



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report No.: 50-261/87-05

Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
 P. O. Box 1551
 Raleigh, NC 27602

Docket No.: 50-261

License No.: DPR-23

Facility Name: H. B. Robinson

Inspection Conducted : March 11 - April 10, 1987

Inspectors:	<u>S. J. Vias</u>	<u>5/1/87</u>
	for H. E. P. Krug, Senior Resident Inspector	Date Signed
	<u>S. J. Vias</u>	<u>5/1/87</u>
	R. M. Latta, Resident Inspector	Date Signed
Approved by:	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>5/7/87</u>
	P. E. Fredrickson, Section Chief	Date Signed
	Division of Reactor Projects	

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of Technical Specification (TS) compliance; including observance of any Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO), plant tour, operations performance, reportable occurrences, housekeeping, site security, surveillance activities, maintenance activities, quality assurance practices, radiation control activities, outstanding items review, IE Bulletin and IE Notice followup, organization and administration, independent inspection, Plant Status Report, Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) and enforcement action followup. An Integrated Safety System Functional Inspection (ISSFI) team from Region II conducted an inspection of the electrical power systems during the weeks of March 9-13, 1987 and March 23-27, 1987; and the associated Inspection Report Number is 50-261/87-06.

Certain inspector followup items generated by the team will be reviewed by the resident inspectors for resolution. Where these items are addressed in this report, reference is made to the "ISSFI team."

Results: Inspector Followup Item 50-261/87-05-01, "Thermometer Fragments in Station Vital Batteries," Inspector Followup Item 50-261/87-05-02, "Station Vital Batteries Tilted," Inspector Followup Item 50-261/87-05-03, "EDG Governor Stability," and Inspector Followup Item 50-261/87-05-04, "EDG Run Interval Adequacy."

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Licensee Employees Contacted

R. Barnett, Maintenance Supervisor, Electrical
G. Beatty, Manager, Robinson Nuclear Project Department
J. Benjamin, Supervisor, Operations
R. Chambers, Engineering Supervisor, Performance
D. Crocker, Principal Health Physics Specialist
J. Curley, Director, Regulatory Compliance
J. Eaddy, Supervisor, Environmental and Chemistry
W. Flanagan, Manager, Design Engineering
W. Gainey, Maintenance Supervisor, Mechanical
P. Harding, Project Specialist, Radiation Control
E. Harris, Director, Onsite Nuclear Safety
D. Knight, Shift Foreman, Operations
E. Lee, Shift Foreman, Operations
F. Lowery, Manager, Operations
D. McCaskill, Shift Foreman, Operations
A. McCauley, Principal Specialist, Onsite Nuclear Safety
R. Moore, Shift Foreman, Operations
R. Morgan, Plant General Manager
M. Morrow, Specialist, Emergency Preparedness
D. Nelson, Operating Supervisor
B. Murphy, Senior Instrumentation and Control Engineer
M. Page, Engineering Supervisor, Plant Systems
R. Powell, Principal Specialist, Maintenance
D. Quick, Manager, Maintenance
B. Rieck, Manager, Control and Administration
S. Crocker, Supervisor, Radiation Control
D. Sayre, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
D. Seagle, Shift Foreman, Operations
R. Smith, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control
R. Steele, Shift Foreman, Operations

R. Wallace, Manager, Technical Support
L. Williams, Supervisor, Security
H. Young, Director, Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC)

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, construction personnel, security force members, and office personnel.

2. Exit Interview (30702, 30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 8, 1987, with the Vice President of the Robinson Nuclear Project and the Acting Director of Regulatory Compliance. The licensee acknowledged the findings without exception. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the

materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. No written material was given to the licensee by the Resident Inspectors during this report period.

3. Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Items (92701)

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-261/87-01-01, Fire Barrier Penetrations. This matter identifies inadequacies in a number of electrical and mechanical penetrations in the Auxiliary Building. During a sampling of 350 penetrations, approximately 25 penetrations were found to have less than the required amount of fire retardant material installed. Based upon the results found, the licensee is expanding the scope of the inspections to include 100% of the penetrations. All seals will be repaired as necessary and the penetrations returned to operable status within the 7-day limit specified in TS 3.14.7.2c. Also, during those periods of time when the seals are inoperable, verification of fire detection system operability within the one hour constraint as required by TS 3.14.7.2a was performed. This TS insures that prompt detection capability exists in the vicinity of the penetration barrier. Should an area detection system be inoperable, a continuous fire watch would be established within one hour as required by TS 3.14.7.2b, to provide the required protection until the seal is restored to operable status.

During the inspection, the following penetrations that had been repaired were examined by the inspector to verify compliance with Corrective Maintenance procedure CM-621, Revision 4, December 30, 1986, "Structural, Mechanical and Electrical Penetration Fire Barriers." The penetrations were all in Fire Zone 21, Rod Control Room:

<u>Penetration</u>	<u>Work Request Package</u>
FT 3927	--
CP 3921	WR-87-ANDT1
EP 4051	WR-87-ADNU1
FT 4052	--
FT 4025	--
EP 3925 FL	WR-87-ADQB1

Work Request WR-87-AEKU1 was reviewed and the following two penetrations from this package, were observed by the inspector during actual modification: EP 4053.02, a 1" diameter conduit; and EP 4052.05, a 2" diameter conduit. This item is closed.

4. Plant Tour (71707, 62703, 71710)

The inspectors conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions and maintenance activities, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate. The inspectors determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, excess equipment or material was stored

properly, and combustible material was disposed of expeditiously. During tours, the inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint abnormal settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment clearance tags and component status, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates. Some tours were conducted on backshifts. Plant housekeeping and contamination control were observed to be excellent.

The inspectors performed system status checks on the following systems:

- a. Safety Injection System
- b. Component Cooling Water System
- c. Vital Station Batteries
- d. Electrical Switchgear
- e. Chemical and Volume Control System
- f. Emergency Diesel Generators
- g. Dedicated Shutdown System

While touring the station vital battery room, the inspectors noted that there were broken fragments of glass thermometers laying in three of the station batteries; specifically battery numbers A-54, A-55, and B-37. The presence of these broken thermometer fragments was brought to the attention of the licensee who stated that the battery manufacturer had been contacted and that the determination was made that the batteries could be severely damaged by the retrieval process and that the presence of these fragments would not affect the operation or reliability of the batteries. Documentation of the communications between the licensee and the battery supplier concerning this issue was not available for review by the inspectors. This item is identified as an inspector followup item.

Inspector Followup Item 50-261/87-05-01: "Thermometer Fragments in Station Vital Batteries."

The ISSFI team also determined that the station vital battery racks are not level. Both the "A" and the "B" battery racks tilt forward producing an approximate 3/8 inch difference in the electrolyte between the front and the back of the batteries. This condition could conceivably result in inadvertently uncovering the battery plates at the back of the batteries. The ISSFI team also observed that procedural credit is taken from electrolyte level during the daily conduct of MST-902 "Battery Test - Daily, 5 Days Per Week" (Revision 7). The electrolyte level is recorded for each battery plus or minus 1/16 inch and is factored into a formula for determining the corrected specific gravity of the batteries. The level error introduced by the tilt on the battery racks could affect the computation of the corrected specific gravity. Until the licensee corrects tilt on the vital station battery racks, this is identified as an inspector followup item.

Inspector Followup Item 50-261/87-05-02: "Station Vital Battery Racks Tilted".

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

5. Technical Specification Compliance (71707, 62703, 61726)

During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with selected limiting conditions for operation and reviewed results of certain surveillance and maintenance activities. These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, and review of completed logs and records.

