UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report No.: 50-261/86-28

Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
P. O. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602

Docket No.: 50-261 License No.: DPR-23

Facility Name: H. B. Robinson

Inspection Conducted: October 11 - November 10, 1986

Inspectors: P. S. Mell 12/1/86
H. E. P. Krug, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed

P. S. Mell 12/1/86
R. M. Latta, Resident Inspector Date Signed

Approved by: P. E. Fredrickson 12/4/86
P. E. Fredrickson, Section Chief Date Signed
Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of Technical Specification (TS) compliance, plant tour, operations performance, reportable occurrences, housekeeping, site security, surveillance activities, maintenance activities, quality assurance practices, radiation control activities, outstanding items review, IE Bulletin and IE Notice followup, organization and administration, independent inspection, Plant Status Report, Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) and enforcement action followup.

Results: Violation 50-261/86-28-05, "Failure to follow procedures, AOP-010 and MST-014," paragraphs 4 and 14. Unresolved Item 50-261/86-28-06, "Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Operators," paragraph 18. Inspector Followup Item 50-261/86-28-01, "DS bus feeder breaker DS-632 not replaced," paragraph 4. Inspector Followup Item 50-261/86-28-02, "Acoustic Monitor Preamplifiers," paragraph 4. Inspector Followup Item 50-261/86-28-03, "Adequacy of RCS vent path," paragraph 4. Inspector Followup Item 50-261/86-28-04, "Modification of AOP-002," paragraph 4.

REPORT DETAILS

1. Licensee Employees Contacted

R. Barnett, Maintenance Supervisor, Electrical
G. Beatty, Manager, Robinson Nuclear Project Department
A. Beckman, Principal Specialist, Planning and Scheduling
J. Benjamin, Supervisor, Operations
R. Chambers, Engineering Supervisor, Performance
D. Crocker, Principal Health Physics Specialist
J. Curley, Director, Regulatory Compliance
J. Eaddy, E&C Supervisor
W. Flanagan, Manager, Design Engineering
W. Gainey, Maintenance Supervisor, Mechanical
P. Harding, Project Specialist (Acting), Radiation Control
E. Harris, Director, Onsite Nuclear Safety
D. Knight, Shift Foreman, Operations
E. Lee, Shift Foreman, Operations
F. Lowery, Manager, Operations
M. Marquick, Senior Specialist, Planning and Scheduling
D. McCaskill, Shift Foreman, Operations
A. McCauley, Principal Specialist, Onsite Nuclear Safety
R. Moore, Shift Foreman, Operations
R. Morgan, Plant General Manager
M. Morrow, Specialist, Emergency Preparedness
D. Nelson, Operating Supervisor
B. Murphy, Senior Instrumentation and Control Engineer
M. Page, Engineering Supervisor, Plant Systems
R. Powell, Principal Specialist, Maintenance
D. Quick, Manager, Maintenance
B. Rieck, Manager, Control and Administration
W. Ritchie, Supervisor (Acting), Radiation Control
D. Sayre, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
D. Seagle, Shift Foreman, Operations
R. Smith, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control
R. Steele, Shift Foreman, Operations
R. Wallace, Manager, Technical Support
L. Williams, Supervisor, Security
H. Young, Director, Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC)

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, construction personnel, security force members, and office personnel.

2. Exit Interview (30702,30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 7, 1986, with the Vice President of the Robinson Nuclear Project, the Acting Director of Regulatory Compliance, and the Director of Quality Assurance. A violation described in paragraphs 4 and 14 was discussed in detail. The licensee acknowledged the findings without exception. The licensee did not identify

as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. No written material was given to the licensee by the Resident Inspectors during this report period.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

(Closed) Violation 50-261/83-12-01: The inspectors reviewed the licensee's System Description, SD-16 (Revision 20) titled, "Electrical System" and determined that it has been revised to include all the deficiencies identified. This item is closed.

4. Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Items (92701)

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-261/83-32-08: The inspectors reviewed applicable sections of the H. B. Robinson Long Term Improvement Program addressing Section XV, Task 2, TS Required Surveillance Items. Within this area, the inspectors determined that the Onsite Nuclear Safety Unit had reviewed the Fire Protection periodic test requirements including preliminary as-built drawings. This review disclosed that both the necessary procedural changes and drawing corrections have been implemented. This item is closed.

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-261/83-15-10: The inspectors reviewed the contents of the completed turnover and closeout package for Modification 445X and determined that the required rewiring of selected actuation and alarm circuits in the fire detection and actuating system was completed. This item is closed.

