UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-261/79-15

Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
411 Fayetteville Street
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

Facility Name: H. B. Robinson, Unit 2

Docket No. 50-261

License No. DPR-23

Inspection at H. B. Robinson near Hartsville, South Carolina

Inspected by: L. Modenos — Date Signed 7/31/79

Approved by: A. R. Herdt, Section Chief, RC&ES Branch — Date Signed 7/31/79

SUMMARY

Inspected on July 17-19, 1979

Areas Inspected

This special, unannounced inspection involved 20 inspector-hours on-site and in office in the areas of concrete expansion anchor installation.

Results

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

   Licensee Employees

   *R. Starkey- Plant Manager
   J. Curley - Engineering Supervisor
   F. Bishop - Plant Engineer

   *Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

   The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 18, 1979 with the person indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

   Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

   Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Concrete Expansion Anchors

   In response to IE Bulletin No. 79-02, Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) submitted their response to the bulletin on July 9, 1979. The response was reviewed by IE:Region II with the subsequent inspection of the site to verify their data. It was determined that the response to the bulletin was inadequate.

   The inspection and test program as stated in their respone identified a total of 2108 anchor bolts in all their safety related systems, including small bore piping down to 1¼" diameter. A sample technique as defined in IE Bulletin 79-02 was employed. A total of 1088 anchor volts were inspected and tested. Of this total, 302 anchor bolts required modification, representing 14.3 percent of all anchor bolts.

   The inadequacy of the response was identified to CP&L, with a rate of failure of 14.3 percent they should have increased their sample size as the bulletin requires "A high rate of failure rate should be the basis for increased testing." It was stated to CP&L that their numbers were incorrect in that they had a rate of failure of 27.75 percent not 14.3%. It was further stated that their response had to be resubmitted to identify major and minor modifications which had questionable items found in their "Verification Program for Pipe Support Base Plates using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts" dated June 29, 1979.

The following supports were reviewed from the "Summary sheets of Expansion Anchor Bolt Verification Program" and descrepancies were identified:

- CH-BC-84
- 2CH-8A-BC-62
- CH-8C-RA 62
- CH-15A-LC-5
- CH-15A-RA2-10
- CH-14-11-LC-56
- 2B1-LC-36
- 2B2-LC-50
- 3WD-78-LC-25
- SI-34-LC-19
- SI-152-RA2-211
- SI-41-RA2-305
- 2-CH-8C-8C51
- 2-B1-LC-43
- WD-49-RAZ-3
- 3WD-14-SS-26

On July 18, 1979 a conference call between the site, IE Headquarters, Region II office, EBASCO Services and CP&L corporate office making it clear that in order for H. B. Robinson to return to operation, CP&L must resolve the questions the NRC has identified.

On July 20, 1979 a supplement response to IEB 79-02 was submitted to Region II with answers and evaluation to questions imposed on CP&L. The answers were evaluated with H. B. Robinson being released from the constraint of the questions regarding IEB 79-02.

In the final review, H. B. Robinson agreed to continue their inspection program and eventually do 100 percent of the anchor bolts in the safety-related systems. All inaccessible supports inside the polar crane wall will have been inspected prior to starting up and remaining supports would be inspected while the plant was operating.

This IE Bulletin 79-02 remains open until all inspections and evaluations are completed and evaluated by the NRC. No items of noncompliance or devations were identified.