



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-261/80-19

Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
411 Fayetteville Street
Raleigh, NC 27602

Facility Name: H. B. Robinson Unit 2

Docket No. 50-261

License No. DPR-23

Inspection at H. B. Robinson Site near Hartsville, South Carolina

Inspector: *D R Quick for* 9/11/80
B. T. Moon Date Signed

Approved By: *D R Quick* 9/11/80
D. R. Quick, Section Chief, RONS Branch Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on August 11-14, 1980

Areas Inspected

This routine, announced inspection involved 30 inspector-hours on site in the areas of diesel generator units used as onsite electric power systems, review of IE Bulletin 80-06, and review of diesel generator testing requirements at IE headquarters' request.

Results

Of the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

8010240 653

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *R. B. Starkey, Jr., General Manager
- *R. T. Connelly, Director, Nuclear Safety & QA
- *F. L. Lowery, Operating Supervisor
- *C. W. Crawford, Manager, Operation & Maintenance
- *T. S. Elleman, Vice President Nuclear Safety & Research
- *J. M. Curley, Engineering Supervisor

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, and office personnel.

NRC Resident Inspector

- *E. H. Brooks, Acting Resident Inspector

*Attended exit interview.

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 14, 1980 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 5.b.

5. Followup Inspection For IE Bulletin 80-06, Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Reset Controls

The inspector reviewed Procedures PT. 2.1, safety injection test, and PT. 23.2, emergency diesel auto start on loss of power and safety injection, to ascertain that action item 2 of IE Bulletin 80-06, was implemented by the licensee in accordance with their response to the bulletin, dated June 10, 1980. The inspector also witnessed portions of the safety injection test conducted on August 11, 1980. The procedure incorporates certain steps to verify that all equipment remains in the position associated with

an emergency mode after ESF actuation signals are reset. The actuation signals addressed in the procedure are: safety injection; phase A containment isolation; containment ventilation isolation; and main feedwater isolation. The inspector has no further questions with regard to the above PT's, however, the bulletin will remain open pending completion of PT3.1 during this outage. Problems identified during the witnessing of PT 2.1 are described in the following paragraphs.

a. Safety Injection Test

During the test the inspector observed that SI pump "A" failed to start as required on a SI initiation signal. An acceptance criterion requires all components must receive the SI signal. It was subsequently determined that the cause for the start-up failure of the pump was due to a slightly disengaged control power fuse. The fuse was pulled in accordance with a general operating procedure performed during the unit shutdown and had not been fully reinserted at the time of restoration prior to this test. The inspector found that the elapsed sequencer time for the pump start-up was recorded in the procedure, however, the startup failure was not recorded because no provisions exist to document the actual pump start-up. This is inconsistent with the intent of Technical Specification 4.5.1.1 and 4.5.1.2, which require verification of all components receiving the SI signal. The licensee agreed to revise the procedure to incorporate necessary documentation by November 1, 1980. The inspector stated that appropriate administrative controls should be provided for the pump breakers to ensure proper restoration following maintenance and testing. This item is an inspector followup item (50-261/80-19-01).

b. An Overridden Containment Isolation Valve

During the test the inspector found that Instrument Air Valve PCV-1716 did not move to the safeguards position when the containment isolation "Phase A" signal was generated. It was subsequently determined that, the cause for the containment isolation failure was due to a mispositioned override switch. The licensee's investigation revealed that the valve was not overridden for the test, however, he could not establish the time of the occurrence at the exit interview. The licensee also confirmed that he did not have an administrative procedure to control the override switch. The inspector stated that Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires the licensee to establish an administrative procedure to cover bypassing of safety functions. The inspector further stated that, containment integrity shall not be violated, in accordance with the requirement of Technical Specification 3.6.1, and if the licensee's investigation reveals a noncompliance to this requirement, the event must also be reported to the NRC in accordance with their reporting requirement. This item was identified as an unresolved item pending completion of the licensee's investigation (50-261/80-19-02). The licensee indicated that this item will be resolved prior to the forthcoming unit start-up.

6. Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units used as Onsite Electric Power Systems

The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedure PT 23.2 entitled "Emergency Diesel Auto Start on Loss of Power and Safety Injection. This procedure describes the tests to be performed to verify that the emergency buses de-energize and shed loads, and that the diesel generator system starts and assumes ECCS loads under a simulated loss of off-site power condition, concurrent with an ECCS test signal. The procedure, including annotations, was approved by qualified management personnel. Check-off lists are provided for documenting initial conditions, testing procedures, and test data. The inspector reviewed portions of the test conducted during the period of August 11 and 12, 1980 to verify that (1) minimum crew requirements were met, (2) test prerequisites were completed, (3) special equipment was installed and calibrated, and (4) changes to the procedure were documented and approved.

Within the scope of the inspector's review, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7. Review of Diesel Generator Testing Requirements

The inspector reviewed the licensee's current technical specifications, at IE Headquarters' request, to verify that the requirement for diesel generator load sequencer testing is adequate with respect to the current "Standard Technical Specification requirements for Westinghouse PWR Reactors". The three specific required cases for load sequencer testing are: (i) the loss of offsite power without a safety injection signal, (ii) the loss of offsite power with a safety injection signal, and (iii) the actuation of an engineered safety features signal without a loss of offsite power. The inspector found that items (ii) and (iii) above are included in the licensee's current technical specifications as far as the titles are concerned. The licensee's current technical specification lacks many requirements listed in the standard technical specifications. This was discussed with the licensee at the exit interview and he stated that he will look into the possibility of incorporating the other item into the technical specifications. However, he will not commit to it voluntarily at this time (50-261/80-19-03).