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

6. Plant Operations Review (71707, 62703, 61726, 61707)

Periodically during the inspection interval, the inspectors reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions. This review included control room logs, maintenance work requests, auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs, and equipment tagout records. The inspectors routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during shift changes and plant tours. The inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections during the reporting interval to assure that operations and security were maintained in accordance with plant procedures.

The inspectors periodically verified the reactor shutdown margin. The inspectors also periodically observed the reactor axial flux difference and compared the observed values with those required by the TS.

As reported by the licensee, the maximum permissible concentrations (MPC) of Iodine in the containment following cooldown and depressurization were higher than previously observed during outages because of recent fuel leakage. This condition necessitated extended containment purging prior to the initiation of refueling activities. The inspectors discussed this issue with the licensee and examined the analytical methods used to calculate MPC and the Iodine source terms used for resolution of isotopic components. The inspectors determined that the elevated airborne activity in the containment was attributed to I-131 and I-133 as evidenced by samples taken from the R-11 and R-12 detectors and that the method used to calculate MPC appeared adequate. The exact source of the leakage leading to the elevated airborne activity in the containment is currently under investigation; however, by April 2, 1987, the levels were reduced to the point where personnel respirators were not required for containment entry.

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

7. Physical Protection (71707)

In the course of the monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The inspectors verified by general observation, perimeter walkdowns and interviews that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current

requirements. The inspectors routinely observed the alertness and demeanor of security force personnel during plant tours. The inspectors visited the central and secondary alarm stations.

The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory posts. In addition, the inspectors observed protected area lighting, protected and vital areas barrier integrity and verified an interface between the security organization and operations. The inspectors also inspected security measures related to plant outage activities.

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

8. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726, 61700, 71710)

The inspectors observed portions of selected surveillance tests including all aspects of one major surveillance test involving safety-related systems. The inspectors determined that the surveillance test procedure conformed to TS requirements, that all precautions and LCOs were met and that the surveillance test was completed at the required frequency. The inspectors also verified that the required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the test, that the testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved test procedure and that the required test instrumentation was properly calibrated.

The inspectors witnessed the execution of the operability test of the emergency diesel as it was performed on the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) on March 23, 1987. This test was conducted using Operations Surveillance Test Procedure OST-401 (Revision 8) titled "Emergency Diesels - Weekly."

OST-401 is designed to verify the mechanical performance and operational readiness of the emergency diesels; and that the requirements of TS 4.6.1.1 and 4.6.1.4 are satisfied. With respect to tests and surveillances which are performed as stated, TS 4.6.1.1 requires a:

"Manually-initiated start of the diesel generator, followed by manual synchronization with other power sources and assumption of load by the diesel generator up to the nameplate rating. Normal plant operation will not be affected."

TS 4.6.1.4 requires that:

"Diesel generator electric loads shall not be increased beyond the long term rating of 2500 kw."

The inspectors noted that although the TS requires that this test be performed on a monthly basis, the licensee performs the test weekly in accordance with a vendor recommendation. As part of the test, the operator verified the operation of the redundant solenoid valves on the "A" diesel prior to the engine start. The "A" diesel generator successfully completed the test requirements.

Upon completion of the testing, the inspectors observed that the recorded test data was accurate and complete, and independently verified that the system was properly returned to service.

During the conduct of this surveillance, the inspectors verified a finding of the ISSFI team, that the diesel generator output dropped from the nominal value of 2500 kw to approximately 2300 kw and that to maintain the desired load constant, operator adjustment was required. Also during this inspection period, the "B" EDG experienced operational problems with high crankcase pressure, a noisy scavaging air blower, which required replacement of the blower unit, and multiple leaks in the lube oil heat exchanger. The operational problems are identified as an inspector followup item.

Inspector Followup Item 50-261/87-05-03: "EDG Governor Stability."

As a result of the above mentioned operational difficulties, the "B" EDG was declared inoperable twice during this reporting period. During these periods of inoperability, the "A" EDG was run daily in accordance with OST-401 and OWP-DG2 to satisfy TS 3.7.2.d which states:

"Power operation may continue for seven days if one diesel generator is inoperable provided the remaining diesel generator is tested daily to ensure operability and the engineered safety features associated with this diesel generator shall be operable."