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-261/83-15-09: The inspectors reviewed Work Request and Authorization Form 5175-BUM and determined that Westinghouse approved replacement undervoltage devices on DS breakers for the following loads were installed and tested: the "D" Service Water pump, the "A" Component Cooling Water Pump, the RHR Pumps and the "A" Charging Pump. The undervoltage device on the DS Bus Feeder Breaker, DS-632, was not replaced. However, the licensee has scheduled replacement when parts become available. The inspector determined that this item is being tracked internally by the licensee. This item is closed.

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-261/84-26-01: This item concerns discrepancies identified during a system walkdown of the Safety Injection System. The inspectors reviewed the following licensee documentation: Flow Diagram 5379-685, Revision 20; "Chemical and Volume Control System Purification and Makeup", Sheet 3; Flow Diagram 5379-1082, Revision 23; "Safety Injection System", Sheet 2; OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS), Revision 13; and Modification 888," In-site Abandonment of BIT." The inspectors determined that the corrective action taken by the licensee to rectify the identified discrepancies in system drawings, valve identification and plant procedures appeared adequate. This item is closed.

The inspector reviewed 10 CFR 21 Notification 84-01. This item concerns the 10 CFR 21 report by the licensee of defective reactor protection test switches, purchased for use in the protection/safeguard circuitry, which failed to pass installation continuity checks. The licensee verified the operability of the remaining test switches prior to installation, reviewed interim test methods, and temporarily increased the surveillance testing of these switches. The licensee also sent a representative to the vendor's plant and determined that the production process which caused the defect in the test switches was no longer employed and that the defective switches appeared to be an isolated case. As stated by the licensee, there have been no subsequent failures of these test switches, other than replacement due to normal wear. The inspectors determined that these test switches are being tracked on the licensee's trend evaluation program. The corrective measures taken by the licensee appear to be adequate.

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-261/84-03-02: This item concerns the adequacy of the cross sectional area in the reactor coolant system (RCS) vent path to containment that is established prior to disarming the low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP) system. The inspectors determined that the licensee has initiated action to modify General Procedure GP-007, "Plant Cooldown From Hot Shutdown to Cold Shutdown" and GP-001, "Fill and Vent of the Reactor Coolant System". The changes to these procedures will provide adequate venting of the RCS prior to disarming the LTOP system by opening a PROV and its associated block valve. The subject procedural changes are being tracked on the licensee's regulatory action item and are scheduled to be completed during the next report period. This item is closed.

(CLosed) Inspector Followup Item 50-261/83-15-16: This item concerned the acoustic monitors installed downstream of the pressurizer safety relief valves. The inspectors reviewed the completed Work Request and Authorization form ENG-737, and Engineering Evaluation No. ENG-83-76, and determined that the replacement of cable splices to the acoustic monitors with approved splices and cable sleeving appeared adequate. The pre-amplifiers associated with the acoustic monitors, which are mounted on the outside of the pressurizer cubical, have not been qualified. As stated by the licensee, Mod 876 is designed to install instulated enclosures which protect the pre-amplifiers from LOCA conditions within the containment following a design basis earthquake. The inspectors determined that the installation of seismically and environmen-tally qualified enclosures for the subject pre-amplifiers is in agreement with the licensee's implementation commitments to Regulatory Guide 1.97 as documented in CP&L letter serial: NLS-86-257, from Mr. A. B. Cutter, to: Mr. L. S. Rubenstein, dated July 28, 1986.

(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-261/86-26-03, concerned the use of emergency boration in an attempt to stabilize reactor power subsequent to a reduction in feedwater flow initiated by the tripping of the heater drain pumps.

Further evaluation by the inspectors disclosed that Abnormal Operating Procedure AOP-010 (Revision 1), "Inadequate Feedwater Flow" directly

addresses the evolution since Symptom 1.3 is a "Loss of Heater Drain Pump". Also, Step 3.1.3 states "VERIFY Tavg AND Reactor Power are being maintained automatically OR manually INSERT Control Rods to maintain Reactor Power AND Tavg. " AOP-010 does not identify the use of emergency boration to stabilize power; nor, according to the licensee, does the licensee's training program teach the use of emergency boration to stabilize power subsequent to the loss of one or both heater drain pumps. Finally, the symptoms section of AOP-002 (Revision 1), "Emergency Boration", does not authorize entry into AOP-002 for loss of heater drain pumps or reduction in feedwater flow. The failure to implement AOP-010 to stabilize reactor power subsequent to the loss of the heater drain pumps, and resulting in a reactor trip as a consequence of overboration of the primary system, is identified as an example of violation 50-261/86-28-05: "Failure to follow procedures; AOP-010 and MST-014." See also paragraph 14 of this report for an additional example of this violation.

