

Southern California Edison Company



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December 9, 1980

J. G. HAYNES
MANAGER OF NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

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US NRC
DISTRICT OFFICE
BRANCH

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REGULATORY DISTRICT
SERVICES UNIT

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: R. H. Engelken, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region V
Suite 202, Walnut Creek Plaza
1990 North California Boulevard
Walnut Creek, California 94596

DOCKET NO. 50-206
SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 1

Dear Sir:

This letter describes a reportable occurrence involving a momentary loss of AC power to all station auxiliaries. Submittal is in accordance with the reporting requirements stipulated in Section 6.9.2(b) of Appendix A to the Provisional Operating License DPR-13.

On November 22, 1980 at 0945 with the Reactor in the Cold Shutdown condition, and the Reactor Coolant System drained to mid loop, AC power to 4KV buses 1-C & 2-C was momentarily lost during an attempt to transfer the AC power supply from auxiliary transformers A & B through the bus tie breakers. An incorrect breaker alignment during the transfer resulted in the power loss. Both emergency diesel generators started automatically and were available for loading if needed.

At the time of the incident, the main transformer and auxiliary transformers A & B had been returned to service and switching had been performed to transfer 4KV buses 1-C & 2-C from auxiliary transformer C to auxiliary transformers A & B through the bus tie breakers. During the transfer, however, the control operator inadvertently opened the bus tie breakers instead of the auxiliary transformer C bus supply breakers. This allowed 4KV buses 1-C & 2-C to become de-energized when auxiliary transformer C was de-energized. Power was restored within 15 seconds by re-energizing auxiliary transformer C.

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During the 15 second period no power was available to the operable CVCS charging pump, residual heat removal pumps, component cooling water pumps and salt water cooling pumps. However, no significant temperature increases were noted in any of these systems during the loss of power. Furthermore, both emergency diesel generators started automatically and were ready to load should offsite power not have been restored. This event was the result of an error by a licensed operator. The event has been reviewed with the plant operators to preclude recurrence.

Should you have any questions, please contact me.

Sincerely,



J. G. Haynes
Manager of Nuclear Operations

Enclosure: Licensee Event Report 80-038

SS:dh

cc: L. Miller (NRC Resident Inspector - San Onofre Unit 1)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Nuclear Reactor Regulation