

License Amendment Request Adoption of TSTF-505 Risk-Informed Completion Times

Pre-submittal Meeting

June 24, 2014

Agenda



- License amendment request (LAR) scope and schedule
- LAR Clarifications for TSTF-505
- Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model
- Implementation of risk-informed completion times (RICT)
- Training and communication
- Takeaways
- Questions/Staff Feedback







- LARs are aligned with model application and follow TSTF-505
- RICT proposed only for systems in the scope of TSTF-505
- RICT program will be implemented in Modes 1 and 2 only







Planned submittals

Third quarter 2014St. Lucie Unit 1 & 2 (PSL)Turkey Point 3 & 4 (PTN)





LAR Clarifications for TSTF-505

- Different TS Format and Numbering from Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ITS)
 - PSL
 - PTN
- Table 1 in LAR
 - Cross references TSTF-505 and plant-specific Technical Specifications (TS)
 - Identifies candidate TS for RICT
 - Cross references Required Actions (RAs) in TSTF-505 and corresponding RAs for PTN TS







TS Bases

- Bases revised, as applicable, to discuss completion times consistent with TSTF-505
- Bases revised to discuss the actions and notes related to conditions for two or more inoperable trains or subsystems

TSTF-505 Editorial Error

- TS 3.3.1, Function 20 is missing the Condition for two or more channels inoperable
- PTN LAR proposes to include action for two or more channels inoperable (reactor trip breaker trip mechanisms)



LAR Clarifications for TSTF-505



- TS 3.3.5, LOP DG Start Instrumentation
 - TS not in non-ITS plant; function included in PTN ESF
 TS
 - ITS already addresses two or more channels inoperable
 - PTN LAR proposes to add new action to address two or more channels inoperable
- TS 3.5.2, ECCS
 - ITS actions based on ECCS flow capability
 - Non-ITS plants do not address flow capability
 - PTN LAR proposes RICT for component inoperability





LAR Clarifications for TSTF-505

Trains / Components

- ITS address single and multiple inoperable trains
- Non-ITS plants address inoperable components rather than trains
- PTN LAR proposes RICT for single and multiple inoperable components

Electrical Power

- PTN TS actions for operable equipment without emergency power source
- PTN LAR proposes to apply RICT when emergency power source unavailable (consistent with applying RICT to TS for AC Sources)

PRA Model Status



- All sites conform to NRC PRA Quality Standard (RG 1.200 Rev 2) for Internal Events PRA
- NFPA 805 Fire PRA
 - Duane Arnold (PDA) NFPA 805 fully implemented. PTN, PSL, and Point Beach (PBN) in review by NRC. Seabrook (SEA) staying with Appendix R (MSO's incorporated)
- External Events assessment
 - GAP assessment performed in 2012 for SEA as a fleet model
 - Tornado/High Winds PRA completed for PBN
 - Seismic risk being calculated based on new GMRS





PRA Model Status

 Shutdown modes (4 & 5) will only be included for Seabrook since other plants do not have shutdown models





PRA Model Status

- Peer review findings/observations have either been closed or will be addressed in the LAR with a resolution path identified with respect to risk-managed tech specs (RMTS) application
- PRA model is under configuration control with approved procedures for periodic and immediate updating to reflect as-built, as-operated plant





Impact of External Events

Fire

- Modifications have been credited in development of NFPA 805. Compensatory actions as addressed in NFPA 805 LAR will be implemented until plant modifications are complete
- For Seabrook, Fire PRA does not conform to RG 1.200. A gap assessment has been performed against the RG and efforts underway to close gaps. Any gaps not closed will be addressed in the LAR for their impact
- Insights from fire have been incorporated into maintenance rule (a)(4)






Impact of External Events

Seismic

- Seismic for PTN, PSL, PBN and PDA
 - Justification will be provided for minimal impact on RICT calculation
- Seabrook has all modes PRA that takes into account seismic contribution. The seismic part is not RG 1.200, therefore impact will be addressed









Configuration Risk Control

- Configuration Risk Calculations
 - All plants use CAFTA for PRA quantification and model development except that SEA uses Riskman
- EPRI Phoenix Risk Monitor will be used for Risk Managed Tech Specs, Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP), and RICT program
- Maintenance Rule (a)(4) plans to use same calculation method and tool for non-RMTS conditions





Risk Informed Completion Times

- The RICT processes and technical approach will be structured similar to South Texas Project (Operations/Work Control centered)
- Software tools and procedures will be implemented to ensure compliance with requirements
- Organization and position specific training and communication plan will be established to appropriately train plant staff





Risk Informed Initiatives

Site	4b Planned LAR Submittal	FIRE MR (a)(4) Implemented
PSL	3 rd Quarter	2013
PTN	3 rd Quarter	2013
PDA	3 rd Quarter	2013
PBN	4 th Quarter	2013
SEA	4 th Quarter	2013





Training and Communication

- Scope of training for RICT Program
 - Requirements of the program
 - Configuration risk management program software
 - TS Actions included in the program
 - Implementing procedures
- Selected Site and Corporate Personnel





Take Aways

- RICT proposed only for SSCs in scope of TSTF-505 and modeled
- PRA quality for internal events meet RG 1.200
 - Required for Risk Informed applications, LARs, etc.
- External events gap assessment completed
- Effective plant communications of risk insights
- Transition to NFPA 805 at 4 sites provides confidence in the PRA quality
- Control of model will be maintained by one set of fleet procedures and a common implementation tool
- Implementing risk informed initiatives for fleet
 - 4b and 5b.





Questions / Staff Feedback

