



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report No.: 50-261/92-22

Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
P. O. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602

Docket No.: 50-261

License No.: DPR-23

Facility Name: H. B. Robinson Unit 2

Inspection Conducted: July 18 - August 7, 1992

Lead Inspector: *L. W. Garner* 8/21/92
L. W. Garner, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed

Other Inspectors: C. R. Ogle, Resident Inspector
D. J. Roberts, Project Inspector

Approved by: *H. O. Christensen* 8/21/92
H. O. Christensen, Chief Date Signed
Reactor Projects Section 1A
Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of operational safety verification, maintenance observation, and followup.

Results:

One violation was identified involving failure to follow an annunciator procedure (paragraph 3).

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

- *R. Barnett, Manager, Outages and Modifications
- *C. Baucom, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
- S. Billings, Technical Aide, Regulatory Compliance
- *R. Chambers, Plant General Manager, Robinson Nuclear Project
- B. Clark, Manager, Maintenance
- C. Dietz, Vice President, Robinson Nuclear Project
- *D. Dixon, Manager, Control and Administration
- J. Dobbs, Manager, Nuclear Assessment Department Site Unit
- R. Femal, Shift Supervisor, Operations
- *W. Flanagan, Manager, Operations
- R. Moore, Shift Supervisor, Operations
- *A. Padgett, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control
- M. Page, Manager, Technical Support
- D. Seagle, Shift Supervisor, Operations
- *D. Stadler, Onsite Licensing Engineer, Nuclear Licensing
- W. Stover, Shift Supervisor, Operations
- D. Winters, Shift Supervisor, Operations

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, engineers, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

NRC Managements Visits

J. P. Stohr, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, was on site July 21, 1992, to meet with plant management and tour the facility with the inspectors.

*Attended exit interview on August 11, 1992.

Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.

2. Plant Status

The unit remained at full power operation during the inspection period.

3. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors evaluated licensee activities to confirm that the facility was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements. These activities were confirmed by direct observation, facility tours, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel and management, verification of safety system status, and review of facility records.

To verify equipment operability and compliance with TS, the inspectors reviewed shift logs, Operations' records, data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions. Through work observations and discussions with Operations staff members, the

inspectors verified the staff was knowledgeable of plant conditions, responded properly to alarms (except as discussed below), adhered to procedures and applicable administrative controls, cognizant of in-progress surveillance and maintenance activities, and aware of inoperable equipment status. The inspectors performed channel verifications and reviewed component status and safety-related parameters to verify conformance with TS. Shift changes were observed, verifying that system status continuity was maintained and that proper control room staffing existed. Access to the control room was controlled and operations personnel carried out their assigned duties in an effective manner. Control room demeanor and communications were appropriate.

Plant tours and perimeter walkdowns were conducted to verify equipment operability; assess the general condition of plant equipment; and verify that radiological controls, fire protection controls, physical protection controls, and equipment tagging procedures were properly implemented.

B EDG Jacket Water Temperature Switch Malfunction

On June 30, 1992, the inspectors noted that the B EDG jacket water temperature was 97 degrees F, well below the jacket water heater actuation temperature of 110 degrees F. Additionally, it was noted by the inspectors that despite this low temperature condition, the low jacket water temperature alarm of 105 degrees F had not activated. Subsequent troubleshooting by Operations and Maintenance Department personnel indicated that both the temperature control switch for the jacket water heater (TC-4515B) and the temperature alarm switch (TS-4514B) were out of calibration. The jacket water heater control switch was replaced, and both the control and alarm temperature switches were calibrated. Engineering evaluation 92-011 for the B EDG was conducted to demonstrate that the B EDG remained operable despite this low jacket water temperature condition.

CST High Level Alarm Procedure Not Implemented

On July 23, 1992, the inspectors noted that a condensate storage tank (CST) HI/LO level annunciator was lit on the RTGB due to high CST level (95%). As a result of this observation, the inspector subsequently questioned the makeup water treatment operator as to the level in the CST. Upon noting the high level condition, the makeup water treatment operator secured filling the CST. Discussions between the inspectors, the shift supervisor, makeup water treatment operator and other control room personnel indicated that the makeup water to the CST was throttled, but not stopped as required by alarm procedures. Makeup flow was throttled to allow the temporary truck mounted makeup water treatment system to remain in service verses being shutdown. Alarm procedure E7 of annunciator panel procedure APP-006, S/G & PPS Systems, required that the following action be taken, "If High Level, STOP source of CST makeup water." Subsequent review by the licensee revealed that the control room operator had informed the makeup water treatment operator that a

high level alarm had been received, but failed to inform him of the required action. The failure to follow the procedural requirements of APP-006, (i.e., stop filling the CST on the receipt of a high level alarm) is considered a VIO: Failure To Implement Alarm Procedure When High CST Level Alarm Was Received, 92-22-01.

One violation was identified. Except as noted above, the program area was adequately implemented.

4. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspectors observed safety-related maintenance activities on systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with TS and approved procedures. The inspectors determined that these activities did not violate LCOs and that administrative, testing, and radiological controls were adhered to. In particular, the inspectors observed/reviewed the following maintenance activities:

WR/JO 92-AEE323	A And B EDG Governor Brush Cap Inspection
WR/JO 92-AKTP1	Control Rod Drive Room Temperature Alarm Repair

No violations or deviations were identified. Based on the information obtained during the inspection, the program area was adequately implemented.

5. Followup (92700, 92701, 92702)

(Closed) IFI 90-03-01, Review Containment Spray Header Penetration Isolation Configuration With GDC. A question was raised as whether manual CV spray isolation valves SI-891A and B met the containment isolation boundary requirements of the draft GDCs to which the plant was licensed. Specifically, the inspectors had questioned whether or not CV spray pump discharge check valves SI-890A and B were also part of the CV isolation boundary. In discussions between the licensee and NRR, it was determined that SI-890A and B did not perform a containment isolation function. In a letter to the NRC, dated May 14, 1992, the licensee confirmed this position and committed to change the check valve IST classification to category A/C and provide specific quantitative acceptance criteria for backflow leakage. The inspectors verified that TMM-004, In-Service Inspection Testing, was revised to classify the check valves as category A/C, and EST-058, SI-890 and 890B Check Valve Test, was revised to include a maximum allowable backleakage rate of 3.7 gpm. The actions taken addressed the inspectors questions. This item is considered closed.

No violations or deviations were identified. Based on the information obtained during the inspection, the program area was adequately implemented.

6. Exit Interview (71701)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 10, 1992, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below and in the summary. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

<u>Item Number</u>	<u>Description/Reference Paragraph</u>
92-22-01	VIO - Failure To Implement Alarm Procedure When High CST Level Alarm Was Received (paragraph 3)

7. List of Acronyms and Initialisms

APP	Annunciator Panel Procedure
CST	Condensate Storage Tank
CV	Containment Vessel
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
F	Fahrenheit
GDC	General Design Criteria
gpm	Gallons Per Minute
i.e.	That is
IFI	Inspector Followup Item
IST	Inservice Test
LCO	Limiting Condition for Operation
LVL	Level
NRR	Nuclear Reactor Regulation
PPS	Penetration Pressurization System
RTGB	Reactor Turbine Generator Board
S/G	Steam Generator
SI	Safety Injection
TMM	Technical Support Management Manual
TS	Technical Specification
VIO	Violation
WR/JO	Work Request/Job Order