5. Plant Tour (71707, 62703, 71710)

The inspectors conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions and maintenance activities, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate. The inspectors determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, excess equipment or material was stored properly, and combustible material was disposed of expeditiously. During tours the inspector looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint abnormal settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment clearance tags and component status, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates. Some tours were conducted on backshifts. Plant housekeeping and contamination control were observed to be outstanding.

The inspectors performed system status checks on the following systems:

a. Safety Injection System
b. Component Cooling Water System
c. Auxiliary Feedwater System
d. Vital Station Batteries
e. Electrical Switchgear
f. Chemical and Volume Control System
g. Residual Heat Removal System
h. Emergency Diesel Generators

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

6. Technical Specification Compliance (71707, 62703, 61726)

During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with selected limiting conditions for operation and reviewed results of certain surveillance and maintenance activities. These verifications were

accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, and review of completed logs and records.

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

7. Plant Operations Review (71707, 62703, 61726, 61707, 61711)

Periodically during the inspection interval, the inspectors reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions. This review included control room logs, maintenance work requests, auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs, and equipment tagout records. The inspectors routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during shift changes and plant tours. The inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections during the reporting interval to assure that operations and security were maintained in accordance with plant procedures.

The inspectors periodically verified the reactor shutdown margin. The inspectors also periodically observed the reactor axial flux difference and compared the observed valves with those required by the TS.

While the inspectors were in the control room at 6:08 a.m., on October 30, 1986, they witnessed the response of the fire brigade to an unannounced fire drill. The simulated fire was located near the "B" instrument air compressor in the auxiliary room. The inspectors witnessed the response of the fire brigade team leader (senior reactor operator on duty) as well as the actions of other plant personnel who were utilizing Fire Protection Procedure FP-001 (Revision 10) titled "Fire Emergency".

The inspectors observed the control room verification of the operation of the motor driven fire pump as well as the donning of full turn-out gear and self-contained breathing apparatus by all fire brigade members, and the access control of the radiologically controlled area by security personnel.

The inspectors noted that the fire brigade personnel responded quickly to the alarm and exhibited good fire fighting techniques throughout the drill.

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

8. Physical Protection (71707)

In the course of the monthly activities, the Resident Inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The inspectors verified by general observation, perimeter walkdowns and interviews that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirements. The inspectors routinely observed the alertness and demeanor of security force personnel during plant tours.

The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and

retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory actions. In addition, the Resident Inspectors observed protected area lighting, protected and vital areas barrier integrity, and verified an interface between the security organization and operations or maintenance.

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

9. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726, 61700, 71710)

The inspectors observed certain surveillance related activities of safety-related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with license requirements. The inspectors observed portions of selected surveillance tests including all aspects of one major surveillance test involving safety-related systems. The inspectors determined that the surveillance test procedure conformed to TS requirements, that all precautions and Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCOs) were met and that the surveillance test was completed at the required frequency. The inspectors also verified that the required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the test, that the testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved test procedure and that the required test instrumentation was properly calibrated. Upon completion of the testing, the inspectors observed that the recorded test data was accurate, complete and met TS requirements; verified that test discrepancies were properly rectified; and, independently verified that the systems were properly returned to service.

In particular, the inspectors witnessed the conduct of Maintenance Surveillance Test MST-007 (Revision 4) titled "Reactor Coolant Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection System Test". The purpose of this test is to determine the operability of the overpressure protection system channels and to meet the TS requirements of Table 4.1-1, Item 31.

The inspectors witnessed the comprehensive briefing and procedural review of test requirements by both operations and I&C personnel prior to commencing this surveillance test. During the execution of this test, the inspectors noted that all prerequisites and precautions were observed by the personnel involved, including the limitation that only one protection channel set be tested at any given time. The inspectors witnessed the redundant verification of the key switch position for the RTGB permissive controlling the PORVs by both the control operator and the I&C technician involved, and verified that the test equipment utilized was properly calibrated and controlled.

The inspectors observed the return to service of both trains of the reactor coolant low-temperature overpressure protection system.

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

10. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspectors observed the conduct of maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, TS and appropriate industry codes and standards. The inspectors determined that these activities were not violating Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCOs) and that redundant components were operable. The inspectors also determined: (1) that the procedures used were adequate to control the activity, (2) that required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to work initiation, (3) that proper radiological, ignition and fire prevention controls were implemented, and (4) that replacement parts and materials used were properly certified. The inspectors verified that these activities were accomplished by qualified personnel using approved procedures. The inspectors independently verified that equipment was properly tested before being returned to service.

