(106 Documents)

Group EB

(Records Withheld In Part)

Li, Yong

From: Wang, Weijun
Sent: Tuesday, March 15, 2011 10:42 AM
To: Li, Yong
Subject: Vogtle Site Layout
Attachments: Vogtle Site Layout.pptx

Yong:

Here are some plots for your use. Let me know if there is anything else I can do for you.

Weijun

EB/1

Vogtle Site Layout



Vogtle Unit 3&4 Locations



Vogtle Site Soil Profile with Backfill



Vogtle Unit 3&4 Power Block Excavation and Backfill Sections



SECTION A



SECTION B

Weaver, Tonna

From: Nesheiwat, Julia [NesheiwatJ@state.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 12:47 AM
To: Cherry, Ronald C; Duncan, Aleshia D; Cipullo, Timothy L; Mears, Jeremy M; DartDOELiaison1@OFDA.gov; Trapp, James; Morales, Russell A; Tamada, Yoshimi; Ulses, Anthony; Uchida, Koichi
Cc: Fuller, Matthew G; Hinds, Lynda J; Angelov, Bonnie A; Forsberg, Aaron P
Subject: IEA - Factsheet on Japan's Energy Supply
Attachments: Japan_Factsheet_15_March.pdf

IEA (Tanaka) consulted Japan's METI on this factsheet.

Julia

-----Original Message-----
From: VAN BOHEMEN Aad, IEA/EMS/EPD [

Dear SEQ and SOM Delegates,
Please find below a message of Mr. Tanaka, just sent to the Governing Board.

Best regards,

Aad van Bohemen

From: BARNSLEY Ingrid, IEA/EXD
Sent: Tuesday, March 15, 2011 9:35 PM
Subject: RE: IEA - Factsheet on Japan's Energy Supply

Message from IEA Executive Director Nobuo Tanaka to the Chair and Representatives of the IEA Governing Board and Management Committee:

Dear Colleagues,

Following up on my email of yesterday concerning the situation in Japan in the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami of 11 March, please find attached a factsheet on the country's energy supply.

It should of course be borne in mind that the situation in the affected region is still evolving on a daily basis.

Yours sincerely,

Nobuo Tanaka

Nobuo TANAKA
Executive Director
International Energy Agency
9 rue de la Federation
75739 Paris Cedex 15
France
Tel: 33 (0) 1 40 57 65 10
E-mail: nobuo.tanaka@iea.org

EB/2

IMPACT OF EARTHQUAKES AND TSUNAMIS ON ENERGY SECTORS IN JAPAN (International Energy Agency 15 March 2011)

A. Electricity

Background: Electricity Sector in Japan

Japanese power output in 2009 was 1046 Twh, made up of coal fired power (28%), nuclear (27%), gas (sourced almost entirely from LNG) 26%, oil 9%, and hydro 8%. The national electricity grid is split into two separate frequency areas and interconnected through three frequency converters. The split is just west and south-west of Tokyo, with Tokyo in the affected area.

Earthquake and Tsunami Impact

Output Loss

The damage and impact to the power sector has been greatest in the area of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and that of Tohoku Electric Power Company (Tohoku-EPCO). TEPCO is the largest Japanese power utility, with an installed capacity of some 64 GW, and a yearly production of 280 TWh in 2009. TEPCO is amongst the largest power companies in the world; its output is in the range of that of Italy. As of 2008 IEA In-Depth Review, total capacity in the Kanto region (including Tokyo) was 78 GW.

Tohoku-EPCO is more to the north with an installed capacity of 17 GW. As of the 2008 IEA In-Depth Review, total capacity in the Tohoku region was 27 GW. While the interchange ability between the TEPCO and Tohoku-EPCO areas is strong, especially from Tohoku-EPCO to TEPCO, the ability to link these two areas with the rest of Japan to the west and south is 1 GW through frequency converters.

According to their websites, some 9.7 GW of TEPCO, Tohoku-EPCO, and Japan Atomic Power nuclear plant capacity was automatically shut-down because of the earthquake (Fukushima Dai-Ichi, Fukushima Daini, Onagawa and Tokai Daini). Also some 9.5 GW of coal, gas and oil fired capacity was shut down. In normal operating conditions (70% average utilisation rate) the nuclear plants would generate some 60 TWh annually.

Rolling blackouts of 3 hours in 5 areas have been announced by TEPCO. They have been implemented from Monday 14 March depending on the actual demand/supply balance. Tohoku-EPCO has also announced rolling blackouts in 8 areas which will be implemented as of Wednesday 16 March.

Transmission Interconnectors in Japan



Source: ESCJ.

This map is for illustrative purposes and is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory covered by this map.

B. Oil

Earthquake and Tsunami Impact

Regarding the refining sector in Japan, 6 refineries with a total refining capacity of 1.4 mb/d (around 30% of Japan's total refining capacity) are shut down[1]. The closure of these refineries is expected to last for at least a week. It is not known yet if the utilization rate of other refineries in operation has been increased, following the closure of 6 refineries. Several LPG tanks at two refineries were damaged and burnt.

According to JOGMEC, stockholding agency of Japan, one of the 10 governmental oil stockpiling sites, located at Kuji, was affected by the tsunami. This site, which has underground storage facilities, is currently out of operation. Some 11 mb of government stocks (crude) are stored at this site, which accounts for merely 3% of the total Japan's public stocks.

The Japanese government has been closely coordinating with the domestic industry to facilitate the distribution of oil products required in the affected areas from non-damaged regions. As Japan holds ample amounts of oil stocks, some of these stocks could be used for this purpose. The Japanese Government announced on 14 March that they have lowered the obligation for industry to hold emergency stocks by 3 days, from 70 days to 67 days, freeing up 8 mb of oil products for distribution.

[1] The six refineries include JX Nippon Oil & Energy (Sendai, Kashima and Negishi), Cosmo Oil (Chiba), Kyokuto (Chiba) and TonenGeneral (Kawasaki).

Basic Oil Information on Japan

Key Oil Data

	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2008	2009	2010
Production (kb/d)	13.7	13.3	18.7	17.5	18.5	20.5	19.2	17.9
Demand (kb/d)	4 436.0	5 315.4	5 693.1	5 515.5	5 328.0	4 788.4	4 367.2	4 417.9
Motor gasoline	*569.5*	*738.5*	*879.0*	*998.9*	*1 045.6*	*982.4*	*988.4*	*1 003.6*
Gas/diesel oil	*798.9*	*1 112.3*	*1 271.1*	*1 241.3*	*1 149.8*	*924.4*	*843.7*	*837.8*
Residual fuel oil	*950.9*	*898.3*	*795.6*	*653.2*	*581.5*	*535.7*	*401.9*	*391.6*
Others	*2 116.6*	*2 566.3*	*2 747.3*	*2 622.0*	*2 551.2*	*2 345.9*	*2 133.2*	*2 185.0*
Net imports (kb/d)	4 422.3	5 302.1	5 674.4	5 498.0	5 309.5	4 767.9	4 348.0	4 400.0
Import dependency	*99.7%*	*99.7%*	*99.7%*	*99.7%*	*99.7%*	*99.6%*	*99.6%*	*99.6%*
Refining capacity (kb/d)	4 966	4 198	4 847	4 998	4 707	4 651	4 691	4 896
Oil in TPES	55.3%	57.0%	53.4%	49.2%	46.7%	43.2%	42.7%	-

(Source: IEA)

Oil Demand

Japan's oil demand gradually decreased from 5.5 mb/d in 2000 to 4.4 mb/d in 2010. The transport sector accounted for around 40% of the total oil consumption in Japan in 2008.

Japan's oil consumption, by sector (2008)



Source: IEA

Oil Imports

Japan is entirely dependent on oil imports and the sources of these imports are currently concentrated in one region, the Middle East. Japan's oil imports in 2010 were some 4.7 mb/d, consisting of 3.7 mb/d crude oil (including NGLs and feedstocks) and 1 mb/d refined products. Japan's exports of refined products stood at some 350 kb/d in 2010.

Japan's crude imports, by source (2010)



Source: IEA

Refineries

Japan has 27 oil refineries, situated primarily in coastal areas. As of January 2011, total refining capacity was about 4.5 mb/d.

Japan refinery output and demand, by product (2010)



Source: IEA

Oil Stocks

Japan holds government stocks and places a minimum stockholding obligation on industry.
As of December 2010, Japan held some 590 mb of oil stocks, equivalent to 169 days of net imports. Japan's emergency oil reserves consist of about 320 mb of government oil stocks (94 days of net imports) and some 270 mb of industry stocks (75 days). Government stocks managed by JOGMEC (stockholding agency of Japan) are almost all in crude oil form.

Oil Infrastructure Map of Japan



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on maps included in this publication do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the IEA.

Source: IEA

C. Natural Gas

Earthquake and Tsunami Impact

No damages to LNG terminals and key gas pipeline systems were reported.

Basic Gas Information on Japan

Gas Demand

Gas demand steadily increased from 83 BCM (some 230 MCM/d) in 2000 to 100 BCM (about 275 MCM/d) in 2009, and increased an estimated further 5% in 2010. The transformation sector represented 60% of total gas consumption in Japan in 2008.

Japan's gas consumption, by sector (2008)



Source: IEA

Gas Imports

With little domestic production, Japan relies almost entirely on imports to meet its gas demand. Due to the lack of international pipelines, all of the gas imports are in the form of LNG.

In 2009 Japan imported some 93 BCM (some 255 MCM/d) of gas. Australia, Qatar and ASEAN gas producers (Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei) are the main import sources of gas for Japan.

Japan's gas imports, by source (2009)



Source: IEA

LNG Terminals

Japan has 28 importing LNG terminals in operation, with a total import capacity of around 260 BCM (about 720 MCM/d) of natural gas. Japan also has some 15 MCM storage capacity for LNG (equivalent to 9 BCM of natural gas) held at the LNG regasification terminals. This overcapacity provides a high degree of flexibility to respond to potential demand increases, or to effectively move gas around the country.

Gas Infrastructure Map of Japan



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on maps included in this publication do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the IEA.

DOE Perspective on corrosion issues at Fukushima

Executive summary

(b)(5)

DOE Frame of reference on activity to date: (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Comparison with Millstone experience: On Sept. 1, 1972, the Millstone Unit 1 BWR was undergoing routine startup. Due to a leak in the main condenser tube, high conductivity sea-water was introduced into full flow demineralizers. The demineralizers failed very rapidly and led to high conductivity water in the reactor vessel via the condensate/feedwater system.

As noted in their report, the effects of this event introduced "maximum chloride content" were reduced somewhat because of the very low oxygen content in the water. However, some key corrosion effects were observed in a matter of hours.

- 116/120 of the local power range monitors (stainless steel) were damaged by cracking in a short time period. In part, this extensive damage was due to the very thin walls of the LPRM's.
- Stress corrosion cracking was observed in other reactor components such as stainless steel piping [composition assumed from other similar BWRs]. These cracks were predominantly in crevice areas of threaded components or tight joints and measured to be 0.75 to 1.25 mm in depth. Notably, these cracks were considered to be "superficial" and not expected to propagate during subsequent operation. Later analysis confirmed these results.

EB/3

- Subsequent tests at GE found results more severe than in the actual incident. Cracks were found in highly stressed stainless steel and age-hardened alloys, but not in Inconel or carbon-steel.

Several implications are important when considering events in Fukushima.

(b)(5)

Corrosion impacts on key components: As noted above for Millstone, salt water will clearly facilitate corrosion processes of reactor components. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Evidence of corrosion in the system: (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: Givvines, Mary
Sent: Tuesday, April 19, 2011 12:12 PM
To: Dudek, Michael; Hiland, Patrick
Cc: Wagner, Paige; Peterson, Gordon
Subject: RE: Japan Response Staffing (w/ Attachment)

Pat, Michael,

I just spoke to Gordon Peterson from OCFO. OMB has called again requesting the information. I explained we were working and could have an answer within the hour but to tell OMB we will provide in two hours.

Looking ahead – should we get together with OCFO and establish a disciplined process on how to proceed with these type external requests in the most efficient manner? I would be glad to schedule the meeting. Pat and I feel this should be led by NSIR (Operations Center) but open to suggestions.

Thanks

From: Dudek, Michael
Sent: Tuesday, April 19, 2011 11:41 AM
To: Hiland, Patrick
Cc: Givvines, Mary
Subject: Japan Response Staffing (w/ Attachment)

Pat,

In accordance with our discussion this morning, I have attached the entire HOC staffing list (by week) for the Japan Response. It does not appear that the list includes the team members that the NRC sent to Japan. Also, I have notified the other POCs and OCFO that you will be providing the Agency answer for each "tasking."

I have summarized the HOC staff (by week) for convenience below:

Assumptions: (a) Does not include Japan Site Team, (b) HOC was staffed 24 hours/day, (c) Staff worked 8 hour shifts, (d) Includes all people in HOC.

March 11-12th – ~72 people worked in the HOC during this two day span on 8 hour shift. (72 x 8 = 576 man-hours)

March 13-19th – ~580 people x 8 hrs = 4,640 man-hours

March 20-26th – ~600 people x 8 hrs = 4,800 man-hours

March 27-April 2nd – ~450 people x 8 hrs = 3,600 man-hours

April 3-9th - ~450 people x 8 hrs = 3,600 man-hours

April 10-16th - ~130 people x 8 hrs = 1,040 man-hours

Total: ~18,256 HOC man-hours as of April 16th

Going Forward = ~130 people per week x 8 hrs = 1,040 man-hours

EB/4

Please let me know what else you need.

Thanks!

Michael I. Dudek
Michael Dudek | Technical Assistant | NSIR/Division of Preparedness & Response | U.S. NRC
11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852 | ☎ (301) 415-6500 | ✉: Michael.Dudek@nrc.gov

Japan Earthquake ERO Staffing Roster
March 11 - 15, 2011
Pay Period 6 - Week 2

Position	Date	Time	Staff
Executive Team			
ET Director			
Fri-Sat	3/11-3/12	11pm - 7am	Dan Dorman
Sat	12-Mar	7am - 7pm	Marty Virgilio
Sat	12-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Bill Borchardt
ET Response Advisor			
Fri-Sat	3/11-3/12	7pm - 7am	Scott Morris
Sat	12-Mar	7am - 7pm	Brian McDermott
Sat	12-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Chris Miller
Executive Briefing Team			
EBT Admin. Assistant			
Fri-Sat	3/11-3/12	11pm - 11am	Sapna Hurd
Sat	12-Mar	11am - 11pm	Annette Stang
EBT Coordinator			
Fri-Sat	3/11-3/12	11pm - 11am	Vanice Perin
Sat	12-Mar	11am - 11pm	Sara Mroz
Executive Support Team			
EST Status Officer			
Fri-Sat	3/11-3/12	11pm - 11am	Jeff Grant
Sat	12-Mar	7am - 7pm	Jane Marshall
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	7pm - 7am	Bill Gott
EST Coordinator			
Fri-Sat	3/11-3/12	11pm - 11am	Jeff Grant
Sat	12-Mar	11am - 11pm	Tony Bowers
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	11pm - 11am	Jeff Grant
Sun	13-Mar	11am - 11pm	Tony Bowers
EST Chronology Officer			
Fri-Sat	3/11-3/12	11pm - 11am	Margie Kotzalas
Sat	12-Mar	11am - 11pm	Kratchman, Jessica / Alan Frazier
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	11pm - 11am	Greg Bowman
EST Response Ops Mgr			
Fri-Sat	3/11-3/12	7pm-7am	Karen Jackson
Sat	12-Mar	7am-7pm	Omar Khan
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	10pm - 7am	Karen Jackson
EST Admin. Assistant			
Fri-Sat	3/11-3/12	3pm - 11am	Linda Williamson/Andrea Wimbush
Sat	11-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Tabitha Howard
Sat	12-Mar	11am - 11pm	Emily Larson
Liason Team			
LT Director			
Fri-Sat	3/11-3/12	7pm - 2am	Tom Blount
Sat	12-Mar	2am - 7am	Mike Tschiltz
Sat	12-Mar	7am - 11pm	Tim McGinty
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	11am - 11pm	Mark Thaggard

Japan Earthquake ERO Staffing Roster
March 11 - 15, 2011
Pay Period 6 - Week 2

Position	Date	Time	Staff
LT Coordinator			
Fri-Sat	3/11-3/12	7pm - 7am	Nathan Sanfilippo
Sat	12-Mar	2am - 7am	Rani Franovich
Sat	12-Mar	7am - 7pm	Jeff Temple/Milt Murray
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	7pm - 7am	Janelle Jesse
Sun	13-Mar	7am - 7pm	Jeff Temple/Milt Murray
Sun-Mon	3/13-3/14	7pm - 7am	TBD
Mon	14-Mar	7am - 7pm	Jeff Temple/Milt Murray
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	7pm - 7am	TBD
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 7pm	Jeff Temple/Milt Murray
LT Federal Liaison			
Fri-Sat	3/11-3/12	1am - 7am	Ted Smith
Sat	12-Mar	7am - 7pm	Russ Chazell / Beth Reed
LT Congressional Liaison			
Fri-Sat	3/11-3/12	10pm - 7am	Raeann Shane/Gene Dacus
Sat	12-Mar	7am - 2pm	Amy Powell/Becky Schmidt
Sat	12-Mar	2pm - 9pm	Spiros Drogettis/Tim Riley
LT International Liaison			
Fri-Sat	3/11-3/12	11pm - 7am	Eric Stahl
Sat	12-Mar	7am - 7pm	Kirk Foggie
Sat	12-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Jack Ramsey/Danielle Emche
Protective Measures Team			
PMT Coordinator			
Fri-Sat	3/11-3/12	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon
Sat	12-Mar	7am - 11am	Prosanta Chowdhury
Sat	12-Mar	7am-7pm	Nima Ashkeboussi
PMTR Prot Actions Asst Dir			
Fri-Sat	3/11-3/12	11pm - 7am	Kathryn Brock
Sat	12-Mar	7am - 7pm	Stacey Rosenberg
PMTR RAAD			
Fri-Sat	3/11-3/12	11pm - 7am	Steve LaVie
Sat	12-Mar	7am - 7pm	Bruce Watson
PMTR Dose Assessment (RASCAL)			
Fri-Sat	3/11-3/12	7pm - 7am	Kimberly Ropon
Sat	12-Mar	7am-11am	Prosanta Chowdhury
Sat	12-Mar	11am - 11pm	Gary Purdy
Reactor Safety Team			
RST Director			
Fri-Sat	3/11-3/12	11pm - 7am	Mike Case
Sat	12-Mar	7am - 3pm	Dave Skeen
Sat	12-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Bill Ruland
RST Coordinator			
Fri-Sat	3/11-3/12	11:45pm - 7am	Brett Rini

Japan Earthquake ERO Staffing Roster
March 11 - 15, 2011
Pay Period 6 - Week 2

Position	Date	Time	Staff
Sat	12-Mar	7am - 3pm	Peter Alter
Sat	12-Mar	3pm - 10pm	Rick Hasselberg
Severe Accident/PRA			
Fri-Sat	3/11-3/12	11pm - 7am	Mike Cheok
Sat	12-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jeff Circle
Sat	12-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Don Dube
BWR Expertise			
Fri-Sat	3/11-3/12	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Sat	12-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tim Kolb
Sat	12-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Chuck Norton
RST Comm/ERDS Operator			
Fri-Sat	3/11-3/12	11pm - 7am	Jim Isom
Sat	12-Mar	7am - 7pm	Steve Bloom
Sat	12-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Mark Padovan (arrive at 5:00pm)

Japan Earthquake ERO Staffing Roster
March 11 - 15, 2011
Pay Period 7 - Week 1

Position	Date	Time	Staff
Executive Team			
ET Director			
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	11pm - 7am	Mike Weber
Sun	13-Mar	7am - 3pm	Marty Virgilio
Sun	13-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Bill Borchardt
Sun-Mon	3/13-3/14	11pm - 7am	Mike Weber
Mon	14-Mar	7am - 3pm	Marty Virgilio
Mon	14-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Bill Borchardt
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm - 7am	Mike Weber
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 3pm	Marty Virgilio / Mike Weber
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Jack Grobe
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Dan Dorman
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mike Weber
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Bruce Boger
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Dan Dorman
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mike Weber
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Jack Grobe
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Roy Zimmerman
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jim Wiggins
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Bruce Boger
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Roy Zimmerman
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jim Wiggins
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Brian Sheron
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Mike Johnson
ET Response Advisor			
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	11pm - 7am	Scott Morris
Sun	13-Mar	7am - 3pm	Brian McDermott
Sun	13-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Mary Jane Ross-Lee
Sun-Mon	3/13-3/14	11pm - 7am	Scott Morris
Mon	14-Mar	7am - 3pm	Brian McDermott
Mon	14-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Chris Miller
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm - 7am	Scott Morris
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 3pm	Brian McDermott
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Mary Jane (MJ) Ross-Lee
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Chris Miller
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Brian McDermott
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Mary Jane (MJ) Ross-Lee
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Chris Miller
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Brian McDermott
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Mary Jane (MJ) Ross-Lee
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Scott Morris (also 3/18-3/19)
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Brian McDermott
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Mary Jane (MJ) Ross-Lee
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Scott Morris
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Brian McDermott
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Mary Jane (MJ) Ross-Lee
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Scott Morris
ET Rx Prot Measures & State Coordinator			

Position	Date	Time	Staff
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 3pm	Charles Miller
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Larry Camper
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Rob Lewis
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Charles Miller
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Vonna Ordaz
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Rob Lewis
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 7pm	Charles Miller
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	7pm - 7am	Dan Dorman (Follow - up)
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Charles Miller
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Vonna Ordaz
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Scott Moore
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Larry Camper
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Patricia Holahan
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Rob Lewis
Executive Briefing Team			
EBT Admin. Assistant			
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	11pm - 11am	Sapna Hurd
Sun	13-Mar	11am - 11pm	Annette Stang
Sun-Mon	3/13-3/14	11pm - 11am	Christina Merritt
Mon	14-Mar	11am - 11pm	Kelly Riner
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm - 7am	Tia Pope
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 3pm	Sapna Hurd
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Annette Stang
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Christina Merritt (vac after today)
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Melissa Ralph
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Annette Stang
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Tia Pope
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Sapna Hurd
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Annette Stang
Thru-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Tia Pope
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Carolyn Kahler
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Annette Stang
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Sapna Hurd
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Carolyn Kahler
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Annette Stang
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 9am	Sapna Hurd
EBT Coordinator			
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	7pm - 7am	Eric Schrader
Sun	13-Mar	7am - 7pm	Sara Mroz
Sun-Mon	3/13-3/14	7pm - 7am	Jim Anderson
Mon	14-Mar	7am - 7pm	Yen-Ju Chen
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	7pm - 7am	Eric Schrader/Rebecca Stone
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jim Anderson
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Sara Mroz
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Yen-Ju Chen
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jim Anderson
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 3am	Sara Mroz
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	3am - 3pm	Jim Anderson
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Sara Mroz
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Rebecca Clinton

Position	Date	Time	Staff
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jim Anderson
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Sara Mroz
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Christine Steger
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Caroline Nguyen
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Sara Mroz
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Jim Andersen
Executive Support Team			
EST Status Officer			
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm - 7am	Jeff Grant
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jane Marshall
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Bill Gott
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Jeff Grant
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jane Marshall
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Bill Gott
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Jeff Grant
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jane Marshall
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Bill Gott
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Jeff Grant
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jane Marshall
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Bill Gott
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Doug Huyck
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Craig Erlanger
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	John Jolicoeur
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Doug Huyck
EST Actions Officer			
Mon	14-Mar	7am - 3pm	Wendy Reed
Mon	14-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Sarah Mroz
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm - 7am	
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 3pm	Zahira Cruz-Perez (until 11am)/Melissa Ralph
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Tony Bowers
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Wendy Reed (until 4:30pm)
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Amy Salus
Wed-Thur	3/16 - 3/17	11pm - 7am	
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Wendy Reed
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Melissa Ralph
Thur-Fri	3/17 - 3/18	11pm - 7am	Amy Roundtree
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jonathan Fiske
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Melissa Ralph
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Amy Roundtree
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Bezakulu Alemu
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Melissa Ralph
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Jonathan Fiske
EST Coordinator			
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	11pm - 11am	Jeff Grant
Sun	13-Mar	11am - 11pm	Tony Bowers
Sun-Mon	3/13-3/14	11pm - 11am	Jeff Grant
Mon	14-Mar	11am - 11pm	Tony Bowers
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm - 7am	Jeff Grant
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tony McMurtray

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Position	Date	Time	Staff
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Tony Bowers
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Jeff Grant
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tony McMurtray
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Tony Bowers
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Rebecca Stone
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tony McMurtray
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Tony Bowers
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Rebecca Stone
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tony McMurtray
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Steve Campbell
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Rebecca Stone
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Clyde Ragland
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Tony Bowers
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Rebecca Stone
EST Chronology Officer			

Sun	13-Mar	11am - 11pm	Alan Frazier
Sun-Mon	3/13-3/14	11pm - 7am	Greg Bowman
Mon	14-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jessica Kratchman
Mon	14-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Rebecca Karas
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm - 7am	Scarbrough, Thomas
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jessica Kratchman
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Rebecca Karas
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Scarbrough, Thomas
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jessica Kratchman
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Rebecca Karas
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Scarbrough, Thomas
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jessica Kratchman
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Rebecca Karas
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Scarbrough, Thomas (on travel 3/18-3/19)
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jessica Kratchman
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Rebecca Karas
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Dennis Gordon
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Vanice Perrin
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rebecca Karas
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Cynthia Dorsey
EST Response Ops Mgr			

Sun	13-Mar	7am - 7pm	Roberto Figueroa
Sun-Mon	3/13-3/14	7pm - 7am	Omar Khan
Mon	14-Mar	7am - 7pm	Karen Jackson
Mon	14-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Roberto Figueroa
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm - 7am	Omar Khan
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 3pm	Karen Jackson
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Roberto Figueroa
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Omar Khan
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Karen Jackson
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Roberto Figueroa
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Omar Khan
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Karen Jackson

Position	Date	Time	Staff
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Roberto Figueroa
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Omar Khan
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Karen Jackson
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Roberto Figueroa
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Omar Khan
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Cris Brown
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bob Stransky
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Jean Trefethan
EST Admin. Assistant			
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	11pm - 7am	Amy Salus
Sun	13-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mary Glenn Crutchley
Sun	13-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Emily Larson
Sun-Mon	3/13-3/14	11pm - 7am	Linda Williamson
Mon	14-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tabitha Howard
Mon	14-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Michelle Manahan
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm - 7am	Amy Salus
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 3pm	Linda Williamson
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Michelle Manahan
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Andrea Wimbush
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Emily Larson
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Tabitha Howard
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Andrea Wimbush
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Karen Meyer
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Mary Glenn Crutchley
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Linda Williamson
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Amy Salus
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Mary Glenn Crutchley
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Tabitha Howard
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Karen Meyer
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Amy Salus
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Chris Lamb
Liaison Team			
LT Director			
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	11pm - 7am	Tom Blount
Sun	13-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mike Tschiltz
Sun	13-Mar	3pm-11pm	Tim McGinty
Sun-Mon	3/13-3/14	11pm - 7am	Tom Blount
Mon	14-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mark Thaggard
Mon	14-Mar	3pm-11pm	Tim McGinty
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm - 7am	Tom Blount
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mark Lombard
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Tim McGinty
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Tom Blount
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mark Lombard
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Mark Thaggard
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Tom Blount
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mark Lombard
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Mark Thaggard
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Tom Blount

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Position	Date	Time	Staff
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mark Lombard
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Mark Thaggard
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Tom Blount
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tom Bergman
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bob Webber
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	John Adams
LT Coordinator			
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	7pm - 7am	Janelle Jesse
Sun	13-Mar	7am - 7pm	Jeff Temple/Milt Murray
Sun-Mon	3/13-3/14	7pm - 7am	Nathan Sanfilippo
Mon	14-Mar	7am - 3pm	Rani Franovich
Mon	14-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Milt Murray
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm - 7am	Jeff Temple
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 3pm	Milt Murray
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Nathan Sanfilippo
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Jeff Temple
Wed	16-Mar	7am-3pm	Milt Murray
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Nathan Sanfilippo
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Jeff Temple
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Milt Murray
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Rani Franovich
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Jeff Temple
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Milt Murray
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Rani Franovich
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm - 7am	Janelle Jesse
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Janelle Jessie
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jeff Temple
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rani Franovich
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Janelle Jessie
LT State Liaison			
Sun	13-Mar	7am-3pm	Rich Turtil
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	9pm-7am	Ryan/Turtil (ON CALL ONLY)
Fri	18-Mar	7am-2pm	Lukes/Flannery
Fri	18-Mar	2pm-9pm	Turtil/Maupin
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	9pm-7am	Ryan/Turtil (ON CALL ONLY)
Sat	19-Mar	7am-2pm	Ryan/Turtil (ON CALL ONLY)
Sat	19-Mar	2pm-9pm	Ryan/Turtil (ON CALL ONLY)
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	9pm-7am	Ryan/Turtil (ON CALL ONLY)
LT Federal Liaison (2)			
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	7pm - 7am	Susan Salter / Jason Lising
Sun	13-Mar	7am - 3pm	Russ Chazell
Sun	13-Mar	3pm - 11 pm	Beth Reed
Sun-Mon	3/13-3/14	11pm - 7am	Ted Smith/ Bethany Cesare
Mon	14-Mar	7am - 7pm	Beth Reed (until 3pm)/Scott Sloan
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	7pm - 7am	Jeffrey Lynch/Eddie Robinson
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 3pm	Ted Smith / Beth Reed
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Scott Sloan
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Jeff Lynch
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Beth Reed/Ted Smith

Position	Date	Time	Staff
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Jerry Hale
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Scott Sloan
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Beth Reed/Ted Smith
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Jerry Hale
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Scott Sloan
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Beth Reed/Jeff Lynch
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Ted Smith
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Scott Sloan
LT Congressional Liaison (2)			
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	9pm -7am	David Decker
Sun	13-Mar	7am - 2pm	Amy Powell
Sun	13-Mar	2pm - 9pm	Tim Riley
Sun-Mon	3/13-3/14	9pm -7am	Gene Dacus
Mon	14-Mar	7am - 2pm	Raeann Shane
Mon	14-Mar	2pm - 9pm	Amy Powell
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	9pm -7am	Tim Riley
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 2pm	Spiros Drogettis
Tue	15-Mar	2pm - 7pm	Gene Dacus
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 2pm	Spiros Drogettis
Wed	16-Mar	2pm - 7pm	Tim Riley
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 2pm	David Decker
Thur	17-Mar	2pm-9pm	Raeann Shane
Fri	18-Mar	7am-2pm	Gene Dacus
Fri	18-Mar	2pm - 7pm	Tim Riley
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 2pm	Spiros Droggitis
Sat	19-Mar	2pm-9pm	Tim Riley
LT International Liaison (2)			
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	11pm - 7am	Charlotte Abrams/Jen Schwartzman
Sun	13-Mar	7am - 3pm	Nader Mamish/Brooke Smith/Janice Owens
Sun	13-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Kirk Foggie/Karen Henderson
Sun-Mon	3/13-3/14	11pm - 7am	Nancy Fragoyanis/Eric Stahl
Mon	14-Mar	7am - 3pm	Nader Mamish
Mon	14-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Kirk Foggie
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm - 7am	Margaret Doane
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 3pm	Margaret Doane/Jen Schwartzman
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Steve Dembeck/Danielle Emche
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Nader Mamish/Andrea Jones/Lauren Mayros
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Margaret Doane/Skip Young/Karen Henderson
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Steve Dembeck/Eric Stahl
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Nader Mamish/Brian Wittick/Elizabeth Smiroldo
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Charlotte Abrams/Lance English
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Steve Dembek/Eric Stahl
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Nader Mamish/Brian Wittick/Mugeh Afshar-Tous
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jen Schwartzman/Steve Bloom
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Jenny Tobin/Lauren Mayros
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Elizabeth Smiroldo/Danielle Emche
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Lance English/Steve Bloom
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jenny Tobin/Jill Shephard
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Elizabeth Smiroldo/Danielle Emche

Position	Date	Time	Staff
Protective Measures Team			
PMTR Director			
Mon	14-Mar	8:30am -5:30pm	Christiana Lui
Mon	14-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Vince Holahan
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm - 7am	Patricia Milligan
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 3pm	Cynthia Jones
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	John Lubinski
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Terry Reis
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 12pm	Cynthia Jones (7am- 12pm)
Wed	16-Mar	12pm - 11pm	Patricia Holahan
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Terry Reis
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Cynthia Jones
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Don Cool
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Aby Mohseni
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	John Lubinski
Fri	18-Mar	3pm-11pm	Patricia Holahan
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Kathy Gibson
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	John Lubinski
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Don Cool
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Kathy Gibson
PMTR Coordinator			
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	7pm - 7am	Lou Brandon
Sun	13-Mar	7am-3pm	Jack Foster
Sun	13-Mar	3pm-11pm	Nima Ashkeboussi
Sun-Mon	3/13-3/14	11pm - 7am	John Lubinski
Mon	14-Mar	7am-3pm	Prosanta Chowdhury
Mon	14-Mar	3pm-11pm	Nima Ashkeboussi
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm - 7am	John Lubinski
Tue	15-Mar	7am-3pm	Prosanta Chowdhury
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Johnny Eads
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 8am	Lou Brandon
Wed	16-Mar	8am - 3pm	Prosanta Chowdhury
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Nima Ashkeboussi
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 8am	Mike Norris
Thur	17-Mar	8am - 3pm	Prosanta Chowdhury
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Nima Ashkeboussi
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Duane Hardesty
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Arlon Costa
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Mike Norris
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Duane Hardesty
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jay Patel
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon
PMTR Prot Actions Asst Dir			
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	7pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Sun	13-Mar	7am-3pm	Kathryn Brock
Sun	13-Mar	3pm-11pm	John Tappert
Sun-Mon	3/13-3/14	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto

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Mon	14-Mar	7am-3pm	Kathryn Brock
Mon	14-Mar	3pm-11pm	Vince Holahan
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm-7am	Greg Casto
Tue	15-Mar	7am-3pm	Stacey Rosenberg
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Kathryn Brock
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Kathryn Brock
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Vince Holahan
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Kathryn Brock
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	John Tappert
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Kathryn Brock
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Vince Holahan
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Greg Casto
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Kathryn Brock
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Kevin Williams
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
PMTR RAAD			
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	7pm-7am	Michelle Hart
Sun	13-Mar	7am-3pm	Bruce Watson
Sun	13-Mar	3pm-11pm	Steve LaVie
Sun-Mon	3/13-3/14	11pm-7am	Randy Sullivan
Mon	14-Mar	7am-3pm	Bruce Watson
Mon	14-Mar	3pm-11pm	Michelle Hart
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm-7am	Patricia Milligan
Tue	15-Mar	7am-3pm	Bruce Watson
Tue	15-Mar	3pm-11pm	Steve LaVie
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Patricia Milligan
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 2pm	Bruce Watson
Wed	16-Mar	2pm - 11pm	Steve LaVie
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Randy Sullivan
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Bruce Watson
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Patricia Milligan
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Randy Sullivan
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Bruce Watson
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Michelle Hart
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Randy Sullivan
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Bruce Watson
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Michelle Hart
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Patricia Milligan
PMTR Dose Assessment (RASCAL) - Need 2			
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	11pm - 7am	Duane Schmidt
Sun	13-Mar	7am-3pm	Kimberly Ropon Gambone (arrive 11am)
Sun	13-Mar	3pm-11pm	Richard Clement (2pm-7pm)/Casper Sun
Sun-Mon	3/13-3/14	11pm-7am	Patricia Milligan
Mon	14-Mar	7am-3pm	Tony Huffert/Fritz Sturz
Mon	14-Mar	3pm-11pm	Kimberly Gambone / Rich Clement (3pm - 8pm)
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm-7am	Randy Sullivan / Joe DeCicco/Eric Schrader
Tue	15-Mar	7am-3pm	Casper Sun / John Parillo

Position	Date	Time	Staff
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Fritz Sturz/Tony Huffert
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Bernie White/Joe DeCicco
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Kimberly Gambone / Rich Clement
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Gary Purdy/Margaret Cervera/Casper Sun (3-7)
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Fritz Sturz, Lou Brandon
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	John Parillo/Eric Schrader (Mike McCoppin to assist)
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Casper Sun/Duane Schmidt
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Kimberly Gambone/Joe DeCicco
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	John Parillo/Eric Schrader
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Gary Purdy/Casper Sun
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Duane Schmidt/Tony Huffert
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Casper Sun / Joe DeCicco (10am arrive)
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Margaret Cervera / Joe DeCicco
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Kimberly Gambone/John Parillo
RASCAL Developer			
Tue	15-Mar	1pm-7pm	George Athey (contractor)
PMTR GIS Analyst			
Sun	13-Mar	10:30 am-5pm	Yong Li
Mon	14-Mar	7am - 3pm	Yong Li (leaving @ 4:00)
Mon	14-Mar	3pm - 11pm	George Wunder
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm - 7am	Dogan Seber
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 3pm	Yong Li
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Alice Stieve
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Stephanie Devlin
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Yong Li
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	George Wunder
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Stephanie Devlin
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Yong Li
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	George Wunder
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Stephanie Devlin
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Yong Li
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Dogan Seber
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Alice Stieve
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Phil Brandt
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Ken See
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Alice Stieve
PMTR Meteorologist			
Mon	14-Mar	7am - 3pm	Brad Harvey
Mon	14-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Kevin Quinlan
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm - 7am	Dave Brown
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tom Galletta
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Kevin Quinlan
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Dave Brown
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tom Galletta
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Kevin Quinlan
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Dave Brown
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tom Galletta
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Kevin Quinlan
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Dave Brown

