

# UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV 1600 E LAMAR BLVD ARLINGTON, TX 76011-4511

June 13, 2014

EA-14-024

Adam Heflin, President and Chief Executive Officer Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation P.O. Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839

SUBJECT: ERRATA, NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000482/2013502, WOLF CREEK

**GENERATING STATION** 

Dear Mr. Heflin:

The NRC has identified an error in NRC Inspection Report No. 05000482/2013502, dated April 2, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14092A618). Specifically, the report incorrectly lists the report number as 2013502. The correct report number is 2014502. The NRC has reissued the report to correct this error, which affects the first page of the cover letter, the distribution page, the report cover page, the report summary, page 6 of the report, and the supplemental information page.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at <a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html">http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html</a>.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Mark Haire, Branch Chief Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety

Docket No. 50-482 License No. NPF-42

Enclosures:

Inspection Report 05000482/2014502

Electronic Distribution for Wolf Creek Generating Station

A. Heflin - 2 -



# UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV 1600 E LAMAR BLVD ARLINGTON, TX 76011-4511

EA-14-024

Adam Heflin, President and Chief Executive Officer Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation P.O. Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839

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Sincerely,

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Mark Haire, Branch Chief Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety

Docket No. 50-482 License No. NPF-42

**Enclosures:** 

Inspection Report 05000482/2014502

cc: Electronic Distribution for Wolf Creek Generating Station

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File Located: R:\\_REACTORS\\_Errata WC 2013502 Letter IR2014502.docx (ML14167A202)

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ADAMS PACKAGE NUMBER: ML14167A188

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DATE	6/13	3/14								

Letter to Adam Heflin from Mark S. Haire, dated June 13, 2014

SUBJECT: ERRATA, NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000482/2013502, WOLF CREEK **GENERATING STATION** 

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# UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV 1600 E. LAMAR BLVD. ARLINGTON, TX 76011-4511

April 2, 2014

EA-14-024

Adam Heflin, President and Chief Executive Officer Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation P.O. Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839

SUBJECT: WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC BASELINE INSPECTION

REPORT 05000482/2014502, PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING

Dear Mr. Heflin:

This letter refers to the in-office and onsite inspections conducted September 3, 2013, through March 4, 2014, for the Wolf Creek Generating Station. The inspection was a baseline evaluation of your emergency preparedness program through observation of emergency response organization performance during the November 5, 2013, biennial exercise. The enclosed report presents the results of this inspection. The inspectors discussed the preliminary inspection findings with you and your staff at the conclusion of the on-site portion of the inspection. Additional telephone discussions occurred on September 30, 2013, and January 27, February 10, and February 20, 2014. A final exit briefing was conducted with you and your staff on March 4, 2014.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions in your license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of an examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of emergency preparedness activities, and interviews with personnel.

This inspection identified a finding that has preliminarily been determined to be a White finding with low to moderate safety significance that may require additional NRC inspection. The finding is associated with a failure to maintain adequate methods for assessing the potential consequences of a radiological emergency condition in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9). This deficiency was corrected on February 25, 2014. This finding is also an apparent violation of NRC requirements and is being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, which can be found on the NRC's Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/ enforcement/enforce-pol.html.

The preliminary low to moderate safety significance (White) finding was assessed based on the best available information, using the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process (SDP) and the NRC Enforcement Policy. The basis for the NRC's preliminary significance determination is described in the enclosed report. The final resolution of this finding will be conveyed in separate correspondence.

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In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, we intend to complete our evaluation of the White finding using the best available information, and issue our final determination of safety significance within 90 days of the date of this letter. The significance determination process encourages an open dialogue between the NRC staff and the licensee; however, the dialogue should not impact the timeliness of the staff's final determination. Before we make a final decision on this matter, we are providing you with an opportunity to attend a Regulatory Conference where you can present to the NRC your perspective on the facts and assumptions the NRC used to arrive at the finding and assess its significance, or submit your position on the finding to the NRC in writing.

