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teleconference

Date:

Friday, February 4, 2014

Work Order No.: NRC-573

Pages 1-33

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1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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4	10 CFR 2.206 PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB)
5	CONFERENCE CALL
6	RE
7	SEISMIC CONCERNS AT COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
8	(G20130776)
9	+ + + +
10	TUESDAY
11	FEBRUARY 4, 2014
12	+ + + +
13	The conference call was held, Joe Giitter,
14	Chairperson of the Petition Review Board, presiding.
15	
16	PETITIONER: CHARLES K. JOHNSON
17	PETITION REVIEW BOARD MEMBERS
18	JOE GIITTER, Director, Division of Risk
19	Assessment, NRR
20	FRED LYON, Petition Manager for 2.206 petition
21	MERRILEE BANIC, Petition Coordinator
22	YONG LI, NRR/DE/EMCB
23	MICHAEL MARKLEY, NRR
24	SERITA SANDERS, NRR
25	DAVID SULKOWSKY, OGC

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1	FACILITATOR:
2	BOB HAGAR
3	
4	NRC REGION IV
5	DAN BRADLEY, Resident Inspector
6	JEREMY GROOM, Senior Resident Inspector
7	
8	ALSO PRESENT:
9	DON GREGOIRE, Energy Northwest
10	NANCY MATELA , Alliance for Democracy
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PROCEEDINGS

1:09 p.m.

MR. HAGAR: Let's get started. And we've done a few introductions to get started, but we'll do more complete introductions in just a moment. Again, my name is Bob Hagar, and I'm the facilitator for this meeting. And my role is to ensure the meeting goes smoothly and to make sure that everybody who has something to say in this meeting has an opportunity to say it without being interrupted.

And I want to remind everybody and want to emphasize that the purpose of today's meeting is to allow the petitioners from the Oregon and Washington Physicians for Social Responsibility to address the NRC's Petition Review Board regarding 10 CFR 2.206 petition that was dated October 31st, 2013. And in that petition, there was actually a letter. The petitioners asked the NRC to take enforcement-related action against Energy Northwest, the licensee for the Columbia Generating Station.

Now, when I talk about the Petition Review Board in this meeting, I may mention the PRB and other speakers may do the same. So if we do that, and we say PRB, we're just talking about the Petition Review Board.

Now, this meeting is scheduled for one hour, and it's being recorded, I think as everybody recognizes, by the NRC Operations Center. And it will be transcribed by a court reporter, and the resulting transcript will become a supplement to the petition. And before they file the transcript in ADAMS, which is the NRC's document library, the Petition Review Board will review it to ensure it doesn't contain any allegations or sensitive information.

But, now, in order to produce a complete and accurate transcript of this meeting, we have to set some ground rules. First, everyone, please turn off or mute your electronic devices if you're going to speak. And everyone who is not speaking should mute their phones, so we don't hear background noise on the line. And if your phone doesn't have a mute button, then you can mute it by pressing the key *6 and then you can unmute it by pressing *6 again.

Another ground rule is that, when you do speak, let's ensure that only one person speaks at a And you've got to be close enough to the phone and speak clearly and loudly to ensure that your voice is recorded. And, also, the first time you speak, please again state your name for the record so that the person producing the transcript will have no doubt

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about who's speaking.

the meeting participants. Early on, we went through the speakers for the court reporter. But now I want to make sure we introduce all of the participants that are on the line, and we'll do it in turn. And I've introduced myself twice already, so I don't need to do it again. But let's do, first, the NRC participants that are at Headquarters in the room with Fred and Joe. Could you please, let's introduce everybody, even if they're not going to speak. And what I'd like is your name, your position, and the organization you represent.

MR. GIITTER: Okay. My name is Joseph Giitter. I'm the Chairman of the PRB, and my position is Division Director for the Division of Risk Assessment in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation at the NRC.

MR. LYON: This is Fred Lyon. I am the Petition Manager, and I am also a Project Manager in the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of the NRC.

MS. BANIC: Lee Banic, Petition Coordinator, NRR.