The inspectors witnessed the replacement of isolation valve MS-161 and the associated "Y" strainer on the supply line to the Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump drain on October 16, 1986. This safety related maintenance activity was necessitated by a through wall defect in the "Y" strainer.

Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the controlling Work Request and Authorization Form, with its attached welding instructions and weld sketch, Engineering Evaluation, Weld Data Report and Welding and Brazing Material Control Record. The inspectors examined the Q-Listed material records and reviewed the system tag-out forms.

The inspectors determined that the station welding procedures, cleanliness controls, QC hold points; and the design, fabrication, and installation documents and records used during this safety-related repair activity appeared adequate.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed several outstanding job orders to determine that the licensee was giving priority to safety-related maintenance and that a backlog which might affect its performance was not developing on a given system.

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

11. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors observed licensee activities to ascertain that the facility was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements, and that the licensee management control system was effectively discharging its responsibilities for continued safe operation by direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee management and personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation, and reviewing facility records.

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

12. ESF System Walkdown and Monthly Surveillance Observation (71710, 61726, 56700)

The inspectors verified the operability of an engineered safety features system by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system as prescribed in Operations Surveillance Test Procedure OST-251 (Revision 10) titled "RHR Component Test (Monthly)". The purpose of this surveillance test is to verify the mechanical performance and assess the operational readiness of components in the RHR system to fulfill their required safety functions. The inspectors confirmed that the licensee's system lineup procedures matched plant drawings and the as-built configuration. The inspectors looked for equipment conditions and items that might degrade performance (hangers and supports were operable, housekeeping, etc.) and inspected the interiors of electrical and instrumentation cabinets for debris, loose material, jumpers, evidence of rodents, etc. The inspectors verified that valves were in their proper positions, power was available, and valves were locked as required. The inspectors compared both local and remote position indications.

The inspectors determined that OST-251 conformed to TS requirements, that all precautions and LCOs were met and that OST-251 was completed at the required frequency. The inspectors also verified that the required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the test, that the testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved test procedure and that the required test instrumentation was properly calibrated.

In particular, the inspectors witnessed the verification of proper oil levels in each of the RHR pumps tested, the starting and running of both the "A" and the "B" RHR pumps, the recording of pump discharge and differential pressures, and the recording of pump vibration amplitudes. Upon completion of the testing, the inspectors observed that the recorded test data was accurate, complete and met TS requirements; and, independently verified that the systems were properly returned to service.

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

13. Onsite Followup of Events and Subsequent Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities (92700, 90714, 93702)

For onsite followup of nonroutine events, the inspectors determined that the licensee had taken corrective actions as stated in written reports of the events and that these responses to the events were appropriate and met regulatory requirements, license conditions, and commitments. During this reporting period, the inspectors reviewed the following LERs to verify that the report details met license requirements, identified the cause of the event, described appropriate corrective actions, adequately assessed the event, and addressed any generic implications. When licensee identified

violations were noted, they were reviewed in accordance with enforcement policy. The inspectors had no further comments.

LER	EVENT
85-23	TS Required Test Discrepancy in Feed Flow/Steam Flow Mismatch Comparitor
86-13	Reactor Trip on Low Steam Generator Level

(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-261/85-OL-01: The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures: AOP-002 (Revision 1) titled "Emergency Boration", and FRP-S.1 (Revision 0) titled "Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS". The inspectors also discussed the issue of the apparently incomplete information in the subject procedures relative to an ATWS. The inspectors determined that the licensee has initiated corrective measures to assess AOP-002. This item is closed.

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

14. Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Power Reactors (93702)

On September 10, 1986, at 8:57 a.m., and while the reactor was operating at 99.5% power, an automatic reactor trip occurred as a result of a low water level coincident with steam flow greater than feed flow in "B" steam generator (S/G).

At the time of the trip, two instrumentation and control (I&C) technicians and a licensed control operator (CO) were performing MST-014 "Steam Generator Pressure Protection Channel Testing" for "B" S/G. It is noted that there are two steam flow channels, 484 and 485, which are selected on the Reactor Turbine Generator Board (RTGB) during this surveillance test. One channel is compared to the selected S/G feed flow to produce a flow error signal for S/G level control. Channel 484 is tested first by the procedure. In order to preclude an input of an erroneous low steam flow test signal into the S/G level control circuit, the non-tested channel (in this case, channel 485) is selected from the RTGB. At this point in the procedure, the CO failed to put the "B" S/G Steam Flow Channel Selector Switch in the 485 position from the 484 position as required by Step 7.6.5 of MST-014, thus leaving the switch in the incorrect 484 position; also, the I&C technician did not verify that position 484 was no longer controlling steam flow. When placed in the test position, channel 484 indicated low steam flow resulting in the closure of the "B" feedwater regulating valve. Water level in the "B" S/G dropped to the low level position. Since flow transmitter 485 was still providing a full power steam flow input to the protection channel for S/G "B", a reactor trip occurred on low water level coincident with steam flow greater than feed flow on "B" S/G. Thus, the trip was a result of a failure to properly execute, and to verify the proper execution of, procedure MST-014.