Position	Date	Time	Staff
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tom Galletta
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Kevin Quinlan
Fri-Sat	18-Mar	3pm-11pm	Mike Mazaika
Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Dave Brown
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Kevin Quinlan
Sat-Sun	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Mike Mazaika
Reactor Safety Team			
RST Director			
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	11pm - 7am	Mike Case
Sun	13-Mar	7am - 3pm	Pat Hiland
Sun	13-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Fred Brown
Sun-Mon	3/13-3/14	11pm - 7am	Dave Skeen
Mon	14-Mar	7am - 3pm	Laura Dudes
Mon	14-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Bill Ruland
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm - 7am	Mike Case
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 3pm	Dave Skeen
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Fred Brown
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Pat Hiland
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Dave Skeen
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Bill Ruland
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Mike Case
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Laura Dudes
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Fred Brown
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Pat Hiland
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Laura Dudes
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Bill Ruland
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Jennifer Uhle
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Laura Dudes
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Dave Skeen
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Jennifer Uhle
RST Coordinator			
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	11pm - 7am	Mike Morlang
Sun	13-Mar	7am - 3pm	Peter Alter
Sun	13-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Rick Hasselberg
Sun-Mon	3/13-3/14	11pm - 7am	Brett Rini
Mon	14-Mar	7am - 3pm	Peter Alter
Mon	14-Mar	3pm - 11pm	R. Berry
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm - 7am	R. Berry
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 3pm	Rick Hasselberg
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Frank Collins
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Mike Morlang
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Rick Hasselberg
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Greg Schoenbeck
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Rollie Berry
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Frank Collins
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Greg Schoenbeck
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Rollie Berry
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Peter Alter
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Greg Schoenbeck
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Rollie Berry

Position	Date	Time	Staff
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Scott Sloan
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Oleg Bukharin
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Frank Collins
Severe Accident/PRA			
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Sun	13-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jeff Circle
Sun	13-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Hossein Esmaili
Sun-Mon	3/13-3/14	11pm - 7am	Mike Cheok
Mon	14-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jeff Circle
Mon	14-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Len Ward
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm - 7am	Steve Laur
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jeff Circle
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Michael Salay
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	J. Schaperow
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Ed Fuller
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Hossein Esmaili
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Mike Salay
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jeff Circle
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Steve Laur
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Mike Salay
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Hossein Esmaili
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	J. Schaperow
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm - 7am	Don Marksberry
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Len Ward
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Ed Fuller
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Mike Salay
BWR Expertise			
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Sun	13-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tim Kolb
Sun	13-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Chuck Norton
Sun-Mon	3/13-3/14	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Mon	14-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tim Kolb
Mon	14-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Chuck Norton
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jim Shea / Peter Alter
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Chuck Norton
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Larry Vick
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Chuck Norton
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jim Shea (Peter Alter?)
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Chuck Norton
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jim Shea ?
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Chuck Norton
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Mike Brown
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Peter Alter
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	John Kauffman

Japan Earthquake ERO Staffing Roster
March 11 - 15, 2011
Pay Period 7 - Week 1

Position	Date	Time	Staff
RST Comm/ERDS Operator			
Sat-Sun	3/12-3/13	11pm - 7am	?
Sun	13-Mar	7am-3pm	Joseph Williams
Sun	13-Mar	3pm-11pm	Ken Hart
Sun-Mon	3/13-3/14	11pm - 7am	?
Mon	14-Mar	7am-3pm	Steve Bloom
Mon	14-Mar	3pm-11pm	Mark Padovan
Mon-Tue	3/14-3/15	11pm - 7am	Ken Hart
Tue	15-Mar	7am-3pm	Donna Williams
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Jim Isom
Tue-Wed	3/15-3/16	11pm - 7am	Ken Hart
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Joseph Williams
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Steve Bloom
Wed-Thur	3/16-3/17	11pm - 7am	Mark Padovan
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Donna Williams
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Frank Collins/John Thorp
Thur-Fri	3/17-3/18	11pm - 7am	John Thorp
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jim Isom
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Ken Hart
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Andy Kugler
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Joseph Williams
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	John Thorp
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Ujagar Bhachu
RST Support (Seismology Q&A)			
Tue	15-Mar	7am - 3pm	Cliff Munson
Tue	15-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Annie Kammerer
Wed	16-Mar	7am - 3pm	Cliff Munson
Wed	16-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Annie Kammerer
Thur	17-Mar	7am - 3pm	Nilesh Chokshi
Thur	17-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Annie Kammerer
Fri	18-Mar	7am - 3pm	Cliff Munson
Fri	18-Mar	3pm - 11pm	Annie Kammerer

Position	Date	Time	Staff
		Executive Team	
ET Director			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Mike Johnson
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jim Wiggins
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Brian Sheron
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Mike Johnson
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mike Weber
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jim Wiggins
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Mike Johnson
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mike Weber
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jim Wiggins
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Bruce Boger
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mike Weber
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Roy Zimmerman
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Bruce Boger
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mike Weber
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Roy Zimmerman
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Jennifer Uhle
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jim Dyer
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Roy Zimmerman
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	Jennifer Uhle
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jim Dyer
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Brian Sheron
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Jennifer Uhle
ET Response Advisor			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Scott Morris
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Chris Miller
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Mary Jane (MJ) Ross-Lee
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Scott Morris
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Brian McDermott
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Chris Miller
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Scott Morris
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mary Jane (MJ) Ross-Lee
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Chris Miller
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Tim McGinty
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Brian McDermott
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Joe Giitter
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Tim McGinty
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mary Jane (MJ) Ross-Lee
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Joe Giitter
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Tim McGinty
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mary Jane (MJ) Ross-Lee
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Joe Giitter
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	Tim McGinty
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mary Jane (MJ) Ross-Lee
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Joe Giitter
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Chris Miller
ET Rx Prot Measures & State Coordinator			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Rob Lewis

Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Vonna Ordaz
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Larry Camper
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Cynthia Carpenter
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Charlie Miller
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Larry Camper
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Rob Lewis
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Charlie Miller
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Patricia Holahan
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Cynthia Carpenter
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Charlie Miller
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Patricia Holahan
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	N/A
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Larry Camper
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Cynthia Carpenter
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	N/A
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Cynthia Carpenter
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Patricia Holahan
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	N/A
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	N/A
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	N/A
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	N/A
Executive Briefing Team			
EBT Admin. Assistant			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 9am	Sapna Hurd
Sun	20-Mar	9am - 7pm	Annette Stang
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	7pm-7am	Carolyn Kahler
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	A. Stang (7-11) / Sapna Hurd (11-3)
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Tia Pope
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Christina Merritt
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Carolyn Kahler/Sapna Hurd
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jon Fiske
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Tia Pope
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jon Fiske
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Annette Stang
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Christina Merritt
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Carolyn Kahler/Sapna Hurd
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jonathan Fiske
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Tia Pope
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jon Fiske
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Sapna Hurd
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	Carolyn Kahler
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	Kelly Riner
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Louise Lovell
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Jonathan Fiske
EBT Coordinator			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Jim Andersen
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Yen-Ju Chen
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Caroline Nguyen
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Jim Andersen
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Yen-Ju Chen

Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Sara Mroz
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Jim Andersen
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Caroline Nguyen
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Sara Mroz
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Jim Andersen
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Yen-Ju Chen
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Sara Mroz
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Jim Andersen
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Yen-Ju Chen
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Sara Mroz
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Jim Andersen
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Caroline Nguyen
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Sara Mroz
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	Jim Andersen
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	Yen-Ju Chen/Tonya Russell
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Sara Mroz
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Jim Anderson
Executive Support Team			
EST Status Officer			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Doug Huyck
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Craig Erlanger
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	John Jolicoeur
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Doug Huyck
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jane Marshall
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bill Gott
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Jeff Grant
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	John Jolicoeur
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bill Gott
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Jeff Grant
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Sally Billings/Jane Marshall
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bill Gott
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Jeff Grant
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jane Marshall
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bill Gott
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Jeff Grant
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jane Marshall
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bill Gott
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	Jeff Grant
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jane Marshall ?
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bill Gott
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Jeff Grant
EST Actions Officer			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Jonathan Fiske
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Melissa Ralph
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jonathan Fiske
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Dori Votolato-Willis
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Melissa Ralph
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Amanda Nerret
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Kelly Grimes
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Melissa Ralph

Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Dori Votolato-Willis
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Kelly Grimes
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Melissa Ralph
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Dori Votolato-Willis
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Kelly Grimes
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Wendy Reed
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Dori Votolato-Willis
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	N/A
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Amanda Nerret
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Melissa Ralph
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	N/A
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	James Corson
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Don Algama
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	N/A
EST Coordinator			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Rebecca Stone
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Clyde Ragland
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Tony Bowers
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Rebecca Stone
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tony McMurtray
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Tony Bowers
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Rebecca Stone
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tony McMurtray
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Clyde Ragland
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Rebecca Stone
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tony McMurtray
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Clyde Ragland
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Rebecca Stone
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tony McMurtray
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Clyde Ragland
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Steve Campbell
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Taylor Lichatz
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Tony McMurtray
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	Steve Campbell
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tonya Russell
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Tony McMurtray
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Steve Campbell
EST Chronology Officer			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Cynthia Dorsey
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	James Vaughn
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rebecca Karas
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Mark Resner
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Hector Rodriguez-Luccioni
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rebecca Karas
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Thomas Scarbrough
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Hector Rodriguez-Luccioni
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rebecca Karas
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Thomas Scarbrough
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	James Vaughn
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rebecca Karas

Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Nick Ballam
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Hector Rodriguez-Luccioni
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rebecca Karas
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Thomas Scarbrough
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Hector Rodriguez-Luccioni
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rebecca Karas
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	Thomas Scarbrough
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	Nick Ballam
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rebecca Karas
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Thomas Scarbrough
EST Response Ops Mgr			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Jean Trefethan
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Karen Jackson
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Roberto Figueroa
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Jean Trefethan
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Bob Stransky
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Omar Khan
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Cris Brown
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Bob Stransky
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Karen Jackson
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Roberto Figueroa
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Bob Stransky
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jean Trefethan
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Cris Brown
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Karen Jackson
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Omar Khan
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Roberto Figueroa
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jean Trefethan
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Cris Brown
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	Roberto Figueroa
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	Omar Khan
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Cris Brown
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Roberto Figueroa
EST Admin. Assistant			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Chris Lamb
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Karen Meyer
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Linda Williamson
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Chris Lamb
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Karen Meyer
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Mary Glenn Crutchley
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Andrea Wimbush
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Cynthia Dorsey
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Mary Glenn Crutchley
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Michelle Manahan
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Karen Meyer
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Mary Glenn Crutchley
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Andrea Wimbush
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Cynthia Dorsey
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Mary Glenn Crutchley
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	N/A

Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Karen Meyer
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Cynthia Dorsey
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	N/A
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Cynthia Dorsey
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	N/A
		Liaison Team	
LT Director			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	John Adams
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tom Bergman
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bob Webber
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	John Adams
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tom Bergman
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bob Webber
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	John Adams
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tom Bergman
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bob Webber
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	John Adams
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Michael Tschiltz
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rich Correia
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Jake Zimmerman
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Michael Tschiltz
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rich Correia
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Jake Zimmerman
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Michael Tschiltz
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rich Correia
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	Jake Zimmerman
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	Michael Tschiltz
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rich Correia
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Marissa Bailey
LT Coordinator			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Janelle Jessie
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jeff Temple
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Nathan Sanfilippo
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Milt Murray
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jeff Temple
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Nathan Sanfilippo
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Milt Murray
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Rani Franovich
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Nathan Sanfilippo
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Milt Murray
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Rani Franovich
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jeff Temple
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Milt Murray
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Rani Franovich
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jeff Temple
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Milt Murray
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Janelle Jessie
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rani Franovich
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	Milt Murray

Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	Janelle Jessie
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rani Franovich
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Milt Murray
LT State Liaison			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	9pm-7am	Michelle Ryan/Rich Turtil (ON CALL)
Sun	20-Mar	7am-2pm	Michelle Ryan/Rich Turtil (ON CALL)
Sun	20-Mar	2pm-9pm	Michelle Ryan/Rich Turtil (ON CALL)
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	9pm-7am	Michelle Ryan/Rich Turtil (ON CALL)
Mon	21-Mar	7am-2pm	Flannery (Riveria-On Call)
Mon	21-Mar	2pm-9pm	Easson (Turtil-On Call)
Mon-Tue	3/21-3/22	9pm-7am	Michelle Ryan/Rich Turtil (ON CALL)
Tue	22-Mar	7am-2pm	Maupin
Tue	22-Mar	2pm-9pm	Easson/Michelle Ryan
Tue-Wed	3/22-3/23	9pm-7am	Alison Rivera/Amanda Noonan (ON CALL)
Wed	23-Mar	7am-2pm	Maupin
Wed	23-Mar	2pm-9pm	Alison Rivera
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	9pm-7am	Michelle Ryan/Turtil (ON CALL)
Thur	24-Mar	7am-2pm	Flannery
Thur	24-Mar	2pm-9pm	Amanda Noonan
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	9pm-7am	Rivera/Turtil (ON CALL)
Fri	25-Mar	7am-2pm	Kim Lukes
Fri	25-Mar	2pm-9pm	Michelle Ryan
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	9pm-7am	Alison Rivera/Amanda Noonan (ON CALL)
Sat	26-Mar	7am-2pm	Michelle Ryan/Amanda Noonan (ON CALL)
Sat	26-Mar	2pm-9pm	Michelle Ryan/Amanda Noonan (ON CALL)
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	9pm-7am	Michelle Rivera/Amanda Noonan (ON CALL)
LT Federal Liaison (2)			
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Ned Wright
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jeff Temple
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Scott Sloan
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Lisa Wright
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Beth Reed/Ted Smith
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Ned Wright
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Lisa Wright
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Beth Reed/Ted Smith
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Ned Wright
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Lisa Wright
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jerry Hale/Ted Smith
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Ned Wright
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Lisa Wright
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Ted Smith/Bethany Cecere
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jerry Hale
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Scott Sloan
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Ted Smith/Bethany Cecere
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jason Lising
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	Scott Sloan
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	Lisa Wright
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jeff Temple
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Scott Sloan

LT Congressional Liaison (2)			
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 2pm	Rebecca Schmidt
	20-Mar	2pm-9pm	Reanne Shane
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 2pm	Spiros Droggitis
	21-Mar	2pm-9pm	Tim Riley
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 2pm	Tim Riley
	22-Mar	2pm-9pm	Spiros Droggitis
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 2pm	Gene Dacus
	23-Mar	2pm-9pm	Raeann Shane
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 2pm	Spiros Droggitis
	24-Mar	2pm-9pm	Raeann Shane
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 2pm	Gene Dacus
	25-Mar	2pm-9pm	Amy Powell
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
LT International Liaison (2)			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Elizabeth Smiroldo/Danielle Emche
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Karen Henderson/Steve Baker
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Eric Stahl/Nancy Fragoyanis
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Elizabeth Smiroldo/Jenny Tobin
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jen Schwartzman/Charlotte Abrams/Nancy (12-3)
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Danielle Emche/Lauren Mayros
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Eric Stahl/Mugeh Afshar-Tous
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jen Schwartzman/Charlotte Abrams/Nancy (12-3)
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Danielle Emche/Lauren Mayros
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Eric Stahl/Mugeh
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jen Schwartzman/Charlotte Abrams/Nancy (12-3)
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Danielle Emche/Lauren Mayros
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Eric Stahl/Mugeh
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Steve Bloom/Lance English
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Janice/Jenny Tobin
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Andrea/Elizabeth Smiroldo
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Steve Bloom/Lance English
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Janice/Jenny Tobin
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	Andrea/Elizabeth Smiroldo
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	Steve Bloom / Lance English
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Janice Owens / Jenny Tobin
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Cindy Rosales/ Elizabeth Smiroldo
		Protective Measures Team	
PMTR Director			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Kathy Gibson
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	John Lubinski
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Don Cool
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Kathy Gibson
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	John Lubinski
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Don Cool
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	John Tappert
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	John Lubinski
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Don Cool

Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	John Tappert
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Terry Reis
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Cindy Jones
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Randy Sullivan
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Terry Reis
Thur	24-Mar	5pm-11pm	Cindy Jones
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Randy Sullivan
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Terry Reis
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Cindy Jones
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	Randy Sullivan
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	Terry Reis
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Cindy Jones
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Randy Sullivan
PMTR Coordinator			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Nima Ashkeboussi
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jay Patel
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Prosanta Chowdhury (8 am)
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jay Patel
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Prosanta Chowdhury (8 am)
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Nima Ashkeboussi
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Mike Norris
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	John Wray
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Nima Ashkeboussi
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Mike Norris
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	John Wray
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jay Patel/Joe DeCicco
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Mike Norris
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Duane Hardesty/Joe DeCicco
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Ryan Craffey
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	Lou Brandon
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	Arlon Costa
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Kimberly Hardin
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon
PMTR Prot Actions Asst Dir			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Kathryn Brock
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Tim Harris
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto (Jessica Kratchman - to shadow)
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Kathryn Brock
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Dan Barss
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Jessica Kratchman
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Kathryn Brock
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Tim Harris
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Jessica Kratchman
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Sandra Wastler
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Vince Holahan
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Jessica Kratchman

Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Sandra Wastler
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Stacey Rosenberg
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Jessica Kratchman
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Kathryn Brock
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Vince Holahan
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	Greg Casto
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	Dan Barss
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Sandra Wastler
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto/Tim Harris
PMTR RAAD			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Patricia Milligan
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Eric Schrader
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Steve LaVie
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Mike Norris
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Michelle Hart
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Steve Lavie
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Boby Abu-Eid
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Bruce Watson
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Steve LaVie
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Boby Abu-Eid
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Bruce Watson
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Michelle Hart
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Duane Schmidt
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Bruce Watson
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Steve LaVie
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Cynthia Barr
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Bruce Watson
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Michelle Hart
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	Cynthia Barr
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	Boby Abu-Eid
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Steve LaVie
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Mike Norris
PMTR Dose Assessment (RASCAL) - Need 2			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Kimberly Gambone/John Parillo
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Casper Sun / Duane Schmidt
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Margaret Cervera / Tony Huffert
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Kimberly Gambone/John Parillo
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Eric Schrader/Rich Clement
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Margaret Cervera/Tony Huffert
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	John Parillo / Bernie White
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Eric Schrader/Rich Clement
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Gary Purdy/Casper Sun
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Margaret Cervera/Tony Huffert
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Eric Schrader/Rich Clement
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Kimberly Gambone/Casper Sun
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Tony Huffert/John Parillo
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Eric Schrader/Rich Clement
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Kimberly Gambone/Casper Sun
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Tony Huffert/John Parillo
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Eric Schrader/Rich Clement

Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Gary Purdy/Casper Sun
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	John Parillo / Bernie White
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	Charlie Hinson/Tony Huffert
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Leroy Hardin / Ed Roach
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	John Parillo/Ron LaVera
PMTR GIS Analyst			
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Alice Stieve
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Nebiyu Tiruneh
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Stephanie Devlin
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Alice Stieve
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Yong Li
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Stephanie Devlin
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Alice Stieve
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Allen Gross
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Stephanie Devlin
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Phil Brandt
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Yong Li
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Stephanie Devlin
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Dogan Seber
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Allen Gross
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	N/A
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	N/A
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	N/A
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	N/A
PMTR Meteorologist			
Sat-Sun	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Mike Mazaika
Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	David Brown
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Kevin Quinlan
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Mike Mazaika
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	David Brown
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mike Mazaika
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Brad Harvey
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Kevin Quinlan
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	David Brown
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Brad Harvey
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Andy Imboden/Kevin Quinlan
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mike Mazaika
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Brad Harvey
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Kevin Quinlan
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	David Brown
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Brad Harvey
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Kevin Quinlan
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mike Mazaika
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	N/A
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	N/A
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	N/A
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	N/A

Reactor Safety Team			
RST Director			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Jennifer Uhle
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Laura Dudes
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Dave Skeen
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Jennifer Uhle
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Fred Brown
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Dave Skeen
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Jennifer Uhle
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Fred Brown
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Dave Skeen
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Brian Holian
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Fred Brown
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bill Ruland
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Brian Holian
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Fred Brown
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bill Ruland
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Brian Holian
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Pat Hiland
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bill Ruland
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	Brian Holian
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	Pat Hiland
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bill Ruland
Sat	3/26-27/2011	11pm - 7am	Dave Skeen
RST Coordinator			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Frank Collins
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Peter Alter
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Eric Thomas
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Mike Morlang
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Peter Alter
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Greg Schoenebeck
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Frank Collins
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Rick Hasselberg
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Mike Morlang
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Oleg Bukharin
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Eric Thomas
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Greg Schoenebeck
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Frank Collins
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Rick Hasselberg
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Brett Rini
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Tom Boyce (RES)
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Eric Thomas
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Brett Rini
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	Frank Collins
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	Eric Thomas
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Mark Orr
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Brett Rini
Severe Accident/PRA			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Mike Salay
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	John Lane

Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jim Gilmer
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Don Dube
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jeff Circle
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Hossein Esmaili
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Jim Gilmer
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Ed Fuller
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Len Ward
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Sam Miranda
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jeff Circle
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Steven Arndt
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Mike Salay
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jeff Circle
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Steve Laur
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Don Helton
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Steven Arndt
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Steve Laur
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	Don Helton
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	Steven Arndt
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jerry Dozier
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Ray Skarda
BWR Expertise			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	John Kauffman
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Larry Vick
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Mike Brown
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Bob Summers
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Mike Brown
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tom Boyce (RES)
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Mike Brown
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Larry Vick
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Peter Alter
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Bob Summers
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	Eva Brown
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mike Brown
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
RST Comm/ERDS Operator			
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Ujagar Bhachu
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Denise McGovern
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Donna Williams
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Ujagar Bhachu
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Joseph Williams
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	John Thorp

Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Bill Roggenbrodt
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Steve Bloom
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jim Isom
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Bill Roggenbrodt
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Joseph Williams
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Ken Hart
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Bill Roggenbrodt
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	John Thorp
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Ken Hart
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Bill Roggenbrodt
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Donna Williams
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	David Solorio
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	Rick Hasselberg
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	John Thorp
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Stan Gardocki
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Denise McGovern
RST Support (Seismology Q&A)			
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Off (ON CALL)
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Off (ON CALL)
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Off (ON CALL)
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Alice Stieve (ON CALL) Working as PMT GIS
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Cliff Munson (ON CALL)
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Annie Kammerer (ON CALL)
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Stephanie Devlin (ON CALL)
Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Cliff Munson (ON CALL)
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	A. Kammerer 3-11; M. Bensi 3-6 (ON CALL)
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Dogan Seber (ON CALL)
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Nilesh Chokchi On Call)
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	S. Devlin 3-11; M. Bensi 3-6 (ON CALL)
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Cliff Munson (ON CALL)
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Nilesh Chokchi On Call)
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	A. Kammerer 3-11, M. Bensi 3-6 (ON CALL)
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Annie Kammerer (ON CALL)
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Cliff Munson (ON CALL)
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	A. Kammerer 3-11, M. Bensi 3-6 (ON CALL)
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Dogan Seber (ON CALL)
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Dogan Seber (ON CALL)
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	A.Kammerer 3-11, M. Bensi 3-6 (ON CALL)
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	Dogan Seber (ON CALL)
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	(ON CALL)
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	(ON CALL)
RST Support (Structural)			
Fri-Sat	3/18-3/19	11pm-7am	Off (ON CALL)
Sat	19-Mar	7am - 3pm	Off (ON CALL)
Sat	19-Mar	3pm-11pm	Off (ON CALL)
Sat-Sun	3/19-3/20	11pm - 7am	Off (ON CALL)
Sun	20-Mar	7am - 3pm	Off (ON CALL)
Sun	20-Mar	3pm-11pm	Off (ON CALL)
Sun-Mon	3/20-3/21	11pm - 7am	Off (ON CALL)

Mon	21-Mar	7am - 3pm	Off (ON CALL)
Mon	21-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bret Tegeler (ON CALL)
Mon-Tues	3/21-3/22	11pm - 7am	Bret Tegeler (ON CALL)
Tues	22-Mar	7am - 3pm	Pravin Patel (ON CALL)
Tues	22-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bret Tegeler (ON CALL)
Tues-Wed	3/22-3/23	11pm - 7am	Bret Tegeler (ON CALL)
Wed	23-Mar	7am - 3pm	Pravin Patel (ON CALL)
Wed	23-Mar	3pm-11pm	Samir Chakrabart (ON CALL)
Wed-Thur	3/23-3/24	11pm - 7am	Samir Chakrabart (ON CALL)
Thur	24-Mar	7am - 3pm	Pravin Patel (ON CALL)
Thur	24-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jerry Chung (ON CALL)
Thur-Fri	3/24-3/25	11pm - 7am	Jerry Chung(ON CALL)
Fri	25-Mar	7am - 3pm	Pravin Patel (ON CALL)
Fri	25-Mar	3pm-11pm	Manas Chakravorty (ON CALL)
Fri-Sat	3/25-3/26	11pm-7am	Manas Chakravorty (ON CALL)
Sat	26-Mar	7am - 3pm	Off (ON CALL)
Sat	26-Mar	3pm-11pm	Off (ON CALL)
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Off (ON CALL)

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Position	Date	Time	Staff
		Executive Team	
ET Director			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Jennifer Uhle
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jim Dyer
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Brian Sheron
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	Jim Wiggins
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mike Weber
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Roy Zimmerman
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	Jim Wiggins
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mike Weber
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Roy Zimmerman
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Jim Wiggins
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Bruce Boger
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Roy Zimmerman
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Jim Wiggins
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Bruce Boger
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Brian Sheron
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	Cynthia Carpenter
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Mike Weber
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Bruce Boger
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	Cynthia Carpenter
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	Eric Leeds
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Mike Weber
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Cynthia Carpenter
ET Response Advisor			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Chris Miller
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tom Blount
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Brian McDermott
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	Chris Miller
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tom Blount
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Brian McDermott
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	Scott Morris
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tom Blount
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Brian McDermott
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Scott Morris
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tom Blount
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Brian McDermott
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Scott Morris
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Joe Giitter
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Mark Thaggard
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	Scott Morris
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Tom Blount
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Mark Thaggard
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	Scott Morris
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	Tom Blount
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Mary Jane Ross Lee
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm-7am	Brian McDermott

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ET Rx Prot Measures & State Coordinator			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	N/A
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	N/A
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	N/A
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	N/A
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	N/A
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	N/A
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	N/A
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	N/A
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	N/A
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	N/A
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	N/A
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	N/A
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	N/A
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	N/A
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	N/A
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	N/A
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	N/A
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	N/A
Executive Briefing Team			
EBT Admin. Assistant			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Jonathan Fiske
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Annette Stang
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Carolyn Kahler
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	Christina Merritt
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Louise Lovell
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Annette Stang
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	Jonathan Fiske (11pm - 9am)
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Sapna Hurd (9am - 3pm)
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Tonya Russell
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Christina Merritt
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Carolyn Kahler/Sapna Hurd
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Tonya Russell
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Jeanne Dempsey
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Louise Lovell
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Tonya Russell
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	N/A
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Annette Stang
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Tonya Russell (4:00pm - 9:15pm)
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	N/A
Sat	2-Apr	7am-3pm	N/A
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Andrea Wimbush
Sat-Sun	Apr 2-Apr3	11pm-7am	N/A
EBT Coordinator			

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Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Jim Anderson
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Eddie Robinson
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Nichole Glenn
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	Caroline Nguyen
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Yen Chen
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Sara Mroz
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	Jim Anderson
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Yen Chen
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Sara Mroz
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Jim Anderson
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Yen Chen
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Sara Mroz
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Jim Anderson
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Yen Chen
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Sara Mroz
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	Jim Anderson
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Yen Chen
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Sara Mroz
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	Jim Anderson
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Jeremy Susco
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Yen Chen
		Executive Support Team	
EST Status Officer			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Jeff Grant
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jane Marshall
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bill Gott
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	Jeff Grant
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jane Marshall
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bill Gott
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	Jeff Grant
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jane Marshall
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bill Gott
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Jeff Grant
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jane Marshall
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bill Gott
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Jeff Grant
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jane Marshall
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bill Gott
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	Jeff Grant
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jane Marshall
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Bill Gott
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	Jeff Grant
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	John Jolicoeur
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Bill Gott
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Jeff Grant
EST Actions Officer			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	N/A

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Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Kelly Grimes
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Melissa Ralph
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	N/A
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Zahira Cruz
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Melissa Ralph
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	N/A
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Bezakulu Alemu/Kelly Grimes
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Melissa Ralph
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	N/A
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Wendy Reed
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Melissa Ralph
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	N/A
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jonathan Fiske
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Melissa Ralph
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	N/A
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Wendy Reed
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Kelly Grimes
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	N/A
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	Melissa Ralph
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Bezakulu Alemu
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	N/A
EST Coordinator			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Steve Campbell
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tonya Russell
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Stella Opara
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	Taylor Lichatz
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tony McMurtray
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rebecca Stone
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	Stacy Smith
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tony McMurtray
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Tony Bowers
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Rebecca Stone
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tony McMurtray
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Stacy Smith
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Rebecca Stone
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tony Bowers
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Tony McMurtray
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	Rebecca Stone
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Steve Campbell
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Tony McMurtray
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	Rebecca Stone
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	Stacy Smith
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Steve Campbell
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Tony Bowers
EST Chronology Officer			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Thomas Scarbrough
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Hector Rodriguez
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rebecca Karas

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Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	Thomas Scarbrough
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Hector Rodriguez
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rebecca Karas
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	Nick Ballam
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Vanice Perin
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rebecca Karas
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Nick Ballam
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Hector Rodriguez
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rebecca Karas
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Thomas Scarbrough
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Vanice Perin
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rebecca Karas
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	Nick Ballam
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Sandra Valencia
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Margie Kotzalas/Rebecca Karas
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	Nick Ballam
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	Mark Resner
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Rebecca Karas
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Nick Ballam
EST Response Ops Mgr			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Roberto Figueroa
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Omar Khan
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Cris Brown
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	Roberto Figueroa
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Karen Jackson
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Cris Brown
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	Omar Khan
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Bob Stransky
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Cris Brown
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Karen Jackson
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Omar Khan
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Cris Brown
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Bob Stransky
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Karen Jackson
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Omar Khan
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	Bob Stransky
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Roberto Figueroa
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Karen Jackson
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	Omar Khan
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	Roberto Figueroa
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Karen Jackson
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Omar Khan
EST Admin. Assistant			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	N/A
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tonya Russell
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Cynthia Dorsey
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	N/A
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Michelle Manahan

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Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Carol Greenwood
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	N/A
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Michelle Manahan
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Mary Glenn Crutchley
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	N/A
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Cynthia Dorsey
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Mary Glenn Crutchley
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	N/A
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Amy Salus
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Andrea Wimbush (arrive at 4:00pm)
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	N/A
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Carol Greenwood
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Tabitha Howard
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	N/A
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	Don Algama
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Cynthia Dorsey
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	N/A
		Liaison Team	
LT Director			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Marissa Bailey
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mike Tschiltz
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Marrisa Bailey
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	Mark Thaggard
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Allen Howe
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Marrisa Bailey
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	Bob Caldwell
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Allen Howe
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Marrisa Bailey
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Bob Caldwell
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Allen Howe
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Marrisa Bailey
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Andy Campbell
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	John Adams
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Mark Lombard
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	N/A (Eliminated per Temple and Evans)
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	John Adams
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Mark Lombard
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	N/A
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	John Adams
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Jake Zimmerman
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	N/A
LT Coordinator			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Milt Murray
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Lisa Wright
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jeff Temple
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	Milt Murray
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jeff Temple
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rani Franovich

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Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	Janelle Jessie
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Milt Murray
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rani Franovich
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Janelle Jessie
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Milt Murray
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jeff Temple
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Janelle Jessie
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Milt Murray
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jeff Temple
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	Rani Franovich
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jeff Temple
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Janelle Jessie
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	Rani Franovich
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jeff Temple
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Milt Murray
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Joe Rivers
LT State Liaison			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	9pm-7am	A. Rivera/A. Noonan (ON CALL)
Sun	27-Mar	7am-2pm	Alison Rivera (ON CALL)
Sun	27-Mar	2pm-9pm	Alison Rivera (ON CALL)
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	9pm-7am	Alison Rivera (ON CALL)
Mon	28-Mar	7am-2pm	C. Maupin/C. Flannery (ON CALL)
Mon	28-Mar	2pm-9pm	Stuart Easson
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	9pm-7am	R. Virgilio (ON CALL)
Tue	29-Mar	7am-2pm	C. Maupin/R. Turtil (ON CALL)
Tue	29-Mar	2pm-9pm	Stuart Easson
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	9pm-7am	Richard Turtil (ON CALL)
Wed	30-Mar	7am-2pm	Cindy Flannery
Wed	30-Mar	2pm-9pm	Michelle Ryan
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	9pm-7am	Richard Turtil (ON CALL)
Thur	31-Mar	7am-2pm	Amanda Noonan
Thur	31-Mar	2pm-9pm	Michelle Ryan
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	9pm-7am	Richard Turtil (ON CALL)
Fri	1-Apr	7am-2pm	Kim Lukes
Fri	1-Apr	2pm-9pm	Alison Rivera
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	9pm-7am	Richard Turtil (ON CALL)
Sat	2-Apr	7am-2pm	Amanda Noonan (ON CALL)
Sat	2-Apr	2pm-9pm	Amanda Noonan (ON CALL)
Sat-Sun	2-Apr	9pm-7am	Amanda Noonan (ON CALL)
LT Federal Liaison (2)			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Scott Sloan
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Susan Salter / Lisa Wright
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jerry Hale
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	Scott Sloan
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jason Lising/Susan Salter
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Lisa Wright
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	Ned Wright
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Susan Salter / Jerry Hale

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Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Lisa Wright
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Ned Wright
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jerry Hale/Bethany Cecere
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Lisa Wright
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Bethany Cecere
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jason Lising/Bethany Cecere
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jeff Lynch
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	Ned Wright
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jeff Lynch / Beth Reed
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Jerry Hale
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	Jason Lising
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	Beth Reed
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Bethany Cecere
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Jason Lising
LT Congressional Liaison (2)			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 2pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
Fri	1-Apr	2pm-9pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 2pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
Sat	2-Apr	2pm-9pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
Sun	3-Apr	7am-2pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL)
LT International Liaison (2)			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Cindy Rosales/ Elizabeth Smiroldo
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jill Shepard/ Karen Henderson
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Nancy Fragoyannis/ Jenny Tobin
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	Steve Baker / Brian Wittick
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jill Shepard/ Karen Henderson
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Nancy Fragoyannis / Cindy Rosales
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	Steve Baker / Brian Wittick
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jill Shepard/ Karen Henderson
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Nancy Fragoyannis / Gerri Fehst
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Steve Baker / Brian Wittick
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Charlotte Abrahams / Lauren Mayros (J. Tobin 12-3)

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Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Gerri Fesht / Mugah Afshar-Tous
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Jen Schwartman / Charlotte Abrams
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jill Shepard/Lauren Mayros
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Gerri Fehst/Mugah Afshar-Tous
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	Jen Schwartman / Charlotte Abrams
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Cindy Rosales/ Lauren Mayros
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Gerri Fehst/Mugah Afshar-Tous
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	Jen Schwartman / Charlotte Abrams
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	Steve Bloom/ Karen Henderson
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Janice Owens / Jenny Tobin
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Gerri Fehst / Elizabeth Smiroldo
Protective Measures Team			
PMTR Director			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Randy Sullivan
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Don Cool
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Christiana Lui
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	John Tappert
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Don Cool
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Doug Coe
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	John Tappert
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Don Cool
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Doug Coe
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Don Cool
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Doug Coe
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Randy Sullivan
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	John Lubinski
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	Christiana Lui
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Randy Sullivan
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Don Cool
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	Christiana Lui
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	Randy Sullivan
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Don Cool
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Christiana Lui
PMTR Coordinator			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Ryan Craffey
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jay Patel
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Duane Hardesty
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Nima Ashkeboussi
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Duane Hardesty
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Nima Ashkeboussi
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Michael Raddatz
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jay Patel

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Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Ryan Craffey
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Duane Hardesty
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Michael Raddatz
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	Kimberly Hardin/ Lou Brandon
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Duane Hardesty
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Nima Ashkeboussi
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	Lou Brandon
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	Prosanta Chowdhury
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Kimberly Hardin
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon
PMTR Prot Actions Asst Dir			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Kevin Williams
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Tim Harris
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Sandra Wastler
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Mike McCoppin
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Michael Takacs
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Tim Harris
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Bruce Musico
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Michael Takacs
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Sandra Wastler
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Bruce Musico
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jessica Kratchman
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Tim Harris
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	Eric Benner
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jessica Kratchman
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Stewart McGruder
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	Bruce Musico
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	Richard Jervey
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Sandra Wastler
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Bruce Musico
PMTR RAAD			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Mike Norris
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Michelle Hart
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Leroy Hardin
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	Mike Norris
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Steve LaVie
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Michelle Hart
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	Mike Norris
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Bruce Watson
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Steve LaVie
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Mike Norris
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Bruce Watson
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Steve LaVie
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Eric Benner
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Michelle Hart

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Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Eric Schrader
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	Mike Norris
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Duane Schmidt
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Steve LaVie
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	Michelle Hart
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	Eric Schrader
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Bobby Abu-Eid
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Mike Norris
PMTR Dose Assessment (RASCAL) - Need 2 people per day			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	John Parillo/Ron LaVera
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tony Huffert/Larry Wheeler
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Casper Sun/Ed Roach
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	Margaret Cervera/John Parillo
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Rich Clement/Tony Huffert
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bernie White/Casper Sun
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	Margaret Cervera/John Parillo
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tony Huffert/Rich Clement
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Casper Sun/Fritz Sturtz
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Margaret Cervera/Bernie White
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Tony Huffert/Rich Clement
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Casper Sun/Ron LaVera
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Margaret Cervera/John Parillo
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Rich Clement/Joe DeCicco
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Casper Sun/
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	John Parillo/Leroy Hardin
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Margaret Cervera/Rich Clement
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Casper Sun/Fritz Sturtz
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	John Parillo/AJ Nosek
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	Ronald LaVera/Bernie White
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Casper Sun/Leroy Hardin
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	John Parillo/Fritz Sturtz
PMTR GIS Analyst			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	N/A
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	N/A
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	N/A
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	N/A
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	N/A
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	N/A
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	N/A
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	N/A
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	N/A
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	N/A
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	N/A

Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	N/A
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	N/A
PMTR Meteorologist			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	N/A
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	N/A
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	N/A
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	N/A
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	N/A
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	N/A
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	N/A
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	N/A
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	N/A
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	N/A
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	N/A
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	N/A
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	N/A
		Reactor Safety Team	
RST Director			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Dave Skeen
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Pat Hiland
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Fred Brown
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	Dave Skeen
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Pat Hiland
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Fred Brown
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	Dave Skeen
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Ed Hackett
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Fred Brown
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Dave Skeen
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Brian Holian
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Fred Brown
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Mike Case
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Ed Hackett
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bill Ruland
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	Mike Case
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Allen Howe

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Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Bill Ruland
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	Mike Case
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	Brian Holian
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Pat Hiland
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Mike Case
RST Coordinator			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Brett Rini
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Peter Alter
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rick Hasselberg
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	Frank Collins
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Peter Alter
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Tom Boyce (RES)/Dion
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	Mike Morlang
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Brett Rini
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Greg Schoenebeck
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Mike Morlang
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Peter Alter
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Greg Schoenebeck
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Frank Collins
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Peter Alter
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Greg Schoenebeck
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	Frank Collins
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Brett Rini
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Mark Orr
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	Frank Collins
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	Peter Alter
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Brett Rini
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Oleg Bukharin
Severe Accident/PRA			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Ray Skarda
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Andy Howe
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Jeff Mitman
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	Jim Gilmer
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jeff Circle
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Len Ward
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	Donnie Harrison
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Hossein Esmaili
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Ed Fuller
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Donnie Harrison
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jim Gilmer
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Hossein Esmaili
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Steve Arndt
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Don Chung
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Hossein Esmaili
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	Steve Arndt
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jeff Mitman
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Don Hilton
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	Ray Skarda

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Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	Hossein Esmaili
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Don Chung
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Ray Skarda
BWR Expertise			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mike Brown
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mike Brown
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	Jim Shea
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mike Brown
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Jim Shea
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mike Brown
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Jim Shea
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mike Brown
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	Jim Shea
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Mike Brown
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	Eva Brown
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	Larry Vick
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
RST Comm/ERDS Operator			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Denise McGovern
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mark Padovan
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bill Roggenbrodt
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	Denise McGovern
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Mark Padovan
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Rick Jervey
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	Brian Horn
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	John Thorp
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Andy Kugler
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Brian Horn
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Steve Bloom
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Bill Roggenbrodt
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Liliana Ramadan
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Jon Thompson
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	John Thorp
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	Mark Padovan
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Andy Kugler
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	David Solario
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	Liliana Ramadan
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	John Thorp
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	Stan Gardocki

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Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Margie Kotzalas
RST Support (Seismology Q&A)			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	(ON CALL)
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	(ON CALL)
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	(ON CALL)
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	(ON CALL)
Mon-Tue	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	(ON CALL)
Tue	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Tue	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	(ON CALL)
Tue-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	(ON CALL)
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	(ON CALL)
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	(ON CALL)
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	(ON CALL)
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	(ON CALL)
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	(ON CALL)
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	(ON CALL)
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	(ON CALL)
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	(ON CALL)
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	(ON CALL)
RST Support (Structural)			
Sat-Sun	3/26-3/27	11pm - 7am	Off (ON CALL)
Sun	27-Mar	7am - 3pm	Off (ON CALL)
Sun	27-Mar	3pm-11pm	Off (ON CALL)
Sun-Mon	3/27-3/28	11pm - 7am	Off (ON CALL)
Mon	28-Mar	7am - 3pm	Pravin Patel (ON CALL)
Mon	28-Mar	3pm-11pm	Pravin Patel (ON CALL)
Mon-Tues	3/28-3/29	11pm - 7am	Pravin Patel (ON CALL)
Tues	29-Mar	7am - 3pm	Pravin Patel (ON CALL)
Tues	29-Mar	3pm-11pm	Pravin Patel (ON CALL)
Tues-Wed	3/29-3/30	11pm - 7am	Pravin Patel (ON CALL)
Wed	30-Mar	7am - 3pm	Pravin Patel (ON CALL)
Wed	30-Mar	3pm-11pm	Pravin Patel (ON CALL)
Wed-Thur	3/30-3/31	11pm - 7am	Pravin Patel (ON CALL)
Thur	31-Mar	7am - 3pm	Pravin Patel (ON CALL)
Thur	31-Mar	3pm-11pm	Pravin Patel (ON CALL)
Thur-Fri	3/31-4/1	11pm - 7am	Pravin Patel (ON CALL)
Fri	1-Apr	7am - 3pm	Pravin Patel (ON CALL)
Fri	1-Apr	3pm-11pm	Pravin Patel (ON CALL)
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	Pravin Patel (ON CALL)

Japan Earthquake ERO Staffing Roster
April 3-9, 2011
Pay Period 8 - Week 2

Position	Date	Time	Staff
		Executive Team	
ET Director			
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Cynthia Carpenter
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	Michele Evans
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	Brian Sheron
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	Mike Johnson
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jim Wiggins
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	Cynthia Carpenter
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	Mike Johnson
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	Bruce Boger
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Cynthia Carpenter
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	Mike Johnson
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jim Wiggins
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	Roy Zimmerman
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	Mike Johnson
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	Bruce Boger
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	Roy Zimmerman
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	Jennifer Uhle
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jim Wiggins
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	Roy Zimmerman
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	Jennifer Uhle
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	Michele Evans
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	Roy Zimmerman
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Jennifer Uhle
ET Response Advisor			
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Brian McDermott
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	Tim McGinty
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	Chris Miller
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	Brian McDermott
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	Mark Thaggard
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	Joe Giitter
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	Brian McDermott
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	Tim McGinty
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Joe Giitter
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	Scott Morris
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	Tim McGinty
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	Joe Giitter
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	Scott Morris
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	Joe Holonich
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	Joe Giitter
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	Scott Morris
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	Joe Holonich
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	Tom Blount
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	Mark Thaggard
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	Chris Miller
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	Tom Blount
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Mark Thaggard
ET Rx Prot Measures & State Coordinator			

Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	N/A
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	N/A
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	N/A
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	N/A
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	N/A
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	N/A
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	N/A
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	N/A
		Executive Briefing Team	
EBT Admin. Assistant		**Email: OST04**	
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	N/A
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	Jon Fiske
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	N/A
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jon Fiske
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	Carolyn Kahler
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	N/A
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Annette Stang
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	N/A
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	Annette Stang
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	N/A
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	Annette Stang
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	N/A
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	Louise Lovell
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	N/A
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	Annette Stang
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	N/A
EBT Coordinator		**Email: LIA07**	
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Yen Chen
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	Nichole Glenn

Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	Jim Anderson
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	Sara Mroz
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	Yen Chen
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	Jim Anderson
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A (On Call Yen Chen 415-1018 or (b)(6)
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Sara Mroz
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	Jim Anderson
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	Sara Mroz
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	Jim Anderson
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	Yen Chen
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	Jim Anderson
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	Sara Mroz
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	Jim Anderson
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	Yen Chen
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Jim Anderson
		Executive Support Team	
EST Status Officer		**Email: ET07**	
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Jeff Grant
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	John Jolicoeur
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	Bill Gott
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	Sally Billings
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jane Marshall
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	Bill Gott
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	Sally Billings
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	Doug Huyck
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Bill Gott
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	Jeff Grant
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jane Marshall
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	John Jolicoeur
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	Jeff Grant
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jane Marshall
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	Bill Gott
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	Jeff Grant
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jane Marshall
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	Bill Gott
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	Jeff Grant
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jane Marshall
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	Bill Gott
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Jason Kozal
EST Actions Officer		**Email: ET05**	
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	N/A
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	Kelly Grimes
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	Melissa Ralph
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	N/A
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	Bezakulu Alemu

Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	Amy Roundtree
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	N/A
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	Bezakulu Alemu
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Amy Roundtree
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	N/A
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	Kelly Grimes
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	Amy Roundtree
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	N/A
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	Don Algama
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	Amy Roundtree
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	N/A
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	Kelly Grimes
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	Amy Roundtree
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	N/A
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	Melissa Ralph
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	N/A
EST Coordinator		**Email: OST01**	
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Tony Bowers
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 7pm	Jeff Kowalczik
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	7pm - 7am	Rebecca Stone
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	Steve Campbell
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	Jeff Kowalczik
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	Rebecca Stone
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	Tony Bowers
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Jeff Kowalczik
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	Rebecca Stone
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	Steve Campbell
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	Melissa Ralph
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	Rebecca Stone
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	Tony Bowers
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	Sally Billings
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	Stacy Smith
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	Tony Bowers
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	Sally Billings
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	N/A
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jeff Kowalczik
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	Cynthia Dorsey
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Clyde Ragland
EST Chronology Officer		**Email: ET02**	
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Nick Ballam
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	TR Rowe
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	Carolyn Faria-Ocasio
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	Nick Ballam
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	TR Rowe
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	Rebecca Karas
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	Tom Scarbrough
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	TR Rowe
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Rebecca Karas/Cynthia Rheaume (Training)

Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	Carolyn Faria-Ocasio
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	Stella Opara
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	Rebecca Karas
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	Carolyn Faria-Ocasio
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jessica Kratchman
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	Rebecca Karas
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	Tom Scarbrough
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	Stella Opara
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	Rebecca Karas
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	Nick Ballam
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jon Fiske
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	Sandra Valencia
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Nick Ballam
EST Response Ops Mgr		**Email: ET03**	
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Omar Khan
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	Roberto Figueroa
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	Sandra Valencia
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	Omar Khan
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	Bob Stransky
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	Karen Jackson
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	Nick Ballam
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	Bob Stransky
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Omar Khan
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	Roberto Figueroa
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	Karen Jackson
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	Omar Khan
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	Cris Brown
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	Karen Jackson
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	May Cheng
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	Cris Brown
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	Karen Jackson
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	May Cheng
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	Cris Brown
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jean Trefethen
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	Roberto Figueroa
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Cris Brown
EST Admin. Assistant		**Email: OST02**	
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	N/A
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	Michelle Manahan
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	Cynthia Dorsey
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	N/A
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	Michelle Manahan
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	Andrea Wimbush
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	N/A
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	Patty Nibert
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Andrea Wimbush
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	N/A
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	Michelle Manahan
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	Andrea Wimbush

Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	N/A
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	Taylor Lichatz
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	N/A
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	N/A
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	N/A
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	N/A
		Liaison Team	
LT Director		**Email: LIA06**	
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	N/A
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	John Adams
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	Mark Lombard
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	N/A
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	John Adams
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	Mark Lombard
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	N/A
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	John Adams
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Mark Lombard
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	N/A
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	Tom Bergman
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	Mark Lombard
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	N/A
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	Tom Bergman
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	Mark Lombard
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	N/A
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	Tom Bergman
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	Rich Correia
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	N/A
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	Tom Bergman
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	Rich Correia
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	N/A
LT Coordinator		**Email: LIA08**	
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Joe Rivers
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jeff Temple
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	Milt Murray
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	Joe Rivers
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	Rani Franovich
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	Milt Murray
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	Jeff Temple
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	Rani Franovich
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Milt Murray
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	Jeff Temple
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	Rani Franovich
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	Milt Murray
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	Janelle Jessie
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jeff Temple

Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	Clyde Ragland
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	Janelle Jessie
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jeff Temple
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	Clyde Ragland
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	Rani Franovich
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jeff Temple
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	Milt Murray
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Rani Franovich
LT State Liaison		**Email: LIA04/OST05**	
Sat-Sun	2-Apr	9pm-7am	Amanda Noonan (ON CALL)
Sun	3-Apr	7am-2pm	Michelle Ryan (ON CALL)
Sun	3-Apr	2pm-9pm	Michelle Ryan (ON CALL)
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	9pm-7am	Michelle Ryan (ON CALL)
Mon	4-Apr	7am-2pm	Cindy Flannery
Mon	4-Apr	2pm-9pm	Stuart Easson
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	9pm-7am	Alison Rivera
Tue	5-Apr	7am-2pm	Kim Lukes
Tue	5-Apr	2pm-9pm	Michelle Ryan
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	9pm-7am	Amanda Noonan
Wed	6-Apr	7am-2pm	Cindy Flannery
Wed	6-Apr	2pm-9pm	Stuart Easson
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	9pm-7am	Alison Rivera
Thur	7-Apr	7am-2pm	Amanda Noonan
Thur	7-Apr	2pm-9pm	Alison Rivera
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	9pm-7am	Richard Turtil
Fri	8-Apr	7am-2pm	Alison Rivera
Fri	8-Apr	2pm-9pm	Richard Turtil
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	9pm-7am	Amanda Noonan
Sat	9-Apr	7am-2pm	Amanda Noonan (ON CALL)
Sat	9-Apr	2pm-9pm	Amanda Noonan (ON CALL)
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	9pm-7am	Amanda Noonan (ON CALL)
LT Federal Liaison		**Email: LIA01/LIA11**	
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Jason Lising
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jerry Hale
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	Susan Salter
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	Jason Lising
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jerry Hale
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	Russ Chazell
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	Jason Lising
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	Beth Reed
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Russ Chazell
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	Scott Sloan
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	Ned Wright
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	Jerry Hale
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	Scott Sloan
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	Ned Wright
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	Russ Chazell
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	Scott Sloan
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	Ned Wright

Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	Jerry Hale
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	Scott Sloan
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	Russ Chazell
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	Jeff Lynch
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Scott Sloan
LT Congressional Liaison (2)		**Email: LIA12**	
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 2pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL ONLY)
Sat	2-Apr	2pm-9pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL ONLY)
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 2pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL ONLY)
Sun	3-Apr	2pm-9pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL ONLY)
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 2pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL ONLY)
Mon	4-Apr	2pm-9pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL ONLY)
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 2pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL ONLY)
Tue	5-Apr	2pm-9pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL ONLY)
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 2pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL ONLY)
Wed	6-Apr	2pm-9pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL ONLY)
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 2pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL ONLY)
Thur	7-Apr	2pm-9pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL ONLY)
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 2pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL ONLY)
Fri	8-Apr	2pm-9pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL ONLY)
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 2pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL ONLY)
Sat	9-Apr	2pm-9pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL ONLY)
Sun	10-Apr	7am - 2pm	Amy Powell (ON CALL ONLY)
LT International Liaison (2)		**Email: LIA02/LIA03/LIA10**	
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Gerri Fehst / Elizabeth Smiroldo
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	Steve Bloom / Karen Henderson
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	Janice Owens / Jenny Tobin
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	Jill Shepard / Elizabeth Smiroldo
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	Steve Bloom/Lance English
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	Janice Owens / Jenny Tobin
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	Jill Shepard / Elizabeth Smiroldo
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	Skip Young / Kirk Foggie
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Steve Baker / Brian Wittick
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	Jill Shepard / Gerri Fehst
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	Skip Young / Kirk Foggie
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	Steve Baker / Brian Wittick
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	Jenny Tobin / Gerri Fehst
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	Skip Young / Kirk Foggie
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	Steve Baker / Brian Wittick
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	Jenny Tobin / Gerri Fehst
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	Eric Stahl / Mugeh Afshar-Tous
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	Jen Schwartzman / Charlotte Abrams
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	Elizabeth Smiroldo / Lauren Mayros
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	Eric Stahl /Mugeh Afshar-Tous
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	Jen Schwartzman / Charlotte Abrams
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Jenny Tobin /Lauren Mayros
		Protective Measures Team	
PMTR Director		**Email: PMT12**	

Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Christiana Lui
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	Cyndi Jones
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	Scott Flanders
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	John Lubinski
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	Cyndi Jones
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	Scott Flanders
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	John Lubinski
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	Cyndi Jones
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Scott Flanders
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	John Lubinski
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	Cyndi Jones (Patricia Milligan Noon-3pm)
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	Scott Flanders
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	John Lubinski
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	Trish Holahan
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	Patricia Milligan
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	Kathy Gibson
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	Trish Holahan
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	Don Cool
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	Kathy Gibson
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	Trish Holahan
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	Don Cool
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Kathy Gibson
PMTR Coordinator		**Email: PMT09**	
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	Brian Harris
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	Nima Ashkeboussi
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	Arlon Costa
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	Nima Ashkeboussi
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	Duane Hardesty
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Nima Ashkeboussi
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	Arlon Costa
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	Ryan Craffey
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	Kimyata MorganButler
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	Duane Hardesty
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	Nima Ashkeboussi
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	Arlon Costa
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	Ryan Craffey
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	Lou Brandon
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	Duane Hardesty
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	Ryan Craffey
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Kimyata MorganButler
PMTR Prot Actions Asst Dir		**Email: PMT12**	
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Bruce Musico
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jessica Kratchman
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	Tim Harris

Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	Kathy Brock
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	Tim Harris
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	Kathy Brock/Jessica Kratchman (1-3pm)
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Tim Harris
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	Kathy Brock
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	Sandra Wastler
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	Kathy Brock
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	Tim Harris
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	Kathy Brock (Bruce Musico from 11-1)
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	Sandra Wastler
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	Jessica Kratchman
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	Stewart McGruder
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	Sandra Wastler
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Jessica Kratchman
PMTR RAAD		**Email: PMT05**	
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Mike Norris
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	Don Johnson
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	Duane Schmidt
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	Mike Norris
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	Cynthia Barr
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	Steve LaVie
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	Mike Norris
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	Duane Schmidt
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Steve LaVie
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	Mike Norris
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	Stewart Schneider
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	Michelle Hart
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	Mike Norris
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	Duane Schmidt
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	Steve LaVie
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	Mike Norris
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	Cynthia Barr
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	Michelle Hart
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	Stephanie Bush-Goddard
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	Fritz Sturz
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	Michelle Hart
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Mike Norris
PMTR Dose Assessment (RASCAL) - Need 2 people/day			**Email: PMT02/PMT11**
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	John Parillo/Fritz Sturz
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	Ed Roach/Tony Huffert
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	Casper Sun/Kimberly (Rapon) Gambone
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	John Parillo/**AJ Nosek** (b)(6)
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	Tony Huffert/Rich Clement/Anita Gray (in training)
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	Bernie White/Fritz Sturz

Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	John Parillo/AJ Nosek (b)(6)
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	Tony Huffert/Rich Clement/John Tomon (in training)
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Casper Sun/Fritz Sturz
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	AJ Nosek/Leroy Hardin
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	Tony Huffert/Rich Clement/Anita Gray (in training)
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	Casper Sun/Ron LaVera
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	Bernie White/AJ Nosek
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	Tony Huffert/Rich Clement
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	Casper Sun/Kimberly (Rapon) Gambone
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	Bernie White/Stephanie Bush-Goddard
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	Anita Gray/Rich Clement
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	Casper Sun/Mohammad Saba
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	Ron LaVera
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	Mohammad Saba
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	Casper Sun
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Ed Roach
PMTR GIS Analyst		**Email: GIS**	
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	N/A
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	ON CALL ONLY
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	N/A
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	ON CALL ONLY
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	N/A
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	ON CALL ONLY
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	N/A
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	ON CALL ONLY
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	N/A
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	ON CALL ONLY
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	N/A
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	ON CALL ONLY
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	N/A
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	ON CALL ONLY
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	N/A
PMTR Meteorologist		**Email: PMT01**	
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	N/A
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	ON CALL ONLY
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	N/A
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	ON CALL ONLY
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	N/A
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	ON CALL ONLY
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A

Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	N/A
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	ON CALL ONLY
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	N/A
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	ON CALL ONLY
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	N/A
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	ON CALL ONLY
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	N/A
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	ON CALL ONLY
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	N/A
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	N/A
Reactor Safety Team			
RST Director		**Email: RST01**	
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Mike Case
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	Brian Holian
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	Bill Ruland
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	Laura Dudes
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	Brian Holian
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	Stu Richards
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	Laura Dudes
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	Brian Holian
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Bill Ruland
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	Laura Dudes
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	Stu Richards
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	Ed Hackett
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	Laura Dudes
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	Stu Richards
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	Brian Holian
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	Fred Brown
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	Mike Case
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	Pat Hiland
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	Fred Brown
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	Mike Case
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	Pat Hiland
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Fred Brown
RST Coordinator		**Email: RST01B**	
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Oleg Bukharin
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	Rick Hasselberg
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	Eric Thomas
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	Frank Collins
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	Tom Boyce (RES)
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	Brett Rini
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	Mike Morlang
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	Frank Collins
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Greg Schoenebeck
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	Mike Morlang
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	Peter Alter

Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	Greg Schoenebeck
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	Frank Collins
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	Tom Boyce (RES)
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	Greg Schoenebeck
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	Rick Hasselberg
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	Mark Orr
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	Joelle Starfros
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	Frank Collins
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	Mark Orr
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	Kerri Kavanaugh
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Oleg Bukharin
Severe Accident/PRA		**Email: RST10**	
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Ray Skarda
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	Tom Koshy
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	Jerry Dozier
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	Antonio Zoulis
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	Mirela Gavrilas
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	Hossein Esmali
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	Antonio Zoulis
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	Jim Gilmer
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Ed Fuller
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	See-Ming Wong
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	Ray Skarda
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	Tom Koshy
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	Ben Beasley
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	Mirela Gavrilas
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	Hossein Esmaili
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	Ben Beasley
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	Mirela Gavrilas
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	Ray Skarda
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	Shawn Marshall
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	See-Ming Wong/ Raj Lyengar
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	Jeff Mitman
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Alex Velazquez-Lozada
BWR Expertise		**Email: RST11**	
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	Larry Vick
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	Mike Brown
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	Peter Alter
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	Mike Brown
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	Mike Brown

Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	Mike Brown
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	Eva Brown
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	Mike Brown
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Greg Cranston
RST Comm/ERDS Operator		**Email: RST16**	
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	Margie Kotzalas
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	Mark Padovan
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	Andy Kugler
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	Rosemary Reeves
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	Donna Williams
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	John Thorp
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	Rollie Berry
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	Mark Padovan
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	Andy Kugler
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	Rollie Berry
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	Steve Bloom
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	Mark Padovan
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	Rollie Berry
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	Rick Jervey
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	John Thorp
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	Rollie Berry
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	Mark Padovan
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	Rosemary Reeves
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	Jon Thompson
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	Mark Padovan
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	Rick Jervey
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Liliana Ramadan
RST Support (Seismology Q&A)			
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	(On Call)
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	(On Call)
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	(On Call)
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	(On Call)
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	(On Call)
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	(On Call)
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	(On Call)
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	(On Call)
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	(On Call)
Mon-Tue	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	(On Call)
Tue	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	(On Call)
Tue	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	(On Call)
Tue-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	(On Call)
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	(On Call)
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	(On Call)
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	(On Call)
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	(On Call)

Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	(On Call)
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	(On Call)
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	(On Call)
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	(On Call)
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	(On Call)
Sat	9-Apr	7am - 3pm	(On Call)
Sat	9-Apr	3pm-11pm	(On Call)
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	(On Call)
RST Support (Structural)			
Fri-Sat	4/1-4/2	11pm-7am	(On Call) Pravin Patel
Sat	2-Apr	7am - 3pm	(On Call) Pravin Patel
Sat	2-Apr	3pm-11pm	(On Call) Pravin Patel
Sat-Sun	4/2-4/3	11pm - 7am	(On Call) Pravin Patel
Sun	3-Apr	7am - 3pm	(On Call) Pravin Patel
Sun	3-Apr	3pm-11pm	(On Call) Pravin Patel
Sun-Mon	4/3-4/4	11pm - 7am	(On Call) Pravin Patel
Mon	4-Apr	7am - 3pm	(On Call) Pravin Patel
Mon	4-Apr	3pm-11pm	(On Call) Pravin Patel
Mon-Tues	4/4-4/5	11pm - 7am	(On Call) Pravin Patel
Tues	5-Apr	7am - 3pm	(On Call) Pravin Patel
Tues	5-Apr	3pm-11pm	(On Call) Pravin Patel
Tues-Wed	4/5-4/6	11pm - 7am	(On Call) Pravin Patel
Wed	6-Apr	7am - 3pm	(On Call) Pravin Patel
Wed	6-Apr	3pm-11pm	(On Call) Pravin Patel
Wed-Thur	4/6-4/7	11pm - 7am	(On Call) Pravin Patel
Thur	7-Apr	7am - 3pm	(On Call) Pravin Patel
Thur	7-Apr	3pm-11pm	(On Call) Pravin Patel
Thur-Fri	4/7-4/8	11pm - 7am	(On Call) Pravin Patel
Fri	8-Apr	7am - 3pm	(On Call) Pravin Patel
Fri	8-Apr	3pm-11pm	(On Call) Pravin Patel
Fri-Sat	4/8-4/9	11pm-7am	(On Call) Pravin Patel

Position	Date	Time	Staff
Executive Team - Director			
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Jennifer Uhle
Sun	4/10	7am - 3pm	Jim Dyer
Sun	4/10	3pm-11pm	Cynthia Carpenter
Sun-Mon	4/10-4/11	11pm - 7am	Jennifer Uhle
Mon	4/11	7am - 3pm	Jim Dyer
Mon	4/11	3pm-11pm	Cynthia Carpenter
Mon-Tue	4/11-12/5	11pm - 7am	Jim Wiggins
Tue	4/12	7am - 3pm	Jim Dyer
Tue	4/12	3pm-11pm	Cynthia Carpenter
Tue-Wed	4/12-13/6	11pm - 7am	Jim Wiggins
Wed	4/13	7am - 3pm	Jim Dyer
Wed	4/13	3pm-11pm	Bruce Boger
Wed-Thur	4/13-4/14	11pm - 7am	Mike Johnson
Thur	4/14	7am - 3pm	Roy Zimmerman
Thur	4/14	3pm-11pm	Bruce Boger
Thur-Fri	4/14-4/15	11pm - 7am	Mike Johnson
Fri	4/15	7am - 3pm	Roy Zimmerman
Fri	4/15	3pm-11pm	Bruce Boger
Fri-Sat	4/15-4/16	11pm-7am	Mike Johnson
Sat	4/16	7am - 3pm	Roy Zimmerman
Sat	4/16	3pm-11pm	Scott Moore
Sat	4/16-4/17	11pm - 7am	Glenn Tracy
Executive Support Team			
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	N/A
Sun	4/10	7am - 3pm	N/A
Sun	4/10	3pm-11pm	N/A
Sun-Mon	4/10-4/11	11pm - 7am	N/A
Mon	4/11	7am - 3pm	Melissa Ralph
Mon	4/11	3pm-11pm	Andrea Wimbush
Mon-Tue	4/11-4/12	11pm - 7am	Rebecca Stone
Tue	4/12	7am - 3pm	Annette Stang
Tue	4/12	3pm-11pm	Andrea Wimbush
Tue-Wed	4/12-13/6	11pm - 7am	Rebecca Stone
Wed	4/13	7am - 3pm	Jeff Kowalczik
Wed	4/13	3pm-11pm	Andrea Wimbush
Wed-Thur	4/13-4/14	11pm - 7am	Nick Ballam
Thur	4/14	7am - 3pm	Annette Stang
Thur	4/14	3pm-11pm	Cynthia Dorsey
Thur-Fri	4/14-4/15	11pm - 7am	Nick Ballam
Fri	4/15	7am - 3pm	Emily Larson
Fri	4/15	3pm-11pm	Cynthia Dorsey
Fri-Sat	4/15-4/16	11pm-7am	Nick Ballam
Sat	4/16	7am - 3pm	Nick Ballam / Jeff Kowalczik
Sat	4/16	3pm-11pm	Dennis Andrukat
Sat	4/16-4/17	11pm - 7am	Emily Larson

Liaison Team - Coordinator			
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Rani Franovich
Sun	4/10	7am - 3pm	Lisa Wright
Sun	4/10	3pm-11pm	Milt Murray
Sun-Mon	4/10-4/11	11pm - 7am	Jeff Temple
Mon	4/11	7am - 3pm	Lisa Wright
Mon	4/11	3pm-11pm	Clyde Ragland
Mon-Tue	4/11-12/5	11pm - 7am	Jeff Temple
Tue	4/12	7am - 3pm	Lisa Wright
Tue	4/12	3pm-11pm	Joe Rivers
Tue-Wed	4/12-13/6	11pm - 7am	Jeff Temple
Wed	4/13	7am - 3pm	Joe Rivers
Wed	4/13	3pm-11pm	Lisa Wright
Wed-Thur	4/13-4/14	11pm - 7am	Jeff Temple
Thur	4/14	7am - 3pm	Clyde Ragland
Thur	4/14	3pm-11pm	Rani Franovich
Thur-Fri	4/14-4/15	11pm - 7am	Russ Chazell
Fri	4/15	7am - 3pm	Milt Murray
Fri	4/15	3pm-11pm	Clyde Ragland
Fri-Sat	4/15-4/16	11pm-7am	Rani Franovich
Sat	4/16	7am - 3pm	Jake Zimmerman
Sat	4/16	3pm-11pm	Jeff Temple
Sat	4/16-4/17	11pm - 7am	Milt Murray
Protective Measures Team - PAAD			
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Jessica Kratchman
Sun	4/10	7am - 3pm	Kathy Brock
Sun	4/10	3pm-11pm	Stacey Rosenberg
Sun-Mon	4/10-4/11	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Mon	4/11	7am - 3pm	Kathy Brock
Mon	4/11	3pm-11pm	Stacey Rosenberg
Mon-Tue	4/11-12/5	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Tue	4/12	7am - 3pm	Kathy Brock
Tue	4/12	3pm-11pm	Stacey Rosenberg
Tue-Wed	4/12-13/6	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Wed	4/13	7am - 3pm	Kathy Brock
Wed	4/13	3pm-11pm	Sandra Wastler
Wed-Thur	4/13-4/14	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Thur	4/14	7am - 3pm	Kathy Brock
Thur	4/14	3pm-11pm	Stacey Rosenberg
Thur-Fri	4/14-4/15	11pm - 7am	Jessica Kratchman
Fri	4/15	7am - 3pm	Sandra Wastler
Fri	4/15	3pm-11pm	Stacey Rosenberg
Fri-Sat	4/15-4/16	11pm-7am	Jessica Kratchman
Sat	4/16	7am - 3pm	Kimberly Gambone
Sat	4/16	3pm-11pm	Michelle Hart
Sat	4/16-4/17	11pm - 7am	John Parillo

Reactor Safety Team			
Severe Accident/PRA			
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Velazquez-Lozada
Sun	4/10	7am - 3pm	SM Wong
Sun	4/10	3pm-11pm	Raj Iyengar
Sun-Mon	4/10-4/11	11pm - 7am	Larry Criscione
Mon	4/11	7am - 3pm	Len Ward
Mon	4/11	3pm-11pm	Mark Caruso
Mon-Tue	4/11-12/5	11pm - 7am	Larry Criscione
Tue	4/12	7am - 3pm	Ben Beasley
Tue	4/12	3pm-11pm	Antonios Zoulis
Tue-Wed	4/12-13/6	11pm - 7am	Larry Criscione
Wed	4/13	7am - 3pm	Mark Caruso
Wed	4/13	3pm-11pm	Antonio Zoulis
Wed-Thur	4/13-4/14	11pm - 7am	Hanh Phan
Thur	4/14	7am - 3pm	Tina Ghosh
Thur	4/14	3pm-11pm	Antonios Zoulis
Thur-Fri	4/14-4/15	11pm - 7am	Ben Beasley
Fri	4/15	7am - 3pm	Raj Iyengar
Fri	4/15	3pm-11pm	Antonios Zoulis
Fri-Sat	4/15-4/16	11pm-7am	Larry Criscione
Sat	4/16	7am - 3pm	Tina Ghosh
Sat	4/16	3pm-11pm	Nate Hudson
Sat	4/16-4/17	11pm - 7am	See-Meng Wong
BWR Expertise			
Sat-Sun	4/9-4/10	11pm - 7am	Greg Cranston
Sun	4/10	7am - 3pm	Larry Vick
Sun	4/10	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Sun-Mon	4/10-4/11	11pm - 7am	Tim Kolb
Mon	4/11	7am - 3pm	Mike Brown
Mon	4/11	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Mon-Tue	4/11-12/5	11pm - 7am	Tim Kolb
Tue	4/12	7am - 3pm	Mike Brown
Tue	4/12	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Tue-Wed	4/12-13/6	11pm - 7am	Tim Kolb
Wed	4/13	7am - 3pm	Mike Brown
Wed	4/13	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Wed-Thur	4/13-4/14	11pm - 7am	Tim Kolb
Thur	4/14	7am - 3pm	Mike Brown
Thur	4/14	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Thur-Fri	4/14-4/15	11pm - 7am	Steve Arndt
Fri	4/15	7am - 3pm	Greg Cranston
Fri	4/15	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Fri-Sat	4/15-4/16	11pm-7am	Eva Brown

Position	Date	Time	Staff
Executive Team - Director			
Sat-Sun	4/16-4/17	11pm - 7am	Glenn Tracy
Sun	4/17	7am - 3pm	Roy Zimmerman
Sun	4/17	3pm-11pm	Bruce Boger
Sun-Mon	4/17-4/18	11pm - 7am	Jim Wiggins
Mon	4/18	7am - 3pm	Roy Zimmerman
Mon	4/18	3pm-11pm	Bruce Boger
Mon-Tue	4/18-4/19	11pm - 7am	Jennifer Uhle
Tue	4/19	7am - 3pm	Roy Zimmerman
Tue	4/19	3pm-11pm	Bruce Boger
Tue-Wed	4/19-4/20	11pm - 7am	Jennifer Uhle
Wed	4/20	7am - 3pm	Roy Zimmerman
Wed	4/20	3pm-11pm	Glenn Tracy
Wed-Thur	4/20-4/21	11pm - 7am	Jennifer Uhle
Thur	4/21	7am - 3pm	Roy Zimmerman
Thur	4/21	3pm-11pm	Glenn Tracy
Thur-Fri	4/21-4/22	11pm - 7am	Jennifer Uhle
Fri	4/22	7am - 3pm	Lawrence Kokajko
Fri	4/22	3pm-11pm	Glenn Tracy
Fri-Sat	4/22-4/23	11pm-7am	Mike Johnson
Sat	4/23	7am - 3pm	Jennifer Uhle
Sat	4/23	3pm-11pm	Cynthia Carpenter
Sat	4/23-4/24	11pm - 7am	Mike Johnson
Executive Support Team			
Sat-Sun	4/16-4/17	11pm - 7am	Emily Larson
Sun	4/17	7am - 3pm	Kelly Riner
Sun	4/17	3pm-11pm	Cynthia Dorsey
Sun-Mon	4/17-4/18	11pm - 7am	T. Rowe
Mon	4/18	7am - 3pm	Clyde Ragland
Mon	4/18	3pm-11pm	Mary Glenn Crutchley
Mon-Tue	4/18-4/19	11pm - 7am	T. Rowe
Tue	4/19	7am - 3pm	Emily Larson
Tue	4/19	3pm-11pm	Cynthia Dorsey
Tue-Wed	4/19-4/20	11pm - 7am	Tia Pope
Wed	4/20	7am - 3pm	Tabitha Howard
Wed	4/20	3pm-11pm	Emily Larson
Wed-Thur	4/20-4/21	11pm - 7am	T. Rowe
Thur	4/21	7am - 3pm	Christine Steger
Thur	4/21	3pm-11pm	Cynthia Dorsey
Thur-Fri	4/21-4/22	11pm - 7am	Tia Pope
Fri	4/22	7am - 3pm	Tabitha Howard
Fri	4/22	3pm-11pm	
Fri-Sat	4/22-4/23	11pm-7am	T. Rowe
Sat	4/23	7am - 3pm	Cynthia Dorsey
Sat	4/23	3pm-11pm	Clyde Ragland
Sat	4/23-4/24	11pm - 7am	T. Rowe

Liaison Team - Coordinator			
Sat-Sun	4/16-4/17	11pm - 7am	Milt Murray
Sun	4/17	7am - 3pm	Jake Zimmerman
Sun	4/17	3pm-11pm	Jeff Temple
Sun-Mon	4/17-4/18	11pm - 7am	Milt Murray
Mon	4/18	7am - 3pm	Jake Zimmerman
Mon	4/18	3pm-11pm	Jeff Temple
Mon-Tue	4/18-4/19	11pm - 7am	Milt Murray
Tue	4/19	7am - 3pm	Jake Zimmerman
Tue	4/19	3pm-11pm	Jeff Temple
Tue-Wed	4/19-4/20	11pm - 7am	Milt Murray
Wed	4/20	7am - 3pm	Jeff Temple
Wed	4/20	3pm-11pm	Janelle Jesse
Wed-Thur	4/20-4/21	11pm - 7am	Joe Rivers
Thur	4/21	7am - 3pm	Clyde Ragland
Thur	4/21	3pm-11pm	Janelle Jesse
Thur-Fri	4/21-4/22	11pm - 7am	Joe Rivers
Fri	4/22	7am - 3pm	Clyde Ragland
Fri	4/22	3pm-11pm	Ned Wright
Fri-Sat	4/22-4/23	11pm-7am	Rani Franovich
Sat	4/23	7am - 3pm	Lisa Wright
Sat	4/23	3pm-11pm	Ned Wright
Sat	4/23-4/24	11pm - 7am	Rani Franovich
Protective Measures Team - PAAD			
Sat-Sun	4/16-4/17	11pm - 7am	John Parillo
Sun	4/17	7am - 3pm	Casper Sun
Sun	4/17	3pm-11pm	Michelle Hart
Sun-Mon	4/17-4/18	11pm - 7am	John Parillo
Mon	4/18	7am - 3pm	Kimberly Gambone
Mon	4/18	3pm-11pm	Michelle Hart
Mon-Tue	4/18-4/19	11pm - 7am	John Parillo
Tue	4/19	7am - 3pm	Kimberly Gambone
Tue	4/19	3pm-11pm	Michelle Hart
Tue-Wed	4/19-4/20	11pm - 7am	John Parillo
Wed	4/20	7am - 3pm	Kimberly Gambone
Wed	4/20	3pm-11pm	Casper Sun
Wed-Thur	4/20-4/21	11pm - 7am	Jessica Kratchman
Thur	4/21	7am - 3pm	Kimberly Gambone
Thur	4/21	3pm-11pm	Casper Sun
Thur-Fri	4/21-4/22	11pm - 7am	Jessica Kratchman
Fri	4/22	7am - 3pm	Kimberly Gambone
Fri	4/22	3pm-11pm	Casper Sun
Fri-Sat	4/22-4/23	11pm-7am	Jessica Kratchman
Sat	4/23	7am - 3pm	Jack Foster
Sat	4/23	3pm-11pm	Casper Sun
Sat	4/23-4/24	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon

