

Charles R. Pierce
Regulatory Affairs Director

Southern Nuclear
Operating Company, Inc.
40 Inverness Center Parkway
Post Office Box 1295
Birmingham, Alabama 35201

Tel 205.992.7872
Fax 205.992.7601



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NL-14-0635

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant
License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications
Reactor Trip System Instrumentation

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.90, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) proposes to revise the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS). The proposed amendment would modify Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.1 and Surveillance Requirements (SR) 3.2.4.2 in order to avoid confusion as to when a flux map for quadrant power tilt ratio (QPTR) monitoring is required. Appropriate TS Bases changes would be made consistent with the TS changes.

Enclosures 1 through 3 provide the Basis for Proposed Change, Markup of Proposed Technical Specifications and Bases pages, and Clean Type Technical Specifications pages in support of the amendment request.

It has been determined that this amendment application does not involve a significant hazard consideration as determined per 10 CFR 50.92. Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment needs to be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

SNC requests approval of the proposed license amendments by 5/31/2015. The proposed changes would be implemented within 120 days of issuance of the amendment.


This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please contact Ken McElroy at (205) 992-7369.

Mr. C. R. Pierce states he is Regulatory Affairs Director of Southern Nuclear Operating Company, is authorized to execute this oath on behalf of Southern Nuclear Operating Company and, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the facts set forth in this letter are true.


Respectfully submitted,



C. R. Pierce
Regulatory Affairs Director



Sworn to and subscribed before me this 3 day of June, 2014.



Laura L. Croston
Notary Public

My commission expires: 10/8/2017

CRP/RMJ

Enclosures:

1. Basis for Proposed Change
2. Markup of Proposed Technical Specifications and Bases Pages
3. Clean Typed Technical Specifications Pages

cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company
Mr. S. E. Kuczynski, Chairman, President & CEO
Mr. D. G. Bost, Executive Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer
Ms. C. A. Gayheart, Vice President – Farley
Mr. B. L. Ivey, Vice President – Regulatory Affairs
Mr. D. R. Madison, Vice President – Fleet Operations
Mr. B. J. Adams, Vice President - Engineering
RTYPE: CFA04.054

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mr. V. M. McCree, Regional Administrator
Mr. S. A. Williams, NRR Project Manager - Farley
Mr. P. K. Niebaum, Senior Resident Inspector - Farley
Mr. J. R. Sowa, Resident Inspector - Farley

Alabama Department of Public Health
Dr. D. E. Williamson, State Health Officer

**Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant
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Enclosure 1

Basis for Proposed Change

Enclosure 1
Basis for Proposed Change

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1. Summary Description

Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) proposes to revise the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS). The proposed amendment would modify Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.1 and Surveillance Requirements (SR) 3.2.4.2 in order to avoid confusion as to when a flux map for quadrant power tilt ratio (QPTR) monitoring is required. The following is a detailed description of the proposed changes:

- SR 3.2.4.2, "Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio," the Note is revised to be consistent with the changes to LCO 3.3.1. The frequency is revised to be consistent with the intent of the previous Note.
- LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation," a Note is added to refer to LCO 3.2.4 for one Power Range Neutron Flux channel inoperable (Condition D). The existing Note becomes Note 1 and the new Note is Note 2.
- LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation," Required Actions D.1.2, D.2.1 and D.2.2 are deleted. The remaining Required Actions are renumbered accordingly.

Appropriate TS Bases changes would be made consistent with the TS changes.

2. Background

Amendment No. 180/173 approved the incorporation of WCAP-14333. In this application, LCO 3.3.1, Condition D was revised to allow 72 hours to place a channel in trip as opposed to 6 hours, but the requirement to perform SR 3.2.4.2 in Required Action D.2.2 remained once per 12 hours. As a result, there is a potential for confusion with the layout of the current TS 3.3.1, Condition D. TS LCO 3.3.1, Condition D could incorrectly lead an operator to believe that he could pursue the option of Required Actions D.1.1 and D.1.2, potentially overlooking the requirement to do a flux map for QPTR within 12 hours. In addition, Required Actions with shorter Completion Times (12 hours) should appear before Required Actions with longer Completion Times (72 hours) in the D.2.1 and D.2.2 option. Deleting Required Action D.1.2, D.2.1 and D.2.2 from LCO 3.3.1, Condition D eliminates requirements that are duplicative to LCO 3.2.4, thereby eliminating the potential for confusion. Finally, SR 3.2.4.2 is revised to be consistent with the proposed changes to LCO 3.3.1, Condition D.

