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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Protecting People and the Environment

Regulatory Basis – Sabotage

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Objectives

- Improve consistency and clarity;
- Make generically applicable security requirements similar to those imposed on fuel cycle facilities by the security orders;
- Consider risk insights, operational oversight and inspection activities, and international guidance
- Use a risk-informed and performance-based structure

Risk Insights from New Studies

- Material Attractiveness
- Dose Limit Threshold
- **Sabotage**
- Fatigue
- Safety-security-safeguards Interface

Sabotage

- Security orders addressed potential for lethal exposures from radiological material or chemicals subject to NRC regulations
  - Issues being address separate from this Regulatory Basis

Sabotage

- SNM at Fixed Facility
  - Additional requirements for plutonium (Category III)
- SNM during Transport
  - Considered in proposed revisions
- Non-power Reactors
  - Addressed by 10 CFR 73.60(f)

Timeline

- Early Stakeholder Engagement – Feb/March 2014
- Federal Register Notice – May 2014
- Public Meeting – June 2014
- Finalize Regulatory Basis – Oct 2014

Stakeholder Input

- Is this the right approach?
- Are there other approaches we should consider?
- What would be the potential impacts?
- Other things we should consider?

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Questions