Reactor Safety Team			
Severe Accident/PRA			
Sat-Sun	4/16-4/17	11pm - 7am	See-Meng Wong
Sun	4/17	7am - 3pm	Larry Criscione
Sun	4/17	3pm-11pm	Raj Iyengar
Sun-Mon	4/17-4/18	11pm - 7am	Steven Arndt
Mon	4/18	7am - 3pm	Larry Criscione
Mon	4/18	3pm-11pm	Antonios Zoulis
Mon-Tue	4/18-4/19	11pm - 7am	Steven Arndt
Tue	4/19	7am - 3pm	Larry Criscione
Tue	4/19	3pm-11pm	Antonios Zoulis
Tue-Wed	4/19-4/20	11pm - 7am	Steven Arndt
Wed	4/20	7am - 3pm	Mirela Gavrilas
Wed	4/20	3pm-11pm	Antonios Zoulis
Wed-Thur	4/20-4/21	11pm - 7am	Steven Arndt
Thur	4/21	7am - 3pm	Mirela Gavrilas
Thur	4/21	3pm-11pm	Antonios Zoulis
Thur-Fri	4/21-4/22	11pm - 7am	See-Meng Wong
Fri	4/22	7am - 3pm	
Fri	4/22	3pm-11pm	
Fri-Sat	4/22-4/23	11pm-7am	
Sat	4/23	7am - 3pm	Raj Iyengar
Sat	4/23	3pm-11pm	
Sat	4/23-4/24	11pm - 7am	See-Meng Wong
BWR Expertise			
Sat-Sun	4/16-4/17	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Sun	4/17	7am - 3pm	Larry Vick
Sun	4/17	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Sun-Mon	4/17-4/18	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Mon	4/18	7am - 3pm	Tim Kolb
Mon	4/18	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Mon-Tue	4/18-4/19	11pm - 7am	Jim Shea
Tue	4/19	7am - 3pm	Tim Kolb
Tue	4/19	3pm-11pm	Chuck Norton
Tue-Wed	4/19-4/20	11pm - 7am	Jim Shea
Wed	4/20	7am - 3pm	Mike Brown
Wed	4/20	3pm-11pm	
Wed-Thur	4/20-4/21	11pm - 7am	Jim Shea
Thur	4/21	7am - 3pm	Mike Brown
Thur	4/21	3pm-11pm	
Thur-Fri	4/21-4/22	11pm - 7am	Jim Shea
Fri	4/22	7am - 3pm	Tim Kolb
Fri	4/22	3pm-11pm	
Fri-Sat	4/22-4/23	11pm-7am	Jim Shea

Position	Date	Time	Staff
Executive Team - Director			
Sat-Sun	4/23-4/24	11pm - 7am	Mike Johnson
Sun	4/24	7am - 3pm	Jennifer Uhle
Sun	4/24	3pm-11pm	Cynthia Carpenter
Sun-Mon	4/24-4/25	11pm - 7am	Mike Johnson
Mon	4/25	7am - 3pm	Jennifer Uhle
Mon	4/25	3pm-11pm	Cynthia Carpenter
Mon-Tue	4/25-4/26	11pm - 7am	Mike Johnson
Tue	4/26	7am - 3pm	Jennifer Uhle
Tue	4/26	3pm-11pm	Cynthia Carpenter
Tue-Wed	4/26-4/27	11pm - 7am	Mike Johnson
Wed	4/27	7am - 3pm	Lawrence Kokajko
Wed	4/27	3pm-11pm	Jim Wiggins
Wed-Thur	4/27-4/28	11pm - 7am	Glenn Tracy
Thur	4/28	7am - 3pm	Jennifer Uhle
Thur	4/28	3pm-11pm	Jim Wiggins
Thur-Fri	4/28-4/29	11pm - 7am	Glenn Tracy
Fri	4/29	7am - 3pm	Roy Zimmerman
Fri	4/29	3pm-11pm	Jim Wiggins
Fri-Sat	4/29-4/30	11pm-7am	Glenn Tracy
Sat	4/30	7am - 3pm	Rob Lewis
Sat	4/30	3pm-11pm	Jim Wiggins
Sat	4/30-5/1	11pm - 7am	Glenn Tracy
Executive Support Team			
Sat-Sun	4/23-4/24	11pm - 7am	T. Rowe
Sun	4/24	7am - 3pm	
Sun	4/24	3pm-11pm	T. Rowe
Sun-Mon	4/24-4/25	11pm - 7am	
Mon	4/25	7am - 3pm	
Mon	4/25	3pm-11pm	Mary Glenn Crutchley
Mon-Tue	4/25-4/26	11pm - 7am	
Tue	4/26	7am - 3pm	
Tue	4/26	3pm-11pm	
Tue-Wed	4/26-4/27	11pm - 7am	
Wed	4/27	7am - 3pm	
Wed	4/27	3pm-11pm	
Wed-Thur	4/27-4/28	11pm - 7am	
Thur	4/28	7am - 3pm	
Thur	4/28	3pm-11pm	Mary Glenn Crutchley
Thur-Fri	4/28-4/29	11pm - 7am	
Fri	4/29	7am - 3pm	
Fri	4/29	3pm-11pm	
Fri-Sat	4/29-4/30	11pm-7am	
Sat	4/30	7am - 3pm	
Sat	4/30	3pm-11pm	
Sat	4/30-5/1	11pm - 7am	

Liaison Team - Coordinator			
Sat-Sun	4/23-4/24	11pm - 7am	Rani Franovich
Sun	4/24	7am - 3pm	Lisa Wright
Sun	4/24	3pm-11pm	Mike Dudek
Sun-Mon	4/24-4/25	11pm - 7am	Jeff Temple
Mon	4/25	7am - 3pm	Lisa Wright
Mon	4/25	3pm-11pm	Mike Dudek
Mon-Tue	4/25-4/26	11pm - 7am	Jeff Temple
Tue	4/26	7am - 3pm	Lisa Wright
Tue	4/26	3pm-11pm	Mike Dudek
Tue-Wed	4/26-4/27	11pm - 7am	Jeff Temple
Wed	4/27	7am - 3pm	Ned Wright
Wed	4/27	3pm-11pm	Mike Dudek
Wed-Thur	4/27-4/28	11pm - 7am	Jeff Temple
Thur	4/28	7am - 3pm	Ned Wright
Thur	4/28	3pm-11pm	Mike Dudek
Thur-Fri	4/28-4/29	11pm - 7am	Jeff Temple
Fri	4/29	7am - 3pm	Janelle Jessie
Fri	4/29	3pm-11pm	Rich Turtil
Fri-Sat	4/29-4/30	11pm-7am	Milt Murray
Sat	4/30	7am - 3pm	Lisa Wright
Sat	4/30	3pm-11pm	Jeff Temple
Sat	4/30-5/1	11pm - 7am	Milt Murray
Protective Measures Team - PAAD			
Sat-Sun	4/23-4/24	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon
Sun	4/24	7am - 3pm	Leroy Hardin
Sun	4/24	3pm-11pm	Stacy Rosenberg
Sun-Mon	4/24-4/25	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Mon	4/25	7am - 3pm	Jack Foster
Mon	4/25	3pm-11pm	Stacy Rosenberg
Mon-Tue	4/25-4/26	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Tue	4/26	7am - 3pm	Jack Foster
Tue	4/26	3pm-11pm	Stacy Rosenberg
Tue-Wed	4/26-4/27	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Wed	4/27	7am - 3pm	Cynthia Barr
Wed	4/27	3pm-11pm	Stacy Rosenberg
Wed-Thur	4/27-4/28	11pm - 7am	Jessica Kratchman
Thur	4/28	7am - 3pm	Duane Schmidt
Thur	4/28	3pm-11pm	Tim Harris
Thur-Fri	4/28-4/29	11pm - 7am	Jessica Kratchman
Fri	4/29	7am - 3pm	Kathy Brock
Fri	4/29	3pm-11pm	Tim Harris
Fri-Sat	4/29-4/30	11pm-7am	Jessica Kratchman
Sat	4/30	7am - 3pm	Kathy Brock
Sat	4/30	3pm-11pm	Jack Foster
Sat	4/30-5/1	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon

Reactor Safety Team			
Severe Accident/PRA			
Sat-Sun	4/23-4/24	11pm - 7am	See-Meng Wong
Sun	4/24	7am - 3pm	Raj Iyengar
Sun	4/24	3pm-11pm	Steven Arndt
Sun-Mon	4/24-4/25	11pm - 7am	See-Meng Wong
Mon	4/25	7am - 3pm	
Mon	4/25	3pm-11pm	Steven Arndt
Mon-Tue	4/25-4/26	11pm - 7am	See-Meng Wong
Tue	4/26	7am - 3pm	
Tue	4/26	3pm-11pm	Steven Arndt
Tue-Wed	4/26-4/27	11pm - 7am	
Wed	4/27	7am - 3pm	
Wed	4/27	3pm-11pm	Steven Arndt
Wed-Thur	4/27-4/28	11pm - 7am	See-Meng Wong
Thur	4/28	7am - 3pm	
Thur	4/28	3pm-11pm	
Thur-Fri	4/28-4/29	11pm - 7am	
Fri	4/29	7am - 3pm	
Fri	4/29	3pm-11pm	
Fri-Sat	4/29-4/30	11pm-7am	
Sat	4/30	7am - 3pm	
Sat	4/30	3pm-11pm	See-Meng Wong
Sat	4/30-5/1	11pm - 7am	
BWR Expertise			
Sat-Sun	4/23-4/24	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Sun	4/24	7am - 3pm	
Sun	4/24	3pm-11pm	Larry Vick
Sun-Mon	4/24-4/25	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Mon	4/25	7am - 3pm	
Mon	4/25	3pm-11pm	
Mon-Tue	4/25-4/26	11pm - 7am	
Tue	4/26	7am - 3pm	
Tue	4/26	3pm-11pm	
Tue-Wed	4/26-4/27	11pm - 7am	
Wed	4/27	7am - 3pm	Mike Brown
Wed	4/27	3pm-11pm	Andrew Kugler
Wed-Thur	4/27-4/28	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Thur	4/28	7am - 3pm	Mike Brown
Thur	4/28	3pm-11pm	Andrew Kugler
Thur-Fri	4/28-4/29	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Fri	4/29	7am - 3pm	
Fri	4/29	3pm-11pm	Andrew Kugler
Fri-Sat	4/29-4/30	11pm-7am	Eva Brown

Position	Date	Time	Staff
Executive Team - Director			
Sat-Sun	4/30-5/1	11pm - 7am	Glenn Tracy
Sun	5/1	7am - 3pm	Mike Johnson
Sun	5/1	3pm-11pm	Jim Wiggins
Sun-Mon	5/1-5/2	11pm - 7am	Glenn Tracy
Mon	5/2	7am - 3pm	Mike Johnson
Mon	5/2	3pm-11pm	Jim Wiggins
Mon-Tue	5/2-5/3	11pm - 7am	Bruce Boger
Tue	5/3	7am - 3pm	Mike Johnson
Tue	5/3	3pm-11pm	Roy Zimmerman
Tue-Wed	5/3-5/4	11pm - 7am	Bruce Boger
Wed	5/4	7am - 3pm	Mike Johnson
Wed	5/4	3pm-11pm	Roy Zimmerman
Wed-Thur	5/4-5/5	11pm - 7am	Bruce Boger
Thur	5/5	7am - 3pm	Mike Johnson
Thur	5/5	3pm-11pm	Roy Zimmerman
Thur-Fri	5/5-5/6	11pm - 7am	Jim Wiggins
Fri	5/6	7am - 3pm	Jennifer Uhle
Fri	5/6	3pm-11pm	Roy Zimmerman
Fri-Sat	5/6-5/7	11pm-7am	Jim Wiggins
Sat	5/7	7am - 3pm	Bruce Boger
Sat	5/7	3pm-11pm	Roy Zimmerman
Sat	5/7-5-8	11pm - 7am	Jim Wiggins
Executive Support Team			
Sat-Sun	4/30-5/1	11pm - 7am	
Sun	5/1	7am - 3pm	
Sun	5/1	3pm-11pm	
Sun-Mon	5/1-5/2	11pm - 7am	
Mon	5/2	7am - 3pm	
Mon	5/2	3pm-11pm	
Mon-Tue	5/2-5/3	11pm - 7am	
Tue	5/3	7am - 3pm	
Tue	5/3	3pm-11pm	
Tue-Wed	5/3-5/4	11pm - 7am	
Wed	5/4	7am - 3pm	
Wed	5/4	3pm-11pm	Mary Glenn Crutchley
Wed-Thur	5/4-5/5	11pm - 7am	
Thur	5/5	7am - 3pm	
Thur	5/5	3pm-11pm	
Thur-Fri	5/5-5/6	11pm - 7am	
Fri	5/6	7am - 3pm	
Fri	5/6	3pm-11pm	
Fri-Sat	5/6-5/7	11pm-7am	
Sat	5/7	7am - 3pm	
Sat	5/7	3pm-11pm	
Sat	5/7-5-8	11pm - 7am	

Liaison Team - Coordinator			
Sat-Sun	4/30-5/1	11pm - 7am	Milt Murray
Sun	5/1	7am - 3pm	Ned Wright
Sun	5/1	3pm-11pm	Jeff Temple
Sun-Mon	5/1-5/2	11pm - 7am	Milt Murray
Mon	5/2	7am - 3pm	Rani Franovich
Mon	5/2	3pm-11pm	Jeff Temple
Mon-Tue	5/2-5/3	11pm - 7am	Mike Dudek
Tue	5/3	7am - 3pm	Rani Franovich
Tue	5/3	3pm-11pm	Jeff Temple
Tue-Wed	5/3-5/4	11pm - 7am	Mike Dudek
Wed	5/4	7am - 3pm	Rani Franovich
Wed	5/4	3pm-11pm	Jake Zimmerman
Wed-Thur	5/4-5/5	11pm - 7am	Mike Dudek
Thur	5/5	7am - 3pm	Jeff Temple
Thur	5/5	3pm-11pm	Jake Zimmerman
Thur-Fri	5/5-5/6	11pm - 7am	Mike Dudek
Fri	5/6	7am - 3pm	Jeff Temple
Fri	5/6	3pm-11pm	Jake Zimmerman
Fri-Sat	5/6-5/7	11pm-7am	Beth Reed
Sat	5/7	7am - 3pm	
Sat	5/7	3pm-11pm	Jeff Temple
Sat	5/7-5-8	11pm - 7am	Beth Reed
Protective Measures Team - PAAD			
Sat-Sun	4/30-5/1	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon
Sun	5/1	7am - 3pm	Duane Hardesty
Sun	5/1	3pm-11pm	Michelle Hart
Sun-Mon	5/1-5/2	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon
Mon	5/2	7am - 3pm	Duane Hardesty
Mon	5/2	3pm-11pm	Michelle Hart
Mon-Tue	5/2-5/3	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon
Tue	5/3	7am - 3pm	Duane Hardesty
Tue	5/3	3pm-11pm	Michelle Hart
Tue-Wed	5/3-5/4	11pm - 7am	Lou Brandon
Wed	5/4	7am - 3pm	Duane Hardesty
Wed	5/4	3pm-11pm	Michelle Hart
Wed-Thur	5/4-5/5	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Thur	5/5	7am - 3pm	Jack Foster
Thur	5/5	3pm-11pm	Stacy Rosenberg
Thur-Fri	5/5-5/6	11pm - 7am	Greg Casto
Fri	5/6	7am - 3pm	Jack Foster
Fri	5/6	3pm-11pm	Stacy Rosenberg
Fri-Sat	5/6-5/7	11pm-7am	Greg Casto
Sat	5/7	7am - 3pm	Jack Foster
Sat	5/7	3pm-11pm	
Sat	5/7-5-8	11pm - 7am	Jessica Kratchman

Reactor Safety Team			
Severe Accident/PRA			
Sat-Sun	4/30-5/1	11pm - 7am	
Sun	5/1	7am - 3pm	
Sun	5/1	3pm-11pm	Ray Skarda
Sun-Mon	5/1-5/2	11pm - 7am	See-Meng Wong
Mon	5/2	7am - 3pm	
Mon	5/2	3pm-11pm	Ray Skarda
Mon-Tue	5/2-5/3	11pm - 7am	
Tue	5/3	7am - 3pm	
Tue	5/3	3pm-11pm	Ray Skarda
Tue-Wed	5/3-5/4	11pm - 7am	
Wed	5/4	7am - 3pm	
Wed	5/4	3pm-11pm	Ray Skarda
Wed-Thur	5/4-5/5	11pm - 7am	See-Meng Wong
Thur	5/5	7am - 3pm	
Thur	5/5	3pm-11pm	
Thur-Fri	5/5-5/6	11pm - 7am	
Fri	5/6	7am - 3pm	Larry Criscione
Fri	5/6	3pm-11pm	
Fri-Sat	5/6-5/7	11pm-7am	
Sat	5/7	7am - 3pm	Larry Criscione
Sat	5/7	3pm-11pm	
Sat	5/7-5-8	11pm - 7am	See-Meng Wong
BWR Expertise			
Sat-Sun	4/30-5/1	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Sun	5/1	7am - 3pm	Larry Vick
Sun	5/1	3pm-11pm	Andrew Kugler
Sun-Mon	5/1-5/2	11pm - 7am	Eva Brown
Mon	5/2	7am - 3pm	Tim Kolb
Mon	5/2	3pm-11pm	
Mon-Tue	5/2-5/3	11pm - 7am	
Tue	5/3	7am - 3pm	Tim Kolb
Tue	5/3	3pm-11pm	
Tue-Wed	5/3-5/4	11pm - 7am	
Wed	5/4	7am - 3pm	Mike Brown
Wed	5/4	3pm-11pm	
Wed-Thur	5/4-5/5	11pm - 7am	
Thur	5/5	7am - 3pm	Mike Brown
Thur	5/5	3pm-11pm	
Thur-Fri	5/5-5/6	11pm - 7am	
Fri	5/6	7am - 3pm	Tim Kolb
Fri	5/6	3pm-11pm	
Fri-Sat	5/6-5/7	11pm-7am	Eva Brown

March 23, 2011 2300 EDT

Briefing Sheet
Fukushima Daiichi

Units 1, 2, and 3 reactors appear to be in a static condition. Seawater injection to the reactor coolant systems (via fire trucks) is continuing. Containment integrity status is uncertain for all 3 units. Report of steam coming from Unit 2. Reports of smoke from Unit 3 due to potential oil fire (Source: INPO). Unit 1 feedwater thermocouple reading 720 degrees F; and reactor lower head temperature is 741 degrees F (may not be reliable). Recent information indicates a second seawater injection path was established on Unit 1 through a feedline, with a slight drop in temperature noted.

AC power cables installed from a nearby transmission line to Units 1&2. TEPCO is working to establish power to necessary cooling equipment (U2 first). Electrical power has been restored to the Unit 3 control room (Source: NHK World). Power cables connected to a load center in Unit 4. External AC power restored to Unit 5 and 6. Unit 6 diesel generators running. RHR pumps providing cooling to both Units 5&6. 480 VAC power has been restored to portions of all 4 units, but limited capability to operate any equipment at this time.

Multi-day trending of all available dose rate information shows slightly declining levels.

Some indications of trace but detectable amounts of I-131 are being reported at some nuclear plants in the U.S. (Ginna and Nine Mile). Region I is being asked to get more detail.

Industry Consortium call established for 10:00 am each day. Priorities include establishing a method for US industry to interact with TEPCO (INPO representative scheduled to arrive in Tokyo 5:00 pm JDT March 23) and offering longer-term solutions for core and spent fuel pool cooling. Two shipments of the first train of Bechtel-designed equipment arrived at Yokota Air Base today. There is a third shipment of components for this train that will be shipped on Thursday, as the fittings etc., are still being fabricated. DoD is the lead U.S. Government agency coordinating equipment support logistics, funding, etc.

1:00 am call occurred with RST and TEPCO. Call focused on salt accumulation, hydrogen and criticality issues. RST is providing assistance to TEPCO following their request for analysis of when lower core will be filled with salt, and means to mitigate this, including criticality issues.

5:00 am report from C. Casto – TEPCO reports that the Unit 2 spent fuel pool is full of water, and cool at 54 degrees C. However, Unit 2 primary containment is likely to be damaged/breached as steam is observed coming from the containment. DOE planning to convey analysis on salt accumulation and prioritization of RHR restoration, then moving to freshwater source, via letter to TEPCO.

State Department to raise at Deputies call that Agencies (b)(5)

(b)(5)

EB/5

March 23, 2011 2300 EDT

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Fukushima Daiichi

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12:00 am call occurred with RST and TEPCO, primarily focused on salt accumulation issue, restoring RHR cooling system and moving to freshwater for feed and bleed. Initial RST calculations were more conservative is providing assistance to TEPCO following their request for analysis of when lower core will be filled with salt, and means to mitigate this, including criticality issues.

5:00 am report from C. Casto – TEPCO reports that the Unit 2 spent fuel pool is full of water, and cool at 54 degrees C. However, Unit 2 primary containment is likely to be damaged/breached as steam is observed coming from the containment. DOE planning to convey analysis on salt accumulation and prioritization of RHR restoration, then moving to freshwater source, via letter to TEPCO.

State Department to raise at Deputies call that Agencies (b)(5)

(b)(5)

EB/6

USNRC Emergency Operations Center Status Update

April 9, 2011
Earthquake / Tsunami Status Update
Compiled by Executive Briefing Team

This report includes NRC's current understanding of the ongoing situation in Japan. Historical and background information can be found in past reports.

NRC's Top Priorities

1) Continued assessment of radiological conditions, dose projections, and protective action recommendations. Currently, the NRC Japan Team reports that no PMT additional support or actions are being requested (offsite radiological assessments, RASCAL source term updates).

2) Providing technical assistance to the US Ambassador in Japan and the Japanese Government, including a particular focus on the Unit 1 drywell and the Unit 3 and 4 spent fuel pools.

3) Coordination with other US Departments and Agencies, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), Bechtel, General Electric Hitachi (GEH), Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), and the Japanese military.

Status

At 0946 EST, March 11, 2011, the NRC entered Monitoring Mode and the agency continues to monitor the unfolding events in Japan. The Headquarters Operations Center is staffed 24/7.

The team of NRC experts in Japan continues to support the US Ambassador and his staff. A fourth team to Japan is scheduled to begin departing on April 9, 2011.

NRC has issued numerous press releases related to the earthquake and tsunami. These press releases can be found online at: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2011/

On March 14, 2011, the NRC experts in Japan reported that the Japanese had requested US technical assistance for cooling the Fukushima Daiichi Units, as needed. The effort to provide assistance is being coordinated by the US Ambassador.

The current protective action recommendation for US citizens residing within 50 miles (80 km) of the Fukushima Daiichi site is to evacuate.

One pump that was deployed to the site is being used to pump fresh water from one of the barges to a clean water holding tank as a source of fresh water to cool the reactors and the spent fuel pools. A second pump is ready as a spare, if necessary.

EB 7

The NRC Reactor Safety Team completed an assessment and recommendations for the Fukushima Daiichi units based on the severe accident management guidelines. The assessment included the input and concurrence of INPO, GEH, EPRI, Naval Reactors, and DOE/NE. This document has been provided to the NRC Site Team in Japan. The document is now being cited in the news media (New York Times). NRC is evaluating what steps may be appropriate to address an OUO document being provided to the public. An updated assessment is underway to account for current plant conditions (e.g. inerting Unit 1 drywell).

The US Department of Energy and the US Environmental Protection Agency are the Federal communicators for questions regarding possible domestic impacts from the events in Japan and on domestic monitoring.

The Commission established a senior level agency task force to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations with specific near-term and long-term objectives.

Status of NRC Licensee and Agreement State Facilities

Air sample and standing water sample results from US nuclear plant licensees have been entered into a password protected database established by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). NRC and Federal partners have access to the plant data.

Industry Consortium / Contractor Activities

NRC/Consortium calls are held daily at 2000 EDT. The NRC Site Team in Japan has served as a clearinghouse by reviewing material and assistance requests from the Japanese Government (GoJ), comparing them to the consortium list and combining all requests into a central list to avoid duplication. As of 4/8/11, the U.S. Embassy list and the consortium list have been consolidated. This is in preparation to transfer the GOJ request list to the Embassy for maintenance. GoJ has been asked to prioritize all requests on the list. Meetings continue daily between the Embassy team (supported by NRC and DOE) and the GoJ to discuss GoJ requests for assistance and equipment. International liaisons have suggested that the U.S. Embassy take the lead in communicating to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all U.S. assistance to Japan and coordinating that assistance if DOS-HQ is agreeable. It was decided in the Agency Deputies meeting earlier in the week that DOE is the lead for interagency technical support to Japan.

Current Understanding of Japanese Facilities

(This information is compiled from the NRC in-country team, TEPCO press releases, NISA press releases, Japan Atomic Industrial Forum (JAIF) compiled data and assessments, IAEA information releases, Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan, World Association of Nuclear Operators, Department of Energy (DOE) and others.)

Fukushima Daiichi

The Japanese national government has encouraged evacuation for local residents within the 20-30 km radius of the site boundary. This is a slight change from the previous voluntary evacuation with shelter in place for the 20-30 km zone. GOJ has required some evacuations in towns/villages outside of 30 km in areas Northwest of the Fukushima site. IAEA confirms a no-fly zone out to 30 km around the Fukushima Daiichi plant. No additional damage has been reported as a result of the 4/7/11 magnitude 7.1 aftershock.

STATUS as of 0430 EDT, April 9, 2011 - (1730 Japan, April 9)

Unit 1 – (NRC Priority: 1)

Core Status: Estimated 70% damage (Source: TEPCO), fuel partially or fully exposed (Source: JAIF, NISA, TEPCO). The volume of sea water injected to cool the core has left enough salt to fill the lower plenum to the core plate (Source: GEH, US Industry).
Vessel temperatures 119.4°C at bottom drain, 250°C at FW nozzle (Source: NISA 4/8).
RPV pressure (Ch A: 57.3 psig, Ch B: 115.0 psig) (Source: NISA 4/8). Stuck open SRV on Unit 1 (Site Team, confirmed by TEPCO 4/7).

Core Cooling: Fresh water injection via fire extension line to FW line at 26.4 gpm (Source: TEPCO 4/5). Recirculation pump seals have likely failed. (Source: GEH)

Primary Containment: Damage suspected, slow leakage, DW pressure increased to 12.1 psig, torus pressure at 7.8 psig and slowly increasing from N_2 injection (Source: NISA 4/8). Losing 10-30% drywell volume per day (Source: TEPCO via Site Team 4/2). Stuck open SRV (Source: Site Team, confirmed by TEPCO 4/7). Began injecting nitrogen to drywell at 0130 Japan on April 7 (Source: IAEA, 4/7).

Secondary Containment: Severely damaged (hydrogen explosion)

Spent Fuel Pool: Temperature is at 24°C (Source: JAIF 4/6, uncertain, overhead thermography). Periodic freshwater spray using concrete pump truck (Source: DOE 4/3). SFP has 292 assemblies with last transfer of 64 assemblies from reactor to SFP in March 2010 (Source: GEH 4/2).

Rad Levels: DW: 6830 R/hr (Source: NISA 4/8), Reported instrument failure (Source: INPO 4/8), Torus: 1220 R/hr (Source: NISA 4/8), Outside site at plant gate(s): 4 mR/hr at west gate (very slight trend downward) (Source: JAIF).

Power: On external power (Source: NISA); equipment testing in progress (Source: JAIF, NISA, TEPCO). External AC power to the Main Control Room of Unit 1 lighting and instrument power is available.

Unit 2 – (NRC Priority: 2)

Core Status: Estimated 30% damage (Source: TEPCO), fuel partially or fully exposed (Source: JAIF, NISA, TEPCO). Bottom head temperature not available (TEPCO), feed water nozzle temperature 141.2°C (Source: NISA 4/8). RPV pressure -2.9 psig (Source: NISA 4/8).

Core Cooling: Fresh water injecting at 30.8 gpm fire line (Source: TEPCO 4/8)

Primary Containment: Damage suspected (Source: JAIF, NISA, TEPCO). Pressure: -0.2 psig (Source: NISA 4/8). Site Team believes an SRV is stuck open, but TEPCO opinion currently differs. May begin injecting nitrogen (Source: NHK).

Secondary Containment: Damaged (Source: JAIF, NISA, TEPCO), blowout panels removed from side of reactor building to reduce hydrogen buildup (Source: visual)

Spent Fuel Pool: Full fresh water injection continuing (Source: IAEA 4/5), fuel pool temperature 58°C (Source: JAIF 4/8). 36 tons of water added 4/7 (Source: Site Team 4/8).

Rad Levels: DW: 2940 R/hr (Source: JAIF 4/8); Torus 77 R/hr (Source: NISA 4/8); Outside site at plant gate(s): 5.8 mR/hr at west gate (very slight trend downward) (Source: JAIF); >100 R/hr at discharge to sea (Source: IAEA 4/3); The leak of contaminated water into the ocean has been stopped (Source: Multiple Reports).

Power: On offsite power (NISA 4/3)

Unit 3 – (NRC Priority: 3)

Core Status: Estimated 25% damage (Source: TEPCO), fuel partially or fully exposed (Source: JAIF, NISA, TEPCO). Bottom head temperature 110.8°C, FW nozzle temperature: 88.8°C (Source: NISA 4/8). RPV pressure Ch A: -0.6 psig, Ch B: -11.4 psig) (Source: NISA 4/8). RPV level ~2/5 TAF (Source: IAEA 4/3).

Core Cooling: Freshwater injection via fire line at 30.8 gpm via temporary electrical pump (Source: NISA 4/8). Recirculation pump seals have likely failed. (Source: GEH)

Primary Containment: NRC assessment is that damage is suspected. Pressure: 0.6 psig (Source: NISA 4/8). May begin to inject nitrogen (Source: NHK).

Secondary Containment: Damaged (Source: JAIF, NISA, TEPCO)

Spent Fuel Pool: Low water level. Temperature 60°C estimated (Source: JAIF 4/6, uncertain, overhead thermography). Freshwater injection via SF cooling system and spraying fresh water periodically into SFP (Source: IAEA 4/5). Water will be added on 4/8 (Source: Site Team 4/8).

Rad Levels: DW: 1880 R/hr, Torus: 73.8 R/hr (Source: NISA 4/8); Outside site at plant gate(s): 4.0 mR/hr at west gate (very slight trend downward) (Source: JAIF); 100 R/hr debris outside Rx building (covered).

Power: On offsite power (NISA 4/3)

Unit 4 – (NRC Priority: 4)

Core Status: Offloaded 105 days at time of accident (Source: JAIF, NISA, TEPCO)

Core Cooling: Not necessary (Source: JAIF, NISA, TEPCO)

Primary Containment: Not applicable (Source: JAIF, NISA, TEPCO)

Secondary Containment: Severely damaged from hydrogen explosion. (Source: JAIF, NISA, TEPCO)

Spent Fuel Pool: Temperature 57°C (Source: JAIF 4/7, uncertain, overhead thermography); periodic freshwater injection via an extended boom (Source: JAIF 3/31). 38 tons of water added 4/7 (Source: Site Team 4/8). Hydrogen from the fuel pool exploded on March 15 (Source: JAIF 3/31). Intermittent steam-like substance emitting from SFP from injection/spray (Source: JAIF 4/1). Level trending down (Source: Site Team 4/6). TEPCO considering adding sand slurry to SFP (Source: Site Team 4/7).

Power: On offsite AC power (DOE 4/3)

Unit 5 – (NRC Priority: 5)

Core Status: In vessel (Source: JAIF, NISA, TEPCO), temperature 45.5°C (increasing) (Source: NISA 4/8)

Core Cooling: Functional (Source: JAIF, NISA, TEPCO)

Primary Containment: Functional (Source: JAIF, NISA, TEPCO)
Secondary Containment: Vent hole drilled in rooftop to avoid hydrogen build up (Source: JAIF, NISA, TEPCO)
Spent Fuel Pool: Fuel pool cooling functional, RHR pump repaired, temperature 34.7°C (Source: NISA 4/8)
Power: External AC power supplying the unit, diesel generators available. (Source: JAIF, NISA, TEPCO)
Other: Groundwater leaking into turbine basement drain pits, being pumped into ocean (Source: TEPCO 4/5)

Unit 6 – (NRC Priority: 6)
Core Status: In vessel (Source: JAIF, NISA, TEPCO), temperature 22.7°C (Source: NISA 4/8)
Core Cooling: Functional (Source: JAIF, NISA, TEPCO)
Primary Containment: Functional (Source: JAIF, NISA, TEPCO)
Secondary Containment: Vent hole drilled in rooftop to avoid hydrogen build up (Source: JAIF, NISA, TEPCO)
Spent Fuel Pool: Fuel pool cooling functional, temperature 30.5°C (Source: NISA 4/8)
Power: External AC power supplying the unit, diesel generators available. (Source: JAIF, NISA, TEPCO)
Other: Groundwater leaking into turbine basement drain pits, being pumped into ocean (Source: TEPCO 4/5)

Common Spent Fuel Pool (NRC priority: 7): 6,000 bundles (Source: GEH); water level maintained at 29°C (Source: TEPCO 4/6); normal cooling started 1805 JST March 24 (Source: NISA)
Electrical Power (NRC priority: 7): Offsite power connected to Unit 2 auxiliary transformer / distribution panel; work continues on energizing equipment in Unit 2.
Dry Cask Storage: Visual inspection revealed no problems. All casks are vertical casks manufactured by Hitachi Shipbuilding (Source: RST).

The leak of contaminated water into the ocean has been stopped (Source: Multiple Reports).

NRC priorities are based on analyses by the Reactor Safety Team. Unit 1 is priority 1 based on the belief that primary containment functionality, though degraded, can still be preserved if the responders take actions to inject to the RPV and primary containment. Unit 2 is priority 2 because of the apparent damage to primary containment and the other barriers to release. This damage requires continued attention to cool the core and provide water to the primary containment to minimize potential for release. Unit 3 is priority 3 because primary containment may be nominally functional but continued attention is required to pursue core cooling and injection. Unit 4 is priority 4 because progress has been made in addressing the spent fuel pool heat removal requirements, and the SFP area has indicated temperatures of less than 100°C.

Other Plants

No new information to report.

Protective Measures Team (PMT) Update

The PMT continues to assess available dose rate information from DOE AMS data, the US Navy, TEPCO, and MEXT. Multi-day trending of available onsite monitors shows slightly declining dose rates over the past several days. On April 8, 2011 dose rates at the west gate were about 5 mR/hr (Source: Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and IAEA). PMT is trending near site dose rates using the MOFA/IAEA data and will use this source in future.

DOE continues to take field measurements around the site. To date, over 110,000 field measurements have been taken by DOE teams. The 4/17 AMS flyover approximately 30 miles west of the site detected low levels of deposition.

The PMT was requested to support NOAA with information on the source term released. This will be used to assist in ocean modeling.

International Response

- Secretary of State Clinton tentatively visiting Japan on April 18, 2011.
- The IAEA has announced that it will hold a high-level conference on preliminary lessons learned from Fukushima on June 20-24, 2011. Information is available at www.iaea.org.
- NRC has daily teleconferences with the United Kingdom's Health and Safety Executive, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, and French Nuclear Safety Authority. IAEA and Finland also participate intermittently.
- France has publicly posted its assessment of projected doses in Tokyo on the French Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety Institute (IRSN) website.
- The NRC RST and PMT will have a call with Taiwan early in the week of 4/11 to discuss current status and source term issues.
- An Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) staff member in Tokyo is coordinating with US government staff at the Embassy concerning equipment requests.

Reference

Units

1 rem (rem) = 1,000 millirem (mrem)
1 Sievert (Sv) = 1,000 milliSieverts (mSv) = 1,000,000 microsieverts (μSv)
1 rem = 0.01 Sv = 10 mSv
1 Sv = 100 rem

Reactor Abbreviations

atm – Atmosphere (unit of pressure)
DW – Drywell
FW – Feed Water
gpm – gallons per minute
RHR – Residual Heat Removal
RPV – Reactor Pressure Vessel
SFP – Spent Fuel Pool
SRV – Safety Relief Valve
TAF – Top of Active Fuel

April 26, 2011 0700 EDT

One-Pager - Fukushima Daiichi

ET Overview and Priorities

- ET turnover: WebEOC turnover list, one-pager, list of major documents, tasker list, ET Log Book.
- Plant and fuel pool conditions are generally unchanged.
- Headquarters Operations Center transition activities continue. Documented the process for tasking actions to Line Organizations. See Ops Center Transition Plan Document (WebEOC).
- USAID will transition support for NRC Japan Site Team to NRC (OCFO/OIP) on May 1. USAID will continue to support until May 1.
- NRC reviewed and provided to Japan Site Team Lead the analysis of the adequacy of the TEPCO Roadmap on April 25. This document was also sent to the Consortium for comment by 4/27.

RST Overview and Priorities

- Continued monitoring of Units. Conditions at the units were static.
- Completed NRC review of the TEPCO Roadmap, which was provided to the site team. NRC review will be provided to Japanese Government early Tuesday morning (Japan time). Consortium to provide comments on accuracy only by COB Wednesday, April 27.
- "RST Assessment Rev. 2"- received feedback from Japan Site team to hold (or freeze) continued revisions. Japan Site Team believes a number of recommendations proposed in the document may not be implementable under current conditions. The consensus is that a more forward-looking document can be developed when more information on actual conditions are received.
- "Interim Comprehensive Assessment" (Global Assessment/Interim Safety Assessment) will be worked by NRR with data from previous two assessment document; target completion by Friday, April 29.

