

CONTROL BLOCK: (1)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	S	C	H	B	R	2	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	1	1	1	1	1	4			5				
7	8	LICENSEE CODE						14		LICENSE NUMBER											25		LICENSE TYPE						30		57	CAT	58

CON'T

0	1	REPORT SOURCE										L	6	0	5	0	0	0	2	6	1	7	0	4	1	5	7	9	8	0	5	1	6	7	9	9												
7	8											60	61	DOCKET NUMBER										68	69	EVENT DATE										74	75	REPORT DATE										80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | At 1130 on April 15, 1979, the engine driven fire pump was rendered inoperable when

0 3 | a fuel leak was discovered which required its fuel supply to be isolated. This

0 4 | resulted in operation in a degraded mode permitted by Technical Specification

0 5 | 3.14.2.2. The motor driven fire pump was operable during the time that the engine

0 6 | driven fire pump was out of service. This constitutes a reportable occurrence per

0 7 | Technical Specification 6.9.2.b.2.

0 8 | _____ 80

SYSTEM CODE A B (11)		CAUSE CODE A (12)		CAUSE SUBCODE E (13)		COMPONENT CODE E N G I N E (14)		COMP. SUBCODE Z (15)		VALVE SUBCODE Z (16)	
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER (17) [7 9]		EVENT YEAR [7 9]		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. [0 1 0]		OCCURRENCE CODE [0 3]		REPORT TYPE [L]		REVISION NO. [0]	
ACTION TAKEN [A] (18)		FUTURE ACTION [H] (19)		EFFECT ON PLANT [Z] (20)		SHUTDOWN METHOD [Z] (21)		HOURS [0 0 0 0] (22)		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED [Y] (23)	
NPRD-4 FORM SUB. [N] (24)		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER [A] (25)		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER [W 0 5 9] (26)							

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The fuel leak was caused by the failure of the solenoid operated fuel shut off valve to close fully. This was due to small pieces of weld "slag" located between the valve seating surfaces. The slag was removed and the valve was reinstalled. The EDPF was returned to service at 2132 hours on April 16, 1979.

1	4		
7	8	9	80

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

FACILITY STATUS (28) % POWER (29) OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

1 5 H 0 0 0 Z B Operator Observation

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)
1 6 Z (33) Z (34) N/A

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	(37) Z	(38) N/A	(39)		

7		8		9		11		12		13		80	
PERSONNEL INJURIES													
NUMBER						DESCRIPTION						(41)	
1	8	0	0	0	(40)	N/A							

7 8 9 11 12
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
TYPE DESCRIPTION
1 9 Z (42) N/A
79052201104

7 8 9 10
 PUBLICITY
 ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)
 (2) (0) (Z) (44) N/A
 NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER

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Licensee Event Report 79-10

SERIAL: RSEP/79-485

May 7, 1979

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 79-10

1. Cause Description and Analysis:

The solenoid operated fuel "shut off" valve on the engine driven fire pump (EDFP) failed to close properly due to small particles of weld material between the valve seating surfaces. The material apparently entered the fuel line following a construction project which involved the welding of a larger diameter "guard" pipe around the original fuel line. The failure of this valve to fully close necessitated the isolation of the fuel supply to the EDFP. The EDFP is an equal capacity (2500 gpm) backup to the motor driven fire pump (MDFP). During the time that the EDFP was out of service the MDFP was operable. This occurrence, therefore, did not jeopardize the capability of this system to provide its water suppression function.

2. Corrective Action:

The solenoid valve was removed, disassembled, and inspected by one of the mechanical maintenance personnel. The inspection revealed small pieces of welding slag located between the valve seating surfaces. These surfaces were cleaned and the valve was reassembled. The fuel line was purged, the "in-line" filter was renewed, and the solenoid valve was reinstalled. The EDFP was test operated with satisfactory results and declared back in service at 2132 hours on April 16, 1979.

3. Corrective Action to Prevent Further Occurrence:

The importance of "post weld" cleanup has been re-emphasized to the construction personnel involved with welding operations being performed at the plant.