

CENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [] [] [] [] [] [] [1] 6

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

[0] [1] [S] [C] [H] [B] [R] [2] [2] [0] [0] [-] [0] [0] [0] [0] [-] [0] [0] [3] [4] [1] [1] [1] [1] [4] [] [] [5]

LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T

[0] [1] REPORT SOURCE [L] [6] [0] [5] [0] [0] [0] [2] [6] [1] [7] [0] [8] [0] [9] [7] [9] [8] [0] [9] [1] [0] [7] [9] [9]

60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

[0] [2] During normal operations on August 9, 1979, at 1100 hours the valve SI-855 mechanically
[0] [3] stuck in mid-travel after adding nitrogen to the accumulators. This valve is a Con-
[0] [4] tainment Automatic Isolation Trip Valve and its failure is reportable under Technical
[0] [5] Specification 6.9.2.b(2). The penetration was isolated by locking closed manual valves
[0] [6] within the four hours as required by Technical Specification 3.6.3.C. This is a closed
[0] [7] system within containment and therefore was not a threat to the public health or
[0] [8] safety.

[0] [9] SYSTEM CODE [S] [D] [11] CAUSE CODE [E] [12] CAUSE SUBCODE [B] [13] COMPONENT CODE [V] [A] [L] [V] [E] [X] [14] COMP. SUBCODE [F] [15] VALVE SUBCODE [D] [16]

9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

[17] LER/RO REPORT NUMBER [7] [9] EVENT YEAR [] [] SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. [0] [2] [8] OCCURRENCE CODE [0] [3] REPORT TYPE [L] [] REVISION NO. [0]

21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

ACTION TAKEN [G] [18] [B] [19] FUTURE ACTION [] [] EFFECT ON PLANT [Z] [20] SHUTDOWN METHOD [Z] [21] HOURS [0] [0] [0] [0] ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED [Y] [23] NRPD-4 FORM SUB. [Y] [24] PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER [N] [25] COMPONENT MANUFACTURER [B] [3] [1] [4] [26]

33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

[1] [0] The Blaw Knox, one inch, globe, air operated, fail close, carbon steel, 1500 pound
[1] [1] valve failed to close due to mechanical binding. The parallel valves in the line
[1] [2] downstream from containment were locked closed to satisfy containment isolation
[1] [3] criteria. When plant conditions permit, the binding in valve 855 will be corrected.

[1] [5] FACILITY STATUS [E] [28] % POWER [1] [0] [0] [29] OTHER STATUS [NA] [30] METHOD OF DISCOVERY [A] [31] DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION [Operator Observation] [32]

7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

[1] [6] ACTIVITY RELEASED OF RELEASE [Z] [33] [Z] [34] AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY [NA] [35] LOCATION OF RELEASE [NA] [36]

7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

[1] [7] PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER [0] [0] [0] [37] TYPE [Z] [38] DESCRIPTION [NA] [39]

7 8 9 11 12 13 80

[1] [8] PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER [0] [0] [0] [40] DESCRIPTION [NA] [41]

7 8 9 11 12 80

[1] [9] LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE [Z] [42] DESCRIPTION [NA] [43] PUBLICITY ISSUED [N] [44] DESCRIPTION [NA] [45]

7 8 9 10 12 80

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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
FOR
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 79-28

1. Cause Description and Analysis:

During normal operations on August 9, 1979, at 1100 hours the Containment Automatic Trip Valve SI-855 failed to close after adding nitrogen to the Safety Injection Accumulators. The fail closed valve was found stuck in mid-travel due to mechanical binding and is reportable under Technical Specification 6.9.2.b(2). The containment penetration was isolated by locking closed two manually operated valves in this line within the four hours as required by Technical Specification 3.6.3.C. This is a closed system within containment and therefore was not a threat to the public health or safety. The precise cause of the binding is not known at this time since the valve cannot be easily disassembled under operating conditions.

2. Corrective Action:

The two manual valves downstream from containment in this line were locked closed. A special procedure was implemented whereby nitrogen could be added to the accumulators by having an operator attend these valves and stay in direct communication with the Control Room. When plant conditions permit, the binding in valve SI-855 will be corrected.

3. Corrective Action to Prevent Further Occurrence:

The valve will be inspected when plant conditions permit. The binding will be corrected and the conditions investigated to determine what can be done to prevent further occurrence. The corrective action taken satisfies the requirements of the Technical Specifications and will be maintained until a permanent repair of the valve is completed.