MR. CYLKOWSKI: This is David Cylkowski.

1	I'm an attorney with the Office of General Counsel in
2	the NRC and serving as legal advisor to the PRB.
3	MR. MARKLEY: Mike Markley. I'm the Chief
4	of Licensing in the Division of Operator Reactor
5	Licensing for the Columbia Station, also with Nuclear
6	Reactor Regulation.
7	MR. LI: My name is Yong Li. I'm an NRC
8	seismologist.
9	MR. LYON: And that's everyone here, Bob.
10	MR. HAGAR: Thank you. Now could we have
11	the NRC participants in the Columbia resident
12	inspector office introduce themselves?
13	MR. GROOM: Yes. This is Jeremy Groom.
14	I'm from NRC Region IV. I'm the Senior Resident
15	Inspector at Columbia Generating Station.
16	MR. BRADLEY: I'm Dan Bradley, Resident
17	Inspector, NRC, at Columbia Generating Station.
18	MR. HAGAR: All right. Next, are there
19	any other participants in the Region IV office or
20	elsewhere? Please speak up now.
21	MS. SANDERS: What do you mean by
22	elsewhere? Region IV participants outside of the
23	Region IV office or NRC
24	MR. HAGAR: NRC personnel that are not
25	with Fred and Joe and that group or are not at the
1	•

1	Columbia resident inspector office, and that would be
2	you, Serita.
3	MS. SANDERS: Okay. Serita Sanders. I'm
4	the back up to petition coordinator in the Generic
5	Communications Branch.
6	MR. HAGAR: All right. And are there any
7	other NRC participants who have not yet introduced
8	themselves? All right. Then now could we have the
9	representatives for Entergy Northwest, the licensee
10	for Columbia Generating Station, introduce yourselves,
11	please?
12	MR. GREGOIRE: Let's just be clear. It's
13	Energy, not Entergy, Northwest. And I am Don
14	Gregoire. I'm the Reg Affairs Manager here at
15	Columbia Station.
16	MR. JAVORIK: Alex Javorik, Engineering
17	Vice President, Columbia.
18	MR. DONOVAN: Paul Donovan, Design Stress
19	Supervisor at Columbia.
20	MR. TRAUTVETTER: JR Trautvetter,
21	Compliance Supervisor, Columbia.
22	MR. DOBKEN: Public affairs.
23	MR. LANGDON: Andy Langdon, Fukushima
24	flooding hazard project.
25	MR. LYLE: Greg Lyle, Fukushima project

1 engineer. MR. GREGOIRE: And that's it from Energy 2 3 Northwest. MR. HAGAR: All right, gentlemen. 4 5 apologize for the slip of my tongue there. that you guys are Energy Northwest and not Entergy. 6 7 I apologize for even making that suggestion that you were. So, now, Mr. Johnson, would you and the other 8 representatives οf 9 petitioners or the your 10 organizations please introduce yourselves? I'm Charles K. 11 MR. JOHNSON: Okay. Johnson, and I'm the Director of the Joint Tasks Force 12 on Nuclear Power for Oregon and Washington Physicians 13 for Social Responsibility. 14 MATELA MS. : I'm Nancy Matela 15 I'm with Alliance for Democracy, co-petitioner with 16 Washington Physicians for Social 17 Oregon and I'm also the head of the Nuclear Responsibility. 18 Energy and Waste Committee of Alliance for Democracy. 19 MR. HAGAR: All right. Now, we don't 20 require members of the public to introduce themselves. 21 But if there's any member of the public on the phone 22 that wants to introduce himself or herself, right now 23 would be a good time to do that. Please state your 24

It sounds like no members of the

name.

25

All right.

public are on the line. Is there anyone listening that has not been introduced? All right.

Then before we actually get started, I want to review some general information about the 10 CFR 2.206 process and make sure we're all starting from the same place. Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations describes the petition process. It's the primary mechanism for the public to ask the NRC to take enforcement action. And this process permits anyone to petition the NRC to take enforcement action the NRC to take enforcement action related to NRC licensees or licensed activities. And depending on the results of the evaluation, the NRC could modify, suspend, or revoke an NRC-issued license or take any other appropriate enforcement action to resolve the problem.