If you request a Regulatory Conference, it should be held within 30 days of the receipt of this letter and we encourage you to submit supporting documentation at least one week prior to the Conference in an effort to make the Conference more efficient and effective. The focus of the Regulatory Conference is to discuss the significance of the finding and not necessarily what the root cause is or corrective action(s) associated with the finding. If a Conference is held, it will be open for public observation and a public meeting notice and press release will be issued to announce the conference. If you decide to submit only a written response, such submittal should be sent to the NRC within 30 days of your receipt of this letter. If you decline to request a Conference or to submit a written response, you relinquish your right to appeal the final SDP determination, in that by not doing either, you fail to meet the appeal requirements stated in the Prerequisite and Limitation Sections of Attachment 2 of IMC 0609.

Please contact Mr. Mark Haire, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1, at 817-200-1527, within 10 days from the issue date of this letter to notify the NRC of your intentions. If we have not heard from you within 10 days, we will continue with our significance determination and enforcement decision. Since the NRC has not made a final determination in these matters, no Notice of Violation is being issued for these inspection findings at this time. In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of the apparent violation may change as a result of further NRC review.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice and Procedure," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at <a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html">http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html</a>. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy or proprietary information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.

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If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. Mark Haire, Branch Chief, Plant Support Branch 1, at 817-200-1527, or Mr. Paul Elkmann, Senior Inspector, Plant Support Branch 1, at 817-200-1539.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jeffrey A. Clark, Acting Director Division of Reactor Safety

Docket No. 50-482 License No. NPF-42

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000482/2014502 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

Electronic Distribution for Wolf Creek Generating Station

- 4 -A. Heflin

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#### ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML14092A618

ADAMS: □ No ⊠Yes			⊠ SUNSI	Review Complete	Reviewer Initials: PJE	
SUNSI Review Complete:   Yes  Pu				y Available   Non-Sensitive		
			□ Non-publicly Available		□ Sensitive	
SEPI:PSB1 EPI:PSB1 C:P			PSB1	RI:WC/DRP/B	C:DRP/B	SES:ACES
PElkmann	GGuerra	MHaire		RStroble	NO'Keefe	RBrowder
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	C:ACES	NSIR-BC		D/DRP	AD/DRS	
	VCampbell	mpbell R.Kahler		KKennedy	JClark	
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# U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV

Docket: 05000482

License: NPF-42

Report: 05000482/2014502

Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation

Facility: Wolf Creek Generating Station

Location: 1550 Oxen Lane NE, Burlington, Kansas

Dates: September 3, 2013, through March 4, 2014

Inspectors: P. Elkmann, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector

G. Guerra, CHP, Emergency Preparedness Inspector

R. Stroble, Resident Inspector N. Okonkwo, Reactor Inspector

Approved By: Mark S. Haire,

Chief, Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety

- 1 - Enclosure

#### SUMMARY

IR 05000482/2014502; 09/03/2013 – 03/04/2014; Wolf Creek Generating Station, Regional Report; Emergency Plan Biennial Exercise, 71114.01, 71114.05

The report covered an announced baseline inspection by region-based and resident inspectors. One apparent violation was identified whose significance has not been determined. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process." The cross-cutting aspect is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, "Components Within the Cross Cutting Areas." The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

#### A. <u>NRC-Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings</u>

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

• <u>TBD</u>. An apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) was identified involving the failure to maintain adequate methods for assessing the actual or potential consequences of a radiological emergency between September 2012 and November 2013, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9). During an exercise conducted on November 13, 2012, the licensee identified that the Electronic Dose Calculation Program did not accurately calculate the consequences of a radiological release through the main vent stack with the effluent monitor in accident mode. The inaccurate calculation was corrected on February 25, 2014.

The inspectors determined the failure to maintain a dose assessment process capable of providing a technically adequate estimate of offsite dose was a performance deficiency within the licensee's control. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the emergency response organization performance and the Facilities and Equipment cornerstone attributes. This finding was evaluated using the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process and was preliminarily determined to be of low to moderate safety significance (White) because it was a degraded risk significant planning standard function. The planning standard function was degraded because between September 13, 2012, and November 8, 2013, some calculations used to assess the offsite consequences of a radiological release were inaccurate. This issue has been entered into the licensee's corrective action system as Condition Report 2013-0076247 (Section 1EP5).