3. Technical Evaluation

Amendment No. 180/173 approved relaxation of allowed bypass test times and Completion Times for Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation." These relaxations are those that were generically approved in WCAP-14333-P-A, Revision 1, "Probabilistic Risk Analysis of the RPS and ESFAS Test Times and Completion Times." The amendment allowed completion Times of 72 hours for inoperable analog instruments, and bypass times of 12 hours for surveillance testing of analog channels.

Condition D applies to the Power Range Neutron Flux channel. If one channel is inoperable, then the channel must be placed in trip within 72 hours as stated in Required Action D.1.1. In addition to placing the inoperable channel in the tripped condition, the Required Action in D.1.2 requires the thermal power reduced to $\leq 75\%$ RTP within 78 hours. An alternate to D.1.1 and D.1.2 is to place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition and perform SR 3.2.4.2 once every 12 hours.

Alternatively, LCO 3.2.4, SR 3.2.4.2 requires a flux map to be performed whenever input from one or more Power Range Neutron Flux channels is inoperable with power $> 75\%$ RTP. This flux map must currently be performed once within 12 hours and every 12 hours thereafter. The requirement for every 12 hours thereafter is listed in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The existing layout of LCO 3.3.1, Condition D could incorrectly lead an operator to believe that they could pursue just the option of D.1.1 and D.1.2, potentially overlooking the requirement to do a flux map for QPTR within 12 hours. The proposed amendment would revise TS 3.3.1 Condition D to avoid confusion as to when a flux map for QPTR is required.

Per this amendment request, LCO 3.3.1 Required Actions D.1.2, D.2.1 and D.2.2 are deleted. The LCO 3.3.1 Condition D Note is modified to direct the operator to refer to LCO 3.2.4 for an inoperable power range channel. The requirement to perform SR 3.2.4.2 is defined in LCO 3.2.4. The Note to existing SR 3.2.4.2 is revised to state that SR 3.2.4.2 is only required when the Power Range Neutron Flux input to QPTR is inoperable. If the otherwise inoperable power range channel remains capable of providing a valid input to QPTR, there is no need to perform SR 3.2.4.2. This is consistent with the existing requirements of LCO 3.3.1, Condition D that are proposed for deletion. This proposed change will help eliminate potential confusion regarding the completion time to perform SR 3.2.4.2.

4. Regulatory Evaluation

4.1 Significant Hazards Consideration

Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) proposes to revise the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS). The proposed amendment would modify Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.1 and Surveillance Requirements (SR) 3.2.4.2. The proposed amendment will better align the requirement to perform a flux map once per 12 hours with LCO 3.2.4. The following is a detailed description of the proposed changes.

- LCO 3.3.1, "RTS Instrumentation," a Note is added to refer to LCO 3.2.4 for an Inoperable Power Range Channel. The existing Note becomes Note 1 and the new Note is Note 2.
- LCO 3.3.1, "RTS Instrumentation," Required Actions D.1.2, D.2.1 and D.2.2 are deleted. The remaining Required Actions are renumbered accordingly.

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Basis for Proposed Change**

- **SR 3.2.4.2, "QPTR," the Note is revised to be consistent with the changes to LCO 3.3.1.**

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), SNC has evaluated the proposed changes to the FNP TS using the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92 and has determined that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration. An analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:

- 1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?**

Response: No

The proposed changes do not adversely affect accident initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, conditions, or configuration of the facility or the manner in which the plant is operated and maintained. The proposed changes do not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) from performing their intended function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed changes do not affect the source term, containment isolation, or radiological release assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Further, the proposed changes do not increase the types or amounts of radioactive effluent that may be released offsite, nor significantly increase individual or cumulative occupational/public radiation exposures. The proposed changes are consistent with safety analysis assumptions and resultant consequences.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

- 2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?**

Response: No

The proposed changes do not result in a change in the manner in which the RTS and ESFAS provide plant protection. The RTS and ESFAS will continue to have the same setpoints after the proposed changes are implemented. There are no design changes associated with the license amendment.

