UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-261/80-15

Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
411 Fayetteville Street
Raleigh, NC 27602

Facility: H. B. Robinson 2

Docket No. 50-261

License No. DPR-23

Inspection at H. B. Robinson site near Hartsville, South Carolina

Inspector: H. L. Whitener — H. L. Whitener — Date Signed: 8/14/80

Approved by: D. R. Quick — D. R. Quick — Date Signed: 8/14/80

SUMMARY

Inspection on June 24 - July 2, 1980

Areas Inspected

This routine unannounced inspection involved 83 inspector-hours on site in the areas of witnessing general plant operations, followup inspection of outstanding items, review of plant safety committee meeting minutes, and review of containment purge valve isolation system.

Results

Of the four areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

*R. B. Starkey, General Manager
*C. W. Crawford, Manager O&M
*H. S. Zimmerman, Manager T&A
*R. Connolley, Director, Nuclear Safety and QA
*J. M. Curley, Engineering Supervisor
*R. H. Chambers, Maintenance Supervisor
*J. Benjamin, Plant Engineer R. A. Dayton, Engineer R. S. McGirt, Generation Specialist
D. H. Baur, QA Specialist

Other licensee employees contacted included shift supervisors, reactor operators, auxiliary operators and records personnel.

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 2, 1980, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. No items of noncompliance or deviations were found.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Infraction (261/78-08-01): Failure to develop and use a procedure for functional testinq hydraulic suppressors. The licensee has revised CPL-PT-31.0 to include a procedure for functional testing the hydraulic snubbers. The procedure incorporates temperature corrections and lockup and bleed rate ranges provided by the architect-engineer. This item is considered closed.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Areas Inspected

In the period June 24 to July 2, 1980, the inspector acted in the capacity of the NRC Resident Inspector. Areas inspected are discussed in the following paragraphs.

6. General Operations

The inspector witnessed reactor operations and reviewed operational documentation on a sampling basis. The type of activities performed included the following:

a. Observation of control room activities and discussions with operating personnel.

b. Review of shift supervisor, operator, auxiliary operator and equipment-out-of-service logs.

c. Review status of alarms.

d. Review status of ECCS alignment on control board.

e. Observe shift manning.

f. Tour auxiliary building.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified during the above inspections.

7. Onsite Review Committee

The inspector examined the minutes of the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee meetings for the period June 1, 1979 to June 1, 1980, to verify conformance with appropriate sections of Technical Specification 6.5. This review included: frequency of meetings; quorum of membership at the meetings; and, committee review activities including review of proposed Technical Specification changes, noncompliance items and corrective action, proposed facility and procedure changes and reactor operation events. The inspector concluded that the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee is performing the reviews required by the Technical Specifications.

8. Containment Purge Isolation

The inspector reviewed the containment purge valve isolation circuit logic to determine if any system bypasses, resets or overrides could result in a failure to isolate or cause the purge valves to reopen. Isolation signals to the purge valves are the safety injection condition or high radiation level in containment. The review showed that (1) the purge valves will isolate when either of the above signals is present; (2) valves cannot be reopened manually as long as the isolation signal is present; (3) there are no "designed in" bypasses, resets or overrides which will allow the valves to be opened when an isolation signal is present; and (4) valves require deliberate operator action to be reopened after an isolation signal is removed. The inspector concluded that the purge isolation system should function properly unless intentionally defeated by blocking or removing the isolation signal input to the circuit and then manually opening the purge valves. Administrative controls to prevent improper defeat of the isolation signals and manual opening of the purge valves will be examined during a subsequent inspection (IFI, 80-15-01). At this time the licensee has elected not to purge the containment except when the plant is in cold shutdown. The air supply to the, air-to-open, purge valves has been isolated to prevent inadvertent operation of these valves.