#### REPORT DETAILS

#### 1. REACTOR SAFETY

**Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness** 

#### **1EP1** Exercise Evaluation (71114.01)

#### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the biennial emergency preparedness exercise conducted, November 5, 2013, to determine if the exercise acceptably tested major elements of the emergency plan and provided opportunities to demonstrate key emergency response organization skills. The scenario simulated the following to demonstrate the licensee personnel's capability to implement their emergency plan:

- An earthquake with a strong aftershock
- An automatic plant trip with control rods that fail to insert
- A reactor coolant system leak inside containment that increases over time
- Failures of primary and auxiliary feed pumps to the steam generators
- A fire in a charcoal filter that causes the radiological release to be unfiltered
- A failure of the containment purge system that creates a monitored release to the environment

The inspectors evaluated exercise performance by focusing on the risk significant activities of event classification, offsite notification, recognition of offsite dose consequences, and development of protective action recommendations, in the Control Room Simulator and the following dedicated emergency response facilities:

- Technical Support Center
- Operations Support Center
- Emergency Operations Facility

The inspectors also assessed recognition of, and response to, abnormal and emergency plant conditions, the transfer of decision making authority and emergency function responsibilities between facilities, onsite and offsite communications, protection of emergency workers, emergency repair evaluation and capability, and the overall implementation of the emergency plan to protect public health and safety and the environment. The inspectors reviewed the facility emergency plan, the emergency plan implementing procedures associated with operation of the emergency response facilities, the procedures for the performance of associated emergency functions, and other documents as listed in the attachment to this report.

The inspectors compared the observed exercise performance with the requirements in the facility emergency plan; 10 CFR 50.47(b); 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E; and with the guidance in the emergency plan implementing procedures and other federal guidance.

The inspectors attended the post-exercise critiques in each emergency response facility to evaluate the initial licensee self-assessment of exercise performance. The inspectors also attended a subsequent formal presentation of critique items to plant management. The specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.01-05.

#### b. <u>Findings</u>

No findings were identified.

#### **1EP5** Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness (71114.05)

#### a. <u>Inspection Scope</u>

The inspectors performed an in-office and on-site review of the licensee's response to Condition Report 59832, dated November 13, 2013, which documented a potential inaccuracy in the Emergency Dose Assessment Program identified during an exercise conducted November 13, 2012.

#### b. Findings

Introduction. An apparent violation was identified involving the failure to maintain adequate methods for assessing the actual or potential consequences of a radiological emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9). Specifically, the licensee's dose assessment model incorrectly calculated the concentration of iodine and particulate radioactive material released through the main vent stack when the effluent monitor was in accident mode. This resulted in inaccurate dose assessments between September 13, 2012, and November 8, 2013.

<u>Description</u>. A deficiency was identified that degraded the licensee's ability to accurately assess the offsite dose consequences of a radiological release. The NRC determined that, on November 13, 2012, the licensee had identified that its Electronic Dose Calculation Program (EDCP, radiological assessment software) was potentially inaccurate, and as of November 5, 2013, had not evaluated or corrected the inaccuracy.

The NRC observed that the licensee dose assessor participating in the November 5, 2013, emergency preparedness exercise was knowledgeable about an inaccuracy in the Electronic Dose Calculation Program (licensee's radiological assessment software). The inspectors subsequently reviewed Condition Report 00059832, "E-Plan Drill, Potential Incorrect EDCP Dose Assessments," dated November 13, 2012, which documented a potential inaccuracy in EDCP calculations using the main vent stack radiation monitor that was identified during an exercise conducted November 13, 2012.

