The EAL-1 Flowchart step previously stating "SECURITY EVENT" was changed to "SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY EVENT DECLARED BY SECURITY." The NRC takes no exception to that particular change, as the terminology is more consistent with the Robinson Security Plan. However, the flowpath logic now required for reaching a General Emergency (GE) declaration for loss of physical control of the facility entails a determination that an "EVENT 11 (HOSTAGE/EXTORTION SITUATION)" is occurring, followed by a conclusion that "CONTROL OF EQUIPMENT IN VITAL AREA [IS] THREATENED." The requirement for an Event 11 to be ongoing before the last-quoted step in the logic path can be reached is unnecessarily and inappropriately restrictive. Other types of security events can be envisioned which do not specifically involve a hostage or extortion, but nevertheless result in a threat to the control of equipment in a vital area. The remainder of the flowpath section addressing security events appears to contain another inappropriately restrictive condition embodied in the logic step that indicates a successful Event 7 must be in progress before a Site Area Emergency would be indicated. The two modifications discussed above decrease the effectiveness of the Plan because it is now less conservative than the previous version of EAL-1 in addressing a situation in which the licensee loses, or is threatened with loss of, physical control of the plant to intruders.

2. <u>EAL-1: Discretionary EAL for General Emergency (chart location H-7)</u>

The licensee completely deleted the logic step that, if answered positively, necessitated an immediate GE declaration: "ANY RADIOLOGICAL CONDITION WARRANTING RECOMMENDATION TO EVACUATE OR SHELTER THE PUBLIC BASED ON SEC/SF JUDGEMENT." This logic step was incorporated originally to address NRC guidance specifying the inclusion of a "discretionary" GE EAL (see GE Example Initiating Condition 4 in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, Revision 1). The licensee's assessment, based on feedback from training and exercises, was that the quoted step was confusing and could be misleading, leaving too much room for interpretation. Although the NRC agrees with the licensee's assessment of the specific wording of the deleted EAL, the appropriate corrective action would have been revision of the wording to more clearly address the intent of the applicable NRC guidance. This change decreases the effectiveness of the Plan because the licensee's emergency classification scheme no longer includes discretionary authority for the Site Emergency Director to declare a GE if plant conditions warrant but do not match any of the other specific GE EALs.