The ISSFI team noted that OWP-DG2 specifies a thirty minute run to satisfy TS 3.7.2.d; whereas, OST-401 specifies a sixty minute run, for scheduled surveillance. The adequacy of a thirty minute run to satisfy TS 3.7.2.d is identified as an inspector followup item.

Inspector Followup Item 50-261/87-05-04: "EDG Run Interval Adequacy."

9. Monthly Maintenance Observation and Maintenance Program Evaluation
(62703, 62700, 62704, 62705, 56700)

The inspectors observed several maintenance related activities of safety-related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, TS and appropriate industry codes and standards. The inspectors determined that these activities were not violating LCO's and that redundant components were operable. The inspectors also determined (1) that the procedures used were

adequate to control the activity, (2) that QC hold points were established where required, (3) that required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to work initiation, (4) that proper radiological, and appropriate ignition and fire prevention controls were implemented, and (5) that replacement parts and materials used were properly certified. The inspectors verified that these activities were accomplished by qualified personnel using approved procedures. The inspectors independently verified that equipment was properly tested before being returned to service.

In particular, the inspectors witnessed the replacement of the one-quarter inch pipe fitting on the scavenger air ejector orifice line of the "B" EDG. Replacement of this air ejector was precipitated by a mechanical failure of the fitting discovered during inspection and trouble shooting of the "B" EDG following a diesel trip on hi crankcase pressure on March 25, 1987. This work was accomplished in accordance with Work Request WR/JO 87-ADUZ1. The inspectors verified the clearance tag and procedure used to isolate the "B" EDG including starting air valve isolation at the diesel and the red cap clearance tag on the "B" diesel start switch on the reactor turbine generator board.

Along with the ISSFI team, the inspectors witnessed the replacement of the scavaging air blower on the "B" EDG which suffered some lobe damage during trouble shooting efforts to determine the cause of the high crankcase pressure on the "B" EDG. The apparent cause of the damage of the scavaging air blower was due to differential thermal expansion of the lobes and the housing. The removal of the existing blower assembly and its replacement with a factory rebuilt unit was accomplished under the auspices of Work Request WR/JO 86-AMAE1 and was completed on March 13, 1987. During this corrective maintenance effort, the inspectors visually inspected the air intake and exhaust elbows as well as the intercooler and turbocharger inlet elbows for debris and evidence of damage. Following the installation of the replacement scavaging air blower, the "B" EDG was restarted and was observed to trip on high crankcase pressure on March 25, 1987.

Subsequent to the replacement of the "B" diesel scavaging air blower, the inspectors witnessed the disassembly, inspection, and replacement of defective parts and reassembly of the "B" EDG in accordance with Work Request WR/JO 87-ADKE1. This work included an inspection of visible portions of cylinder liners, pistons, assembly alignment, bolts and cotter pins; and an inspection of the crankcase sump for debris and foreign objects. These repair efforts were directed at identifying the source of crankcase pressurization which was felt to emanate from a crack in one of the pistons. Upon disassembly and inspection, no cracks were discovered in any of the removed pistons or cylinder liners. Based on these findings and the recommendation of the diesel manufacturers technical representatives, the lube oil cooler was hydrostatically tested for leaks. This hydrostatic test of the lube oil heat exchanger revealed numerous defects in the heat exchanger tubes. The inspectors witnessed the tube plugging efforts of the licensee and the subsequent replacement of the old tube nest with a new one.

Adequacy of work controls and maintenance program activities relating to the "B" EDG repair and maintenance activities will be addressed in the ISSFI team report.

10. Operational Safety Verification (71707, 82301)

The inspectors observed licensee activities to ascertain that the facility was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements, and that the licensee management control system was effectively discharging its responsibilities for continued safe operation by direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee management and personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation, and reviewing facility records.