In its normal operating mode, the main vent stack effluent radiation monitor reports separate release rates for total noble gasses, radioactive lodine, and radioactive particulates. In 'accident mode' the iodine and particulate release rates are not measured because the detectors are manually isolated. The inspectors determined that Control Room personnel place this monitor in accident mode when the noble gas channel reaches a value of 3530 microCuries per second (µCi/s) and goes into Alert Alarm. When the main vent stack radiation monitor is in accident mode, EDCP compensates by calculating assumed iodine and particulate release rates, using a noble gas to iodine ratio. A default ratio of 10 is assumed (e.g., the iodine release rate is set to 10 percent of the measured noble gas release rate). Users identified that during the November 13, 2012, exercise; EDCP did not appear to be applying the expected noble gas to iodine ratio when the vent stack radiation monitor was in accident mode. On

November 7, 2013, the licensee confirmed that EDCP was not correctly applying the default noble gas to iodine ratio when the monitor was in accident mode, resulting in an overestimate of the concentration of iodine and particulates by a factor of 10, and an overestimate of the Thyroid Committed Dose Equivalent. The licensee put interim compensatory measures in place on November 8, 2013, to ensure that inaccurate information was not used in the determining protective action recommendations; the licensee directed that dose assessment be considered as 'not available' when a radiological release was through the main stack with the effluent radiation monitor in accident mode. The licensee determined this problem existed in EDCP, Version 4.7, implemented on September 13, 2012, and in EDCP, Version 4.8, implemented on October 28, 2013.

EDCP is a licensee-written program, maintained by the licensee's Information Systems Department. The licensee initiated Service Request 126710 to the Information Systems Department on January 10, 2013, to investigate the apparent inaccuracies in EDCP calculations and, if confirmed, to correct the problem. The licensee reported on November 7, 2013, that the Information Systems Department had not performed any work on Service Request 126710, and that an analyst and due date were not currently assigned. The licensee corrected the inaccurate calculation in EDCP, Version 4.9, implemented on February 25, 2014.

The inspectors determined that Chemistry Technicians were trained as Dose Assessors and Chemists were trained as Radiological Assessment Coordinators. Training for these individuals was conducted during routinely scheduled chemistry department training sessions. The licensee informed the chemistry technicians and chemists about the apparent inaccuracy in EDCP calculations during training cycles 13-Q2, April 15 through May 21, 2013, and 13-Q3, July 8 through August 15, 2013.

Analysis. The inspectors determined that the failure to maintain a dose assessment process capable of providing a technically adequate estimate of offsite dose is a performance deficiency within the licensee's control. This finding is more than minor because it affected the licensee's ability to implement adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public. The finding also affected the facilities and equipment and emergency response organizations performance cornerstone attributes. The finding was associated with a violation of NRC requirements. This finding was evaluated using IMC 0609, Appendix B, "Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process," and was evaluated in accordance with Attachment 2. The finding was preliminarily determined to be of low to moderate safety significance (White) because it was a failure to comply with NRC requirements and was a degraded risk significant planning standard function. The planning standard function was degraded because methods to assess the offsite consequences of a radiological release via the main vent stack pathway were inaccurate between September 13, 2012, and November 8, 2013. However, these errors did not affect other calculations performed by the EDCP. This issue has been entered into the licensee's corrective action system as Condition Report 2013-0076247. A cross-cutting aspect of evaluation in the problem identification and resolution area was assigned to this finding because the finding is representative of current performance and the licensee failed to promptly evaluate whether a problem existed with the Electronic Dose Calculation Program after an issue was raised following the November 13, 2012. EP exercise. The licensee failed to verify the existence of a safety-significant problem and subsequently, failed to resolve the problem within a timeframe appropriate to its safety significance [P.2].

<u>Enforcement.</u> Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50.54(q)(2), requires, in part, that the holder of a nuclear power reactor operating license shall follow and maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b). Title 10 CFR Part 50.47(b)(9) requires, in part, that the onsite and offsite emergency response plans must use adequate methods for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition.

Contrary to the above, between September 13, 2012, and November 8, 2013, the licensee failed to maintain an emergency plan that used adequate methods for assessing and monitoring the actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition. Specifically, a calculational error in the licensee's Electronic Dose Calculation Program resulted in inaccurate offsite doses for the main vent stack pathway when the effluent radiation monitor was in the accident mode: AV 05000482/2014502-01 (Failure to Maintain Accurate Methods for Dose Assessment).

