

2/11/2014

CONVERSATION RECORD

TIME

8 : 00

AM

PM

NAME OF PERSON(S) CONTACTED OR IN CONTACT WITH YOU

TELEPHONE NO.

See below

TYPE OF CONVERSATION

IN-PERSON

E-MAIL

TELEPHONE

INCOMING

OUTGOING

E-MAIL ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION

Department of Transportation (DOT) and AREVA

SUBJECT

Request for Additional Information Teleconference

SUMMARY

NRC participants: Chris Allen, Zhian Li, Ricardo Torres, Meraj Rahimi

AREVA participants: Olivier Douaud

DOT participants: Michael Conroy

Copies of the additional information requests (ML14034A289), as well as draft responses (ML14042A389) provided by AREVA, were distributed prior to the teleconference call commencing at approximately 8 A.M. eastern standard time. Before discussing the information requests, Michael Conroy queried AREVA about the date by which they needed the revalidation certificate. AREVA responded that the end of December, 2014 would be acceptable. Then, the NRC stated that future discussions between AREVA and the NRC might be appropriate because of the significant time and effort NRC staff expend in revalidation efforts for the TN-BGCI, particularly in the area of criticality analyses.

Next, the NRC asked AREVA to confirm that they no longer sought authorization to transport reprocessed uranium, and consequently plutonium, with this revalidation. AREVA did. With that, discussion of the requests for additional information (RAIs) by the Materials reviewer were discussed. The NRC indicated that the response to RAI 1 was sufficient, and proceeded to request clarifying information related to the response to RAI 2. Specifically, the NRC wanted to know which polymer was used in the radiolysis analysis and the maximum temperature used in the analysis. The NRC also requested a copy of the Sandia report referenced in the RAI response. AREVA indicated they did not have the polymer and temperature information at hand, but committed to provide it at a later date. DOT had the Sandia report readily available and forwarded it to the NRC. For RAI 3, the NRC informed AREVA that shipment of metallic uranium alloys in powder form would not be authorized because pyrophoricity information had not been supplied, either now or previously, for the metallic uranium alloys listed in the French certificate of authorization. When asked if this was acceptable, AREVA responded they must consult with their customer. In discussions of

Continue on Page 2

ACTION REQUIRED

NAME OF PERSON DOCUMENTING CONVERSATION

Chris Allen

SIGNATURE

William C. Allen

DATE

2-27-14

ACTION TAKEN

TITLE OF PERSON TAKING ACTION

SIGNATURE OF PERSON TAKING ACTION

DATE

CONVERSATION RECORD (Continued)

SUMMARY:

RAI 4, the NRC indicated that it was unclear what maximum temperature had been calculated for the polymers. AREVA replied that the temperature calculated for the radiological contents had been assigned to polymers surrounding the contents. After discussing the four Materials RAIs, AREVA was asked to clarify the intent of statements about the presence of water in the package within the French certificate relative to TRIGA fuel. AREVA committed to investigate the statements and provide clarifying information.

Discussion of the Criticality RAIs commenced after the Materials RAIs were completed. Since AREVA indicated they no longer wanted to pursue transportation of reprocessed uranium, the first RAI was not discussed. For the second RAI, the NRC explained to AREVA that they considered the information provided in the draft response to be precautionary guidance instead of benchmarking information. The NRC further explained to AREVA that the information requested was a comparison of values calculated by their criticality codes to data obtained from irradiated material. In discussing the third RAI, the conversation focused on the fire test draft response. The NRC expressed concerns about implicit assumptions contained in their fire test draft response, e.g.; neutron poisons remained uniformly distributed after the fire, the resin did not "slump" due to the heat from the fire, etc. The NRC also pointed out that AREVA had not identified the location of the data within the SAR which substantiated their claim. AREVA committed to gathering and providing information which addressed the NRC's concerns. The NRC also cautioned AREVA both to clearly state the test conditions and to clearly explain how post-fire test examinations were performed. When asked if their proposal to limit the uranium-235 mass to the mass associated with air transport in the DOT certificate applied only to content 11b, AREVA responded that the 5 kg uranium-235 mass limit for air transport was acceptable for contents 11b through 11h, but was not acceptable for content 11a.

Due to time constraints, further discussion of the RAIs was not possible and the call was concluded at approximately 9 A.M. eastern standard time.