Now, the NRC staff guidance, 2.206 petition request, is in Management Directive 8.11, and that directive is publically available through the NRC website.

So that's about the process. Now, this specific meeting, in a letter dated October 31st, 2013, the petitioners provided the initial information that the NRC staff was considering under the 2.206 process. Within that process, the Petition Review Board, or PRB, has been formed and is preparing to

consider the subject information and develop a recommendation for responding to the petition. The purpose of today's meeting is to give the petitioners an opportunity to provide additional support for the petition before the Petition Review Board develops that recommendation.

I want to emphasize that today's meeting is not a hearing. It is also not an opportunity for anyone to question or examine the Petition Review Board on the merits of the issues presented in a petition request. While the NRC staff may ask clarifying questions, their primary role in this meeting is to listen to the petitioners.

I want to emphasize no decision regarding the merits of the issues will be made at this meeting. And following this meeting, the Petition Review Board will conduct its internal deliberations. And after they've completed those deliberations, they will discuss the outcome with the petitioners.

Now, the 2.206 process allows the NRC staff to ask clarifying questions in order to better understand the petitioner's presentation. The process also allows the NRC to invite the licensee to participate in the meeting to ensure that they understand the concerns being raised about their

facility order activities.

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Now, in this meeting, the licensees may questions to clarify issues raised by petitioners. But I want to stress that the licensees are not part of the 2.206 or the Petition Review Board's decision-making process.

Does anybody have any questions about any of the topics I've covered and background information? All right. Then let's move on. I'll turn the meeting now over to Joe Giitter, who is the Chair of the Board, to discuss the specific Petition Review petition that's under consideration. Go ahead, Joe.

MR. GIITTER: Okay. Thank you, Bob. I'd like to begin by summarizing the PRB's understanding of the scope of the petition under consideration and then talk about what the NRC activities have been to date.

On October 31st of 2013, Dr. Pearson and Dr. Gilbert, representing the Oregon and Washington Physicians for Social Responsibility, responded to a letter from Chairman McFarlane concerning information about seismic hazards to the Columbia Generating Station. After reviewing the letter, the NRC staff decided that it should be put into a 2.206 Bob described, because process, as petition

specifically requested that the Columbia Generating Station be shut down.

To be specific, the petitioners requested that the NRC provide the data used by the NRC to continue to conclude that the Columbia Generating Station has been designed, built, and operated to safely withstand earthquakes likely to occur in the region, and that the shut down of the Columbia Generating Station Nuclear Power Plant take place immediately until it can be shown that the plant meets adequate earthquake standards.

As the basis for the request, the petitioners provide evidence that, to their knowledge, it is more current and has not been considered by the NRC in its seismic evaluation of the Columbia Generating Station. Then on December 17th of last year, the PRB discussed the petitioner's request for immediate action, and what the PRB decided was to deny the request because the petitioners provided no new information demonstrating an immediate safety concern to the plant or to the health and safety of the public, as documented in the evaluation.

The plant is already undergoing a seismic hazard review, and the issues raised by the petitioners are encompassed by the NRC letter dated

March 12th, 2012, the request for information under 50.54(f), what we call a 50.54(f) letter, regarding recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 have been near-term task force review of advice from the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

The PRB's determination was approved by the Deputy Director of the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Jennifer Uhle, on December 23rd, 2013. And Mr. Johnson was informed of the PRB's determination on January 6th of 2014.

Then on January 14th, Mr. Johnson asked for an opportunity to address the PRB on a telecon, which is the purpose of today's meeting.

As a reminder for the meeting participants, please identify yourself if you make any remarks, as this will help in the preparation of the meeting transcript that will be made publically available at a future date. In addition, the NRC staff verified that no sensitive or proprietary information is contained within the petition.

