



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No.: 50-261/79-03

Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
411 Fayetteville Street
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

Facility Name: H. B. Robinson 2

Docket No.: 50-261

License No.: DPR-23

Inspection at: Hartsville, South Carolina

Inspector: HC Dance
T. J. McHenry, Reactor Inspector

2/16/79
Date Signed

Approved by: HC Dance
H. C. Dance, Chief, RPS No.1, RONS Branch

2/16/79
Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on January 22-25, 1979

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 30 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of licensee event followup, licensee action on previous inspection findings, organization and administration, independent inspection effort and plant tours.

Results

Of the 5 areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in 4 areas; 1 apparent item of noncompliance was found in 1 area (Infraction - Failure to perform a written safety evaluation - Paragraph 6).

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

*R. B. Starkey, Jr., Plant Manager
*C. W. Crawford, Operations Supervisor
*H. S. Zimmerman, Maintenance Supervisor
*J. M. Curley, Engineering Supervisor
*B. W. Garrison, Quality Assurance Supervisor
C. Wright, Engineering Technician
R. H. Chambers, Senior Engineer
R. S. McGirt, Senior Nuclear General Specialist
*W. T. Traylor, Administrative Supervisor

Other licensee employees contacted included operators and office personnel.

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 25, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1, above. The licensee acknowledged the noncompliance discussed in paragraph 6.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Open) Noncompliance (261/78-17), Failure to distribute and/or use current revisions of plant procedures. Administrative controls and personnel training has been implemented as described in the licensee letter dated October 2, 1978. Corrective actions were verified and the inspector reviewed selected procedures in the control room and chemistry lab files to ensure procedures contained in these files were current. No problems were identified; however, the licensee stated that additional corrective actions to prevent recurrence of this item are planned. Therefore, the item will remain open pending completion of all additional actions contemplated by the licensee.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)

The inspector reviewed three LER's for consistency with the requirements of Technical Specification Section 6.9. The inspector examined the licensee's analysis of the event, corrective action taken, and discussed the LER's with licensee's representatives. The following LER's were reviewed:

a. LER 78-16, Low Boron Concentration in the Boron Injection Tank

The licensee's temporary corrective action to correct this problem included revision of PT-2.7A, PT-2.7B and PT-2.7C, Safety Injection System Component Test. The inspector reviewed the affected PT's and verified that appropriate revisions had been incorporated. The inspector discussed permanent, corrective measures to prevent recurrence with the Operations Supervisor. It was determined that the licensee intends to repair the leaking valves which are the root cause of this item. Therefore, this LER will remain open pending permanent corrective action during the next refueling outage.

b. LER 78-26, Spray Pumps Inoperable

The inspector reviewed OP-38C, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System operating procedure and verified that appropriate revision had been made to require venting of affected pumps following RHR alignment for shutdown. This LER is closed.

c. LER 78-30, Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure to Part-Stroke

The inspector discussed the cause of this occurrence with the Maintenance Supervisor. It was determined that the valve sticking had apparently resulted from maintenance on the valve packing to stop steam leakage without subsequent valve testing. The inspector discussed the potential for this event to occur on valves in the inservice inspection (ISI) program since the tightening of valve packing is a routine maintenance item normally covered by generic procedures. The plant manager stated that a program was being established which will provide additional controls to preclude maintenance on valves in the ISI program without appropriate testing. This LER is closed.

6. Facility Tours

The inspector toured portions of the facility, including the auxiliary building, turbine area and control room to ascertain the general state of cleanliness and housekeeping. Control room operations were observed and discussed with control room personnel to assure compliance with Technical Specifications.

During the tour of the auxiliary building, the inspector noted that blind flanges had been removed from the containment spray header air test lines and flanged fittings with open pipes had been attached. The inspector reviewed the FSAR and determined that the containment spray air test line was described with an installed blind flange on Figures 5.2.2-16 and 6.2-1. Subsequent discussion with plant personnel indicated that the blind flanges were removed during the performance of PT-3.0, Containment Spray Nozzle Five Year Test, in November 1975 and had not been replaced following the testing. The inspector reviewed PT-3.0 and determined that the procedure did not require replacement of blind flanges. A review of the procedure authorization form for the approval of PT-3.0 indicated that the procedure had been determined not to change the facility description in the FSAR. Therefore, no written safety evaluation had been performed to provide the bases that the permanent removal of the blind flanges did not involve an unreviewed safety question. 10 CFR 50.59(b) requires a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that a change in the facility as described in the safety analysis report does not involve an unreviewed safety question. The inspector discussed this item with the plant manager who stated that the blind flange replacement should have been required by PT-3.0 and that the review of the procedure should have been more thorough.

The above item has been identified as an infraction in the Notice of Violation (79-03-01).

7. Q-List Valve Number Errors

During the review of the containment spray system drawings for item 6. above, the inspector determined that four valves on the Q-list drawing for the containment spray system had been improperly numbered. The inspector verified that the actual inplant valve label and procedure number corresponded. Therefore, only the error on the Q-list drawing existed. This item was discussed with licensee representatives who stated appropriate corrections would be made. This item was identified as an open item pending the licensee's correction of the error and subsequent review during a future inspection (79-03-02).

8. Organization and Administration

A review was conducted to verify that the licensee's site organization, structure, personnel qualification, PNSC, membership, shift crew composition and licensed personnel requirement are in compliance with Technical Specification Sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.5.1.

No problems were identified.

9. Fire Protection System Modification Review

The inspector discussed the status of the fire protection system modification with the plant engineer responsible for modification activities to ascertain the status of the modifications and the development of pre-operational tests. It was determined that some work was presently being performed on 10 of the 13 major modifications. Design change controls and quality assurance aspects of the modifications were also discussed. The inspector stated that the design modification packages and pre-operational tests associated with the fire protection modification would be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.

No problem were identified.