PMT Overview and Priorities

- PMT, via the line organization, continues to work on the final "Composite" document (4969) aligning it with Japan's evacuation instruction, commensurate with a "Travel Advisory." Goal: Receive Line Organization comment by COB Tuesday April 26, and release document to the Federal Family middle of next week.
- Japan Team is actively tracking radiation readings, and investigating agricultural and marine impacts.
- The Japanese government will begin euthanizing debilitated and dying livestock within the No-go zone (20 km around site) on or after April 25. The government must have owners' consent to euthanize. Euthanized animals will be disinfected with slaked lime and wrapped in vinyl sheeting. Prefectural government staff and veterinarians are in charge of this activity with a daily maximum exposure limit of 50 mSv. At this time, they will not work in a few towns with relatively higher radiation levels.
- On April 25, Ned Wright (NSIR) obtained information from a U.S. news report that the Navy is tracking floating debris fields of about 60 to 70 miles in length. Vince Holahan (PACOM) provided information that the University of Hawaii is tracking this under contract with NOAA, and that the U.S. Coast Guard will probably be tasked to monitor the debris field as it migrates eastward. Other assets are monitoring the situation as well.
- Also on April 25 we received information that NOAA was placing the plume modeling on hold for two weeks. NOAA said that the government of Japan has requested input from IAEA representatives. There is a two week or more delay due to the representatives' arrival.

LT Overview and Priorities

- Next Industry Consortium call scheduled for Tuesday, April 26, 2011 at 2000 (EDT) – U.S. Embassy Japan will send the Request Matrix out for updating.
- Working with Japan Site Team to determine approximate number of U.S. Citizens who live within the 12- and 50- mile radius of the Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.
- U.S.- Japan Economic Strategy Institute in Tokyo requested help in obtaining acceptable shipping containers for radioactive materials. Helen Peterson in the Foreign Commercial Services Unit U.S. Embassy Japan has this for action.

EB/8

From: Jablonowski.Eugene@epamail.epa.gov
Sent: Tuesday, March 15, 2011 12:29 PM
To: Pavek, John - Washington, DC; Wiley, Albert (ORAU); Maher, Carmen T. (FDA/OC/OCS); Miller, Charles W. (CDC/ONDIEH/NCEH); Ansari, Armin (CDC/ONDIEH/NCEH); Whitcomb, Robert C. (CDC/ONDIEH/NCEH); Connell, Carol (ATSDR/DHAC/SRAB); Liles.Darrell@epamail.epa.gov; Tupin.Edward@epamail.epa.gov; Morrison, Ellen F. (FDA/OC/OCTC); Hornsby-Myers, Jennifer (CDC/NIOSH/OD); Brozowski.George@epamail.epa.gov; Evans, Lynn (CDC/ONDIEH/NCEH); Gordon S Cleveland (APHIS); Dixon, John E. (CDC/ONDIEH/NCEH); Cherniack, James J. (FDA/ORA/NE-FO); Sincek, Jeffrey A. (FDA/ORA/CE-FO); Nemhauser, Jeffrey B. (CDC/ONDIEH/NCEH); Jensen, John (USDA); Anderson, Jeri L. (CDC/NIOSH/DSHEFS); Smallwood, Karen R. (FDA/ORA/SE-FO); Keith, Sam (ATSDR/DTEM/ATB); Veal.Lee@epamail.epa.gov; Brandon, Lou; Russo, Mark R. (FDA/OC/OCTC); Brooks, Michael (ATSDR/DHAC/SRAB); Mena, RaJah (DOE/FRMAC); Noska, Mike (FDA); O'Laughlin, Colleen (DOE/FRMAC); Buzzell, Jennifer (CDC/ONDIEH/NCEH); Charp, Paul (ATSDR/DHAC/SRAB); Hansen, Patricia A. (FDA/CFSAN); Pemberton, Wendy (DOE/FRMAC); Peter A Petch (APHIS); Evans, Rachel T. (FDA/ORA/CE-FO); Funk, Renee (CDC/NIOSH/OD); Goodman.Roger@epamail.epa.gov; Graham, Ron (FSIS); DeCair.Sara@epamail.epa.gov; Hargrave, Scotty L. (FDA/ORA/SW-FO); Lough, Scott (AMS); Jones, Terri L. (FDA/ORA/P-FO); Howard King, Vinetta M. (FDA/OC/OCTC); Lotz, William G. (Greg) (CDC/NIOSH/DART); Cunningham, William C. (FDA/CFSAN)
Subject: RE: Advisory Team Distribution List (new NARAC Prediction on CMWeb)

FYI

Posted on CMWeb is the "Refined NARAC Prediction- Unit 2: 100 per.; Units 1+3 40 per". I received it in my CMWeb inbox as a message dated 03/15/2011 10:54:30 CDT. The Consequence Report summary describes "the health effect consequences associated with a hypothetical unknown release to the atmosphere from a radiological source" and projects impacts towards Tokyo.

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EB/9

From: Mazaika, Michael
Sent: Tuesday, March 15, 2011 12:54 PM
To: PMT01 Hoc
Cc: Galletta, Thomas; Quinlan, Kevin; Harvey, Brad; Brown, David; Schaaf, Robert; Brandon, Lou
Subject: Questions Re Model-Predicted Met Data

Folks:

Had some thoughts overnight regarding the Met data being used as input to RASCAL. As I recall, it is being driven by forecast model output. You may have already gotten answers to these questions, but just to be sure:

- What are the parameters output by the forecast model for input to RASCAL?
- If not all RASCAL inputs are included, what are the other parameters and how is the input for the other parameters being obtained?
- What is the elevation above ground for which the forecast model estimates wind speed and direction data and how does that elevation relate to the release height(s) being input to RASCAL? My concern here that the forecast model output may be for a height well above the release height and, if so, that that be accounted for in the RASCAL modeling.
- How does the forecast model estimate the atmospheric stability classes and do they correspond to the Pasquill-Gifford A thru G classes used by NRC or are they truncated at Stability Class F?
- Has the anticipated onshore wind shift taken place (and when), has precipitation started at the site (and in what form) as was in the forecast? Do we have an idea of the cloud cover during this time period and have we checked the reasonability of the stability classes estimated by the model against these actual conditions ambient conditions?

More to come regarding requests to obtain actual historical onsite Met data and offsite data from the Japan Meteorological Agency.

I spoke with Dave Brown twice this morning. He advised me of the current staffing plan for this week and indicated that it was not necessary to report to the office today. I will be available by phone (b)(6) or e-mail. Tom, this and my follow-up e-mail were the reason for my call around 11 AM; no need to return the call unless you want to discuss further.

Thanks,

Mike

EB/10

U.S.NRC
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Protecting People and the Environment

FACT SHEET

Office of Public Affairs
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Seismic Issues for Existing Nuclear Power Plants

Nuclear power plants are built to withstand environmental hazards, including earthquakes. Even those plants that are located outside of areas with extensive seismic activity are designed for safety in the event of such a natural disaster. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires all of its licensees to take seismic activity into account when planning and maintaining its nuclear power plants.

Background

The NRC has examined recent earthquake-related information to assess potential safety implications for nuclear power plants in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). The agency requires plant designs to withstand the effects of natural phenomena including earthquakes (i.e., seismic events). The agency's requirements, including General Design Criteria for licensing a plant, are described in Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR). These license requirements include traditional engineering practices such as "safety margins." Practices such as these add an extra element of safety into design, construction, and operations.

The NRC has always required licensees to design, operate, and maintain safety-significant structures, systems, and components to withstand the effects of earthquakes and to maintain the capability to perform their intended safety functions. The agency ensures these requirements are satisfied through the licensing, reactor oversight, and enforcement processes.

Earthquake (or Seismic) Hazard

The NRC requires that safety-significant structures, systems, and components be designed to take into account:

- the most severe natural phenomena historically reported for the site and surrounding area. The NRC then adds a margin for error to account for the historical data's limited accuracy;
- appropriate combinations of the effects of normal and accident conditions with the effects of the natural phenomena; and
- the importance of the safety functions to be performed.

The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Web site provides general information about earthquakes (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/learning/index.php). An earthquake releases energy that radiates from the fault and causes ground movement. As the ground moves, objects such as nuclear power plant structures on or in the ground also move. The nature of the movement depends on how the earthquake releases energy and on how the soil conditions absorb (or dissipate) the energy as it moves away from the fault to a plant location. The intensity of an earthquake can be characterized by both the frequency of the shaking and by

EB/11

the acceleration of the ground at the plant. These characteristics describe how the energy released from the earthquake impacts the plant's buildings as well as the systems and components that are contained inside those buildings.

Earthquake characteristics provide information used in designing existing nuclear plants. The frequency of the shaking is measured in cycles per second (or Hz), and the acceleration is typically expressed as some fraction of the acceleration of gravity, which is about 32.2 feet per second per second (ft/s^2). For example, an acceleration of 0.15 g (15 percent of the acceleration of gravity) is about equal to an acceleration of 5 ft/s2.

Seismic Safety Assessment

The licensing bases for existing nuclear power plants are based on historical data at each site. This data is used to determine design basis loads from the area's maximum credible earthquake, with an additional margin included. The NRC also requires existing plants to assess their potential vulnerability to earthquake events, including those that might exceed the design basis, as part of the Individual Plant Examination of External Events Program. This process examines the available safety margins of existing plants for various earthquakes and ensures these margins, together with the plant's accident management programs, continue to protect public health and safety.

Today, the NRC utilizes a risk-informed regulatory approach, including insights from probabilistic assessments and traditional deterministic engineering methods to make regulatory decisions about existing plants (e.g., licensing amendment decisions). Any new nuclear plant the NRC licenses will use a probabilistic, performance-based approach to establish the plant's seismic hazard and the seismic loads for the plant's design basis.

Evolving Knowledge about Earthquakes

The CEUS is generally an area of low to moderate earthquake hazard with few active faults in contrast to the western United States. Even so, in 1811–1812, three major earthquakes (Magnitude 7 to 7.7 on the commonly used Richter Scale) shook much of the CEUS. These earthquakes occurred near the town of New Madrid, M.O. In 1886, a large earthquake (Richter Scale magnitude of about 7) occurred near Charleston, S.C. This earthquake caused extensive damage and was felt in most of the eastern United States. Geologists are aware of these historic occurrences, and knowledge of such earthquakes was taken into account in plant design and analysis.

The NRC regularly reviews new information on earthquake source and ground motion models. For example, the NRC reviewed updated earthquake information provided by applicants in support of Early Site Permits for new reactors. This additional information included new models to estimate earthquake ground motion and updated models for earthquake sources in seismic regions such as eastern Tennessee and around both Charleston and New Madrid.

Analysis of these updates indicated slight increases to earthquake hazard estimates for some plants in the CEUS. The NRC also reviewed and evaluated recent USGS earthquake hazard estimates for the CEUS that are used for building code applications outside of plant licensing. These reviews showed that the estimated likelihood of earthquakes occurring at some current CEUS operating sites might be slightly higher than what was expected during design and previous evaluations.

NRC Response to Increased Estimated CEUS Earthquake Hazards

The NRC began assessing the safety implications of increased plant earthquake hazards in the CEUS through a May 26, 2005, memorandum (available under Accession No. ML051450456 in the NRC Agencywide Documents Access and Management System [ADAMS]) in which the staff recommended examining the new CEUS earthquake hazard information under the Generic Issues Program (GIP). The NRC staff identified the issue as GI-199 in a June 9, 2005, memorandum (ADAMS Accession No. ML051600272) and completed the screening analysis for the issue in January 2008. The staff then assessed available earthquake data and models.

The GIP confirmed that operating nuclear power plants are safe. The assessment also found that, although still small, some seismic hazard estimates have increased and warrant further attention. In September 2010, NRC issued a Safety/Risk Assessment report (ADAMS Accession No. ML100270582) and an Information Notice (ADAMS Accession No. ML101970221) to inform stakeholders of the Safety/Risk Assessment results. Further action may include obtaining additional, updated information, as well as developing methods to determine if plant improvements to reduce seismic risk are warranted. Information regarding this generic issue and the GIP in general is available at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/gen-issues.html.

To read more about risk-related NRC policy, see the fact sheets on Probabilistic Risk Assessment (http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/probabilistic-risk-asses.html) and Nuclear Reactor Risk (http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/reactor-risk.html). Each provides more information on the use of probability in evaluating hazards (including earthquakes) and their potential impact on plant safety margins.

November 2010

U.S.NRC
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Protecting People and the Environment

FACT SHEET

Office of Public Affairs
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Emergency Preparedness at Nuclear Power Plants

Background

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reexamined the role of emergency preparedness (EP) for protecting the public near nuclear power plants following the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in 1979. The accident showed the need for improved planning, response, and communication by federal, state, and local governments to deal with reactor accidents. Although the NRC remained vigilant over the years, the events of September 11, 2001, prompted a new focus on emergency preparedness and a further review of the threat environment. The NRC now considers new threat scenarios and protections in emergency preparedness in light of the threat of terrorist attacks.

Nuclear power plant owners, government agencies, State and local officials, as well as thousands of volunteers and first responders have worked together for more than 20 years to create a system of emergency preparedness and response that will serve the public well in the unlikely event of an emergency. The nuclear power plants' emergency plans include preparations for evacuation, sheltering, or other actions to protect the residents near nuclear power plants in the event of a serious incident.

Since commercial nuclear power plants began operating in the United States, there have been no physical injuries or fatalities from exposure to radiation from the plants among members of the U.S. public. Even the country's worst nuclear power plant accident at Three Mile Island resulted in no identifiable health impacts.

Federal Oversight

In the U.S., 104 commercial nuclear power reactors are licensed to operate at 65 sites in 31 States. For each site, there are onsite and offsite emergency plans to assure that adequate protective measures can be taken to protect the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Federal oversight of emergency preparedness for licensed nuclear power plants is shared by the NRC and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This sharing is facilitated through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU is responsive to the President's decision of December 7, 1979, that FEMA take the lead in overseeing offsite planning and response, and that NRC assist FEMA in carrying out this role. The NRC has statutory responsibility for the radiological health and safety of the public by overseeing onsite preparedness and has overall authority for both onsite and offsite emergency preparedness.

Before a plant is licensed to operate, the NRC must have "reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." The NRC's decision of reasonable assurance is based on licensees complying with NRC regulations and guidance. In addition,

licensees and area response organizations must demonstrate they can effectively implement emergency plans and procedures during periodic evaluated exercises. As part of the Reactor Oversight Process, the NRC reviews licensees' emergency planning procedures and training. These reviews include regular drills and exercises that assist licensees in identifying areas for improvement, such as in the interface of security operations and emergency preparedness. Each plant owner is required to exercise its emergency plan with the NRC, FEMA, and offsite authorities at least once every two years to ensure state and local officials remain proficient in implementing their emergency plans. Licensees also self-test their emergency plans regularly by conducting drills. Each plant's performance in drills and exercises can be accessed through the NRC Web site at this address: http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html.

FEMA takes the lead in initially reviewing and assessing the offsite planning and response and in assisting State and local governments, while the NRC reviews and assesses the onsite planning and response. FEMA findings and determinations as to the adequacy and capability of implementing offsite plans are communicated to the NRC. The NRC reviews the FEMA findings and determinations as well as the onsite findings. The NRC then makes a determination on the overall state of emergency preparedness. These overall findings and determinations are used by the NRC to make radiological health and safety decisions before the issuing licenses and in the continuing oversight of operating reactors. The NRC has the authority to take action, including shutting down any reactor deemed not to provide reasonable assurance of the protection of public health and safety.

Emergency Planning Zones

For planning purposes, the NRC defines two emergency planning zones (EPZs) around each nuclear power plant. The exact size and configuration of the zones vary from plant to plant due to local emergency response needs and capabilities, population, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. The two types of EPZs are:

> The plume exposure pathway EPZ extends about 10 miles in radius around a plant. Its primary concern is the exposure of the public to, and the inhalation of, airborne radioactive contamination.
>
> The ingestion pathway EPZ extends about 50 miles in radius around a plant. Its primary concern is the ingestion of food and liquid that is contaminated by radioactivity.

Emergency Classification

Emergency Classification is a set of plant conditions which indicate a level of risk to the public. Nuclear power plants use the four emergency classifications listed below in order of increasing severity.

Notification of Unusual Event - Under this category, events are in process or have occurred which indicate potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant. No release of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring is expected unless further degradation occurs.

Alert - If an alert is declared, events are in process or have occurred that involve an actual or potential substantial degradation in the level of safety of the plant. Any releases of radioactive material from the plant are expected to be limited to a small fraction of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) protective action guides (PAGs). Additional information regarding PAGs can be found on the EPA Web site at: http://www.epa.gov/radiation/rert/pags.html.

Site Area Emergency - A site area emergency involves events in process or which have occurred that result in actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public. Any releases of radioactive material are not expected to exceed the EPA PAGs except near the site boundary.

General Emergency - A general emergency involves actual or imminent substantial core damage or melting of reactor fuel with the potential for loss of containment integrity. Radioactive releases during a general emergency can reasonably be expected to exceed the EPA PAGs for more than the immediate site area.

Protective Actions

The NRC's regulations are designed to mitigate accident consequences and minimize radiation exposure to the public through protective actions. When a radiological emergency occurs, nuclear power plant personnel evaluate plant conditions and make protective action recommendations to the state and local government agencies on how to protect the population. Based on the recommendation and independent assessment of other local factors, the state or local government agencies are responsible for making decisions on the actions necessary to protect the public and for relaying these decisions to the public.

Factors that affect protective action decisions include plant conditions, competing events, weather, evacuation times, shelter factors, how quickly an incident develops, how short-lived a release of radiation may be, and other conditions.

Evacuation, Sheltering, and the Use of Potassium Iodide

Protective actions considered for a radiological emergency include evacuation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, the prophylactic use of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate. Under most conditions, evacuation may be preferred to remove the public from further exposure to radioactive material. However, under some conditions, people may be instructed to take shelter in their homes, schools, or office buildings. Depending on the type of structure, sheltering can significantly reduce a person's dose compared to remaining outside. In certain situations, KI is used as a supplement to sheltering.

Evacuation does not always call for completely emptying the 10-mile zone around a nuclear power plant. In most cases, the release of radioactive material from a plant during a major incident would move with the wind, not in all directions surrounding the plant. The release would also expand and become less concentrated as it travels away from a plant. Therefore, evacuations should be mapped to anticipate the path of the release. Generally as a minimum, in the event of a General Emergency, a two-mile ring around the plant is evacuated, along with people living in the 5-mile zone directly downwind and slightly to either side of the projected path of the release. This "keyhole" pattern (Figure 1) helps account for potential wind shifts and fluctuations in the release path (Figure 2). Evacuation beyond 5 miles is assessed as the accident progresses. Also in response to a General Emergency, people living in the remainder of the 10-mile zone will most likely be advised to go indoors to monitor Emergency Alert System broadcasts.

Sheltering is a protective action that keeps people indoors, such as at home, the office, school, or a shopping mall to reduce exposure to radioactive material. It may be appropriate to shelter when the release of radioactive material is known to be short-term or controlled by the nuclear power plant operator. Additional information on evacuation and sheltering can be found on the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emerg-preparedness/evacuation-sheltering.html.

Another protective action in the 10-mile EPZ involves KI, a compound that helps prevent the thyroid from absorbing radioactive iodine, one of several radioactive materials that could be present in a release from a nuclear power plant accident. If taken within the appropriate time and at the appropriate dosage, KI blocks the radioactive iodine from being absorbed by the thyroid gland and reduces the risk of thyroid cancers and other diseases. KI does not protect against any other inhaled radioactive materials, nor will it offer protection from external exposure to radiation. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has determined that KI is a safe and effective drug when used for this purpose. However, there may be risks and potential side effects in using KI, including gastrointestinal disturbances, allergic reactions, and iodide goiter and hypothyroidism. Please consult your physician if you have questions on the potential side effects.

In January 2001, the NRC modified its regulations to include considering the use of KI, and, later that year, the FDA issued guidance on using the drug. The Federal Emergency Management Agency published its revised Federal Policy on the Use of Potassium Iodide in January 2002. As of October 8, 2009, 22 states have received KI tablets from the NRC for their populations within 10 miles of a nuclear power plant. These states are: Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. Illinois has its own KI program in place; therefore, 21 of the 34 states with populations within the 10-mile EPZ have KI. Further information on KI is available on the NRC Web site at: http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/emerg-preparedness/about-emerg-preparedness/potassium-iodide-use.html

Terrorism and Emergency Preparedness

After September 2001, the NRC examined how terrorist-based events might challenge existing emergency preparedness. The NRC's formal evaluation determined that, in view of the threat environment, the emergency preparedness planning basis remain valid. While a terrorist event might alter the initial response to an event, the consequences of the event will be the same whether it was caused by terrorism or a safety accident.

The nuclear power reactor's emergency plans are periodically updated and are designed to be flexible to identify, evaluate and react to the wide spectrum of emergency conditions. The NRC recognized how the terrorism threat affects emergency planning when it issued orders and guidance to nuclear power plants after September 2001. These orders and guidance include interim measures dealing with how increased security affects implementation of emergency plans. Nuclear industry groups and federal, state, and local government agencies assisted in the prompt implementation of these measures and participated in drills and exercises to test these new planning elements. The NRC has reviewed licensees' commitments to address these requirements and verified the implementation through inspections to ensure public health and safety.

Additional Information

Detailed information about emergency preparedness is contained in NRC regulations, specifically Appendix E to Part 50 of Title 10 in the Code of Federal Regulations and in NUREG-0654 (FEMA-REP-1), a joint publication of the NRC and FEMA published in November 1980, entitled "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants." These documents along with additional information on the NRC's Emergency Preparedness and Response programs is available on the NRC Web site at: http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/emerg-preparedness.html.



Figure 1 – "Keyhole" covering 2-mile radius and downwind sectors



Figure 2 – Original keyhole (L) and revised keyhole following wind shift (R)

July 2010

U.S.NRC
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Protecting People and the Environment

Fact Sheet
Office of Public Affairs
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Safety and Security Improvements at Nuclear Plants

Post 9-11 Actions

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) - responsible for protecting public health and the environment from potential hazards involved in using nuclear materials - took prompt action to enhance safety and security, and has comprehensively re-evaluated security at nuclear power plants and other facilities it regulates.

Since September 11, 2001, NRC has strengthened security at nuclear facilities by working with national experts using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses to realistically predict the consequences of terrorist acts. These studies confirm that, given robust plant designs and the additional enhancements to safety, security, and emergency preparedness and response, it is unlikely that significant radiological consequences would result from a wide range of terrorist attacks, including one from a large commercial aircraft.

Actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies - Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths and greater military aircraft intercept capability - have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, NRC, and its licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary. These actions, coupled with those taken by the NRC and the nuclear industry, are an integral part of the government's overall strategy for protecting the nation's critical infrastructure.

NRC has strengthened requirements at nuclear power plants and enhanced coordination with Federal, State and local organizations since 9-11

NRC major actions include:

- Ordered plant owners to sharply increase physical security programs to defend against a more challenging adversarial threat;
- Required more restrictive site access controls for all personnel;
- Enhanced communication and liaison with the Intelligence Community;
- Ordered plant owners to improve their capability to respond to events involving explosions or fires;

- Enhanced readiness of security organizations by strengthening training and qualifications programs for plant security forces;
- Required vehicle checks at greater stand-off distances;
- Enhanced force-on-force exercises to provide a more realistic test of plant capabilities to defend against an adversary force; and
- Improved liaison with Federal, State, and local agencies responsible for protection of the national critical infrastructure through integrated response training.

Safety and security studies show that a radiological release affecting public health and safety is unlikely from a terrorist attack, including large commercial aircraft

- Power plants are among the most hardened commercial structures in the country and are designed to withstand extreme events, such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and earthquakes;
- Power plants have redundant safety systems and are operated by highly trained staff;
- Multiple barriers protect the reactor and prevent or minimize off-site releases;
- With mitigation strategies and measures in place, the probability of damaging the reactor core and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety is low;
- Significant releases due to a terrorist attack on a spent fuel pool are very unlikely;
- It is highly unlikely that a significant release of radioactivity would occur from a dry spent fuel storage cask; and
- No release of radioactive material is expected from an aircraft attack on a transportation cask.

Time is available to protect the public in unlikely event of a radiation release

- If a radiation release did occur, there would be time to implement mitigating actions and offsite emergency plans at power plants, spent fuel pools, and dry-cask storage installations; and
- Safety and security studies confirm that NRC's emergency planning basis remains valid.

NRC has taken action to strengthen security and safety

Increased aviation security and aggressive NRC action provide enhanced protection against terrorist attacks

February 2005

U.S.NRC
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Protecting People and the Environment

BACKGROUNDER

Office of Public Affairs
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Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident

Background

On April 26, 1986, an accident occurred at Unit 4 of the nuclear power station at Chernobyl, Ukraine, in the former USSR. The accident, caused by a sudden surge of power, destroyed the reactor and released massive amounts of radioactive material into the environment.

To stop the fire and prevent a criticality accident as well as any further substantial release of fission products, boron and sand were poured on the reactor from the air. In addition, the damaged unit was entombed in a temporary concrete "sarcophagus," to limit further release of radioactive material. Control measures to reduce radioactive contamination at and near the plant site included cutting down and burying a pine forest of approximately 1 square mile. The three other units of the four-unit Chernobyl nuclear power station were subsequently restarted. The Soviet nuclear power authorities presented an initial report on the accident at an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meeting in Vienna, Austria, in August 1986.

After the accident, access to the area in a 30-kilometer (18-mile) radius around the plant was closed, except for persons requiring official access to the plant and to the immediate area for evaluating and dealing with the consequences of the accident and operation of the undamaged units. The population evacuated from the most heavily contaminated areas numbered approximately 116,000 in 1986 and another 230,000 people in subsequent years (Source: UNSCEAR 2000, IAEA 2005).

Pripyat, the town near Chernobyl where most of the workers at the plant lived before the 1986 accident, was evacuated several days after the accident, because of radiological contamination. It was included in the 30-km Exclusion Zone around the plant and is closed to all but those with authorized access.

Health Effects from the Accident

The Chernobyl accident caused many severe radiation effects almost immediately. Among the approximately 600 workers present on the site at the time of the accident, 2 died within hours of the reactor explosion and 134 received high radiation doses and suffered from acute radiation sickness. Of these, twenty eight workers died in the first four months after the accident. Another 200,000 recovery workers involved in the initial cleanup work of 1986-1987 received doses of between 0.01 and 0.50 Gy. The number of workers involved in cleanup activities at Chernobyl rose to 600,000, although only a small fraction of these workers were exposed to dangerous levels of radiation. Both groups of cleanup and recovery workers may become ill because of their radiation exposure, so their health is being monitored.

The Chernobyl accident also resulted in widespread contamination in areas of Belarus, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine inhabited by millions of residents. Radiation exposure to residents evacuated from areas heavily contaminated by radioactive material from the Chernobyl accident also has been a concern. Average doses to Ukrainian and Belarusian evacuees were 17 mSv and 31 mSv, respectively. Individual exposures ranged from a low of 0.1 to 380 mSv. However, the majority of the five million residents living in contaminated areas received very small radiation doses which are comparable to natural background levels (1 mSv per year).

The health of these residents also has been monitored since 1986, and to date there is no strong evidence for radiation-induced increases of leukemia or solid cancer (other than thyroid cancer). An exception is a large number of children and adolescents who in 1986 received substantial radiation doses in the thyroid after drinking milk contaminated with radioactive iodine. To date, about 4,000 thyroid cancer cases have been detected among these children. Although 99% of these children were successfully treated, nine children and adolescents in the three countries died from thyroid cancer. Fortunately, no evidence of any effect on the number of adverse pregnancy outcomes, delivery complications, stillbirths or overall health of children has been observed among the families living in the most contaminated areas.

Apart from the increase in thyroid cancer after childhood exposure, no increase in overall cancer or non-cancer diseases have been observed that can be attributed to the Chernobyl accident and exposure to radiation. However, it is estimated that approximately 4,000 radiation-related cancer deaths may eventually be attributed to the Chernobyl accident over the lifetime of the 200,000 emergency workers, 116,000 evacuees, and 270,000 residents living in the most contaminated areas. This estimate is far lower than initial speculations that radiation exposure would claim tens of thousands of lives, but it is not greatly different from estimates made in 1986 by Soviet scientists.

US Reactors and NRC's Response

U.S. reactors have different plant designs, broader shutdown margins, robust containment structures, and operational controls to protect them against the combination of lapses that led to the accident at Chernobyl. Although the NRC has always acknowledged the possibility of major accidents, its regulatory requirements provide adequate protection, subject to continuing vigilance, including review of new information that may suggest weaknesses.

Assessments in the light of Chernobyl have indicated that the causes of the accident have been adequately dealt within the design of U.S. commercial reactors. However, the Chernobyl accident emphasized the importance of safe design in both concept and implementation, of operational controls, of competence and motivation of plant management and operating staff to operate in strict compliance with controls, and of backup features of defense-in-depth against potential accidents.
Although a large nuclear power plant accident somewhere in the United States is unlikely because of design and operational features, the assessment of Chernobyl raised questions as to whether changes were needed to NRC regulations or guidance regarding reactivity accidents, accidents at low or zero power, operator training, and emergency planning.

The NRC's response to the Chernobyl accident was divided into three major phases: (1) determining the facts of the accident, (2) assessing the implications of the accident for safety regulation of commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, and (3) conducting additional specific studies suggested by the assessment.

The first phase, fact finding, was a coordinated effort between several U.S. government agencies and some private groups, with the NRC acting as the coordinating agency. The work was completed in January 1987 and reported in NUREG-1250, "Report on the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station."

The second phase, the implications study, was reported in NUREG-1251, "Implications of the Accident at Chernobyl for Safety Regulation of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States," issued in April 1989. The report concluded that no immediate changes were needed in the NRC's regulations regarding the design or operation of U.S. commercial nuclear reactors as a result of lessons learned from Chernobyl.

For the third phase, Chernobyl follow-up studies for U.S. reactors were reported in June 1992 in NUREG-1422, "Summary of Chernobyl Follow-up Research Activities." That report closed out the Chernobyl follow-up research program, though certain issues will continue to receive attention in the normal course of NRC work. For example, the NRC will follow long-term lessons with regard to contamination control -- decontamination, ingestion pathway, relocation of people. The NRC recognizes that the Chernobyl experience should remain a valuable part of the information to be taken into account when dealing with reactor safety issues in the future.

Discussion

The Chernobyl reactors are of the RBMK type. These are high-power, pressure-tube reactors, moderated with graphite and cooled with water. At the time of the Chernobyl accident there were 17 RBMKs in operation in the Soviet Union and two in Lithuania. Since the accident, five RBMKs have been shut down. All four units at Chernobyl and one of the Lithuanian RBMKs were shut down.
At Chernobyl:

- Unit 4 reactor was destroyed in the 1986 accident;
- Unit 2 was shut down five years later; after a serious turbine building fire;
- Unit 1 was closed in November 1996, and
- Unit 3 was closed December 15, 1999, as promised by Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma.

In Lithuania, Ignalina Unit 1 was shut down in December 2004 as a condition of admission to the European Union. Of the remaining 12 operating RBMKs, 11 are in Russia and one is in Lithuania (proposed to be decommissioned by 2009).

The countries of the G-7, the European Commission and Ukraine helped in closing these reactors. This effort included support for such things as Chernobyl Unit 3 plant-specific short-term safety upgrades, decommissioning of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, development of an action plan for addressing the social impacts on workers and their families resulting from Chernobyl closure, and identification of power supply investments needed to meet Ukraine's future electrical power needs.

On April 26, 1996, the tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident, Ukrainian President Kuchma formally established the Chernobyl Center for Nuclear Safety, Radioactive Waste and Radio-ecology in the town of Slavutych. The Center would provide the Ukraine with an indigenous, institutional capability to provide technical support to its nuclear power industry, the academic community, and nuclear regulators.

Sarcophagus

Construction of the sarcophagus covering the destroyed Chernobyl Unit 4 was started in May 1986 and completed by the Soviet authorities in an extremely challenging environment six months later in November. It was quickly built as a temporary fix to channel remaining radiation from the reactor through air filters before being released to the environment. After several years, uncertainties about the actual condition of the sarcophagus, primarily due to the high radiation environment, began to emerge.

In 1997, the countries of the G-7, the European Commission and Ukraine agreed that a multilateral funding mechanism be established to help Ukraine transform the existing sarcophagus into a stable and environmentally safe system through the Chernobyl Shelter Implementation Plan. The Chernobyl Shelter Fund was established to finance the Plan. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development was entrusted with managing the Fund. The Plan is intended to protect the personnel, population and environment from the threat of the very large inventory of radioactive material contained within the existing sarcophagus for many decades. First, the existing sarcophagus will be stabilized and then eventually it will be replaced with a new safe shelter (confinement). New shelter construction is expected to start in late 2006 with a design to include an arch-shaped steel structure, which will slide across the existing sarcophagus via rails. This new structure is designed to remain functional for 100 years.

Information Resources

UNSCEAR 1988 Report, Sources, Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiation
Annex D, Exposures from the Chernobyl accident
http://www.unscear.org/docs/reports/1988annexd.pdf

UNSCEAR 1988 Report, Sources, Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiation
Appendix to Annex G, Early effects in man of high radiation doses
http://www.unscear.org/docs/reports/1988annexgappx.pdf

UNSCEAR 2000 Report, Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation
Annex J, Exposures and effects of the Chernobyl accident
http://www.unscear.org/docs/reports/annexj.pdf

Environmental Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident and Their Remediation: Twenty years of Experience, Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group "Environment," August 2005
http://www.iaea.org/

Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident and Special Health care Programmes, Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group on "Health," Geneva 2006
http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/chernobyl/who_chernobyl_report_2006.pdf

Chernobyl's Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts and Recommendations to the Governments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, The Chernobyl Forum: 2003-2005, September 2005
http://www.iaea.org/

April 2009

Consideration of Potassium Iodide in Emergency Planning

On this page:

- Eligibility for Obtaining Potassium Iodide
- Process for Obtaining Potassium Iodide
- Process for Replenishment of Existing Potassium Iodide Stockpiles
- Shelf Life Extension and Replenishment of Existing Potassium Iodide Stockpiles
- Distribution of Liquid Pediatric KI
- Regulations and Guidance
- Current Status on KI Distribution
- Role of Reactor Licensees
- Distribution of KI Within 20-Mile Radius of Nuclear Power Plants

For more information, see Potassium Iodide Frequently Asked Questions.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has revised a section of its emergency preparedness regulations. The revised rule requires that States* with a population within the 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) of commercial nuclear power plants consider including potassium iodide as a protective measure for the general public to supplement sheltering and evacuation in the unlikely event of a severe nuclear power plant accident.

The final rule amends 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). The NRC published the rule change in the *Federal Register* (Volume 66, Number 13, page 5427) on January 19, 2001. The change became effective April 19, 2001.

Along with this rule change, the NRC is providing funding for a supply of potassium iodide for a State that chooses to incorporate potassium iodide for the general public into their emergency plans. After funding the initial supply of potassium iodide, the Commission decided to fund the replenishment on a one-time basis.

Potassium iodide is a salt, similar to table salt. Its chemical symbol is KI. It is routinely added to table salt to make it "iodized." Potassium iodide, if taken within the appropriate time and at the appropriate dosage, blocks the thyroid gland's uptake of radioactive iodine and thus reduces the risk of thyroid cancers and other diseases that might otherwise be caused by thyroid uptake of radioactive iodine that could be dispersed in a severe reactor accident.

The NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are the two Federal agencies responsible for evaluating emergency preparedness at and around nuclear power plants. The NRC is responsible for assessing the adequacy of onsite emergency plans developed by the utility, while FEMA is responsible for assessing the adequacy of offsite emergency planning. The NRC relies on FEMA's findings in determining that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is the definitive medical authority in the United States on the use of potassium iodide.

*When used in this Web site, State includes Native American governments.

Some links on this page are to documents in our Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), and others are to documents in Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF). ADAMS documents are provided in either PDF or Tagged Image File Format (TIFF). To obtain free viewers for displaying these formats, see our Plugins, Viewers, and Other Tools page. If you have questions about search techniques or problems with viewing or printing documents from ADAMS, please contact the Public Document Room staff.

Eligibility for Obtaining Potassium Iodide

This rule applies to States and Tribal governments with nuclear power plants within their borders, with populations within the 10-mile EPZ, and local governments designated by States to request potassium iodide funding.

LIA09 Hoc

From: info99@service.govdelivery.com on behalf of White House Press Office [noreply@messages.whitehouse.gov]
Sent: Sunday, March 13, 2011 5:56 PM
To: Kirin, Alexandra
Subject: Statement from the Press Secretary on the Ongoing U.S. Response to the Earthquakes and Tsunami in Japan

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

March 13, 2011

Statement from the Press Secretary on the Ongoing U.S. Response to the Earthquakes and Tsunami in Japan

Our thoughts and our prayers remain with the people of Japan. The President has been kept fully briefed on developments and the response throughout the weekend. As directed by the President, we have offered our Japanese friends whatever assistance is needed as America will stand with Japan as they recover and rebuild.

We have already been helping in a number of ways. USAID is coordinating the overall U.S. government efforts in support of the Japanese government's response to the earthquakes and subsequent tsunami that hit Friday and is currently directing individuals to www.usaid.gov for information about response donations. The U.S. Ambassador declared an emergency which opened up an immediate funding of $100K from USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. They set up a Response Management Team in DC and sent a Disaster Assistance Response Team to Tokyo, which includes people with nuclear expertise from the Departments of Energy and Health and Human Services as well the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The NRC members are experts in boiling water nuclear reactors and are available to assist their Japanese counterparts. Two Urban Search and Rescue Teams (LA County and Fairfax County teams) which total 144 members plus 12 search and rescue canines and up to 45 metric tons of rescue equipment are also on the ground in Misawa, Japan and will begin searching at first light March 14. The Department of Defense has the USS Reagan on station off the coast of Japan and the USS Essex en route, and is currently using an air facility in Misawa as a forward operating base. The American Red Cross (ARC) International Services team is supporting the Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS) to assess the impact, determine response efforts, and assist the people of Japan.