While the EDG's are cool, the lubricating oil temperature gauge on the engine operating pedestal typically reads approximately 90 degrees F; which is below the vendor's minimum engine oil operating temperature of 115 degrees F, as identified in the engine technical manual. After questioning by the inspectors, the licensee verified that (1) the gauge in question should not be used except during engine operation since the tubing leading to the gauge constitutes a stagnant leg which cools during shutdown (2) the engine "keep warm" system maintains the temperature of the lube oil in the sump at about 120 degrees F, and (3) that an alarm occurs in the control room should the temperature of the lube oil in the sump drop below 115 degrees F.

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

11. ESF System Walkdown and Monthly Surveillance Observation (71710, 61726, 56700)

The inspectors verified the operability of an engineered safety features system by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) system. The inspectors confirmed that the licensee's system lineup procedures matched plant drawings and the as-built configuration. The inspectors looked for equipment conditions and items that might degrade performance (hangers and supports were operable, housekeeping, etc.) and inspected the interiors of electrical and instrumentation cabinets for debris, loose material, jumpers, evidence of rodents, etc. The inspectors verified that valves were in proper position, power was available, and valves were locked as appropriate. The inspectors compared both local and remote position indications.

Specifically, the inspectors walked down the "B" EDG using Flow Diagram "Emergency Diesel Generator", G-190204-A, Revision 5, and verified that valves in the system: were installed correctly, that they did not exhibit excessive packing leakage, that there were no bent stems or missing hand wheels, or improper labeling. The inspectors also determined that major components were properly labeled and that the coatings appeared adequate,

that no prohibited ignition sources or flammable materials were present in the vicinity of the EDG and that when the associated fire doors were inoperable, during maintenance, a continuous fire watch was posted. The inspectors also verified that required support systems such as starting air and fuel oil were operational and that the circuit breakers and remote indications on the reactor turbine generator control board were correct.

The ISSFI team did note certain discrepancies such as improper thread engagement on the jacket water, lube oil, and after coolant heat exchangers and that flow orifices on the EDG were not labeled.

On April 7, 1987, the inspectors witnessed the conduct of Special Procedure SP-750 which was performed in conjunction with the scheduled performance of Operations Surveillance Test Procedure OST-401 "Emergency Diesels". The purpose of this special test was to determine if the governor on the "A" EDG would control the diesel generator speed (at constant generator load) such that the generator frequency would not vary more than ± 2 HZ from the nominal value of 60 HZ.

The inspectors observed the "A" EDG frequency and electrical load for the duration of the test and noted that the load remained constant at 400 kw and that the frequency was maintained at 60.0 HZ without any operator adjustment while separated from the grid. The licensee conducted this test to demonstrate the capability of the "A" EDG to carry dedicated loads; i.e., loads not being carried in parallel operation on the grid. The inspectors did note a slight increase in the generator frequency of 0.1 HZ during the last four minutes of the test. However, this minimal variation was determined to be within the stated acceptance criteria of paragraph 5.5 of the subject test procedure and the test was concluded at 10:15 p.m. The stability of the "A" EDG while loaded has been identified as Inspector Followup Item 50-261/87-05-03 in paragraph 8.

Beginning at about 11:00 p.m. on April 1, 1987, the inspectors observed licensee activities associated with the execution of operations surveillance test procedure OST-163 (Revision 5) titled "Operations Surveillance Test Procedure, Safety Injection Test (Refueling)." Prior to the test, the test director conducted a briefing of what was to be accomplished, by whom, and answered questions raised by the test personnel.

At 3:50 a.m. on April 2, 1987, OST-163 (Revision 5) was properly executed and demonstrated the features described in subsequent paragraphs.

The test demonstrated the automatic start of both emergency diesel generators and operation of emergency safety features systems initiated by a manual safety injection signal. The test verified that the safety injection sequence had the proper timing. The test also demonstrated the operability of the Containment Isolation and Ventilation Isolation Systems.