The changes do not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. In addition, the changes do not impose any new or different requirements or eliminate any existing requirements. The changes do not alter

assumptions made in the safety analysis. The proposed changes are consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and current plant operating practice.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No

The proposed changes do not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for operation are determined. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are not impacted by these changes. Redundant RTS and ESFAS trains are maintained, and diversity with regard to the signals that provide reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation is also maintained. All signals credited as primary or secondary, and all operator actions credited in the accident analyses will remain the same. The proposed changes will not result in plant operation in a configuration outside the design basis.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Based upon the above analysis, SNC concludes that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), "Issuance of Amendment," and accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

4.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements / Criteria

The regulatory bases and guidance documents associated with the system discussed in this amendment applications included:

GDC-2 requires that structures, systems, and components important to safety be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without the loss of the capability to perform their safety functions.

GDC-13 requires that instrumentation shall be provided to monitor variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for normal operation, for anticipated operational occurrences, and for accident conditions as appropriate to assure adequate safety, including those variables and systems that can affect the fission process, the integrity of the reactor core, the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and the containment and its associated systems.

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GDC-20 requires that the protection system(s) shall be designed (1) to initiate automatically the operation of appropriate systems including the reactivity control systems, to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences and (2) to sense accident conditions and to initiate the operation of systems and components important to safety.

GDC-21 requires that the protection system(s) shall be designed for high functional reliability and testability.

GDC-22 through GDC-25 and GDC-29 require various design attributes for the protection system(s), including independence, safe failure modes, separation from control systems, requirements for reactivity control malfunctions, and protection against anticipated operational occurrences.

Regulatory Guide 1.22 discusses an acceptable method of satisfying GDC-20 and GDC-21 regarding the periodic testing of protection system actuation functions. These periodic tests should duplicate, as closely as practicable, the performance that is required of the actuation devices in the event of an accident.

10 CFR 50.55a(h) requires that the protection systems meet IEEE 279-1971. Section 4.2 of IEEE 279-1971 discusses the general functional requirement for protection systems to assure they satisfy the single failure criterion.

There will be no changes to the RTS instrumentation design such that compliance with any of the regulatory requirements and guidance documents above would come into question. The above evaluations confirm that the plant will continue to comply with all applicable regulatory requirements.

4.3 Precedent

The NRC approved a similar TS change for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant by letter dated August 15, 2006 (Package No. ML061880216).

4.4 Conclusions

In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

5. Environmental Considerations

SNC has evaluated the proposed change and determine that the proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or a significant increase in the amounts of any

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effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

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Enclosure 2

Markup of Proposed Technical Specifications and Bases Pages

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.2.4.1</p> <p style="text-align: center;">NOTES</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. With input from one Power Range Neutron Flux channel inoperable and THERMAL POWER \leq 75% RTP, the remaining three power range channels can be used for calculating QPTR. 2. SR 3.2.4.2 may be performed in lieu of this Surveillance. <hr/> <p>Verify QPTR is within limit by calculation.</p>	<p>In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program</p>
<p>SR 3.2.4.2</p> <p style="text-align: center;">NOTE</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 5px 0;"> <p>Not required to be performed until 12 hours after input from one or more Power Range Neutron Flux channels are inoperable with THERMAL POWER $>$ 75% RTP.</p> </div> <hr/> <p>Confirm that the normalized symmetric power distribution is consistent with QPTR.</p>	<p>In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program</p>

Only required to be performed if input to QPTR from one or more Power Range Neutron Flux channels is inoperable with THERMAL POWER $>$ 75% RTP.

