(7-77)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [1] (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

[0 1] | S C H B R 2 (2) | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | 4 1 1 1 0 (4) | (5)

7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T

[0 1] REPORT SOURCE | L (6) | 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 1 (7) | 1 0 0 3 7 8 (8) | 1 1 0 1 7 8 (9)

7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

[0 2] During normal operation PPS leakage past the Containment Purge Outlet isolation

[0 3] valves was observed in excess of limits set by Technical Specification 4.4.1.2.

[0 4] This is a reportable event per Technical Specification 6.9.2.b.4. Both valves were

[0 5] declared inoperable at 0655 in the closed position and were maintained closed. Leak

[0 6] testing identified the problem as seat leakage past the outer valve. If required

[0 7] the inner valve was available to maintain containment leakage within allowed limits

[0 8] throughout the event. Reference: LER 77-10, LER 77-11

7 8 9 80

[0 9] SYSTEM CODE: S A (11) | CAUSE CODE: E (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE: X (13) | COMPONENT CODE: V A L V E X (14) | COMP. SUBCODE: B (15) | VALVE SUBCODE: D (16)

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: EVENT YEAR 7 8 | — | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 2 5 | / | OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 | REPORT TYPE L | — | REVISION NO. 0

21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

ACTION TAKEN: E (18) | FUTURE ACTION: X (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT: Z (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) | HOURS (22): 0 0 0 0 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y (23) | NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: Y (24) | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: A (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: A 1 8 0 (26)

33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

[1 0] Leakage past the seat of the 42 in. 50 FR streamseal Butterfly valve was due to

[1 1] normal wear of the Nordel rubber seat. The valve seat was adjusted and both valves

[1 2] pressure leak tested with leakage within allowed limits. To avoid recurrence

[1 3] operators will be instructed to be more aware of trends in PPS leakage so preventive

[1 4] maintenance can be performed on the valves to avoid leakage in excess of allowed limits.

7 8 9 80

[1 5] FACILITY STATUS: E (28) | % POWER: 1 0 0 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30): NA | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: A (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): Operator Observation

7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

[1 6] ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): NA

7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

[1 7] PERSONNEL EXPOSURES — NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE: Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39): NA

7 8 9 11 12 13 80

[1 8] PERSONNEL INJURIES — NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41): NA

7 8 9 11 12 80

[1 9] LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY — TYPE: Z (42) | DESCRIPTION (43): NA

7 8 9 10 80

[2 0] PUBLICITY — ISSUED: N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45): NA

7 8 9 10 68 69 80

NRC USE ONLY

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Supplemental Information For
Reportable Occurrence 78-25

1. Cause Description and Analysis:
A gradual increase in Penetration Pressurization System (PPS) leakage past the Containment Purge Outlet isolation valves occurred during normal operation. Due to fluctuation in leakage values, the trend was not recognized until the value went above .532 SCFM. Per Technical Specification 4.4.1.2, leakage above 1.344 SCFM is a reportable event in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.2.b.4; however, when leakage exceeds 0.532 SCFM indicated on the RTGB, there is no way to determine if leakage actually exceeds the Technical Specification limit. As a conservative measure, the valves are declared inoperable, isolated and maintenance initiated. The valves were declared inoperable in the closed position. Subsequent leak testing identified the problem as seat leakage past the Nordel rubber seat on the outer valve. The cause is attributed to normal wear typical for this type of valve seat.

- During the course of the event, both valves were maintained closed, the position required during both normal and emergency plant operating conditions. Since leakage from the inner valve was verified as being within allowed limits, this valve was available to prevent release of radioactive material to the environment if required. There was therefore no threat to either public health or safety.

2. Corrective Action:
The seat of the outer valve was adjusted and the volume between the isolation valves repressurized. PPS leakage levels observed (.44 SCFM) were within allowed limits. Preventive maintenance was subsequently performed on the inner valve lowering the PPS leakage rate to .17 SCFM and the valves were declared operable.

3. Corrective Action to Prevent Future Occurrences:
Plant operators will be instructed to be more aware of trends in PPS leakage so that increases in leakage rates will be identified. This will allow preventive maintenance to be performed on the valve seats so that leakage levels are maintained within allowed limits. No further corrective action is deemed necessary at this time.