Beginning at about 5:00 a.m. on April 2, 1987, the inspectors observed licensee activities associated with the execution of Operations Surveillance Test Procedure OST-162 (Revision 5), titled "Emergency Diesel Generator Auto Start on Loss of Power and Safety Injection - Emergency Diesel Trips Defeat (Refueling)". Prior to the test, the test director conducted a detailed briefing of what was to be accomplished, by whom, and answered questions raised by the test personnel. If needed, offsite power was quickly available via the auxiliary transformer.

At 6:30 a.m. on April 2, 1987, OST-162 was properly executed and demonstrated the features described in subsequent paragraphs.

Following initiation by a loss of power to the vital buses in conjunction with a manual actuation, both diesels automatically started and load shedding and restoration of operation of the required equipment occurred.

The diesels assumed the required load within 50 seconds after the initial starting signal. As designed, while in the "trips defeat" position, the test demonstrated that the diesel protective trip devices would not trip the diesels.

The operability of the manual block/unblock safety switches on the reactor control board was satisfactorily demonstrated, as was the operability of the emergency power supply to the pressurizer heaters.

The test was performed by qualified personnel using an approved procedure and was excellent in every respect observed.

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

12. Onsite Followup of Events and Subsequent Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities (92700, 90714, 93702)

For onsite followup of nonroutine events, the inspectors determined that the licensee had taken corrective actions as stated in written reports of the events and that these responses to the events were appropriate and met regulatory requirements, license conditions, and commitments. During this reporting period, the inspectors reviewed certain LERs to verify that the report details met license requirements, identified the cause of the event, described appropriate corrective actions, adequately assessed the event, and addressed any generic implications. This inspection effort continues.

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

13. Organization and Administration (36700)

The inspectors reviewed the on-site licensee organization to ascertain whether changes made to the licensee's onsite organization are in conformance with the requirements of the TS by verifying that (1) the established organization is as described in the TS and is functioning effectively,

(2) personnel qualification levels are in conformance with applicable codes and standards, and (3) the lines of authority and responsibility are in conformance with TS and applicable codes and standards. The inspectors also reviewed appropriate licensee records to ascertain whether the licensee's use of overtime is in conformance with regulatory requirements and that any deviations from maximum overtime limits were authorized in accordance with TS and/or plant administrative procedures.

Comprehensive discussions of current safety-related activities were conducted with plant management and technical personnel during this reporting period including, and in particular, the 1987 Outage Organization, Operations, Environmental and Radiation Controls, Quality Assurance, Regulatory Compliance and Onsite Nuclear Safety organizations. Topics discussed included licensee activities associated with plant operations activities, plant modifications, the fire protection system, ongoing construction activities, and communications interfaces.

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

14. Onsite Review Committee (40700)

The inspectors reviewed certain activities of the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee (PNSC) to ascertain whether the onsite review functions were conducted in accordance with TS and other regulatory requirements. The inspectors (1) attended the regular monthly PNSC meeting held on April 3, 1987, and observed the conduct of the meeting, (2) ascertained that provisions of the TS dealing with membership, review process, frequency, qualifications, etc., were satisfied, and (3) reviewed meeting minutes to confirm that decisions and recommendations were accurately reflected in the minutes, and (4) followed up on previously identified PNSC activities to independently confirm that corrective actions were progressing satisfactorily.

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

15. Followup on Headquarters Requests (92704)

The inspectors continued to participate in coordination activities associated with an equipment qualification team inspection scheduled to occur during the week of May 4, 1986.

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

16. Review of Periodic and Special Reports (90713)

Region based inspectors reviewed the Semi-Annual Effluent Report for January-June 1986, against the criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.21, Measuring, Evaluating, and Reporting Radioactivity in Solid Wastes and Releases of Radioactive Material in Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants, and applicable regulatory requirements.

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.