Once within 12 hours
AND

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
C. One channel or train inoperable.	C.1 Restore channel or train to OPERABLE status.	48 hours
	OR C.2 Open RTBs. S	49 hours
D. One Power Range Neutron Flux channel inoperable. 1.	<p style="text-align: center;">-----NOTE----- S</p> <p>The inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing and setpoint adjustment of other channels.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">-----</p>	
	D.1 1 Place channel in trip.	72 hours
	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>D.1.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER to \leq 75% RTP.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>D.2.1 Place channel in trip.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p>	78 hours 72 hours
		(continued)

2. Refer to LCO 3.2.4 for an inoperable power range channel.

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
D. (continued)	<p><u>D.2.2</u> <u>NOTE</u> Only required to be performed when the Power Range Neutron Flux input to QPTR is inoperable.</p> <hr/> Perform SR 3.2.4.2.	Once per 12 hours
	<p><u>OR</u> 2</p> <p><u>D.3</u> Be in MODE 3.</p>	78 hours
E. One channel inoperable.	<p>-----<u>NOTE</u>----- The inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing of other channels.</p> <hr/>	
	<p>E.1 Place channel in trip.</p>	72 hours
	<p><u>OR</u></p> <p>E.2 Be in MODE 3.</p>	78 hours
F. THERMAL POWER > P-6 and < P-10, one Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channel inoperable.	<p>F.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-6.</p>	24 hours
	<p><u>OR</u></p> <p>F.2 Increase THERMAL POWER to > P-10.</p>	24 hours

BASES

ACTIONS

A.6 (continued)

surveillances performed at operating power levels, which can only be accomplished after the excore detectors are normalized to restore QPTR to within limits and the core returned to power.

B.1

If Required Actions A.1 through A.6 are not completed within their associated Completion Times, the unit must be brought to a MODE or condition in which the requirements do not apply. To achieve this status, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to < 50% RTP within 4 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience regarding the amount of time required to reach the reduced power level without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.2.4.1

SR 3.2.4.1 is modified by two Notes. Note 1 allows QPTR to be calculated with three power range channels if THERMAL POWER is $\leq 75\%$ RTP and the input from one Power Range Neutron Flux channel is inoperable. Note 2 allows performance of SR 3.2.4.2 in lieu of SR 3.2.4.1.

This Surveillance verifies that the QPTR, as indicated by the Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) excore channels, is within its limits. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. For those causes of QPT that occur quickly (e.g., a dropped rod), there typically are other indications of abnormality that prompt a verification of core power tilt.

the surveillance is only required to be performed if input to QPTR from one or more Power Range Neutron Flux channels is inoperable with

SR 3.2.4.2

This Surveillance is modified by a Note, which states that ~~it is not required until 12 hours after the input from one or more Power Range Neutron Flux channels are inoperable and the THERMAL POWER is >75% RTP.~~

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1 and C.2 (continued)

within the allowed 48 hour Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the RTBs must be opened within the next hour. The additional hour provides sufficient time to accomplish the action in an orderly manner. With the RTBs open, these Functions are no longer required.

The Completion Time is reasonable considering that in this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the safety function, and given the low probability of an event occurring during this interval.

~~D.1.1, D.1.2, D.2.1, D.2.2,~~ and D.3 < 2

Condition D applies to the Power Range Neutron Flux — High and Power Range Neutron Flux – High Positive Rate Functions.

The NIS has a two-out-of-four trip logic. A known inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition. This results in a partial trip condition requiring only one-out-of-three logic for actuation. The 72 hours allowed to place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition is justified in WCAP-14333-P-A (Ref. 11).

Insert A



~~In addition to placing the inoperable channel in the tripped condition, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to $\leq 75\%$ RTP within 78 hours. Reducing the power level prevents operation of the core with radial power distributions beyond the design limits. With one of the NIS power range detectors inoperable, 1/4 of the radial power distribution monitoring capability is lost.~~

~~As an alternative to the above actions, the inoperable channel can be placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours and the QPTR monitored once every 12 hours as per SR 3.2.4.2, QPTR verification. Calculating QPTR every 12 hours compensates for the lost monitoring capability due to the inoperable NIS power range channel and allows continued unit operation at power levels $\geq 75\%$ RTP. The 12 hour Frequency is consistent with LCO 3.2.4, "QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR)."~~

(continued)

Insert A

The Required Actions have been modified by two Notes. Note 1 allows a channel to be placed in the bypassed condition for up to 12 hours while performing routine surveillance testing. With one channel inoperable, the Note also allows routine surveillance testing of another channel with a channel in bypass. The Note also allows placing a channel in the bypass condition to allow setpoint adjustments when required to reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High setpoint in accordance with other Technical Specifications. The 12 hour time limit is justified in Reference 11.