Since this is a public meeting, I would like to remind the PRB members, the licensee, the petitioner, as well as other meeting participants, of the need to refrain from discussing any NRC sensitive or proprietary information during today's public

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Mr. Johnson, I'll turn the meeting over to you to allow you to provide any additional information you believe the PRB should consider as part of the petition. And starting now, you'll have one hour to make your presentation.

MR. JOHNSON: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My name is Charles K. Johnson. I'm the Director of the Joint Task Force on Nuclear Power for the Oregon and Washington Physicians for Social Responsibility.

I want to start first by introducing Nancy Matela the Alliance for Democracy from indicate that the Alliance for Democracy has decided that they would like to join us as petitioners in this I understand that they will need to be proceeding. written, some sort of sending written а correspondence, but perhaps you'd like to say a couple of words, Nancy, before I go on.

MS. MATELA : Yes. Thank you, Charles. Alliance for Democracy, among other things, works for sustainable economies that also sustain the environment. And the new news about the earthquake faults that lie under and around CGS and are connected to the Puget major fault is very disturbing to us.

Very few people realize that that southeast corner of Washington is upriver from over a million people, including Portland, Oregon. It is upwind from many thousands of people in Idaho, and there's 300,000 people within the 50-mile radius of CGS alone. That would be the lives that would be in jeopardy if an earthquake happens on or near the reservation. It would also destroy industries, such as the ag industry, which is over a billion dollars.

So in terms of economy and environment, we're deeply disturbed by the apparent increased risk that has come to our attention. And that's why we are co-petitioners. I'll turn it back to you, Charles.

MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, Nancy. I have sent Fred a list of additional documents that I'd like you to consider with regard to this petition. The first is actually a question. We had hoped to ask this question informally, but we were told we needed to ask it formally. So we'll go ahead and take this opportunity to do it now. It's from Terry Tolan, who is the geologist that we hired to review the USGS and other seismic studies that have been done in the Hanford Nuclear Reservation and the vicinity around it.

The question is, and this is regarding the

internal determination, the NRC memo that rejected our call for an immediate shutdown of the Columbia Generating Station. This question is directed to the author of that memo. I understand Yong Li is there today. Perhaps he could answer this question now, or perhaps he could answer it later in writing. Either way is fine.

The question is is it the case that the maximum vibratory ground motion, FSE, for the Columbia Generating Station is 0.25 G to 0.60 G in the 2 to 10 hertz range on figure one, as stated in the attached letter? If so, can you explain the statement on page two of the letter highlighted in yellow that cites 20 hertz? Should it state 2 hertz and greater?

MR. HAGAR: This is Bob Hagar. Let me interrupt for just a moment here because it's my understanding that this meeting is not set up to enable or to provide you an opportunity to interrogate the NRC staff. Instead, it's an opportunity for you to present the evidence that you want the PRB to consider. I'd like to --

MR. JOHNSON: Would it be possible to get an answer to this question at some point? And if so, how would I go about doing that? We were hoping to actually ask the authors of the study in some way. We

were told that we, that -- I mean, you instruct me as 1 to how to get the answer to that. Is there some way 2 3 to get an answer to that, or is there no way to get an 4 answer to that question? MR. HAGAR: Let's ask the Headquarters 5 staff to say how you can, how you can have a dialogue 6 7 with the NRC staff. But I'm suggesting that this meeting is not the forum for that. 8 If you'll pardon me for a 9 MR. JOHNSON: moment, it seems to be a typo in the memo. If that's 10 the case, could you tell us that, or what's it going 11 to take to find out? 12 MR. LYON: Chuck, this is Fred Lyon. What 13 we're going to do is take your question, and you are 14 absolutely right. We will look at it. We will verify 15 that what we've written is correct. And if we have a 16 17 typo, then you are correct, we need to fix it and we'll address it, and we will let you know as part of 18 our follow-on response to you. So the answer is, yes, 19 you will get an answer to the question. 20 MR. JOHNSON: Okay. That's all I wanted. 21 22 That's why I put it into the record. Okay, thank you. The second document that I sent to Mr. Lyon is Terry 23 Tolan's response letter to me regarding the NRC's 24

internal determination memo to reject Oregon and

Washington PSR's call for the immediate shut down of the CGS pending the earthquake assessment, and I'm going to read from that. Hang on just a moment.