Officials from the Department of Energy, NRC, and other agencies have maintained contact with Japanese officials and will provide whatever assistance the Japanese government requests as they work to stabilize their damaged nuclear reactors. United States citizens in Japan are encouraged to follow the protective measures recommended by the Japanese government. The NRC has announced (http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2011/11-046.pdf) that these measures appear to be consistent with steps the United States would take. With regards to the United States, the NRC has released information stating that Hawaii, Alaska, the U.S. Territories and the U.S. West Coast are not expected to experience any harmful levels of radioactivity. For instance, according to the NRC, the U.S. evacuation standard at 10 miles is roughly equivalent to the 20-kilometer distance recommended in Japan. The United States and Japan both have highly advanced capabilities in monitoring and predicting the path of any radioactive release. American citizens in Japan should continue to listen to the local authorities regarding evacuation notices and any other preparedness measures and should contact the State Department if they have any questions.

EB/12

From the moment this earthquake struck our State Department and Embassy and Consulates in Japan have been working around the clock to assist and inform U.S. citizens. U.S. citizens in need of emergency assistance should send an e-mail to JapanEmergencyUSC@state.gov with detailed information about their location and contact information, and monitor the U.S. Department of State website at travel.state.gov.

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The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 16, 2011

Readout of the President's call with Japanese Prime Minister Kan

The President spoke this evening by telephone with Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan to discuss the status of ongoing relief efforts in Japan, including the emergency at the Fukushima nuclear plant. The President again conveyed his deep condolences at the tragic loss of life and the widespread suffering in Northeastern Japan. The President emphasized that the U.S. is determined to do everything possible to support Japan in overcoming the effects of the devastating earthquake and tsunami that struck on March 11. The President briefed Prime Minister Kan on the additional support being provided by the U.S., including specialized military assets with expertise in nuclear response and consequence management. The two leaders also discussed the welfare and safety of American citizens in Japan and the President described steps that the U.S. is taking in this regard. He thanked the Prime Minister for his commitment to help American residents. Prime Minister Kan briefed the President on the status of Japanese actions to contain the nuclear emergency and to bring the situation under control. The Prime Minister expressed Japan's appreciation for the extensive humanitarian, technical and other support provided by the United States. The two leaders reaffirmed that U.S. and Japanese experts and officials would continue to cooperate closely and they agreed to remain in close touch through this challenging period. The President promised that the United States will always stand by Japan, our close friend and ally. The President expressed his extraordinary admiration for the character and resolve of the Japanese people, and his confidence that Japan will make a full recovery from this disaster.

BLOG POSTS ON THIS ISSUE

March 18, 2011 12:00 AM EDT
West Wing Week: "Punching Above Your Weight"
This week, Education Month continued, with President Obama asking Congress to fix No Child Left Behind before the beginning of the coming school year. The President also updates the American people on relief efforts in Japan and pledges continued support.

March 17, 2011 6:07 PM EDT
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Last Sunday, economist Dick Thaler wrote an article in the New York Times highlighting the many ways innovators are using government data to create platforms, applications, and other useful tools that touch the lives of our friends and neighbors.

March 17, 2011 5:00 PM EDT
Fostering Innovation Across America
On March 22, the Department of the Treasury will host a conference titled 'Access to Capital: Fostering Innovaiton and Growth for Small Companies.' Email your questions and ideas to AccessToCapRSVP@treasury.gov, and some of these questions will be posed to panelists and Administration officials.

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The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 17, 2011

Remarks by the President on the Situation in Japan

Rose Garden

3:35 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon, everyone. Over the last several days, the American people have been both heartbroken and deeply concerned about the developments in Japan.

We've seen an earthquake and tsunami render unimaginable -- an unimaginable toll of death and destruction on one of our closest friends and allies in the world. And we've seen this powerful natural disaster cause even more catastrophe through its impact on nuclear reactors that bring peaceful energy to the people of Japan.

Today, I wanted to update the American people on what we know about the situation in Japan, what we're doing to support American citizens and the safety of our own nuclear energy, and how we are helping the Japanese people contain the damage, recover and rebuild.

First, we are bringing all available resources to bear to closely monitor the situation, and to protect American citizens who may be in harm's way. Even as Japanese responders continue to do heroic work, we know that the damage to the nuclear reactors in Fukushima Daiichi plant poses a substantial risk to people who are nearby. That is why yesterday, we called for an evacuation of American citizens who are within 50 miles of the plant. This decision was based upon a careful scientific evaluation and the guidelines that we would use to keep our citizens safe here in the United States, or anywhere in the world.

Beyond this 50-mile radius, the risks do not currently call for an evacuation. But we do have a responsibility to take prudent and precautionary measures to educate those Americans who may be endangered by exposure to radiation if the situation deteriorates. That's why last night I authorized the voluntary departures of family members and dependents of U.S. officials working in northeastern Japan.

All U.S. citizens in Japan should continue to carefully monitor the situation and follow the guidance of the U.S. and Japanese governments. And those who are seeking assistance should contact our embassy and consulates, which continue to be open and operational.

Second, I know that many Americans are also worried about the potential risks to the United States. So I want to be very clear: We do not expect harmful levels of radiation to reach the United States, whether it's the West Coast, Hawaii, Alaska, or U.S. territories in the Pacific. Let me repeat that: We do not expect harmful levels of radiation to reach the West Coast, Hawaii, Alaska, or U.S. territories in the Pacific. That is the judgment of our Nuclear Regulatory Commission and many other experts.

Furthermore, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and public health experts do not recommend that people in the United States take precautionary measures beyond staying informed. And going forward, we will continue to keep the American people fully updated -- because I believe that you must know what I know as President.

Here at home, nuclear power is also an important part of our own energy future, along with renewable sources like wind, solar, natural gas and clean coal. Our nuclear power plants have undergone exhaustive study, and have been declared safe for any number of extreme contingencies. But when we see a crisis like the one in Japan, we have a responsibility to learn from this event, and to draw from those lessons to ensure the safety and security of our people.

That's why I've asked the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to do a comprehensive review of the safety of our domestic nuclear plants in light of the natural disaster that unfolded in Japan.

Finally, we are working aggressively to support our Japanese ally at this time of extraordinary challenge. Search and rescue teams are on the ground in Japan to help the recovery effort. A disaster assistance and response team is working to confront the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami. The U.S. military, which has helped to ensure the security of Japan for decades, is working around the clock.

To date, we've flown hundreds of missions to support the recovery efforts, and distributed thousands of pounds of food and water to the Japanese people. We've also deployed some of our leading experts to help contain the damage at Japan's nuclear reactors. We're sharing with them expertise, equipment, and technology so that the courageous responders on the scene have the benefit of American teamwork and support.

And the American people have also opened up their hearts. Many have given generously to support the ongoing relief efforts. The Red Cross is providing assistance to help meet the immediate needs of those who've been displaced. And I would encourage anybody who wants to lend a hand to go to usaid.gov to learn more -- that's usaid.gov -- to find out how you can be helpful.

As I told Prime Minister Kan last night, and reaffirmed at the Japanese embassy here in Washington today, the Japanese people are not alone in this time of great trial and sorrow. Across the Pacific, they will find a hand of support extended from the United States as they get back on their feet. After all, we have an alliance that was forged more than a half century ago, and strengthened by shared interests and democratic values. Our people share ties of family, ties of culture, and ties of commerce. Our troops have served to protect Japan's shores, and our citizens have found opportunity and friendship in Japan's cities and towns.

Above all, I am confident that Japan will recover and rebuild because of the strength and spirit of the Japanese people. Over the last few days, they've opened up their homes to one another. They've shared scarce resources of food and water. They've organized shelters, provided free medical care, and looked out for their most vulnerable citizens. One man put it simply: "It's a Japanese thing. When hard times hit, we have to help each other."

In these hard times, there remains, nevertheless, hope for the future. In one small town that had been flattened by the tsunami, emergency workers rescued a four-month-old baby who had been swept out of her parents' arms and stranded for days among the debris. No one can say for certain just how she survived the water and the wreckage around her. There is a mystery in the course of human events.

But in the midst of economic recovery and global upheaval, disasters like this remind us of the common humanity that we share. We see it in the responders who are risking their lives at Fukushima. We show it through the help that has poured into Japan from 70 countries. And we hear it in the cries of a child, miraculously pulled from the rubble.

In the coming days, we will continue to do everything we can to ensure the safety of American citizens and the security of our sources of energy. And we will stand with the people of Japan as they contain this crisis, recover from this hardship, and rebuild their great nation.

Thanks very much.

END 3:42 P.M. EDT

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The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 17, 2011

Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Greg Jaczko and Deputy Secretary of Energy Dan Poneman, 3/17/2011

James S. Brady Press Briefing Room

12:58 P.M. EDT

MR. CARNEY: Happy St. Patrick's Day, everyone. A lot of green out there -- appreciate that, as a Carney.

I would just start by saying I assume you all got the advisory that the President will have a statement this afternoon. I have, again, brought today some of our experts who can discuss the situation in Japan and, more specifically, our -- what this administration, this government is doing to help the Japanese in dealing with that situation and what the implications are for American citizens.

So I will turn this over to them very briefly -- actually in a minute. I just want to again say that if they could make their quick opening statements, then take questions from you on the subject area that concerns them so that they can then depart, I will stay and take questions on other issues.

I have, just to remind you, with me on my far right the chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Greg Jaczko, and on my near right, Dan Poneman, the Deputy Secretary of Energy. I will turn it over to them. Greg, why don't you start with a statement, and then we'll take questions.

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, I'll just give you a brief status update on basically three points. One, we have a team of 11 technical experts who continue to work in Tokyo to provide assistance to the Japanese government and to the ambassador in Tokyo.

Yesterday the NRC looked at the available information that we had. Based on that information, we took a look at how we would deal with a situation similar to that in the United States, and based on that, we recommended that citizens out to about 50 miles should be evacuated. We provided that recommendation to the ambassador, and he issued a statement for American citizens to that effect. And I want to stress that this is we think a prudent and a precautionary measure to take.

And finally, I just want to reiterate that we don't see any concern from radiation levels that could be harmful here in the United States or any of the U.S. territories.

So I'll turn it over to Dan, then.

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: Thank you, and good morning. We have continued working very hard in consultation with our great friends and strong allies in Japan as they've come to terms and wrestled with this very challenging situation. I think most of you know that our equipment that we sent over to support them in their efforts has arrived on a C-17. We sent a team of 33 additional people, which were added to the six people we already had out there in Japan. They had over 17,000 pounds of equipment with them. They've unpacked that. They've actually taken the two pods that do the aerial measurement of ground depositions, mounted them -- one on a fixed-wing aircraft, one on a helicopter -- and we flew those aircraft on their first missions. We have been collecting information as they've come back. We're in the process of sharing that information with our Japanese hosts. And while that's still being looked at, the preliminary indications are that they are consistent with the recommendations that came down from the chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which then Ambassador Roos used to make a 50 -mile evacuation guideline. So the indications are that that looks like it was a prudent move.

WATCH THE VIDEO

March 17, 2011 5:15 PM
Press Briefing

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On March 22, the Department of the Treasury will host a conference titled 'Access to Capital: Fostering Innovaiton and Growth for Small Companies.' Email your questions and ideas to AccessToCapRSVP@treasury.gov, and some of these questions will be posed to panelists and Administration officials.

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Other countries around the world all continue to do what they can to support the Japanese as they lead this effort to address this challenge. We have had a number of consultations. I have personally been in contact with my counterparts in France and Russia, all of us thinking about ways in which we can assist the Japanese as they come to terms with this challenge.

That's going to continue to be our focus in the days and weeks ahead. We're going to continue to work very closely with the Japanese and come to do what we can to see a safe path through this in support of Japanese-led efforts to come to terms with this very dangerous situation.

MR. CARNEY: Why don't we begin with questions. Ben.

Q Thanks, Jay. Two questions. First, for Chairman Jaczko, when you talk about the 50-mile recommendation of yesterday being based on the best available information, could you tell us where exactly the United States is getting its information and whether it is -- you would consider it to be hard facts or best guesses?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, we have -- as I said, we have a team of 11 of some of our best technical experts in Tokyo, and they're working with counterparts from the utility in Tokyo as well as other individuals with the government. So that's one of the sources. We're collecting data from as many places as we can to -- as I said, to make the best judgments we can with the information available.

But I would stress that this is a very difficult situation. There's often conflicting information. And so we made what we thought was a prudent decision.

Q So how would you characterize your faith in the accuracy of information you're getting?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, I think the team we have in place is providing us with good and reliable information. And we continue to do what we can to support the people of Japan and to provide assistance and recommendations where we can. This is a very difficult situation, and there will be a lot of work continuing as we go forward to deal with continuing to cool the reactors and to provide cooling to the spent fuel pool. So as we go forward we'll continue that dialogue and discussion.

Q One last question. What is your assessment as we stand, as you stand here today, about where this is headed? Best-case scenario, worst-case scenario?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, I really don't want to speculate on where this could go. I think there's tremendous efforts ongoing right now to continue to provide cooling to the reactors and continue to provide cooling to the spent fuel pool. So we're working to provide assistance where we can with ideas about how to address that, and if necessary provide equipment and other means.

MR. CARNEY: Yes.

Q Sorry, just to follow up Ben's initial question about what kind of -- what level of faith the U.S. government has in how the Japanese are handling the crisis. Is the administration satisfied with or not how Japan is handling it? And how would you categorize the -- and are they satisfied with the level of information being provided by Japanese authorities?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, I'm the head of an independent regulatory agency, so I would defer the questions about the administration's position to the others. But I would just say, again, our efforts are really working to help the Japanese people deal with what is a very difficult and really tragic situation. So that's where we're going to continue to focus and see what we can do to provide them with any assistance we can.

MR. CARNEY: Dan.

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: If I could just comment on that. You know Americans, we always want more information and we are constantly trying to find out whatever we can. And as the chairman said, the facts on the ground are genuinely complex, they are genuinely confusing.

We have had a dialogue. We've had our two experts that are already out in Japan; they've been engaging directly with the Japanese. We've had as recently as yesterday, senior-level

officials from METI and from the Nuclear Industrial Security Agency in Japan in direct consultation with us. We're going to maintain that dialogue and do whatever we can in support of their efforts to get this situation under control.

Q Mr. Chairman, you said that there's no concern, I guess here, domestically that radiation will be harmful. In addition to the ongoing measurements I guess that are taken on a regular basis apart -- aside from this disaster, what else is being done to get an accurate measurement that none of this will impact the United States?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, again, I'd probably turn to Dan to answer that question. We're really focused, again, first and foremost, on making sure the plants in this country are safe and then continuing to provide assistance to the Japanese with their efforts in dealing with the crisis there.

Q In addition just to the regular measurements that are taken, have you beefed up that effort to check the quality of the air in the United States?

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: Well, there's a continuous effort, as you well know, that the EPA runs to make sure we have detectors all over the country.

Q But in addition to that, has there been anything that's been added?

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: I will refer you to EPA for more specifics on anything they're doing. What we have been doing to support them in that effort is to make sure that we have the people at Lawrence Livermore who are working on the modeling aspect of this so that as and when data comes in, we've got the capability and a robust one to analyze that information. That's, of course, something that we do in conjunction with NOAA and Jane Lubchenko. So everything that could be done to be prepared for such time as that mechanism needs to be used has been done. But I would go back to what the chairman has said. There's nothing that indicates at this stage that that's going to be required under the circumstances as we now understand them.

Q So Americans shouldn't be concerned at this point?

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: That's him.

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: I just want to stress, I mean, I don't think there's any real disagreement here. The basic physics and basic science tells us that there really can't be any risk or harm to anyone here in the United States or Hawaii or any of the other territories. So that's something that we feel very comfortable with. It's really just based on the basic facts and science that's involved here.

Q Mr. Chairman, could you tell us, since the three days since you stood there before, why did the situation deteriorate the way it did, the four reactors? Can you explain to us what has happened? We've seen the pictures of the reactors. What's happened since you were here on Monday?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, the situation continues to be very dynamic in Japan. And as we looked at a lot of the available information, we saw greater challenges, I think, with providing cooling to some of the spent fuel pools that had initially not been as much of an issue. So that was really one of the major changes that led us to reevaluate some of our information and come up with the recommendation we did.

Q And the situation as it stands right now? The attempts today to put water in there don't seem to have done much.

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, I would say right now there's continued efforts to do that. They're continuing to provide water into the spent fuel pools as well as continue to provide cooling to the reactor core. And that's really what their focus is going to have to be for some time, is just to continue that activity of cooling and getting water or other means to cool the reactors and the pools.

Q Days or weeks?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: This is something that will likely take some time to work through, possibly weeks, as eventually you remove the majority of the heat from the reactors and then the

spent fuel pool. So it's something that will be ongoing for some time. And that's why, as I said, we're continuing to do everything we can to provide assistance to the Japanese as they deal with this situation.

Q You said that the 11 experts, the 11 American experts, are in Tokyo. Does that mean that they are completely reliant on Japanese officials and utility officials closer to the site to give them the information that they then analyze? Or is there an independent way for them to get information about what's actually happening?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, they're working with counterparts from the utility and other officials there to gather information. And then, of course, they're using their judgment, they're communicating back here with our staff and headquarters; we're reaching out to experts in this country to provide additional ideas if necessary.

Q But are they getting any independent information on their own, or is it all coming to them from somebody in Japan?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, the information is coming to them from sources ultimately in Japan. And again, this is a very dynamic and a very -- I think a complicated situation in Japan. So they'll continue to work with their counterparts there and continue to provide recommendations to us about what we think we can do to help the Japanese.

Q And I ask that because even the Prime Minister of Japan and certainly the Japanese public have expressed great frustration with the secrecy and lack of transparency coming in particular from the utility. Are you experiencing that same frustration, are your people, that same frustration in getting information?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, they are -- I think the people we have in Tokyo, they are talking with experts there, they're talking with individuals from the utility. And I think they're getting information that is useful to us in making the kinds of recommendations that we need to make. And our focus is really on looking at how would this situation be similar to a situation in the United States, and then providing suggestions for actions we may need to take relative to American citizens.

The Japanese are, as I said, they're dealing with a very significant crisis and they have a lot of efforts focused on trying to deal with the reactors, trying to deal with the situation on the ground.

So we have a small team there, they're getting good information and we'll continue to do what we can to help.

Q And on the 50 miles, are you -- I'm sorry, go ahead.

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: I might just add there, that's why it's so important that we get the information that we have now sent the equipment over to collect. And we've had two flights come back with additional data pull there. We sent other detectors over there, other sampling equipment. And so it's not just people talking to people; we're beginning to collect the information that will give us the measurements that will help inform policy.

Q And is that because you're frustrated you haven't been able to get that information directly from the Japanese?

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: No, to the contrary.

Q So there's no frustration -- even though the Prime Minister himself just blew up at a press conference over the lack of transparency from TEPCO.

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: And as I said, we Americans always want more information. We're striving for that, but we want a combination of data and things that you can get through collection and things that we get from talking to people who are dealing with this. But we're trying to do what we can to support the Japanese in their efforts, and it's a continuing dialogue and I'm sure it's going to continue.

Q On the 50-mile issue, do you agree that it's a strange situation that you can have different citizens from different countries getting different advice on this, and doesn't it need to all be one consistent standard?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, we have different regulatory systems throughout the world and we have different approaches to dealing with these kinds of issues. So we took the available information we had and we looked at how we would deal with a similar situation here in the United States and we made the recommendation about 50 miles.

Q So are American citizens who don't obey that information risking their lives?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: The recommendation is ultimately a precautionary measure right now based on -- what we looked at are some of the risks and challenges going forward in this situation. So we provided the recommendation to the ambassador, the ambassador made that recommendation, and we think it's a prudent measure to take.

Q Right, but you're the scientist. Are people putting their safety in danger?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: As I said, we think it's a prudent measure to follow the evacuation based on how we would handle a situation like that in the United States.

Q Should Japanese citizens follow that prudent measure?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: I think I've answered that one.

MR. CARNEY: All right. Yes, Mike.

Q Mr. Chairman, my understanding is Senators Boxer and Carper have sent a letter to you asking the NRC to review that ability of American facilities to withstand a -- just different types of disasters. The other day it sounded like maybe that review wasn't necessary because we're constantly reviewing our facilities. But have you seen the letter? What's your reaction? What do you think?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, any time there's a significant event like this anywhere in the world, or even something like this in the United States, we're going to take a look at what happened, we're going to do a systematic and a methodical review of the information, and if we need to make changes to our program we'll make changes to our program.

But I want to emphasize and stress that we have a very robust program where we look at the safety and the security of our nuclear facilities on a minute-by-minute basis. And this certainly will be new information that when we have good, credible information about what happened in Japan, we'll take that information and we'll work to see what changes we might need to make, if any, to our system.

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: I might just add to that, from the aspect of policy, safety has always been our paramount concern and we will continue to strive to make sure that all of our energy sources keep that first and foremost. And so we continue to rely on the independence of the NRC and its ability to make those judgment calls as to whether it is operating safely enough. But we will not rest from our perspective at all, because we'll continue to take every data we can into account and continue to improve the safety of our nuclear power and any other energy source that we are advancing.

Q I imagine the one-two punch of a massive earthquake and then a tsunami has to make people in this country concerned about whether our facilities can withstand that, right?

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: I would think that we -- we do not need to have that great stimuli to have a continued focus on safety. It goes back decades, as we've discussed. After Three Mile Island, which was a different kind of set of facts than what we are now presented with, we went to school on that situation. We improved the way we do our regulations. We moved toward a more passive design approach when it comes to cooling cores and so forth. And we exercise and we've come up with hypotheticals, and then we take facts in hand as they present themselves. It's going to be a continuous effort and it's built into the management principles of our organization that we're always going to look to do what we can to make sure our activities are all carried out in the safest manner possible.

MR. CARNEY: Chuck.

Q Mr. Secretary, in your opening statement, you said that the aerial footage confirmed the chairman's recommendations. And what the chairman had testified to you yesterday was that he thought that there was no more water in the pool, essentially, there was no more cooling mechanism. Is that what you're finding in this footage?

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: Those are two different things. Just to be clear, what we sent out were these pods, and these pods measure deposition of radioactive materials on the ground. And so what our -- what I said was that our preliminary indications -- because the data is being analyzed, it's being shared with the Japanese so they can analyze it, too -- suggest that the prudential measure that the chairman recommended in terms of the 50-mile radius for evacuation is consistent with what we're finding. It's not related to --

Q So you don't have evidence yet of whether this pool -- because he had testified yesterday that you would fear that there was no more water in this fourth -- in the spent fuel pond. Is that correct?

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: If I could just say -- I think I can answer the question. The Japanese themselves have indicated that the level of water in that pond is low and is of concern. And there have been -- we certainly saw the chairman's testimony yesterday, and we're getting whatever data we can on the situation at that pool. It doesn't change what we -- what is important, and that's the Japanese, as they have themselves indicated, need to get more cooling water into that pool. So anything that can be done in that direction, whether it's from water cannons or water drops, that's going to be something they're focused on, and of course, we would do whatever we could to help them.

Q And then just two quick questions, and either one of you -- does the Japanese government still have the capacity to manage this crisis on their own at this point, or has this completely overwhelmed them?

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: I'd just make the following point: The Japanese government has tremendous longstanding capabilities in this area. They have responsibly been developing an integrated nuclear industry for decades. It has always been in close cooperation not only with other partnering countries, which certainly includes the United States, but with the International Atomic Energy Agency and international fora.

So they have treated safety as a very important responsibility, and certainly the indications you've seen from the Prime Minister, chief cabinet secretary, speaking to people, show their continued commitment to that. And we, as their close friends and allies and as a country that is also committed to the safe development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to build a low-carbon energy future, we're going to continue to support them in that effort.

MR. CARNEY: Jonathan.

Q For Mr. Jaczko, the statement that the NRC put out yesterday saying that the protective action recommendations are implemented when projected doses could exceed one rem to the body or five rems to the thyroid. How likely is it in this current situation that those doses would exceed one rem to the body and five rems to the thyroid?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, again, the recommendation was based on the possibility of certain scenarios happening that just haven't happened yet. So we thought given the situation we were seeing, that there was a possibility of the situation becoming worse. And as a result, we thought it was a prudent measure to take the recommendations that we provided.

Q But you don't have dosing estimates, per se, within that radius?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, we've done some very preliminary modeling just to give us an estimate of where we think the likelihood of radiation levels around the plant would be high enough to trigger these kind of protective action recommendations. But right now, again, it's based on a series of prudent assumptions and prudent assessments of what could happen, which is the way that we go about generally doing our protective action recommendations here in the United States. So that was really the way we approached it.

Q And picking up on Chuck's question, a Japanese official today said he did not know if that cooling pool has been emptied. Is it still your assessment that that cooling pond with the spent fuel rods is now empty?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, everything -- when we made the determination the other day, everything indicated that that was the case. And I think as has been said, there's a lot of conflicting information around this. But the bottom line is, is that there clearly appears to be a challenge keeping that spent fuel filled with sufficient water. So it is a very dynamic situation. And again, our efforts are really focused here on helping the Japanese deal with what is a very tragic and difficult situation, and we'll continue to provide recommendations and expertise where we can to help.

Q Will the NRC release the data to the public that it's using?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: We did release the data.

MR. CARNEY: Julianna.

Q One of the questions in the letter that Mike referenced is which nuclear -- U.S. nuclear power plants share similar design features with the affected Japanese reactor facilities. Do you have a tally of the plants that have the similar design features? And also, is there any -- you talked about potential for review, but what about specifically reviewing those plants with those designs or older plants?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, there are about -- there are 35 so-called boiling water reactor designs in this country. Twenty-three of those have the so-called Mark I containment, which is the containment which is similar to the type that's used in the facilities we're dealing with in Japan.

And over the years, we have done studies and assessments of those particular types of reactors. And actually over several decades, actually in the late '80s and early '90s, changes were made to those containments to deal with these types of very severe scenarios.

So again, when we get all the relevant data and we have good, solid data about what happened in Japan, we intend to take a very thorough look at what happened and what changes that we could make. And I understand the President yesterday recommended that this is something the NRC should look at, and it's certainly something that I think we will.

Q But at this point you don't see the need for a specific -- a review of specifically those plants with those design features?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, again, we don't really know exactly what the most relevant information is right now from Japan. So we want to get that information and we want to do a systematic and a methodical look at what changes we may need to make to those types of plants or possibly any other types of plants in the country.

MR. CARNEY: And we'll just take a few more for these gentlemen.

April.

Q I want to go back to what Julianna asked about the plants that are similar to the plants in Japan that are having problems. With the ones that are similar, and going back to what you said about the teaching moments, the plants that are here that are similar, some of the ones that you are looking at, are they along fault lines? And have you tested in any kind of way if there was a possibility of an earthquake how would these cooling systems be able to handle shutting the nuclear reactors down?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, all the plants in the United States are designed to deal with a wide range of natural disasters, whether it's earthquakes, tornados, tsunamis, other seismic events. We require all of them to deal with those. And what we really look at is we look at historically what are the largest kinds of events that we've seen happen, and we then add a little bit of something extra to that just because we know we don't know everything. And from that we design the plants to be able to withstand that kind of activity.

Now, as I said, over the years we've gone a little bit beyond that as well, because we know that sometimes there's limitations in our knowledge. So we've looked at what we call severe accidents,

which are these kinds of very catastrophic situations, and the plants over the years have made modifications that deal with these very catastrophic types of events.

And finally, following September 11th, the agency ordered all the nuclear power plants in this country to basically pre-stage equipment and materials and have procedures in place to deal with a situation very similar to what we have in Japan, where you have a catastrophic loss of power in a very catastrophic situation at the nuclear power plant. So we've inspected that -- that all the plants have those procedures and they have that equipment in place. So we think that there's a very robust program in this country to deal with those things.

MR. CARNEY: Last one, Margaret.

Q How many -- wait, I want to follow up. How many of these nuclear facilities are on fault lines in the United States?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, all the nuclear power plants in this country are designed to deal with seismic events. We tend to think about it at the NRC not in terms of what's near a fault line but in terms of the different types of seismic activity. So, in fact, every plant in the United States is designed to deal with whatever seismic activity is likely for that.

Q I understand, but how many are on fault lines? That's the question. I'm not trying to be funny, but it's a serious question because there is concern about some of these nuclear reactors in California.

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, certainly with the plants in California, they are designed to a very robust seismic standard, and for the ones that are on the coast they're also designed to deal with a very significant tsunami. And in fact, after the 2004 tsunami, we took a look at the programs we have in place to deal with the tsunamis, much as I expect we'll do here with the situation from Japan.

MR. CARNEY: Thank you, guys.

No, wait, I'm sorry, I did say Margaret.

Q I just wanted to quickly clarify about the new aerial measurements that have come back. Those came back, in fact, after you made the 50-mile radius recommendation, right? Is what they showed is that the Japanese have underestimated the radiation? Is that what the new data has shown?

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: No, first of all, we're analyzing the information and we're sharing it with the Japanese. The preliminary look at it has indicated that the measures that have been taken have been prudent ones from all of our perspective. What we monitor from the U.S. side is the guidance that comes out from the ambassador, which is informed by the chairman's recommendation on a 50-mile radius. And we have no reason to question the assessment that had been made or the recommendation that had been made by the Japanese authorities.

Q So the measurements don't suggest that the Japanese best guess earlier was an under-guess?

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: The preliminary indications suggest that all the measures that have been recommended either by the government of Japan or by the government of the U.S. have been prudent and appropriate.

Q Did you gentlemen brief the President today?

Q You can answer. (Laughter.)

MR. CARNEY: I answer for them. As you know, Chairman Jaczko briefed the President yesterday. He has not personally briefed the President today. But they're both part of a team that is being constantly tapped by the National Security Advisor, the Homeland Security Advisor, Deputy National Security Advisor. I know, because I was with them, that Chairman Jaczko was here at the Situation Room until very late last night. So this is a highly coordinated effort and the President is getting very regular updates on the information that they gather and provide.

Q What's he going to announce?

MR. CARNEY: I don't want to get ahead of the President. (Laughter.)

Q You walked into that.

MR. CARNEY: But I think we said that he would have something to say about Japan.

Q Right.

MR. CARNEY: Ben. I'll do this -- let's just say -- let's move very quickly on these other issues. Ben.

Q Very quickly, going back to the big picture here, does the President have full faith that Japan is handling this crisis appropriately and forthrightly?

MR. CARNEY: The President, as you know, spoke for a long time yesterday evening with the Prime Minister of Japan. He is very concerned about the situation in Japan and wanted to make sure that the Prime Minister knew that the United States is fully committed to the alliance, to our friendship with the Japanese, and that we are committed to do everything we can to help them get through this very critical situation.

The coordination between the Japanese government and the international folks, including the United States, who are there providing assistance, is very robust. I think -- I should just refer you to the statements that Chairman Jaczko and Secretary Poneman made, which is it's a very fluid situation. There's a lot of information. It is not particularly easy to get information from the site because of all the reasons that have been cited about the potential radiation emissions and the damage done.

So it's not a question of satisfaction beyond the fact that we are craving information, and I think the way Secretary Poneman described it, as Americans we always want more information. But the cooperation is there, the data is being shared, and we look forward to continuing to work side by side with our Japanese partners in helping them and assisting them deal with this problem.

Q Well, just quickly, to follow up, I understand that the coordination is there and that these events are fluid, but I ask that because I think the American people are trying to figure this out and they're looking to the government, our government, to say, should we have faith in the Japanese government that things are going to be handled. So I'm still trying to figure out whether --

MR. CARNEY: Well, but, Ben, here's the situation. This is the Japanese government, crisis in Japan. They are obviously in the lead. There's not -- I'm not sure what the question implies, that we would take over the effort --

Q No, no, no, I'm just -- the question is just about whether President Obama has faith that the Japanese government is able to handle this.

MR. CARNEY: President Obama has great faith in the idea that the Japanese are fully aware of the severity of the crisis that they're dealing with. How could they not? And they have a tremendous amount of capacity of resources to deal with this very difficult problem, but it is a crisis significant enough that a lot of countries, including the United States, led by the United States, have come in to offer further aid and assistance and expertise to help them deal with it. But it is a crisis in Japan that the Japanese obviously have to take the lead in dealing with -- and they are.

Yes, Matt.

Q I'm sorry, on Libya, what's the reason for the administration's shift from what was earlier very lukewarm support for the idea of a no-fly zone and now seems to be backing for something as extreme as air strikes on Libyan ground forces? And is this still -- are these such measures, if approved by the U.N., enough to stave off defeat for the rebels?

MR. CARNEY: Is that your analysis that it's a shift or is it something you believe that any American official said?

Q It's pretty clear that that has shifted. I mean, your -- we've gone through days of briefings in which --

MR. CARNEY: What we have made --

Q -- no-fly zone has been knocked down.

MR. CARNEY: But here's the thing. What Secretary Rice -- or rather, Ambassador Rice and Secretary Clinton have been doing have been working -- Ambassador Rice in particular at the United Nations -- on negotiating with our partners on the Security Council on a resolution that would support a more effective international response to the situation on the ground in Libya. The President has instructed his team to play an active and leading role in these negotiations, which are aimed at producing a result which would help protect civilians and increase the pressure on the Qaddafi regime.

Now, broadening out, in terms of -- we have made it clear from the first time you and others asked me about this question of a no-fly zone weeks ago, that we are actively considering it and it is an option the President insisted would be on the table. The fact that we have also discussed that we need to look at a broad range of other options, that we want to make sure that the options we choose and pursue will be effective at protecting civilians and putting pressure on the Qaddafi regime, are not contradictory. That remains our position. And we are certainly looking at a resolution that will authorize the -- taking action on a variety of measures that include but go beyond a no-fly zone. It is not our feeling that, as apparently it is -- has been from some others, that a no-fly zone is a snap-your-fingers, one-size-fits-all solution to a problem. And what we want is action on a variety of items that can improve the situation in Libya.

Yes, Dan.

Q As the President is being briefed on not only what's going on in Japan but the review that's ongoing here in the United States of nuclear facilities, is he conveying a sense of urgency that all of these experts need to really sort of step up their game to ensure that facilities here domestically are indeed safe and that an accident that we're witnessing in Japan cannot occur like that here?

MR. CARNEY: Yes, he is. He is making sure that there's a sense of urgency. And he made clear in some interviews he gave the other day that he has requested and asked that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which is an independent body, take into account the information we're getting about what happened in Japan and the ramifications of that on the nuclear facility there; that it takes that information, analyzes it, and then applies the lessons learned to its analysis of the security and safety of the reactors here.

Now, that is the NRC's mission, and I would say that the fact that the President has made that request himself only adds to the urgency of that mission.

But we should remind Americans that the NRC exists precisely for that reason, and that it is -- it's a daily mission for that agency to play out scenarios, evaluate data, and make changes in the security procedures and structures at the nuclear facilities in the United States on a regular basis as it deems necessary to maintain the highest possible security and safety at those facilities.

Q One quick question on Libya.

MR. CARNEY: Yes.

Q Is there a timeline that the administration is looking at? There's been talk now for several weeks about options -- we're looking at various different options. At what point will you really start executing some of these options?

MR. CARNEY: Well, Dan, we've executed an enormous array of options, as you know, in response to -- both unilaterally and with our partners internationally -- in response to the situation in Libya, and we moved very quickly out of the box within, I think, nine days to get some of those actions in place. Nine days.

And the resolution that may emerge from the United Nations, whether -- I think Ann asked me when, and I would refer to my colleagues up in New York on the timing of that. But whether it's today or tomorrow, whenever it is, it will be at a time that, comparative to any similar action taken

by the United Nations in its past, will be with remarkable speed, unprecedented speed. So the urgency has been there.

And the timeline has simply -- has been driven by, from our perspective, making sure the actions we take are the right ones and that we do not pursue an action that sounds good, only to find out it's actually not achieving a purpose that we wanted it to achieve. And that is why the actions that Ambassador Rice is negotiating in New York will hopefully address the problem and the situation on the ground in a way that can be effective.

Yes.

Q Have we gone from considering actively those options that you speak of that would be in the U.N. to actually advocating them?

MR. CARNEY: All I'll say on that is that the President has instructed his team in New York to play an active and leading role in the negotiations with the goal of protecting civilians. And they are obviously working on a resolution which will contain hopefully within it a variety of new options that the international community can take action on that will affect the situation on the ground; protect civilians in Libya. So I think that answers your question.

Q Jay.

MR. CARNEY: Yes.

Q Earlier today Senator John McCain told Sky News that he had some major concerns; that the situation in Bahrain could in fact turn into a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Does this administration share those concerns?

MR. CARNEY: The concerns that we have about the situation in Bahrain have been, I think, very clearly expressed by the Secretary of State, as well as by me here at the podium, which is we find the use of violence against peaceful protestors to be extremely unfortunate, abhorrent and simply not the kind of actions that will lead to a resolution of the political problems that exist in Bahrain and that exist in countries around the region. We urge maximum restraint on the government of Bahrain and everyone else in Bahrain as they deal with this situation. We urge political dialogue, peaceful political dialogue aimed at bringing about the kind of reforms that will respond to the legitimate grievances that Bahrainis have expressed on the streets of their capital city.

Q But outside interests don't concern this administration?

MR. CARNEY: We are obviously always concerned about the behavior of Iran. We've been very clear about our general suspiciousness of their motivations. But the guiding principle we have in looking at the events in Bahrain and the principles that the President of the United States expressed to the King yesterday, as I read out from here, are that we believe that all sides need to exercise maximum restraint, refrain from violence, and come together in a national dialogue that resolves these issues in a way that will in the end benefit the people of Bahrain, the country of Bahrain, and will provide in the long run the kind of stability that I'm sure Bahrain wants and its people deserve.

Q To follow on that, Jay, on Iran?

Q On nuclear --

MR. CARNEY: Yes, sir.

Q How important has the promise by Arab nations to take part in any military intervention, not simply support it, been in the administration's --

MR. CARNEY: It's extremely important. We feel, as we've said many times, that the actions taken by the Arab League over the weekend, the statements that they put out, were very significant in making clear to the regime in Libya, to the people around the region, and to people around the world and governments around the world, that the international community is united in its opposition to

Qaddafi and his actions against his own people, and that the international community is united

as it moves forward to take action -- more action -- aimed at protecting civilians in Libya and eventually removing Qaddafi from power.

So the -- and in terms of participation, we think that is very important because of the signal it sends that this is not a Western action, not an American action, but an international action with the support of the governments and the people in the region.

Q On Israel, Jay?

MR. CARNEY: Let me move -- yes, sir.