Note 2 refers the user to LCO 3.2.4 for additional requirements that may apply for an inoperable power range channel.

BASES

ACTIONS

~~D.1.1, D.1.2, D.2.1, D.2.2~~ and D.3 (continued)

2

beyond the
Completion
Time for
Required
Action D.1

As an alternative to the above Actions, the plant must be placed in a MODE where this Function is no longer required OPERABLE. Seventy-eight (78) hours are allowed to place the plant in MODE 3. The 78 hour Completion Time includes ~~72 hours for channel corrective maintenance,~~ and an additional 6 hours for the MODE reduction ~~as required by Required Action D.3.~~ This is a reasonable time, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. ~~If Required Actions cannot be completed within their allowed Completion Times, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered.~~

~~The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows placing the inoperable channel in the bypass condition for up to 12 hours while performing routine surveillance testing of other channels. The Note also allows placing the inoperable channel in the bypass condition to allow setpoint adjustments of other channels when required to reduce the setpoint in accordance with other Technical Specifications. The 12 hour time limit is justified in Reference 11.~~

~~Required Action D.2.2 has been modified by a Note which only requires SR 3.2.4.2 to be performed if the Power Range Neutron Flux input to QPTR becomes inoperable. Failure of a component in the Power Range Neutron Flux Channel which renders the Trip Function inoperable may not affect the capability to monitor QPTR. As such, determining QPTR using the movable incore detectors once per 12 hours may not be necessary.~~

E.1 and E.2

Condition E applies to the following reactor trip Functions:

- Power Range Neutron Flux — Low;
- Overtemperature ΔT ;
- Overpower ΔT ;
- Pressurizer Pressure — High; and
- SG Water Level — Low Low

(continued)

**Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant
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Enclosure 3

Clean Typed Technical Specifications Pages

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.2.4.1	<p>-----NOTES-----</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. With input from one Power Range Neutron Flux channel inoperable and THERMAL POWER \leq 75% RTP, the remaining three power range channels can be used for calculating QPTR. 2. SR 3.2.4.2 may be performed in lieu of this Surveillance. <p>-----</p> <p>Verify QPTR is within limit by calculation.</p>	<p>In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program</p>
SR 3.2.4.2	<p>-----NOTE-----</p> <p>Only required to be performed if input to QPTR from one or more Power Range Neutron Flux channels is inoperable with THERMAL POWER > 75% RTP.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Confirm that the normalized symmetric power distribution is consistent with QPTR.</p>	<p>Once within 12 hours</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program</p>

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
<p>C. One channel or train inoperable.</p>	<p>C.1 Restore channel or train to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>48 hours</p>
	<p><u>OR</u></p> <p>C.2 Open RTBs.</p>	<p>49 hours</p>
<p>D. One Power Range Neutron Flux channel inoperable.</p>	<p>-----NOTES-----</p> <p>1. The inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing and setpoint adjustment of other channels.</p> <p>2. Refer to LCO 3.2.4 for an inoperable power range channel.</p> <p>-----</p>	<p>72 hours</p> <p>(continued)</p>
	<p>D.1 Place channel in trip.</p>	

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
D. (continued)	<u>OR</u> D.2 Be in MODE 3.	78 hours
E. One channel inoperable.	-----NOTE----- The inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing of other channels. ----- E.1 Place channel in trip. <u>OR</u> E.2 Be in MODE 3.	72 hours 78 hours
F. THERMAL POWER > P-6 and < P-10, one Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channel inoperable.	F.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-6. <u>OR</u> F.2 Increase THERMAL POWER to > P-10.	24 hours 24 hours