#### 1EP8 Exercise Evaluation (71114.08)

#### a. Inspection Scope

The licensee submitted the preliminary scenario for the 2013 biennial emergency preparedness exercise on September 3, 2013, in accordance with the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, Part IV.F(2)(b). The inspectors performed an in-office review of the preliminary exercise scenario to determine whether the scenario would acceptably test the major elements of the licensee's emergency plan and provided opportunities to demonstrate the key emergency response organization skills.

#### b. Findings

No findings were identified.

#### 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

#### **40A1** Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

#### .13 Drill/Exercise Performance (EP01)

#### a. <u>Inspection Scope</u>

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Drill and Exercise Performance, performance indicator for the period July 2012 through September 2013. The definitions and guidance of Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 6, were used to determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported to the NRC. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's records associated with the performance indicator to verify that the licensee accurately reported the indicator in accordance with relevant procedures and the Nuclear Energy Institute guidance. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed licensee records and processes including procedural guidance on assessing opportunities for the performance indicator; assessments of performance indicator opportunities during predesignated control room simulator training sessions, performance during the 2013 biennial exercise, and performance during other drills. The specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.

These activities constitute completion of the drill/exercise performance sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.

#### b. <u>Findings</u>

No findings were identified.

#### .14 <u>Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation (EP02)</u>

#### a. <u>Inspection Scope</u>

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation performance indicator for the period July 2012 through September 2013. The definitions and guidance of Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 6, were used to determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported to the NRC. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's records associated with the performance indicator to verify that the licensee accurately reported the indicator in accordance with relevant procedures and the Nuclear Energy Institute guidance. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed licensee records and processes including procedural guidance on assessing opportunities for the performance indicator, rosters of personnel assigned to key emergency response organization positions, and exercise participation records. The specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.

These activities constitute completion of the emergency response organization drill participation sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.

#### b. Findings

No findings were identified.

#### .15 Alert and Notification System (EP03)

#### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Alert and Notification System performance indicator for the period July 2012 through September 2013. The definitions and guidance of Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 6, were used to determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported to the NRC. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's records associated with the performance indicator to verify that the licensee accurately reported the indicator in accordance with relevant procedures and the Nuclear Energy Institute guidance. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed licensee records and processes including procedural guidance on assessing opportunities for the performance indicator and the results of periodic alert notification system operability tests. The specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.

These activities constitute completion of the alert and notification system sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.

#### b. Findings

No findings were identified.

#### **40A6 Meetings**

#### **Exit Meeting Summary**

On September 30, 2013, the inspectors discussed the preliminary scenario for the 2013 biennial exercise with Mr. T. East, Superintendent of Emergency Planning, and other members of the licensee's staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented.

On November 8, 2013, the inspectors presented the results of the onsite inspection of the licensee's biennial emergency preparedness exercise to Mr. M. Sunseri, President and Chief Executive Officer, and other members of the licensee's staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

On March 4, 2014, the inspectors discussed an apparent violation identified as a result of the November 5, 2013, biennial exercise with Mr. A. Heflin, President and Chief Executive Officer, and other members of the licensee's staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented.

## **SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION**

#### **KEY POINTS OF CONTACT**

## Licensee Personnel

- P. Bedgood, Manager, Radiation Protection
- J. Broschak, Vice President, Engineering
- A. Broyles, Manager, Information Systems
- A. Camp, Plant Manager
- R. Clemens, Vice President, Strategic Projects
- D. Dees, Superintendent, Operations Support
- T. East, Superintendent, Emergency Preparedness
- D. Erbe, Manager, Security
- R. Flannigan, Manager, Nuclear Engineering
- A. Heflin, President and Chief Executive Officer
- S. Henry, Manager, Operations
- R. Hobby, Licensing Engineer
- W. Muilenburg, Supervisor, Licensing
- L. Ratzlaff, Manager, Maintenance
- E. Ray, Manager, Training
- R. Rumas, Manager, Quality
- R. Smith, Site Vice President
- M. Sunseri, President and Chief Executive Officer
- M. Westman, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- J. Yunk, Manager, Corrective Actions

#### LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

#### Opened

05000482/2014502-01 AV Failure to Maintain Accurate Methods for Dose Assessment

#### LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

#### **Section 1EP1: Exercise Evaluation**

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	Revision/Date
APF 06-002-01	Emergency Action Levels	17
AP 17C-028	Emergency Response Duties and Responsibilities	13
EP 06-001	Control Room Operations	19
EP 06-002	Technical Support Center Operations	34A
EP 06-003	Emergency Operations Facility Operations	20A

A-1 Attachment

# **Section 1EP1: Exercise Evaluation**

Number	<u>Title</u>	Revision/Date
EP 06-005	Emergency Classification	7
EP 06-006	Protective Action Recommendations	9
EP 06-007	Emergency Notifications	20A
EP 06-009	Drill and Exercise Requirements	8
EP 06-011	Emergency Team Formation and Control	8
EP 06-012	Dose Assessment, Oct-28-2013	13
EP 06-012	Dose Assessment, Sep-13-2012	12B
EP 06-015	Emergency Response Organization Callout	12B
	Follow-up Assessment and Report, January 13, 2012, Event	
	Follow-up Assessment and Report, March 4, 2013, Event	January 26, 2012
	Follow-up Assessment and Report, March 16, 2013, Event	March 5, 2013
	Follow-up Assessment and Report, April 13, 2013, Event	March 16, 2013
	2009 Biennial Exercise Scenario Timeline	April 23, 2013
11-EVAL-EX	Exercise Scenario Timeline	
13-PRE-01	Exercise Scenario Timeline	
13-PRE-02	Exercise Scenario Timeline	
	Evaluation Report for the August 9, 2012, Exercise	
	Evaluation Report for the October 23, 2012, Exercise	
	Evaluation Report for the November 6, 2012, Exercise	
	Evaluation Report for the November 13, 2012, Exercise	
	Evaluation Report for the July 8, 2013, Exercise	
	Evaluation Report for the July 10, 2013, Exercise	
	Evaluation Report for the August 20, 2013, Exercise	
	Evaluation Report for the August 22, 2013, Exercise	
	Evaluation Report for the October 9, 2013, Exercise	

# **Section 1EP5: Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness**

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	Revision/Date
CE 22 356 10	Workbook: Offsite Dose Projection using EDCP Workbook, June 26, 2012	1
CE 12 356 10	Lesson Plan: Offsite Dose Projection using EDCP, June 26, 2012	11
GE 13 356 01	Lesson Plan: E-Plan Dynamic Learning Activity for Chemistry Technicians, April 2, 2013	2
	Email, Ken Thrall, to Shift Managers, Technical Support Center Site Emergency Managers, and Emergency	November 7, 2013

# **Section 1EP5: Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness**

Number	<u>Number</u> <u>Title</u>				Revision/Date					
		Operations Facility Offsite Emergency Managers								
		Unit Ver	November 7, 2013							
Service Request 126710		EDCP is	January 8, 2013							
		Weekly								
		Cycle 1								
Weekly Schedu				•	•	3				
		Cycle 13-Q3, July 8 to August 15, 2013								
Canditian Da		(Camaa)	iliya Aatian Oy	-t)						
Condition Re	eports	(Correct	ive Action Sy	<u>stem)</u>						
48268	4924	.0	50872	51428	54279	55060	55066			
55071	5955	4	59832	67808	68404	70209	70212			
70220	7022	9	70876	70899	71332	71347	72965			

## <u>Miscellaneous</u>

#### **Section 40A1: Performance Indicator Verification**

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	Revision
EP 06-019	Alert and Notification System Sirens	7
EP 06-022	Tone Alert Radio Maintenance/Compensatory Actions	5
AI 26A-004	Emergency Planning Performance Indicators	6
AP 34-003	Performance Indicator Program	0A

## Miscellaneous Documents

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<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	Revision
AP 06-002	Wolf Creek Station Radiological Emergency Response	15