

Southern California Edison Company



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May 28, 1980

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region V
1990 North California Boulevard
Suite 202, Walnut Creek Plaza
Walnut Creek, California 94596

Attention: R. H. Engelken, Director

DOCKET No. 50-206
SAN ONOFRE UNIT 1

Dear Sir:

Reference: Letter from SCE (J. M. Curran) to USNRC (R. H. Engelken) dated
May 14, 1980

The referenced letter provided prompt notification to the regional office of two failed hydraulic shock and sway suppressors (Snubbers). This letter constitutes a follow-up report submitted in accordance with the provisions of Section 6.9.2.a(9) of Appendix A to our Provisional Operating License DPR-13.

While performing functional testing on an initial sample of ten snubbers, in accordance with Technical Specification 4.14.C., two were determined to be failed. The first had been selected based upon a visual inspection (in accordance with Technical Specification 4.14.A) to determine its operability with low reservoir level. Functional testing in this case was used to verify visual acceptability or rejection. This snubber is identified as main feedwater snubber 1-S-SW-393-1 and is located inside containment. Disassembly of the snubber revealed that it had a worn piston rod bushing, worn cylinder and was essentially empty of hydraulic fluid. It is postulated that a gradual loss of hydraulic fluid occurred, and this coupled with piping vibration eventually caused the piston rod bushing and cylinder wall to wear excessively. The damaged components and seals were replaced and the reassembled snubber functionally tested satisfactorily prior to installation.

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
The second failure, main steam snubber 1-S-SW-7-1 located inside containment, was preliminarily identified as a piston rod thread shearing failure similar to that seen previously in October 1978 and June 1979. However, our investigation has determined that the failure was due to operator error during functional testing. The testing machine operator inadvertently loaded this snubber to the test value for a larger capacity snubber causing it to overload and fail. As this damage was due to a test overload, it is not considered a functional testing failure. The failed piston rod and nut were replaced and the reassembled snubber was successfully functionally tested at the rated load.

In accordance with the functional testing requirements of Technical Specification 4.14 an additional 10% sample of snubbers were functionally tested. All snubbers in this second sample were satisfactory.

In accordance with Technical Specification 4.14.A, all hydraulic snubbers inside containment will be reinspected visually within 12 months \pm 90 days of May 13, 1980.

Should you have any further questions on this matter, please contact me.

Sincerely,



H. L. Ottoson
Manager of Nuclear Operations

Enclosure: Licensee Event Report 80-020

cc: Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation (30)
Director, Office of Management Information & Program Control (3)
Director, Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (1)