Okay. Some comments on the Columbia Generating Station's seismic hazard considerations determination of immediate safety concerns letter. G20130776. "Dear Mr. Johnson, I've had an opportunity to read this response letter cited above. I would first like to respond to the background information set out by the NRC staff. The NRC staff states that each nuclear power plant was designed to a ground motion level that is appropriate for the geology and plant tectonics in the region surrounding the In my two letter reports referenced at the end of the letter, it has been clearly shown that the CGS was designed at a time when much of the geology and tectonics of this region was not well known and was not well understood.

For example, the CGS was designed based on the flawed decision that the epicenter of the largest historical earthquake in this region was 180 miles away, as compared to a recent study that places the epicenter approximately 99 miles away from the CGS site, which is a significant change that needs to be assessed. Second, when the CGS was designed, only six

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faults were considered within the Yakima fold and thrust belt as part of the seismic risk assessment. Subsequent studies have more than doubled this number of Yakima fold and thrust belt faults. The design of the CGS was based on a thin-skinned uncoupled fault modeled for Yakima fold and thrust belt. Published work by the U.S. Geological Survey, Blackly et al 2011, shows that the Yakima fold and thrust belt is best characterized by a thick-skinned coupled fault model, which means that the faulting extends into the basement rock below the salt layers and can give rise to larger-magnitude earthquakes and subsequent high vibratory ground motion at the CGS site. designed, the CGS seismic risk assessment was based on the Yakima fold and thrust belt faults that had relatively short lengths. Based on the published U.S. Geological Survey work, Blackly et al 2011, it appears that these faults are substantially longer and likely capable of producing much larger magnitude earthquakes than previously believed.

Five, when the CGS was designed, it was thought that movement on the Yakima fold and thrust belt faults was old due to the lack of evidence of offsets. This assumption is also questionable based on the published work by Blaekly et al 2011. Six,

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when the CGS was designed, it was not known that there was an active fault just 2.3 miles away from the reactor.

Thus, I question the NRC staff assumption that the design of CGS is appropriate for the geology and tectonics in the region, given all the fundamental revisions in our knowledge that have occurred since the last time the CGS seismic risk was assessed in the early 1990s. These advances in understanding the structural geology of the Yakima fold and thrust belt fundamentally change the basic assumptions previously used to assess seismic hazard and risk at the CGS site.

Concerning the 'evaluation,' I note that they stayed on page two, first bullet, third item, that OWPSR mistakenly compared the 3 to 5 hertz spectral acceleration levels of 0.8 G for the waste treatment plant, WTP, 2005 seismic design with the CGS SSB 20 hertz and greater spectral acceleration value of 0.25 G. Indeed, I should have compared the CGS spectral acceleration to that of the revised WTP spectral response developed by Young 2007, which is 0.6 G.

However, it still doesn't change the fact that the maximum vibratory ground motion for this area

has been dramatically increased based on the WTP studies. As shown in their figure H-3 of the letter, the revised WTP response spectrum is very similar to that developed for the CGS. This is interesting given that Energy Northwest previously implied, letter to the NRC dated 17 December, 2010, response 3-A, second paragraph, that differences in the --" oh, hang on a second. God, I just messed up what I was reading here. Hang on just a moment.

Let me start that sentence again. Well, I'll just continue where I left it. "The differences in the site factors, e.g. difference from the active fault's physical soil properties and thicknesses amplification/deamplification, etcetera, between the CGS and WTP sites does not allow one to apply any of the recent WTP seismic ground motion findings, Rohay and Reidel 2005, Rohay and Brouns 2007, Young 2007, to the CGS site.