Q Thank you, Jay. As Qaddafi intensifies his attacks on rebel-held areas, how concerned is the President that by the time the United Nations decides to act it would be too late to save lives and too late to set back the advances of Qaddafi towards these areas?

MR. CARNEY: Well, I would say that we are very concerned about the situation in Libya and the violence that is being perpetrated by the Qaddafi regime against its people. We are acting with a great sense of urgency, together with our international partners, to take the kinds of actions that we believe will protect Libyan citizens and move towards a situation where Qaddafi is no longer in power -- which is what we believe the Libyan people want.

So again, I would just refer you to the fact that the actions that we -- the international community with the leadership of the United States -- have taken are unprecedented in their speed and their sweep and their scope, and the actions that the United Nations may take as it -- when it emerges from -- the Security Council emerges from its negotiations, will again be unprecedented in their speed and scope.

Let me --

Q Would one vote, even if it's one of the permanent members, which of course, can veto the Security Council -- would one vote then move -- prevent the United States from taking any action?

MR. CARNEY: I don't want to prejudge what will happen at the United Nations. We are working obviously very closely in partnership with other members of the Security Council to craft a resolution that can --

Q Do you think a strong vote in support even if there is one holdout --

MR. CARNEY: Again, I don't want to prejudge it. I can just say that we have been acting in concert with our international partners in a variety of ways since the beginning of this situation in Libya and will obviously continue to do so. But I do not want to in any way prejudge the outcome at the United Nations.

Q On Israel --

MR. CARNEY: Sorry -- Abby.

Q A quick question. Is the President going to take any questions in the Rose Garden today?

MR. CARNEY: I believe it's -- he will be just issuing a statement today.

Q And given -- a quick follow-up -- since he won't be -- I won't have or anyone won't have an opportunity to ask him, he said that he'd asked the Pentagon last week whether the treatment of Bradley Manning was appropriate. I'm just wondering if he believes personally that the treatment of Bradley Manning is appropriate, and what we can read from the fact that just a day later they changed the conditions under which he was being held.

MR. CARNEY: I would refer you -- I would not expand beyond what the President said in terms of his personal reaction to the question. And I would point you to the statements the State Department and the Defense Department have made on that.

Yes.

Q What's the U.S. strategic interest in Libya? Why is the President contemplating a policy to possibly put U.S. forces in danger for what is essentially right now a civil war?

MR. CARNEY: As I've made clear from here, and others have, that the United States believes obviously that the actions of the Qaddafi government against its people are reprehensible and abhorrent, and we have called on him to cease and desist.

We have worked together with our international partners -- not alone, but with our international partners -- to take measures that we believe will put the kind of pressure on Qaddafi that's necessary to get him to cease and desist and eventually leave power. And we think it is in the interest of the United States to take the actions we have taken with our international partners to do just that.

Q Does the President not believe that this is a civil war?

MR. CARNEY: Again, I don't want to -- the terminology is not the issue here. The actions on the ground are obvious. The calls that we and others have made that they cease have been clear. And the actions that we will take -- that we have taken and we will take going forward -- are aimed at affecting that situation positively.

Q Does it hurt the President when he -- and you, also from the podium -- continually call for Qaddafi to leave power, to give up power, and yet he is still in power? Does it in any way hurt the strength of the President in terms of issuing those types of --

MR. CARNEY: Well, I would simply remind you again that we are talking here about an event that is only weeks old. So to suggest that somehow we could -- anybody could snap their fingers and when a leader in a country takes action that the international community condemns -- that leader, if he or she decides that they're going to hunker down and stay in power, that days pass and they haven't left is some measure of the impact of the international community, that's I think a silly standard to set. Because what we are seeing here is remarkable cooperation at the international level, with leadership by the United States, to put immense pressure on the regime in Libya to cease the violence, to stop killing its own people, and to give up power.

Let me go all the way in the back. Yes, sir.

Q With the dangers of the reactor in Japan, what real effect has that had on any U.S.-led efforts for humanitarian rescue, relief, anything like that, to people that are still very isolated from any sort of support?

MR. CARNEY: Well, in terms of the specifics, I'm not sure of the question. We have -- the United States government has in very quick fashion made resources available to the Japanese to help in the rescue effort, to help in the -- in humanitarian efforts that are ongoing, obviously, in Japan.

I think, if I could, that the total obligations that -- this is a USAID-led effort. The total obligation at this point is over $10 million. Obviously those numbers will go up because of the presence of teams and equipment that keeps coming -- keep coming in. But it's a multifaceted effort that the United States is making on behalf of the Japanese people.

Q But have radiation concerns dampened any efforts to actually move assets into any of these areas?

MR. CARNEY: I would have to refer you to USAID, Defense Department, Department of Energy, in terms of that. I don't have answers to those questions. But I can say that a great deal of effort is being expended to assist the Japanese.

Q Follow-up, Jay, on that.

MR. CARNEY: Sorry, let me move -- Bill.

Q Jay, after -- in light of what happened in Japan, Germany yesterday shut down seven nuclear reactors; the head of the E.U. said they were going to do an immediate review of every reactor in 27 different countries. Why hasn't President Obama demanded the same thing for reactors in this country?

MR. CARNEY: Bill, I think I answered this question a couple of times already, and I think Chairman Jaczko has answered it, too. We, the United States of America, have an independent regulatory agency whose sole mission is to constantly review and evaluate the safety and security of the reactors in the United States, which provide 20 percent of the electricity that Americans consume.

Q So he has full confidence in the NRC and believes in it then?

MR. CARNEY: He has full confidence that the agency charged with this responsibility is fulfilling its responsibility, and he has tasked that agency to take into account all of the information it is gleaning from the events in Japan and evaluate that information and apply it as responsible -- as would be responsible and necessary in evaluating the security and safety of the reactors here in the United States.

All the way in the back. Yes.

Q Jay, a couple of weeks ago, the President of Mexico was standing with President Obama, and the President of the U.S. says Mexico has a successful story against war on drugs. But yesterday you had FBI director, Mr. Mueller, went to Capitol Hill and he was asked about it. He says he cannot say it's a successful story because the level of murders and atrocities. So what's the real position of the U.S. government?

MR. CARNEY: Well, I think what the President said is he commended Mr. Calderón on his bravery and his commitment to taking on this enormous challenge. And I think it's obviously a very difficult situation and it takes a great deal of bravery and commitment to do what he's doing, and I think the President was commending him on that. He was not evaluating a success of it, but commending him on the remarkable efforts that he's taken.

Q So he agrees with Mr. Mueller, it's not a successful story?

MR. CARNEY: Again, I don't -- I'm not familiar with the FBI director's remarks and I would point you to what the President said.

Q Thanks, Jay.

MR. CARNEY: Thank you.

END 1:50 P.M. EDT

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The White House

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Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman Greg Jaczko and Deputy Secretary of Energy Dan Poneman, 3/14/2011

James S. Brady Press Briefing Room

Please see below for a correction (marked with asterisks) to the transcript.

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Jay.

We have been working very closely with our colleagues throughout the interagency process here at the Department of Energy. We've been ***led by Secretary Chu -- I just came from speaking with him on this matter and we've been speaking continuously throughout the weekend.

1:07 P.M. EDT

MR. CARNEY: Good afternoon, everyone. Over the weekend, as you know, the President was briefed multiple times on the situation in Japan in the wake of the tragic earthquake and tsunami there. USAID is leading our humanitarian assistance effort with the Department of Energy, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and others.

Here at the White House, Homeland Security Advisor John Brennan is coordinating an interagency process with regards to Japan and engaging with relevant officials from across the government. Because we knew that you would have a lot of questions about the situation in Japan, especially with regard to nuclear issues, I brought with me today, asked to come today, Greg JACZKO, who is the chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. He can answer questions people have about the safety of American citizens in Japan, as well as he can just generally update Americans about the impact of the accident -- or rather the aftermath of the tsunami and earthquake.

And then I also have Dan Poneman, who is our Deputy Secretary of Energy, and he can outline everything that we are doing to assist Japan as it deals with the aftermath.

With that, I'll ask these two gentlemen to speak. If you could address the questions related to their areas to them, and then we'll let them get out of here and get back to work. And I will take questions on other issues. Thanks very much.

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: If I could just start with just a few points. First and foremost, based on the type of reactor design and the nature of the accident we see a very low likelihood, really a very low probability that there's any possibility of harmful radiation levels in the United States or in Hawaii, or in any other U.S. territories.

Right now, based on the information we have, we believe that the steps that the Japanese are taking to respond to this crisis are consistent with the approach that we would use here in the United States. And most importantly, we advise Americans in Japan to listen to and to follow the instructions of the Japanese government with regard to the nuclear facilities.

The agency has been providing technical assistance to the Japanese government as they are requesting, and in particular, we have dispatched two technical experts to Japan and are continuing to assemble a team of experts that would be dispatched in the near future.

So with that, I will then turn to Dan.

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Jay.

We have been working very closely with our colleagues throughout the interagency process here at the Department of Energy. We've been by Secretary Chu -- I just came from speaking with him on this matter and we've been speaking continuously throughout the weekend. John Brennan has been coordinating matters interagency. We have had frequent meetings in person, we've had frequent meetings over the telephone, as we are trying to respond to all of the data that we are taking in.

We've also been in very, very close, continuous consultation, all hours of the day, with Ambassador John Roos -- and hats off to him for the incredible job he and the country team have been doing as they've been coordinating the American response. And as appropriate, given their independent regulatory status, we're making sure we share information as appropriate with Chairman JACZKO and our colleagues over at the NRC.

We have focused our efforts on consulting very, very closely with our Japanese colleagues. We also have dispatched subject matter experts -- both reactor experts and an expert on emergency response. We are in consultation with them and we will make sure that any requirement that they have we are prepared to meet. And we are talking with them even on a real-time basis as that proceeds. So we have technical expertise already there on the ground. We have additional capabilities if and as needed. Of course, the Japanese government has tremendous capabilities on their own, but because a matter of this nature requires all of our best efforts, we stand ready to assist as required.

MR. CARNEY: What I'll do is I'll go ahead and call on people. Ben, why don't you start?

Q Thank you. Chairman Jaczko, can you give us a sense of how President Obama is getting briefed about this nuclear crisis in Japan and the risk to the people there? And also, in the plainest terms you can, can you describe sort of the nature of what we're seeing and just how bad it is?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, I would turn to one of the others about the President's briefings.

MR. CARNEY: Let me just say, Ben, if I could, the President was briefed multiple times over the weekend. He has been briefed this morning and is being updated throughout the day. John Brennan, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, is taking a lead on that and gathering information and coordinating the briefings the President gets with all the relevant officials in the government.

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: It terms of the second part of your question, it is a serious situation certainly in Japan. The efforts right now of the Japanese government, with our assistance where they've requested it, is to continue to look for ways to provide the ability to keep the reactors cool. And that is a process that has been ongoing now for some time, and we continue to provide assistance where we can. In particular, they have asked for additional types of equipment that will help provide water and other resources to ensure that the reactors continue to be cool.

Q Has there been a partial meltdown in any of these reactors there?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: At this time, we don't really have detailed information about the nature of the core in the reactor itself. But it is a situation in which there has been a loss of the normal type of cooling mechanisms to the reactor. So as the situation continues to develop we'll get better information. But right now, the focus has been to do everything possible to ensure that the reactor continues to be cooled.

Q And this incident leading to any safety concerns at nuclear facilities here in the United States?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, as I said, from the NRC's perspective, we are always focused on the safety and security of nuclear power plants in this country. That will always be something that we do. Whenever there's any new information, we always take that information into consideration and make changes if necessary. But right now we continue to believe that nuclear power plants in this country operate safely and securely.

I'll stop at that point.

MR. CARNEY: Jill.

Q Following up on that, is there any attempt, though, at this stage to assess, carry out a study of the ability of these plants in the United States to withstand an earthquake? Because after all, you

have California. And also at least one of the reactors in jeopardy apparently in Japan uses that MOX fuel. Is there more concern about that, heightened -- any situation with the venting?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, with regard to the U.S. power plants, the U.S. power plants are designed to very high standards for earthquake effects. All our plants are designed to withstand significant natural phenomena like earthquakes, tornadoes and tsunamis. So we believe we have a very solid and strong regulatory infrastructure in place right now. But of course, as we always do, as an independent regulatory agency, we will continue to take new information and see if there are changes that we need to make with our program.

With regard to the MOX fuel, again, we are providing assistance to the Japanese where they request our assistance. And at this time, they have not asked for any specific information with regard to the MOX fuel.

Q You just talked about how the high standards are here in the United States domestically. What are the differences in safety standards between what Japan has and what the United States does have?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, right now as I said, our focus is always on keeping the nuclear power plants in this country secure. We are also putting a strong focus right now on providing technical expertise to the Japanese as they request it. Questions about exactly the differences and what changes we might want to consider and look at in this country is something we'll deal with down the road. But bottom line right now, we believe that the plants in this country continue to be designed to a very high standard for seismic and tsunami-type events.

Q There's already been calls -- this might be more for Jay, but there are already calls for moratoriums in the United States. For example, Congressman Markey called for that. Does the President know about these calls for changes in U.S. handling of this issue? And you said you were reviewing, but what is the timeline for that? This is obviously something that Americans are concerned about.

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Again, as an independent regulatory agency, we will always take whatever steps are necessary to ensure the safety and security of nuclear power plants in this country. But right now we believe we have a very strong program in place. As we get more information from Japan, as this immediate crisis ultimately comes to an end, we will look at whatever information we can gain from this event and see if there are changes we need to make to our system.

I would just add as a similar scenario, following the 2004 tsunami, we did review tsunami requirements for nuclear power plants, and, in fact, went and made sure that our plants would be able do deal with that type of event.

MR. CARNEY: Chip.

Q Would plants in the United States be able to withstand a quake of this magnitude?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Again, I don't want to speculate on anything like that at this point.

Q But are they planned to be able to -- I know they try to estimate what they would be able to withstand. I know in Japan, for example, this one I believe was only built to withstand a 7.9 or something like that. In the United States, are they built to withstand a quake of this magnitude, of an 8.9?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: At this point what I can say is we have a strong safety program in place to deal with seismic events that are likely to happen at any nuclear facility in this country. As we get past this immediate crisis where we continue to provide support to the Japanese, we'll gather information about the specifics of the event. But I don't want to speculate too much about what exactly were the relevant factors in Japan at this point.

Q And one other question. You said that there's a "very low likelihood," I believe were your words, of harmful radiation making it to Hawaii or the West Coast. Is that based on the condition of those plants right now, or is that based on a partial meltdown or, heaven forbid, a total meltdown? Could that change your assessment?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: The information about harmful -- the lack of any harmful impacts to the U.S. is simply based on the nature of these reactors and the large distances, obviously, between those and any U.S. territory. So you just aren't going to have any radiological material that by the time it traveled those large distances could present any risk to the American public.

Q Even in a worst-case scenario, even with a meltdown, you're not going to have harmful radiation reach Hawaii or the West Coast?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Again, I don't want to speculate on various scenarios, but based on the design and the distances involved, it is very unlikely that there would be any harmful impacts.

MR. CARNEY: Mike.

Q Do you gentlemen worry about perhaps an overreaction in this country, seeing a nuclear problem in another country, in terms of policymakers running away from nuclear energy?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: I would defer to Dan.

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: I think you just heard very clearly from Chairman Jaczko that we place safety paramount when it comes to the regulation of our nuclear power plants, and we always will. That having been said, we have to have an energy policy and a direction in this country that's driven by our overall assessment of our country's best interest.

In that respect, we are going to continue to seek to diversify our energy supplies. We're going to continue to make sure that each and every one of those sources is as safe as is humanly possible. And we will continue to take all learnings into account as we proceed from episodes that happened, from hypothetical that we might be able to come up with. It's a matter -- it's nothing new about it. It's a matter of our continuous approach to our own development of our safety resources -- our energy resources to make sure that they're done continuously and safely. Each event as it occurs is taken into account, but we don't sort of change from day to day our overall approach to the desire to diversify our overall energy posture.

Q And nuclear is a key component in your interest in diversification, correct?

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: Nuclear power has been a critical component to the U.S. energy portfolio. We have 104 operating reactors -- that's 20 percent of the electricity of this country; 70 percent of the carbon-free electricity in this country comes from nuclear power. So we do see nuclear power as continuing to play an important role in building a low-carbon future. But be assured that we will take the safety aspect of that as our paramount concern.

And under the independent regulatory authority, going back to 1974, the NRC, which is independent and is, therefore, at arms' length, will ensure that we live up to exactly those kinds of high standards that the President expects us to use in operating those plants.

Q And quickly, it is critical to reaching your mission goals, correct -- nuclear energy?

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: We view nuclear energy as a very important component to the overall portfolio we're trying to build for a clean energy future.

Q I want to follow up on a question and see if we can get Jay to answer on this -- the moratoria issue. I think it was Senator Lieberman said over the weekend that what's gone on in Japan should cause us to put the brakes for the moment on nuclear power plant development in America. Does the administration agree with that?

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: I'm happy to start and others can supplement.

As I said, going back decades, every experience that we have with respect to our nuclear plants we take fully into account. Certainly back in March 1979 at the time of the Three Mile Island episode, there were a tremendous amount of learnings that we applied to the improvement of safety in our fleet. Our reactors are much safer today because of all those learnings that have been applied.

We continually hypothesize new scenarios of different types and never stop our efforts to continue to exercise our capabilities, to assess the possibilities, and to ensure that our reactors can operate as safely as possible. We'll continue to do that. We'll continue to seek to improve. We'll certainly take the learnings out of this experience and apply those as well. And we know, because of the independence of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, that in terms of operating our reactors only if

they can operated safely, that is a responsibility that is properly reposed in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Q So a pause isn't necessary?

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: From a policy perspective, we will continue to operate our reactors and seek to operate them safely. We will continue to seek to build nuclear into a part of a responsible energy future, and we will repose our confidence in the NRC to make sure that we only do so to the extent that it can be done safely.

MR. CARNEY: Athena, I would just add that we have the plants that we have already in operation that provide 20 percent of the electricity in the United States. And information is still coming in from Japan, so as we evaluate that information, these gentlemen have made clear that they will incorporate that into how we view safety and security of nuclear energy as a resource.

But it remains a part of the President's overall energy plan when he talks about reaching a clean energy standard it's a vital part of that. And as we get more information about Japan and what happened there, that can be incorporated. But right now, we remain committed to the clean energy standard and the other aspects of the President's energy plan.

Q Mr. Chairman, do you have NRC people in Japan now?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: We currently have two NRC technical experts in Japan. They are working to provide information to the U.S. embassy, as well as to interface with their colleagues in the Japan regulatory authority.

Q And from your understanding of the situation now with the Japanese reactors, is it as bad as it's going to get, or might it get worse?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Again, I don't want to speculate on how this may progress. I would say it is a serious situation, and we continue to provide whatever assistance is requested from us and is necessary -- assistance requested or necessary by the Japanese government. And I would it is a -- Japan is a technically advanced nuclear country and they possess significant technical resources and capability on their own.

Q Jay, so there's nothing -- the President hasn't seen anything in Japan that will lead him to change his position that the U.S. should continue to get power from nuclear sources and increase that amount in the future?

MR. CARNEY: Dan, from a policy point of view -- but again, this is a -- information is still coming in. I think these gentlemen have addressed the issues of safety and security of the American nuclear energy program. And as more information comes in, obviously it will be evaluated. But 20 percent

of our electricity is generated by nuclear power. It is already a major component of our energy here I in the United States.

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: If I could add, just again to reiterate I think the point that's been made, that we are an independent regulatory authority and we always keep focus on a day-to-day basis on the safety and security of nuclear reactors in this country. So if we do get information that would cause us to take action, we will take that action. But at this time, we don't have any information that would cause us to do anything different with our approach with the current reactors. But we will review information as it becomes available.

MR. CARNEY: A couple of more.

Q Mr. Chairman, of those two technical advisors you have there, are they in Tokyo? Are they up near the facility? Are they getting information from the Japanese government? And how would you describe the Japanese government's description of what's going on? Are they being forthcoming with both the public and with you?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Well, our two experts are in Tokyo and they are providing assistance to both the U.S. embassy as well an interface with our Japanese counterparts. And we continue to work to provide resources and assistance as we can.

Q Are they getting information, technical information from the Japanese? Are they watching press reports about what they're seeing going on? To what extent are they really hearing what's going on?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Right now, they're providing a very valuable resource to us to give us direct information from Japan about what's going on. And that's coming from a variety of sources, including interaction with counterparts in their regulatory --

Q Has the government of Japan been very cautious about what it's putting out publicly? They didn't have much urgency at the beginning and it's gotten more and more urgent.

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Again, from what I've seen, we continue to see a very aggressive effort to deal with what is a very difficult situation in Japan right now.

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: Can I just supplement that by saying that we've been in consultation through Ambassador Roos. He's been in continuous consultation with Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano. And we have two subject matter experts over there as well, and they are in communication with their counterparts.

Q Have you supplied any actual equipment to the Japanese? Have they requested anything?

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: Well, we are ready to provide equipment. We have talked to them about what they have. As of this morning, there may be some additional information that Chairman Jaczko may wish to comment on. But what we are making sure of is, A, of course they have a lot of equipment on their own, but, B, such equipment as we have -- and we have equipment that can do aerial monitoring of ground deposition -- that's available. We have emergency response equipment. That's available. We're not starting from a blank slate, though, because the Japanese already have a lot of equipment, and we're just making sure we've got what we need to supplement.

MR. CARNEY: Why don't we -- one question from the Japanese media and then we'll wrap this part up.

Q With the accident at the nuclear plant over the weekend, has there been any direct impact from that on the U.S. support teams that are already in the area? Have they had to alter their plans at all as a result?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: I would defer that question to AID, I believe. They have better information about the teams. The two NRC officials who are in Tokyo have not experienced any issues that I'm aware of. But, obviously, their safety -- their personal safety is important to us. But in Tokyo, there is no direct impact from the nuclear incident itself.

Q Can you talk then more generally about the logistical challenges of going into an area with such unprecedented damage?

CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Again, I would defer some of those broader questions to the folks at AID that we've been working with very closely to help provide that logistical support.

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: I would just add to that, our DOE people have not been impaired in their ability to reach out to their Japanese counterparts. And in fact, at the Ambassador's request, we're sending another technical expert to join the team so they've got more subject matter expertise there.

In the context of the coordination that Mr. Brennan has been doing from the homeland perspective, we are making sure and working very closely with our colleagues in the Pentagon to make sure that any assets from a U.S. government perspective that need to be brought in there, we make available whatever assets we have through them, working with AID, as well.

Q Can I ask about nuclear waste, please? It's very important.

MR. CARNEY: I want to let these guys go for now.

Q Can we ask you about it?

MR. CARNEY: We'll take one question on nuclear waste, Connie.

Q Thank you. Is the U.S. reviewing its policy now on nuclear waste? And what are the Japanese doing in the midst of this crisis with their nuclear waste?

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: I would segregate what they're doing in the middle of this crisis with respect to their nuclear waste. The first focus in the crisis, obviously, is getting the coolant to the cores of the affected reactors. And of course, there is spent fuel present at the reactors and making sure that that used fuel remains cooled properly and so forth.

From a U.S. perspective, we are still very closely evaluating our options. And the principal mechanism here, as you well know, is that President Obama asked Secretary Chu to convene a high-level panel of very distinguished Americans, chaired by Mr. Lee Hamilton, former congressman, and retired general Brent Scowcroft. And that group is going to be looking at all the options having to do with the back end of the fuel cycle for the United States of America, and by July will be coming back with some interim views on the options we ought to think about going forward. I'm sure they're going to be taking all of these experiences, data coming out of this experience into account.

Q Are you confident that Japanese nuclear waste is safe now?

DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN: In terms of Japanese regulation of Japanese nuclear waste, I would refer you to the Japanese regulatory authorities.

MR. CARNEY: Thank you, gentlemen, very much. I appreciate it. We'll move on to the rest of the briefing. Thank you for coming.

Thanks for holding in abeyance your questions on other issues. Ben.

Q Two quick ones, Jay. I know that the President's concern first and foremost is about health and safety as it relates to this disaster. But is he also concerned about the impact the Japan natural disaster could have on the world economy?

MR. CARNEY: Ben, we have full confidence in the capacity of Japan to address the economic challenges during these exceptionally difficult times. We're monitoring, as we do always, the global economic environment, but we stand ready to assist the Japanese who are our friends and allies in any way that we can. And it's important to remember that the Japanese have demonstrated a great resiliency and ability to pull together during times of adversity, and we are confident that they will overcome this challenge and recover from this tragedy.

Q And on one other topic, on the meeting that the President is having with General Petraeus, could you just tell us a bit about why he's here? And specifically, is this a meeting at which he -- the General plans to talk about troop withdrawal plans in Afghanistan?

MR. CARNEY: Well, the General, as you know, is here. He is testifying on the Hill this week, and he is here meeting with the President today -- well, they meet with some regularity -- but to brief him on the progress we're making in Afghanistan. And as part of that discussion, yes, I believe they will discuss the President's plan to being a transition process in July of 2011, which will begin a process that will lead to turning over the security lead to the Afghan security forces by the end of 2014.

Q Jay, I saw the statement this morning about Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and the other GCC countries, but if this is the case that you have Saudi Arabia sending its forces into Bahrain, isn't that a gross violation of the sovereignty of another country?

MR. CARNEY: Well, we're aware of those reports and that other GCC countries are considering doing that. We urge all of our GCC partners to show restraint and to respect the rights of the people of Bahrain, and to act in a way that supports dialogue instead of undermining it. The important factor here is that our overall principles apply to Bahrain and all the countries in the region, which is that we urge restraint. We urge nonviolence in response to nonviolent protesters; the respect for the universal rights of people in the region to gather peacefully, to voice their opinions, to have their grievances heard by their governments, and to have greater participation in the political process.

We have long believed and the President has expressed for a long time now that stability in the region will be brought about by dialogue and political reform. And it is counterproductive to that goal to in any way repress the expression of those desires that the people of Bahrain, in this case, and other countries, have.

Q Jay, that's a very diplomatic way of saying that the U.S. is unhappy about what's going on. But if another country, if Iran had decided to go into another country because they felt it was the right thing to do, what would the United States be saying? And I know it's a hypothetical, but this appears to be pretty serious.

MR. CARNEY: Well, again, I think you have to understand what -- I mean, we've seen the reports that you're talking about. This is not an invasion of a country.

Q Right, but there are security forces.

MR. CARNEY: It is -- correct. And we urge the government of Bahrain, as we have repeatedly, as well as other GCC countries to exercise restraint, and not to meet the nonviolent protests of people legitimately expressing their concerns and asking to have their voices heard with any kind of physical violence. So we -- that -- we call on, again, the government of Bahrain as well as other countries in the region that -- to hear this message.

Steve.

Q Did you get any advance warning that this was going to happen, the Saudis moving in?

MR. CARNEY: I don't have anything on that for you, Steve. As far as --

Q As far as you know -- okay.

MR. CARNEY: I don't know. I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Are we calling on the Saudis to leave?

MR. CARNEY: We are calling on the Saudis, the other members of the GCC countries, as well as the Bahraini government, to show restraint; and that we believe that political dialogue is the way to address the unrest that has occurred in the region, in Bahrain and in other countries, and not to in any way suppress it.

Yes.

Q Over the weekend you sent out a statement responding to the Arab League's endorsement of a no-fly zone, but you didn't obviously indicate whether the United States supports that or not. Knowing that all options are still on the table, isn't it approaching a situation where it might be too little, too late, in Libya to enact this no-fly zone?

MR. CARNEY: As you know, we have discussions going on at the United Nations in New York regarding various options, military options, as well as non-military, and specifically a no-fly zone option. We have, as you know, tomorrow and then Wednesday at NATO, a process by which the plans that were being reviewed and refined that address a no-fly option will be presented to the NAC on Wednesday. And so we are, as we have said, constantly reviewing our options, refining our options, and this process is moving along.

The situation in Libya -- we continue to condemn the use of violence against the Libyan people by the Qaddafi regime, and we are encouraged by the international condemnation of that and by the actions taken by the Arab League, for example, because we believe that whatever actions we do take should be international and especially should represent the will of the people in the region and the countries in the region. And that's why the Arab League's voice on this is so important.

Q Knowing that you are -- could potentially be -- could be moving forward on this this week, but doesn't that -- there's been some voiced concern from foreign counterparts that that might nullify the goal of a no-fly zone, to enact it a little too late. Is there no concern --

MR. CARNEY: Well, Sunlen, again, I would say that the -- to go back to things we've talked about last week, the speed of the international reaction here has been quite remarkable and we are not letting up on our pressure, as the President made clear on Friday. I would note that, as you

probably know, Secretary Clinton is in Paris where she will meet with opposition leaders, Libyan opposition leaders, as well as G8 counterparts to discuss some of these issues.

So we are moving with a great deal of haste and in coordination with our international partners, again with the kind of deliberation and speed that the situation requires, mindful of the fact that the decisions we're talking about here are significant ones and need to be made with everyone's eyes open to what they mean and what the goals are -- and I mean that with regard to a variety of possible options.

Chip.

Q Jay, following up on the no-fly zone, my understanding is there are now about five ships off the coast of Libya, three U.S. submarines off the coast, presumably with cruise missiles, plus you've got plenty of NATO aircraft at bases in the vicinity. Is the hardware now in place where if the President and other leaders were to give the order, that they could pull the trigger on a no-fly zone right now?

MR. CARNEY: Chip, what I would say, first of all, for the technical requirements to impose a no-fly zone, I would refer you to NATO, to the Defense Department. But what I think Secretary Gates has made clear and others have made clear is that this has never been a case about what our capabilities are. Obviously the United States of America has the capacity with its international partners to engage -- activate a no-fly zone, as well as take a variety of other potential measures.

The issue is making sure that the policy decisions we make, we make collectively with our international partners, because it is very important that the response be an international one and not just an American one, and that we are cognizant of what the goals are and whether they're achievable, and what the impacts of that decision will be.

Q But there's no big lag period? If they decide Tuesday, Wednesday to --

MR. CARNEY: Again, I don't have specifics on what technical requirements have to be met in order to begin to implement an option like that. I would refer you to NATO probably for that.

Q Just one more question. Following up on Ben's when he asked you about the global economic impact here, you basically responded with your confidence in the resiliency of Japan. But even if Japan does respond as well as could possibly be expected, this could still have a significant effect on the global economy. In discussions back there that you've been a part of or are aware of, have you heard economic advisors for the administration suggest that what could happen here is the same thing that happened last year with the Greek crisis, delaying the economic recovery? Could this have that same kind of effect on the economic recovery again?

MR. CARNEY: Well, I would just say, Chip, that these are still early days, but that we remain confident that Japan and, therefore, the world can deal with this crisis and respond and rebuild in a

way that is good for Japan and good for the world. So we have that confidence and we therefore believe that -- the resiliency of the Japanese people, the resiliency of the Japanese economy are very important factors in the capacity of Japan to handle this, and therefore the world working with Japan to handle it as well.

Q The recovery is safe?

MR. CARNEY: Again, I would just refer you to what I said.

Q A quick one on the gun laws. President Obama wrote an op-ed over the weekend and he said, "None of us should be willing to remain passive in the face of violence or resigned to watching helplessly as another rampage unfolds on television." So the question is what is the administration prepared to do actively, to actively support legislation-wise? For instance, Representative McCarthy's bill to ban high-round magazines -- is that something that the President or administration officials will come out in support for?

MR. CARNEY: Well, what I've said in the past still holds, which we will review proposed legislation as it comes up. I don't have any announcements for what we would support. But I would also say that the Department of Justice has reached out to stakeholders on all sides of this issue and they're going to be holding a series of discussions as a first step, and that some of those meetings are happening this week.

So we are -- the President made his views known in the op-ed that you referred to. And the Department of Justice is continuing this process by meeting with stakeholders on all sides of the issue to look at ways that we can find common ground to take some common-sense measures that respect Americans' Second Amendment rights, but also deal in a common-sense way with Americans' safety and security.

Q So the administration wouldn't put forth legislation on its own or spearhead a plan?

MR. CARNEY: Well, I don't want to speculate about what we may or may not do legislatively, except to say that we are engaged in this process.

Yes, Carol.

Q Sort of on what Chip was talking about, is there -- how much aid is the United States willing to give to Japan? And have there been discussions in the administration about financial assistance and what that amount might look like? Have the Japanese made any specific requests?

MR. CARNEY: I think we are now in the phase of dealing with the immediate crisis, and we are offering any and all assistance that we can provide that the Japanese request and need to help them deal with it. They are a very close ally and we stand ready to assist them in any way that we

can. Long term, obviously, we'll have to evaluate what the needs are and how we can help. But we're committed to helping Japan recover from this.

Q Have there been any discussions about that internally, in terms of what --

MR. CARNEY: Not that I'm aware of, because we are literally dealing with the aftermath, the considerable aftermath of a terrible situation caused by this earthquake and tsunami.

Q Just one quick thing on education -- and obviously that's an area where the White House sees room for compromise and bipartisanship -- would you consider Race to the Top an area where you have consensus? Or is that an area where the White House thinks that they might need to do some work in order to get consensus?

MR. CARNEY: Well, we are consulting with our partners on Capitol Hill of both parties on education reform regularly. And Race to the Top already has received a great deal of bipartisan support. We think it's been a very effective program and a good model for education reform. And we expect that bipartisan support to continue -- which doesn't mean we take it for granted. And in the process of improving the law, we'll be working with Republicans and Democrats going forward, but we do expect it to happen this year.

Yes, sir.

Q Jay, on a funding bill, does it look to the White House as though you will get a three-week extension before the end of the week?

MR. CARNEY: I don't want to put timing on it, Mark. But we -- the cuts that have been outlined in that temporary measure are ones that we have already identified as acceptable. So we believe that we should be able to get something done. But again, we are focused on the process of achieving a resolution for the full fiscal year. Those conversations and negotiations are ongoing and that is our primary focus.

As the President said on Friday, because of the time it took to allow the process in the Senate to take place where the Senate voted on the Republican measure that emerged from the House and the Senate Democratic measure, it became necessary to give us the breathing space to negotiate the final CR for the fiscal year. But that remains our focus. And we remain absolutely committed to the idea that we need to get this done, last year's business done as soon as possible so we can focus on some of these other big challenges that we face.

Q And Vice President Biden will be taking the lead on that now that he's back from Europe?

MR. CARNEY: Well, this is a team effort. Vice President Biden is back from his trip and I'm sure he will be very much engaged in that process going forward.

Peter.

Q Thank you, Jay. If the U.S. wants -- believes that the legitimate grievances of Bahraini people need to be met, why not call upon Saudi forces to withdraw?

MR. CARNEY: Peter, I don't have anything more for you on that. We are calling on the countries in the region to show restraint and pointing to the fact that the dialogue that can bring about political reform is essential for the stability of the countries in the region and their continued economic prosperity. Because we believe, as the President has said going back to his speech in Cairo, that it is -- the unrest that we have seen is a result of the lack of dialogue and the lack of engagement with the peoples in the region in their governments and in the political process.

Q And also, you mentioned in Egypt that the -- Mubarak was on this wrong side of history. Is that Bahraini monarchy also on the wrong side of history?

MR. CARNEY: Well, we have called on the Bahraini government to -- as we have others in the region -- to have a dialogue with their people, to listen to their grievances, to adopt political reforms, to respect the universal rights of their people. And I think, broadly speaking, in the countries of the region, the leaders in the region will be judged by how they deal with this process. And we think it's important for the future of the region, for the peoples in these countries, that their voices be heard and their legitimate aspirations be addressed.

April.

Q Going back to the op-ed of President Obama on gun control -- the President talked about the mental competency of the gunman in Arizona, how he could not get into the U.S. military, how he could not get into a college, but yet he still purchased a gun. Is that President looking at any -- what kind of ways does the President want there to be issues of judging mental competency in purchasing a gun? Or is that something that he's looking for in anything -- any gun control measures that come along?

MR. CARNEY: That level of specificity, I don't have, April. But I think that his point that he's making is that we can honor our Second Amendment rights while still ensuring that, as you noted, that someone with a criminal record shouldn't be able to check out a gun seller; that an unbalanced man shouldn't be able to buy a gun so easily. I mean, there is room for us to have reasonable laws that uphold liberty, ensure citizen safety, respect the Second Amendment, and that we should be able to find some common ground on some of those measures. I don't want to detail what those measures are or what he has in mind, specifically. The conversations are beginning along those lines at the Department of Justice.

Q Do conversations include gun shows, purchases at gun shows?

MR. CARNEY: Again, I don't have -- I don't want to narrowly define specific measures that may or may not be proposed. We're looking at possible legislation and we're having conversations with stakeholders on all sides of the issue.

Chris.

Q Thanks, Jay. I have some questions for you on marriage. Last week, the Maryland statehouse recommitted a bill legalizing same-sex marriage to committee because proponents didn't feel like they had enough votes for passage. The measure is effectively dead for this year even though Democrats have control of the chamber. By not supporting same-sex marriage, is the President, as head of the Democratic Party, giving cover to Democrats in that chamber who don't support the bill?

MR. CARNEY: Chris, the President's position on gay marriage is well known. He addressed this in December at the press conference and I don't have anything new for you on that.

Q So is the President not concerned that this measure failed to progress in that chamber?

MR. CARNEY: I don't have anything for you on that either.

Q One last question, one last question. The proponents of this bill said they're going to try again in 2012. You said he's grappling with the issue of same-sex marriage. The President said he's wrestling with it. Is he going to pin down support for marriage equality and make an announcement before next year in time for these efforts --

MR. CARNEY: I don't have any timing for you on that either.

Yes.

Q Moroccan King has delivered a speech in which the government will change the reform (inaudible) constitution to give more power for the prime minister and lose more freedom. So does the White House have any comments on Morocco speech?

MR. CARNEY: I'm not sure if we have anything specifically on that. We encourage political reforms that liberalize the governments there, that allow for greater participation and representative government, and that applies across the region.

Q Jay, I have two questions, one a follow-up. Is it safe to assume that the GCC countries have not coordinated or informed the United States about their move to enter Bahrain, considering that they're close allies of the United States? And second, the Turkish Prime Minister said that it's counterproductive to have military intervention in Libya by NATO or any other country. Does this complicate your effort or all-options-on-the-table kind of approach?

