



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-261/79-08

Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
411 Fayetteville Street
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

Facility Name: H. B. Robinson, Unit 2

Docket No. 50-261

License No. DPR-23

Inspection at Robinson Unit 2 Facility near Martsville, South Carolina

Inspector:

T. J. McHenry

5/18/79
Date Signed

Accompanying Personnel: D. R. Quick (April 23, 1979)
R. J. Bursey (April 23, 1979)

Approved by:

H. C. Dance, Section Chief, RONS Branch

5/21/79
Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on April 23 - 25, 1979

Areas Inspected

This combination special announced and routine unannounced inspection involved 41 inspector-hours onsite. The special announced inspection was conducted on the incident at the Three Mile Island facility. In addition a routine inspection was conducted in the areas of licensee event followup, noncompliance followup, IE circulars and notices followup and independent inspection effort.

Results

Of the five areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

*R. B. Starkey, Jr., Plant Manager
*C. W. Crawford, Operations Supervisor
*J. M. Curley, Engineering Supervisor
*B. W. Garrison, Quality Assurance Supervisor
D. S. Crocker, Environmental and Radiation Control Supervisor
C. Wright, Engineering Technician
M. Page, Engineer
W. T. Traylor, Administrative Supervisor
F. Lowery, Training Coordinator

Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included operators and office personnel.

*Attended exit interview.

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 25, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspection activities presented in these details were discussed.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

- a. (Closed) Infraction (78-15-01): Failure to test interlocks between the reactor building and manipulator cranes prior to refueling. The inspector reviewed PT-26, Fuel Handling Equipment Interlock and Operation Test, to insure revision had been made to incorporate required testing. The inspector also verified that the licensee planned to complete PT-26 prior to refueling outage.
- b. (Closed) Infraction (79-03-01): Removal of blind flanges from the containment building spray air test lines without a written safety evaluation. The inspector reviewed PT-3.0, Containment Spray Nozzle Five Year Test, to insure that a procedure revision had been made which requires reinstallation of associated blind flanges. During the facility tour, the inspector also verified that the associated blind flanges were installed as required.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Three Mile Island Incident Briefings

In response to the incident at the Three Mile Island facility, the licensee was requested by the NRC to make all available operations and management personnel available on April 23, 1979 for a briefing conducted by NRC representatives. Two briefing sessions of approximately three hours each were conducted on April 23, 1979, with 58 licensee personnel attending. The purpose of these briefings was to inform all operations and management personnel, to the maximum extent practicable, of the current NRC understanding of the incident at Three Mile Island. Specific areas covered included the sequence of the incident events, the NRC requirements included in IE Bulletin 79-06A and NRC Operating Licensing Branch view of the event in regard to ramifications in training, procedures and operator licensing.

6. Review of IE Circulars (IEC's)

IE Circular 78-08, Environmental Qualifications of Equipment, had been previously reviewed during inspection 78-22 and had remained open pending completion of licensee review. However, IE Bulletin 79-01, Environmental Qualification of Class IE Equipment, incorporates and supercedes the requirements of IEC-78-08. Therefore, IEC 78-08 is closed.

The inspector reviewed IEC 79-02, Failure of 120VAC Vital Power Supply, to ascertain that the IEC had been received on-site and reviewed by cognizant personnel. The inspector determined that the circular had been received and reviewed by engineering personnel. The licensee determined that the type of equipment identified by the IEC was not utilized at the Robinson facility. IEC 79-02 is closed.

7. Review of IE Notices (IEN's)

The inspector verified that the following IEN's were received on-site and reviewed by cognizant personnel. The following IEN's were reviewed and are closed:

<u>Notice</u>	<u>Title</u>
79-01	Bergen-Paterson Hydraulic Shock and Sway Arrestors
79-03	Limitorque Valve Geared Limit Switch Lubricant
79-04	Degradation of Engineering Safety Features

8. Additional Follow-Up on IE Bulletin (IEB) 78-04

IE Bulletin 78-04, Environmental Qualification of Stem Mounted Limit Switches, had been reviewed and closed during inspection 78-12. However, subsequently it was determined that IEB-79-04 failed to express the NRC's concern for potentially non-environmentally qualified limit switches used for position indication. This item was discussed with the licensee during inspection 78-27, and the licensee committed to a further review followed by supplementary response to IEB 78-04.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's supplementary response to IEB 78-04, dated March 7, 1979. In summary, the licensee's supplementary response concluded that no additional non-qualified limit switches utilized for position indication had been identified. The inspector reviewed selected system drawings to verify the licensee's findings. No problems were identified.

This item, which was identified as item 78-27-01, is closed.

9. Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)

The inspector reviewed two LER's for consistency with the requirements of Technical Specifications, Section 6.9. The inspector examined the licensee's analysis of the event, the corrective actions taken and discussed the LER's with licensee representatives. The following LER's were reviewed and are closed:

79-03 Constant Axial Offset Limit Exceeded
79-04 Fire Barrier Penetration Not Sealed

10. Facility Tours

The inspector toured portions of the facility including the reactor building, auxiliary building, turbine area and control room to ascertain the general state of cleanliness and to observe ongoing refueling outage activities. Control room operations were discussed with operators including methods of determining water level in the reactor vessel and measurements to determine vessel temperature. The inspector determined that no additional measurement other than coolant temperature was being used to insure the reactor vessel, including the head and studs, were being maintained above 90 degrees Fahrenheit (minimum temperature for full head bolt tension). The inspector discussed this item with the operations supervisors who stated that the head had already been de-tensioned; however, the coolant temperature had been maintained at greater than 95 degrees Fahrenheit prior to de-tensioning. The inspector stated that while it appeared that adequate measures were established based upon existing coolant and reactor building temperatures, the licensee should evaluate measures to assure that the reactor vessel head and studs are positively maintained above 90 degrees Fahrenheit. This item was discussed at the exit meeting and the licensee stated that a review of measures to insure minimum vessel temperature would be performed prior to tensioning the reactor vessel head. This item will remain open pending a review of the licensee's actions during a future inspection (79-08-01).