It is curious that, if the site factors are different between the CGS and WTP, as Energy Northwest claimed, why are the vibratory ground motion response spectrums so similar? As previously noted and discussed, Energy Northwest needs to develop a CGS site-specific model for ground motion response spectrum based on blowhole vertical seismic profile

data from the ground surface to the top of the Columbia River basalt. They then need to integrate this data with the WTP shear wave velocity data for the Columbia River basalt/Ellensburg formation interbeds.

Energy Northwest also needs to reevaluate the maximum credible earthquakes and overall seismic hazards in light of the recently published U.S. Geological Survey work, Blaekly et al 2011. They would have to incorporate a coupled fault model, extended active fault lengths, and reevaluate the earthquake magnitude/frequency, etcetera, before the CGS site-specific subsurface velocity data could be used to help constrain estimates and vibratory ground motion from various earthquake scenarios.

In the last bullet paragraph, page two, it was stated that Energy Northwest, along with the U.S. Department of Energy, is reevaluating the seismic hazards for the region surrounding the Hanford site and is using the latest data model and methods. They also indicated that they are evaluating the issues we have previously raised as part of this new seismic hazard reevaluation and that this report is due to the NRC in March 2015. I look forward to seeing this report.

In summary, since both the U.S. Department of Energy's Young 2007, Rohay and Brouns 2007, Rohay and Reidel 2005, and Energy Northwest seismic hazard analyses rely on a flawed and outmoded seismic assessment model developed by Geomatrix 1996, one needs to question the basic adequacy of the existing CGS seismic hazards analysis in light of the new and recent data and findings presented by the U.S. Geological Survey. Sincerely, Terry L. Tolan, LEG." And then there's citations at the end, which is in this letter that I submitted to Fred already.

The third item that I submitted was an issue brief that was done by Dave Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned Scientists. The issue is boiling water, it's entitled "Boiling Water Reactor Shutdown System Problem," and this is an additional issue that I'd like you to consider in this petition. It's related to the, to the danger of an earthquake. And I'm going to go ahead and read it into the record.

Again, it's entitled "Boiling Water Reactor Shutdown System Problem." It's from David Lochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists. It's called an issue brief. "GE Hitachi informed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC, about a safety problem related to the reactor shutdown system at its boiling

water reactors, BWRs, via a September 27, 2011 update to NRC Event Report Number 46230, dated September 3, 2010." This is quoting from this. "GE Hitachi, GEH, has determined that the scram capability of control rod drive mechanism in BWR/II-5 plants may not be sufficient to ensure the control rod will fully insert in a cell with channel control rod friction at or below the friction limits specified in MFN 08-420 with concurrent safe shutdown earthquake, SSE. plant condition for which incomplete control insertion might occur is when the reactor is below normal operating pressure, less than 900 psig, and a scram occurs concurrent with the SSE for Mark I containment plants and for the SSE with concurrent loss of coolant accident, LOCA, and safety release valve events for Mark II containment plants.

In this scenario, a substantial safety hazard results because the affected control rods might not fully insert to perform the required safety function. GEH has determined that when channel control blade interference is present at reduced reactor pressure and a friction level considered acceptable in MFN 08-420, a simultaneously-occurring safe shutdown earthquake, SSE, may result in control rod friction that inhibits the full insertion of the

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affected control rods during a reactor scram from these conditions. This scenario was not explicitly considered in MFN 08-420."

And back to the narrative from Lochbaum. "This issue brief provides background information about control rods at BWRs and the specific safety problem. The reactor core of a BWR consists of fuel pellets stacked within column metal rods," and I'm actually not going to read all of that. And I think I'll refrain from reading any of the rest of this because this is background information that's designed for people who don't understand nuclear power plants, and I believe everyone on this call, with the possible exception of myself and Ms. McCullough, did understand this prior to, without having read Mr. Lochbaum's memo.

So, obviously, we're very interested in knowing what measures, if any, have been taken to address this situation at the Columbia Generating Station, whether or not any modifications in the control blades have been discussed or made, you know, replacements of the control blades, and has this issue been addressed either partially or fully; and, if not, what is the time line in which it will be addressed?