This failure to follow procedures is identified as an additional example of Violation 50-261/86-28-05, described in paragraph 4.

15. Organization and Administration (36700)

The inspectors reviewed the on-site licensee organization to ascertain whether changes made to the licensee's onsite organization are in conformance with the requirements of the TS by verifying that (1) the established organization is functioning as described in the TS and is functioning effectively, (2) personnel qualification levels are in conformance with applicable codes and standards, and (3) the lines of authority and responsibility are in conformance with TS and applicable codes and standards.

Comprehensive discussions of current safety-related activities were conducted with plant management and technical personnel during this reporting period including, and in particular, Operations, Environmental and Radiation Controls, Quality Assurance, Regulatory Compliance and Onsite Nuclear Safety organizations. Topics discussed included licensee activities associated with plant operations activities; plant modifications, including the security system upgrade; the fire protection system; ongoing construction activities; and communications interfaces.

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

16. Onsite Review Committee (40700)

The inspectors reviewed certain activities of the plant nuclear safety committee (PNSC) to ascertain whether the onsite review functions were conducted in accordance with TS and other regulatory requirements. The inspectors followed up on previously identified PNSC activities to independently confirm that corrective actions were progressing satisfactorily.

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

17. Followup on Headquarters Requests (92704, TI-0110/4)

On October 29, 1986, the inspectors witnessed licensee activities associated with the placement of the reinforced concrete roof for the horizontal storage module (HSM) as well as the placement of the cask unloading pad and the air outlet shielding blocks. The HSM is a reinforced concrete structure for the dry storage of shielded steel canisters containing spent nuclear fuel assemblies.

The inspectors reviewed the following licensee documentation in order to determine if the above noted sections of the HSM were fabricated in accordance with construction drawings, specifications and procedures: (1) Specification L2-C-021, Fabrication Specification for the Horizontal Storage Module, (2) Plant Modification M-885, Independent Spent Fuel Storage

Installation, (3) Drawing Number RNT 162-C-1101, Horizontal Storage Modules, General Layout and Details, (4) Drawing Number RNT 162-C-1103, Horizontal Storage Modules, Roof Plan and Wall Sections, and (5) Drawing Number RNT-162-C-1107, HSM Air Outlet Shielding Blocks, Plan and Section.

Specifically, the inspectors witnessed the preplacement operations associated with the HSM roof, cask unloading pad, and outlet shielding blocks. These activities included a determination that the forms were tight, level, and appeared to have the proper dimensions; and that the placement environs had been properly cleaned. The inspectors also determined that the size, number, and spacing of reinforcing steel agreed with the reference drawing requirements. The inspectors noted that activities pertaining to delivery time, layer thickness, and consolidation were also in conformance with specification requirements.

Samples of concrete were obtained from designated points and were tested in accordance with procedural requirements. The inspectors witnessed the test results and determined that the samples indicated that the concrete being placed conformed with the specification requirements for slump, air entrainment, unit weight, and temperature.

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

18. Limitorque Motor-Operated Wiring (37700)

On August 21, 1986, Region II's Atlanta based personnel contacted Carolina Power and Light Company (CP&L) concerning their 10 CFR 50.49 Limitorque motor-operated valves (MOVs) with regard to IEN 86-03, "Potential Deficiencies in Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring." The licensee was requested to advise the Region of the action they had taken with regard to IEN 83-72, "Environmental Qualification Notice No. 24," and the above IEN (86-03) and, if required, to provide a justification for continued operation (JCO).

Subsequent telephone conversations with the licensee, indicated that the two Limitorque motor valve operators on the 10 CFR 50.49 list had questionable wiring. The wiring was replaced with new qualified wiring and the replaced wiring was sent out for analysis. A followup letter of September 18, 1986, was sent to NRC confirming the telephone conversations. Since there is some question involving interpretation of 10 CFR 50.49 and its 1985 deadline, this is an unresolved item identified as 50-261/86-28-06, "Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Operators."