And let's see. I will move on from there

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to item number five, which will introduce item number four. I'll go back to number four of the documents that I introduce after I discuss what the document number five is, which is an email from Dave Lochbaum from the Union of Concerned Scientists to me dated the 29th of January, 2014. It's a portion of an email. It's regarding the implications of the D.C. Cook plant fire event when considering the consequences of an SSE magnitude quake on fire protection systems.

Here's what Mr. Lochbaum had to say to me about this, and this came in the context of me asking him questions about this problem with the control blades. He said here's an additional thing you should probably look at.

"Hello, Chuck. Attached is a November 2008 report to the NRC by the owner of the D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant in Michigan. Some turbine blades came apart. The turbine blades are very large pieces of metal rotating at least 1,800 times per minute. When they come apart, it ain't pretty. As the blades came apart, they became missiles. Some missiles ripped through piping, providing hydrogen gas to the generator, starting a fire. Other missiles ripped through piping containing lubricating oil for the turbine bearings, starting another fire."

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No big deal, right? The turbine generator is not a safety-related component, so let it burn.

But check out the paragraph on page three, and he's referring to the NRC licensing event report, which is item number four. The number is 315/2008-006-00.

"Manual reactor trip due to main turbine high vibration' at the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1."

Okay. Check out the paragraph on page three of the Cook LER, beginning with, "At 2125 hours, the fire water headed, the vibrations caused when heavy metal missiles struck concrete walls and floors created a mini earthquake in the local area. As the ground shook, a fire protection header pipe ruptured. Water from the north fire water storage tank poured from the ruptured header. I read other accounts where security officers in the vicinity reported old faithful as a geyser of water shot up from the ground. Not good when an even triggering a fire also disables the fire suppression system. Not good at all.

The NRC's regulations require plants be designed to survive ground motion caused by the safe shutdown earthquake. As you noted earlier, the SSE value for CGS is suspect. But for the moment, let's assume the SSE value is right. The NRC's regulations

28 1 do not require the entire plant survive an SSE shake, 2 only the parts and components of the plant necessary 3 to shut down the reactor core and maintain a shutdown. 4 Control rod system, yes. Fire protection system, no. 5 There's disconnect between а 6 protection regulations non-fire and safety 7 I spoke about that disconnect in a 8 recent bloq post (see9 http://allthingsnuclear.org/fire-safety-OR-not.) 10 The Cook event was caused by a turbine 11 blade failure. An SSE magnitude quake could cause an 12 even greater ground motion at CGS. Would the SSE 13 cause fire or fires, would the SSE disable or degrade the fire protection systems? Lubricating oil is not 14 15 only used for the turbine. CGS has two very large recirculation pumps inside the drywell that use large 16 17 amounts of lubricating oil. There's ample combustible

material available in the reactor building. It would be nice to know that the CGS can survive an SSE, even if the SSE starts a fire. Thanks, and good luck."

So I did include the event report, and the issues that are raised by Mr. Lochbaum in this memo I think are germane to the issue of whether or not the CGS is robust enough to withstand an SSE earthquake or even a larger one, as we believe is possible to occur

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29 1 there. 2 And with that, I think I've introduced all of the elements that we'd like to have added. 3 have any questions about that or this isn't clear, 4 then please let me know. 5 6 MR. LYON: Chuck, this is Fred. Have you 7 already emailed the documents to me? MR. JOHNSON: I emailed them to you at 8 9 9:16 a.m., according to my email, yes. MR. LYON: Okay. 10 MR. JOHNSON: You and Merrilee, also. 11 Okay, great. We probably 12 MR. LYON: missed them. We were already over here making sure 13 that the room was set up. But I will check my email 14 15 and those documents, and they will be entered into our ADAMS document system, ad we will consider them as 16 part of our PRB evaluation. So thank you. 17 I'll let you know if, I'll let you know 18 if, for some reason, they got lost in electron land. 19 MR. JOHNSON: Okay. And I'd be happy to 20 send them again. I don't know if the procedure, now 21 that this is our formal, this is a formal pre-meeting, 22 it's called, if you need additional quess 23

clarification, since I didn't give these to you, you

know, until 45 minutes, I tried to send them to you 45

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minutes before this hearing, if you have additional 1 2 questions, is it permissible for you to ask them after 3 this hearing is closed? 4 MR. LYON: Certainly it is. We're not 5 going to ignore information that might be pertinent to 6 the issues. 7 MR. JOHNSON: Okay. That's all I have at 8 this point. That's all I intend to present today. 9 Okay. So at this time, I MR. GIITTER: 10 just wanted to add a couple of things. This is not a hearing. We'll take a look at the information that 11 12 you provide. At this time, since this is a public 13 meeting, I would like to remind the PRB members, the 14 licensees, and the petitioner, and other meeting 15 participants of the need to refrain from discussing 16 any sensitive or proprietary information from today's 17 meeting. I'm not sure there was any but just a good 18 reminder. 19 Does the staff from NRC Headquarters have 20 any questions for the petitioners at this time? Okay. Does the staff from NRC Region IV have any questions 21 22 for the petitioners? Okay. Hearing none, I'd like to turn the meeting back to Bob to allow questions from 23 any other participants. 24

MR. HAGAR: Thank you, Joe. Does the NRC

staff at the Columbia Generating Station have any questions or comments? All right. Does the licensee have any questions or comments for the petitioners?

MR. GREGOIRE: No questions. This is Don Gregoire, again, Reg Affairs Manager at Columbia. We do appreciate the previous consideration for our station's safety. The NRC's assessment with regard to immediate concern for safety, we agree with the conclusion. We do recognize that there's some very good questions raised from the petitioners, but, as expressed previously, there's a pretty thorough study going on right now with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, many of the peers of Mr. Tolan, that are evaluating this type of information.

Energy Northwest will be implementing any recommendations based on that thorough review of the seismic hazards associated with this region. We'd also like to say that many of the items that were discussed that were brought up from Mr. Lochbaum, those issues have been addressed and I think there's information that can be found on the docket in relation to that. But I do appreciate the opportunity to make comments. That's it.

MR. HAGAR: All right, Don. Thank you. Don, do you have any questions or comments about the

32 1 petition process or the 2.206 process or the Petition 2 Review Board? Do you understand that process? 3 MR. GREGOIRE: Yes, I do understand the 4 I don't have any additional questions at process. 5 this time. 6 MR. HAGAR: All right. Then does any 7 member of the public, anyone else who has joined this 8 call, have any questions either to the petitioners or 9 about the petition process? All right. I'm not 10 hearing any response, so, Joe, do you have concluding comments? 11 MR. GIITTER: Yes. I'd just like to thank 12 everybody, Charles and Nancy, for participating and 13 for sharing their views. 14 We take safety very 15 seriously at the NRC. It's our job. So I wanted to

MR. GIITTER: Yes. I'd just like to thank everybody, Charles and Nancy, for participating and for sharing their views. We take safety very seriously at the NRC. It's our job. So I wanted to thank Charles and Nancy for taking the time to provide the NRC staff with clarifying information on the petition they've submitted. And within a couple of weeks, PRB plans to meet internally to discuss the information that you've provided and any additional information that we haven't looked at yet and to make its initial recommendation on the petition.

Following that meeting, the petition manager will inform you of the PRB's initial recommendation, either accept or reject the 2.206

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1	petition for review, in accordance with the criteria
2	in our management directive. And with that, I'll
3	return it back to you, Bob.
4	MR. HAGAR: All right. Before we close,
5	does the recorder for this meeting need any additional
6	information for the meeting transcript?
7	COURT REPORTER: I don't anticipate I
8	will. If I do, I'll call Mr. Lyon or I'll email Mr.
9	Lyon. But right now, in my first run over, I look
10	pretty good.
11	MR. HAGAR: All right, thank you. With
12	that then, this meeting is concluded. Thank everyone
13	for their time and attention. And we're now going to
14	terminate the telephone conversation. Thank you.
15	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter was
16	concluded at 1:58 p.m.)