MR. CARNEY: Regarding the no-fly zone and other options, nothing has changed since I last addressed this question five minutes or so ago. So the -- and with regards to Bahrain, we've made clear that we call on the nations in the region to show restraint and to honor the peaceful protestors by not using force against them. We make that -- call on the Bahraini government and the GCC countries as well.

Q So they haven't informed you? You don't know anything --

MR. CARNEY: I don't have anything on that.

Yes.

Q Jay, last week, Robert Einhorn over at State had a comment on Iran's nuclear program. He said that the U.S. believes that Iran intends to get to the brink of a nuclear capability but won't go to breakout. Can you talk about the extent to which that's been the subject of the conversation here at the White House by the President?

MR. CARNEY: I don't have anything -- any new information on that since the last time we addressed -- Ron, if you can talk to State about those particular comments.

Q Is that going to change his calculus at all?

MR. CARNEY: Well, we've made very clear that we are very concerned about Iran's pursuit. We and a lot of our international partners maintain that concern, so I think that still holds.

Yes.

Q Secretary Clinton last week told Congress that she wasn't sure that a no-fly zone would actually be effective. She cited Iraq and Kosovo. Was she stating administration policy?

MR. CARNEY: Well, as I've made clear from this podium and others have made clear, too, that it is very important -- no matter what options we choose -- that we are aware of what is entailed in applying them, enforcing them, and that we are confident that the goals we set out for them are achievable.

The fact that, as Secretary Gates and others have said, that a no-fly zone is a serious matter and with costs associated and risks associated doesn't mean that it's off the table. It's still very much on the table. I think the purpose of having Secretary Clinton or Secretary Gates or others make people aware of the seriousness of a measure like that is simply that; so that we all are aware going into this process should that decision be made -- or other decisions be made -- that we know what we're talking about and what we would be pursuing.

Q But she said it doesn't work. So why would it be on the table?

MR. CARNEY: No -- well, I don't want to parse her words. I think -- but what I have made clear and others have made clear is that we need to know -- we would in any process, any decision like this we would make, we would have a plan, which I think elements are being developed at NATO about what a no-fly zone plan would look like and its implementation would look like should that be chosen. And it would obviously include within it discussion about its presumed effectiveness, the impact it would have, the risks associated with it and the potential costs associated with it.

Q Have you run any numbers on that as to cost?

Q She said it didn't get rid of the leader --

MR. CARNEY: I don't have any -- no, I don't.

Q She said it didn't get rid of the leader. It didn't stop the violence. So what would be the point?

MR. CARNEY: Again, making -- she's making an observation about a past exercise. Before we take any action, we would evaluate what that action would mean if it were applied in the specific case at hand.

Q Can I follow up, Jay?

MR. CARNEY: Yes.

Q Thanks, Jay. I don't want to ask about what the U.S. is ready to do or not ready to do, and I have lot of sympathy towards caution, but my question is about what would the U.S. accept others to do? Would it be conceivable that somebody else who seems to be much more eager to call for a no-fly zone, like France, like Arabic states, could you accept that they are taking the lead and say, okay, if France want to do it, together with Egypt, it's fine with us? Or would the U.S. prefer to be in control of the process because the consequences would also be consequences for the position of the U.S. in the region?

MR. CARNEY: Well, I think I have made clear that we feel it's very important that this -- the actions we take in response to the situation in Libya be international actions, that we work in concert with our international partners. So, quite the contrary; this is not about the United States dictating what happens working with our international partners. So the consultations continue with the French and the British and others about what other measures we can take together.

So I don't -- I think we welcome the fact that there is so much international approbation and international unity in condemning what the Qaddafi regime is doing, and so much discussion with our international partners about all the different measures that we could do together to continue to put pressure on Qaddafi, to get him to cease and desist what he's doing against his people, and ultimately to remove him from power.

Q Could it also happen without involvement of the United States?

MR. CARNEY: Well, right now we're discussing at the United Nations, in Brussels at NATO, with our international partners what the various options are. We're very engaged in that discussion and continue to have that specific option on that the table.

Q Just two questions, Jay.

MR. CARNEY: Okay, I'm going to wrap it up here. Thank you very much.

Q When does he fill out his bracket? When is the Andy Katz exclusive?

MR. CARNEY: Stay tuned.

END
1:58 P.M. EDT

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1号機

	A	B	C
1	Chronology at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station after onset of the Tohoku Great Earthquake		
2	Unit 1		
3	Friday, March 11	14:00	14:46 Due to the Miyagi Prefecture Offshore Earthquake, turbine and reactor were shut down automatically. Out of two lines of off-site power, one line was shut down due to failure, which caused the loss of off-site power, and the emergency diesel generator was started automatically.
4		15:00	15:23 Employees of Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station confirmed the first wave of tsunami. 15:41 Emergency diesel generator failed. Loss of all AC power. 15:42 Determined that a specific event pursuant to the provision of Item 1, Article 10 of the Special Law of Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster had occurred. The first emergency order was issued.
5		16:00	16:36 Determined, as a preemptive measure, that a specific event pursuant to the provision of Item 1, Article 15 of the Special Law of Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster had occurred because flow rate of the emergency core cooling system could not be confirmed. 16:45 Unit 1reactor water level monitoring function was recovered and the confirmation of flow rate of the emergency core cooling system was made possible, and therefore the provision of Item 1, Article 15 of the Special Law of Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster was lifted.
6		17:00	17:07 Monitoring function of reactor water level was lost again and being unable to confirm flow rate of the emergency core cooling system, a specific event pursuant to the provision of Item 1, Article 15 of the Special Law of Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster was applied.
7		18:00	18:14(Approximately) A radiation monitoring van measured radioactive materials inside and outside power station site (outdoor areas) and confirmed that the levels were normal and no radiological consequence in the external areas at that point.
8		2:00	02:30 Confirmed that D/W pressure had reached 840Kpa. (Maximum operating pressure is 427kPa), Reactor water level: Top of Active Fuel (hereinafter referred to as TAF) + 1300mm (Fuel region A) TAF+530mm(Fuel region B) 02:50 Reactor pressure:0.8Pa Reactor water level:TAF+1300mm(Fuel region A)、TAF+500mm(Fuel region B) D/W pressure:0.84Mpa
9		5:00	5:14 Determined that external leakage of radioactive materials was occurring based on the confirmation of rising radiation levels within the power plant site * and decreasing trend of D/W pressure (As of 5:09, the pressure dropped from 0.84MPa abs to 0.77Ma abs). * Results of radioactive material measurements by the monitoring van in the vicinity of environmental monitoring area boundary: 0.07 μSV/h→1.59 μSV/h (4:00→5:10 Vicinity of MP8:0.07 μSV/h→0.57 μSV/h(4:00→4:45) 5:55 Reactor water level:TAF+1300mm(Fuel region A)、TAF+530mm(Fuel region B) Reactor pressure 0.8Mpa D/W pressure: Unavailable due to power loss attributable to closing of door of the main control room for raising its air tightness.
			6:00 Reactor water level:TAF+1300mm(Fuel region A)、TAF+530mm(Fuel region B)

EB/13

10	Saturday, March 12	6:00	Reactor pressure0.8Mpa D/W pressure: 0.74Mpa 6:30 Water of raw water tank was injected with a fire engine and 2000 liters was water was injected with diesel-driven fire pump (hereinafter referred to as D/D fire pump) via fire protection line. Reactor water level: TAF+1300mm (Fuel region A)、TAF+550mm (Fuel region B) Reactor pressure: 0.8Mpa D/W pressure: 0.79Mpa 6:47 Reactor water level: TAF+1200mm (Fuel region A)、TAF+400mm (Fuel region B) Reactor pressure: 0.8Mpa D/W pressure: 0.77Mpa
11		7:00	7:00Reactor water level: TAF+800～1200mm (Fuel region A)、TAF+300mm (Fuel region B) Reactor pressure: 0.8Mpa D/W pressure: Unavailable (due to removal of power) 7:30 Reactor water level: TAF—100～+200mm (Fuel regions A and B) Reactor pressure: 0.8Mpa D/W pressure:0.76Mpa abs 7:55 Completed injection of 3,000L
12		8:00	8:15 Completed injection of 4,000L. 8:30 Completed injection of 5,000L.
13		9:00	9:04～ Initiated operation to depressurize reactor pressure vessel (Departure to the field). One TEPCO employee involved in the operation to open the MO valve to 25 % position received radiation dose exceeding 100 mSv (106.30mSv). 9:15 Completed injection of 6,000L. 9:40 Completed injection of 21,000L.
14		10:00	10:17 Valve on the S/C chamber side was remotely operated, and it was recognized that depressurization operation of reactor containment vessel had been started, based on the data from monitoring posts and other sources.
15		14:00	14:10 D/W pressure: 0/730MPa 14:30 Installed a temporary air compressor at around 14:00 and confirmed reduction of D/W pressure, and therefore determined "release of radioactive materials." (Initiation of depressurization operation) 14:41 D/W pressure: 0.610MPa 14:50 D/W pressure: 0.58MPa 14:53 Completed injection of 8,000L.
16		15:00	15:14 D/W pressure: 0.530MPa 15:36 Large tremor of near field type occurred and a large bang occurred in the vicinity of Unit 1, generating white smoke. 15:40 Confirmed rising smoke in the vicinity of Unit 1. Also, the monitoring van confirmed 1,015 μSv/h (15:29) at MP-4. Two TEPCO employees and two contractor workers evacuated from the field. No internal records of contacting fire department, etc. were confirmed.
17		16:00	16:17 Vicinity of MP4: Radioactive materials such as iodine within the power station site measured by the monitoring van was rising, and therefore determined that a specific event (abnormal rise of radiation at site boundary) pursuant to the provision of Item 1, Article 15 of the Special Law of Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster had occurred.
18		20:00	20:20 Initiated sea water injection into Unit 1 reactor using fire protection line.
19	Sunday, March 13	8:00	08:56 Vicinity of MP4: Radioactive materials such as iodine within the power station site (outdoor areas) measured by the monitoring van were rising, and therefore determined, as follows, that a specific event (abnormal rise of radiation at site boundary) pursuant to the provision of Item 1, Article 15 of the Special Law of Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster had occurred.
		14:00	14:15 Vicinity of MP4: Radioactive materials such as iodine within the power station site (outdoor areas) measured by the monitoring van were rising, and therefore determined, as follows, that a specific event (abnormal rise of radiation at site boundary) pursuant to the provision of Item 1, Article 15 of the Special Law of

20			Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster had occurred.
21	Monday, March 14	3:00	03:50 Vicinity of MP6: Radioactive materials such as iodine within the power station site (outdoor areas) measured by the monitoring van were rising, and therefore determined, as follows, that a specific event (abnormal rise of radiation at site boundary) pursuant to the provision of Item 1, Article 15 of the Special Law of Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster had occurred.
22		4:00	04:15 Vicinity of MP2: Radioactive materials such as iodine within the power station site (outdoor areas) measured by the monitoring van were rising, and therefore determined, as follows, that a specific event (abnormal rise of radiation at site boundary) pursuant to the provision of Item 1, Article 15 of the Special Law of Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster had occurred.
23		9:00	09:27 Vicinity of MP3: Radioactive materials such as iodine within the power station site (outdoor areas) measured by the monitoring van were rising, and therefore determined, as follows, that a specific event (abnormal rise of radiation at site boundary) pursuant to the provision of Item 1, Article 15 of the Special Law of Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster had occurred.
24		21:00	21:37 Vicinity of power station main gate: Radioactive materials such as iodine within the power station site (outdoor areas) measured by the monitoring van were rising, and therefore determined, as follows, that a specific event (abnormal rise of radiation at site boundary) pursuant to the provision of Item 1, Article 15 of the Special Law of Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster had occurred.
25	Tuesday, March 15	6:00	06:51 Vicinity of power station main gate: Radioactive materials such as iodine within the power station site (outdoor areas) measured by the monitoring van were rising, and therefore determined, as follows, that a specific event (abnormal rise of radiation at site boundary) pursuant to the provision of Item 1, Article 15 of the Special Law of Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster had occurred.
26		8:00	08:11 Vicinity of power station main gate: Radioactive materials such as iodine within the power station site (outdoor areas) measured by the monitoring van were rising, and therefore determined, as follows, that a specific event (abnormal rise of radiation at site boundary) pursuant to the provision of Item 1, Article 15 of the Special Law of Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster had occurred.
27		16:00	16:17 Vicinity of power station main gate: Radioactive materials such as iodine within the power station site (outdoor areas) measured by the monitoring van were rising, and therefore determined, as follows, that a specific event (abnormal rise of radiation at site boundary) pursuant to the provision of Item 1, Article 15 of the Special Law of Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster had occurred.
28		23:00	23:05 Vicinity of power station main gate: Radioactive materials such as iodine within the power station site (outdoor areas) measured by the monitoring van were rising, and therefore determined, as follows, that a specific event (abnormal rise of radiation at site boundary) pursuant to the provision of Item 1, Article 15 of the Special Law of Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster had occurred.

2号機

	A	B	C
1	Chronology at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station after onset of the Tohoku Great Earthquake		
2	Unit 2		
3	Friday, March 11	14:00	14:46 Due to the Miyagi Prefecture Offshore Earthquake, turbine and reactor were shut down automatically. Out of two lines of off-site power, one line was shut down due to failure, which caused the loss of off-site power, and the emergency diesel generator was started automatically.
4		15:00	15:23 Employees of Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station confirmed the first wave of tsunami. 15:41 Emergency diesel generator failed. Loss of all AC power. 15:42 Determined that a specific event pursuant to the provision of Item 1, Article 10 of the Special Law of Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster had occurred. The first emergency order was issued.
5		16:00	16:36 Determined, as a preemptive measure, that a specific event pursuant to the provision of Item 1, Article 15 of the Special Law of Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster had occurred because flow rate of the emergency core cooling system could not be confirmed.
6		18:00	18:14(Approximately) A radiation monitoring van measured radioactive materials inside and outside power station site (outdoor areas) and confirmed that the levels were normal and no radiological consequence in the external areas at that point.
7		22:00	22:00 Reactor water level gauge regained its function and the reactor water level was confirmed to be TAF+3400mm.
8	Saturday, March 12	2:00	02:50 Confirmed that Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system (hereinafter referred to as RCIC) was in operation. Reactor pressure: 5.6MPa RCIC discharge pressure: 6.0MPa Reactor water level: TAF+3,600mm
9		13:00	13:25 Determined that reactor was in a state of "loss of cooling function," based on the drop of rector water level, possibly caused by loss of RCIC function. Reactor water level: TAF+3,400mm ↓ 2,400mm (12:00) (13:24) 13:34 Conducted reactor depressurization operation and initiated seawater injection. Reactor water level: TAF±0mm (Fuel region) Reactor pressure: 6.998MPa D/W pressure:0.42MPa abs
10		15:00	15:00 Reactor water level: TAF+1,200mm (Fuel region) Reactor pressure: 7.618～7.515MPa D/W pressure:0.44MPa abs S/C pressure:Unavailable
11		16:00	16:00 Reactor water level: TAF+300mm(Fuel region) Reactor pressure: 7.448MPa D/W pressure:0.42MPa abs S/C pressure:Unavailable 16:34 Conducted reactor depressurization operation and initiated seawater injection using fire protection line.
12		17:00	17:17 Reached TAF (Top of Active Fuel)
	Monday,	18:00	18:22 Reactor water level reached −3,700mm from TAF and determined that the

13	March 14		entire fuel was exposed.
14		19:00	19:03 Reactor water level: Downscale Reactor pressure: 0.63MPa D/W pressure:0.40MPa abs S/C pressure:Unavailable 19:57 Started the second fire pump and water injection into reactor was in progress.
15		21:00	21:20 During seawater injection into reactor using fire protection line, closed two safety relief valves, and confirmed start of recovery of reactor water level. 21:30 Reactor water level: TAF−3000mm(Fuel region) Reactor pressure: 0.49MPa D/W pressure:0.457MPa abs S/C pressure:Unavailable
16		22:00	22:23 Confirmed 3,170 μ Sv/h (21:37) in the vicinity of power station main gate, and determined that "to which abnormal rise of radiation at site boundary" was applicable. 22:40 Reactor water level: TAF−700mm(Fuel region) Reactor pressure: 0.428MPa D/W pressure:0.428MPa abs S/C pressure:0.35MPa abs 22:50 D/W pressure (540Pa) exceeded the maximum operating pressure of 427KPa, and determined that "abnormal pressure rise of containment vessel" had occurred.
17	Tuesday, March 15	3:00	03:00 Reactor water level: Downscale Reactor pressure: 0.653MPa D/W pressure:0.75MPa abs S/C pressure:0.33MPa abs
18		5:00	Reactor water level: Downscale Reactor pressure: 0.626MPa D/W pressure:0.75MPa abs S/C pressure:0.30MPa abs
19		6:00	6:14 Large impact noises occurred. Transferred Fukushima Daiichi Emergency Headquarters to Fukushima Daini, and initiated evacuation. (About fifty members remained in the headquarters.) 6:20 Reactor water level: TAF−2,700mm(Fuel region) Reactor pressure: 0.612MPa D/W pressure:0.73MPa abs S/C pressure:0MPa abs 6:51 Confirmed 583.7 μ Sv/h (6:50) in the vicinity of power station main gate, and determined that "abnormal rise of radiation at site boundary" was applicable.
20		8:00	8:25 TEPCO employees confirmed white smoke (seemingly steam) from the wall in the vicinity of fifth floor of the reactor building.
21		9:00	9:40 Confirmed that amount of white smoke from the reactor building was increasing. No TEPCO internal records of contacting fire department, etc. were confirmed.
22		11:00	11:25 Reactor water level: TAF−1,400mm(Fuel region) Reactor pressure: 0.315MPa D/W pressure:0.155MPa abs S/C pressure:Downscale
23		16:00	16:00 Confirmed 531.6 μ Sv/h in the vicinity of power station main gate, and determined that "abnormal rise of radiation at site boundary" was applicable.

3号機

	A	B	C
1	Chronology at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station after onset of the Tohoku Great Earthquake		
2	Unit 3		
3	Friday, March 11	14:00	14:46 Due to the Miyagi Prefecture Offshore Earthquake, turbine and reactor were shut down automatically. Out of two lines of off-site power, one line was shut down due to failure, which caused the loss of off-site power, and the emergency diesel generator was started automatically.
4		15:00	15:23 Employees of Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station confirmed the first wave of tsunami. 15:41 Emergency diesel generator failed. Loss of all AC power. 15:42 Determined that a specific event pursuant to the provision of Item 1, Article 10 of the Special Law of Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster had occurred. The first emergency order was issued.
5		18:00	18:14 (Approximately) A radiation monitoring van measured radioactive materials inside and outside power station site (outdoor areas) and confirmed that the levels were normal and no radiological consequence in the external areas at that point.
6	3月13日(日)	2:00	02:44 High Pressure Core Injection system (hereinafter referred to as HPCI) was shut down Due to low reactor pressure Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system (hereinafter referred to as RCIC) did not operate. D/D fire protection pump (discharge pressure of 0.61MPa) was started but unable to inject. Reactor pressure: 0.58MPa Reactor water level: Unavailable due to loss of instrumentation power
7		3:00	03:44 Reactor pressure: 4.1MPa
8		4:00	04:15 Reached TAF.
9		5:00	05:00 Reactor water level: TAF-2000mm (Fuel region) 05:10 Determined that reactor was in a state of "loss of cooling function," based on the failure of reactor water injection by RCIC.
10		7:00	07:39 Conducted containment vessel spray. 07:45 Reactor water level: TAF-3000mm (Fuel region) Reactor pressure: 7.31MPa D/W pressure: 460kPa abs S/P pressure: 440kPa abs
11		8:00	08:41 Conducted operation to depressurize reactor containment vessel. 08:56 Confirmed 882 μSv/h (08:23) at MP4, and determined that "to which abnormal rise of radiation at site boundary" was applicable.
12		9:00	09:03(Approximately) Conducted rapid depressurization by SR valve of Unit 3. Reactor water level: TAF+1800mm (Fuel region) Reactor pressure: 0.46MPa D/W pressure: 637kPa S/P pressure: 590kPa 09:20 Confirmed decreasing trend of D/W pressure. Initiated preparation for water injection into reactor by fire protection line.
13		11:00	11:25 D/D fire protection pump in operation.
			14:15 Confirmed 905 μSv/h (13:50) at MP4, and determined that "abnormal

14		14:00	rise of radiation at site boundary" was applicable.
15		18:00	18:45 Seawater injection into reactor was in progress with temporary seawater injection pump connected to fire protection line. Reactor water level: TAF-1800mm (Fuel region) Reactor pressure: 0.25MPa D/W pressure: 420kPa abs
16		22:00	22:15 D/D fire protection pump was shut off. (Shut off before fuel run out.)
17		23:00	23:30 Reactor water level: TAF-1800mm (Fuel region) Reactor pressure: 0.066MPa D/W pressure: 250kPa abs
18	Monday, March 14	1:00	01:10 Sea water being injected into reactor was running out, so temporary seawater injection pump was shut down to replenish seawater in check valve pit.
19		2:00	02:00 Reactor water level: TAF-1800mm (Fuel region) Reactor pressure: 0.077MPa D/W pressure: 256kPa abs
20		3:00	03:00 Reactor water level: TAF-2300mm (Fuel region) Reactor pressure: 0.134MP D/W pressure: 315kPa abs 03:20 Resumed seawater injection into Unit 3 reactor with temporary seawater injection pump.
21		4:00	04:00 Reactor water level: TAF-2800mm (Fuel region) Reactor pressure: 0.159MPa D/W pressure: 340kPa abs
22		5:00	05:00 Reactor water level: TAF-2000mm (Fuel region) Reactor pressure: 0.181MPa D/W pressure: 365kPa abs
23		6:00	06:00 Reactor water level: TAF-2350mm (Fuel region) Reactor pressure: 0.181MPa D/W pressure: 425kPa abs
24		7:00	07:00 Reactor water level: Overscale Reactor pressure: 0.338MPa D/W pressure: 520kPa abs 07:44 Determined that "containment vessel pressure abnormal rise" had occurred due to D/W pressure of 460kPa. (Maximum operating pressure is 427kPa.) (06:10)
25		8:00	08:00 Reactor water level: TAF-1000mm (Fuel region) Reactor pressure: 0.31MPa D/W pressure: 500kPa abs
26		9:00	09:05 Reactor water level: TAF-1500mm (Fuel region) Reactor pressure: 0.304MPa D/W pressure: 490kPa abs
27		11:00	11:01 Phenomenon seemingly an explosion occurred and white smoke was generated. 11:25 Reactor water level: TAF-1800mm (Fuel region) Reactor pressure: 0.191MPa D/W pressure: 360kPa abs No internal records of contacting fire department, etc. were confirmed. 11:43 Seemed that one person was injured and six were missing. Off-site center requested three ambulances..
28		12:00	12:15 Four TEPCO employees and two workers were injured. Seven Self Defense Force members were evacuated.
29	Tuesday, March 15	6:00	06:00~06:10 Confirmed steam was floating above the Unit 3 reactor building.
30		10:00	10:00 (Approximately) Confirmed 400mSv/h inside land side of reactor building
31	Wednesday, March 16	8:00	08:30 (Approximately) Confirmed steam-like haze coming out of reactor building.

32	Thursday, March 17	6:00	06:15(Approximately) A quick report of temporary rise of pressure indication of pressure suppression pool was made.
33		9:48	09:48 Conducted watering from Self Defense Force helicopter.
34		19:00	Shortly after 19:00 Watering from riot police high pressure water gun truck and Self Defense Force fire engine was started, and finished at 20:09.

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	A	B	C
1	Chronology at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station after onset of the Tohoku Great Earthquake		
2	Unit 4		
3	Friday, March 11	14:00	14:46 Due to the Miyagi Prefecture Offshore Earthquake, turbine and reactor were shut down automatically. Out of two lines of off-site power, one line was shut down due to failure, which caused the loss of off-site power, and the emergency diesel generator was started automatically.
4		15:00	15:23 Employees of Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station confirmed the first wave of tsunami. 15:41 Emergency diesel generator failed. Loss of all AC power.
5	Monday, March 14	4:00	04:08 Spent fuel pool temperature : 84°C
6	Tuesday, March 15	6:00	06:00~06:10 Large impact noises occurred. Discovered damage near ceiling of reactor building fifth floor. 06:50 Confirmed 583.7 μ Sv/h in the vicinity of power station main gate. Determined that "abnormal rise of radiation at site boundary" was applicable. 06:51
7		8:00	08:11 Confirmed damage of reactor building. Determined that "abnormal release of radioactive materials" due to fire, explosion, etc. 08:20 Confirmed 807 μ Sv/h in the vicinity of power station main gate.
8		9:00	09:38 Confirmed breakout of fire in the vicinity of northwest corner of reactor building third floor.... More information was being collected by the person who discovered fire. *Motor-driven reactor coolant recirculation unit (containing oil) is installed in the vicinity of northwest corner of reactor building third floor. 09:40 (Approximately) Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station requested public fire department for mobilization of fire fighters. Explanation by the management of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station was asked, but Fukushima Daiichi was unable to give explanation due to on-going response to the fire in the field. Unable to contact Self Defense Forces and US forces for requesting cooperation.
9		10:00	10:00 (Approximately) Confirmed 100mSv/h inside land side of reactor building.
10		11:00	11:00 (Approximately) TEPCO employees checked the situation of the reactor building fire in the field and confirmed that fire was naturally out. No flame or smoke was seen from the yard and therefore it was considered that fire had died down.)
11		16:00	16:00 Confirmed 531.6 μ Sv/h in the vicinity of power station main gate. Determined that "abnormal rise of radiation at site boundary" was applicable.
12	Wednesday, March 16	5:00	05:45 TEPCO employees confirmed flame was coming out near northwest of reactor building fourth floor.
13		6:00	06:20 Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station reported fire and requested public fire department for mobilization of fire fighters. Fire fighters were mobilized.

From:	Champ, Billie
To:	Commission E-Reader Distribution; E-Reader Distribution
Subject:	COMMISSION E-READER....MONDAY, MARCH 14, 2011
Date:	Monday, March 14, 2011 11:42:34 AM
Attachments:	Tab A 03-11-11 Markey 11-0110.pdf Tab B 03-10-11 Mull-DOS 11-0114.pdf Tab C 03-04-11 Obama 11-0112.pdf Tab D 03-04-11 Berry 11-0111 .pdf dailymemos.doc

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Some of the information contained in the Reader is not publicly available.
If there are any questions, please contact SECY.

READING FILE

INDEX

March 14, 2011

INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE

Tab "A" 03/11/11 -- Letter from Congressman Markey, requests information related to the potential impacts of the earthquake in Japan and their nuclear facilities, as well as on the implications for U.S. domestic industry.

Tab "B" 03/10/11 -- Memorandum from Stephen Mull, DOS, concerns Protection of Data, Captions and Removable Media.

Tab "C" 03/04/11 -- Memorandum from President Obama, concerns Enhanced Collection of Relevant Data and Statistics Relating to Women.

Tab "D" 03/04/11 -- Letter from John Berry, concerns the working group to examine veteran's preference in the Federal government.

EB/14

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 10, 2011

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIES

SUBJECT: Protection of Data, Captions and Removable Media

The Department of State remains committed to sharing information, including its sensitive diplomatic cables, with its interagency partners, as appropriate. To ensure the Department's messages are delivered only to appropriate officials, State cables contain conspicuous markings that indicate how they should be handled and disseminated. Cables are marked with the classification as well as handling requirements, such as NOFORN. Cables are marked with TAGS (Traffic Analysis by Geography and Subject – Tab B) to ensure that they are routed to relevant officials. Classification and handling markings, as well as TAGS, indicate the sensitivity of the information contained in the cables. Captions may also be used to denote the Department's most sensitive cable traffic (Tab C).

While agencies review information security practices as the Office of Management and Budget directed in its memorandum M-11-08 of January 3, on safeguarding national security information, the Department of State would like to reiterate the stringent requirements that other agencies must meet as a condition for continued access to the Department's diplomatic reporting. In particular, cables marked with the distribution captions EXDIS (exclusive distribution) and NODIS (no distribution) must be handled with utmost sensitivity.

EXDIS cables are used for highly sensitive exchanges between Washington and chiefs of mission. We ask that you ensure access to this information is given only to those who have an essential need to know. Other agencies may not reproduce or excerpt information contained in EXDIS cables without prior approval from the State Department Operations Center. Documents bearing the EXDIS caption must be treated at a minimum as NOFORN. EXDIS is analogous to DoD messages that are designated as SPECAT. SPECAT messages are classified messages identified with specific projects or subjects that require special handling procedures supplemental to those imposed by the security classification.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

The special handling procedures ensure the message will be handled and viewed only by properly cleared and authorized personnel.

The distribution of NODIS cables is even more carefully controlled. This caption is reserved for exchanges of the highest sensitivity between the President, the Secretary of State, and our chiefs of mission at embassies overseas. NODIS cables are eyes-only, to be read solely by named individuals or those designated to receive NODIS. Such messages may not be shown to anyone other than the addressee – even if the named individual determines that those under his authority have a need to know – without prior approval from the Department of State's Operations Center. Moreover, other agencies may not reproduce or excerpt information contained in NODIS cables without prior approval from the State Department Operations Center. NODIS subcategory cables are of particular sensitivity and must be handled with the utmost care and receive even more limited distribution. NODIS is equivalent to DoD messages designated as SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR messages provide transmission and handling security in addition to the highest degree of privacy between individuals. For further information on the handling of NODIS cables, please see the ExecSec message dated April 7, 2010 (Tab D).

The Department requests the immediate removal of any State traffic, especially bearing EXDIS or NODIS captions, that is inappropriately made available (e.g. through email or posted on widely accessible databases).

In addition, agencies are reminded that special attention is required regarding the acceptable use of removable and portable media on your classified networks on which Department of State messages are stored or transmitted. The State Department requires adherence to CNSS Advisory Memorandum Information Assurance 01-10 guidance regarding reducing the risk of removable media on National Security Systems (Tab E).

Stephen D. Mull
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
Tab A - List of addressees
Tab B - 5 FAH-3 H-100 Subject TAGS Definitions

Tab C - Foreign Affairs Manual 12 FAM 539.3 Authorized Special Distribution Captions
Tab D - ExecSec on Handling NODIS Cables, dtd April 7, 2010
Tab E - CNSS Advisory Memorandum Information Assurance 01-10 December 2010

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Office of Personnel Management	Mr. [illegible] Lowe	Director, Executive Secretariat and Ombudsman	Room 5315 1900 E Street, NW Washington, DC 20415-0001	(202) 606-5100	(202) 606-3574	[illegible]@opm.gov
Office of Science and Technology Policy	Mr. Jim Kohlenberger	Chief of Staff	New Executive Office Building 725 17th Street, NW Washington, DC 20502	(202) 456-7116	(202) 456-6021	(b)(6)
Office of the Director of National Intelligence	Mr. [illegible] Brennan	Executive Secretary	Office of the Director of National Intelligence Washington, DC 20511	(703) 275-3[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]@dni.gov

Office of the Vice President	Mr. Antony J. Blinken	Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs	Room 246A Eisenhower Executive Office Building Washington, DC 20501	(202) 456-2730	(202) 456-9500	
Overseas Private Investment Corporation	Ms. Elizabeth Littlefield	President and Chief Executive Officer	Suite 700 1100 New York Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20527-0001	(202) 336-8401	(202) 408-5192	elizabeth.littlefield@opic.gov
Peace Corps	Mr. James F. Cuffe	Executive Secretary	Office of the Director Room 8113 1111 20th Street, NW Washington, DC 20526	(202) 692-2103	(202) 692-2101	jcuffe@peacecorps.gov
Pennsylvania Avenue Corporation	Mr. Conrad Cecil	Director	12th Floor 1200 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20005-4026	(202) 326-4000	(202) 326-4153	cecilc@pennavenue.gov
President's Intelligence Advisory Board	Ms. Stefanie R. Osburn	Executive Director	Room 5020 New Executive Office Building Washington, DC 20503	(202) 456-2353	(202) 395-3403	
President's Commission [illegible]	[illegible]	Deputy Chief of Staff to the Secretary	Smithsonian Institution Building 1000 Jefferson Drive, SW Washington, DC 20013-7012	(202) 633-5110	(202) 786-1783	[illegible]
Social Security Administration	Ms. Robin F. Kaplan		Executive Secretariat Office of the Commissioner Social Security Administration Altmeyer Building, 6401 Security Boulevard, Room 922 Baltimore, MD 21235	(410) 965-3462	(202) 358-6076	SSAExecSec@ssa.gov
United States Agency for International Development	[illegible]	Deputy Executive Secretary	Ronald Reagan Building Room 6.08-102 14th and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20523	(202) 712-0700	(202) 216-3797	[illegible]
United States Commission for the Preservation of America's Heritage Abroad	Ms. Katrina A. Krzysztofiak	Program Manager	1400 K Street, NW Suite 401 Washington, DC 20005	(202) 254-3824	(202) 254-3934	uscommission@heritageabroad.gov
United States Commission of Fine Arts	[illegible]	Secretary	National Building Museum 401 F Street, NW Washington, DC 20001	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
United States Commission on Civil Rights	Mr. Martin J. Dannenfelser, Jr.	Staff Director	Suite 700 624 9th Street, NW Washington, DC 20425	(202) 376-7700	(202) 376-7672	mdannenfelser@usccr.gov
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum	[illegible]	Director, Human Resources	625 Indiana Avenue, NW Suite 700 Washington, DC 20004-2912	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum	Ms. Sara J. Bloomfield	Director	100 Raoul Wallenberg Place, SW Washington, DC 20024-2150	(202) 488-0415	(202) 488-2606	
United States Institute of Peace	[illegible]	President	1200 17th Street, NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20036-3011	(202) 457-1835	(202) 429-6063	[illegible]
United States International Trade Commission	Mr. Stephen M. McLaughlin	Director	Office of Administration Room 316A 500 E Street, SW Washington, DC 20436	(202) 205-3131	(202) 205-2034	stephen.mclaughlin@usitc.gov
United States Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission	Mr. Ray H. Darling, Jr.	Executive Secretary	One Lafayette Centre 1120 20th Street, NW, 9th Floor Washington, DC 20036-3457	(202) 606-5400	(202) 606-5050	rdarling@oshrc.gov
United States Postal Service	Mr. Patrick R. Donahoe	Postmaster General and Chief Executive Officer	Room 10022 475 L'Enfant Plaza West, SW Washington, DC 20260-2000	(202) 268-2000	(202) 268-4860	patrick.r.donahoe@usps.gov

United States Securities and Exchange Commission	Ms. Pamela L. Hare	Director	Office of International Affairs Room 10960 100 F Street, NE Washington, DC 20549	(202) 551-6690	(202) 772-9280/9281	[redacted]
United States Small Business Administration	Ms. Kim Bradley	Director and Executive Secretariat	Office of the Executive Secretariat Office of Management and Administration 409 3rd Street, SW, 5th Floor Washington, DC 20416	(202) 205-2410	(202) 481-0888	SBAExecSec@sba.gov; kim.bradley@sba.gov
United States Trade and Development Agency	Mr. Leonard Lai	Director	Office of the Director 1000 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 1600 Arlington, VA 22209-3901	(703) 875-4357	(703) 875-4009	[redacted]
United States Trade Representative	Mr. Kenneth O. Thompson	Executive Secretary	Room 216, Winder Building 600 17th Street, NW Washington, DC 20508	(202) 395-0317	(202) 395-4549	(b)(6)

U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Handbook Volume 5 Handbook 3
5 FAH-3 H-100 Subject TAGS Definitions

This 115-page TAGS/Terms Handbook is located at the following URL:

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/89261.pdf

12 FAM 539.3 Authorized Special Distribution Captions

(CT:DS-157; 05-14-2010) (Uniform State, USAID, OPIC, TDP)

a. **NO DISTRIBUTION (NODIS)** means no distribution to other than addressee without the approval of the Executive Secretary. This caption is used only on messages of the highest sensitivity between the President, the Secretary of State, and chiefs of mission. Documents bearing this special distribution caption *must* be treated as NOFORN. *In addition to the caption handling requirements,* these documents must be given the physical protection prescribed by their classification. *(*See 5 FAH-4 for additional guidance.*)*

b. **EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION (EXDIS)** means distribution exclusively to officers with essential need-to-know. This caption is used only for highly sensitive traffic between the White House, the Secretary, the Under Secretaries, and chiefs of mission. Documents bearing this special distribution caption *must* be treated *at a minimum* as NOFORN. *In addition to the caption handling requirements,* these documents must be given the physical protection prescribed by their classification. *(*See 5 FAH-4 for additional guidance.*)*

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d. For details regarding caption messages, *(see 5 FAH-4 H-314.7).*

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 7, 2010

S/ES 201006149

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM TO:

MR. NATHAN D. TIBBITS
Executive Secretary
National Security Council

MS. JANET M. STIEGLER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. RICHARD BOLSON
Special Assistant to the
Chairman for Interagency Affairs
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. JUNG Y. CHOI
Executive Secretary
Office of the Director for
National Intelligence

MR. PHILIP MCNAMARA
Executive Secretary
Department of Homeland Security

LT COLONEL ALFREDO NAJERA
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. TENE A. DOLPHIN
Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

MS. CONNIE TURNER
Acting Executive Secretary
U.S. Agency for International
Development

MS. ERICA DE VOS
Director
Office of the Executive Secretariat
Department of Energy

MS. LISA MONACO
Associate Deputy Attorney General
Department of Justice

Subject: Appropriate Handling of NODIS material

Daniel B. Smith
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Memorandum on NODIS handling.

UNCLASSIFIED

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 7, 2010

UNCLASSIFIED

TO: Interagency Executive Secretaries

FROM: Daniel B. Smith, Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Appropriate Handling of NODIS material

This memo serves as a reminder regarding the appropriate handling for U.S. Department of State NODIS telegrams.

NODIS is used for messages of the highest sensitivity between the President, the Secretary of State, and our Chiefs of Mission at embassies overseas. NODIS telegrams are eyes-only, to be read solely by named individuals or those designated to receive NODIS. They may not be shown to anyone other than the addressee - even if the named individual determines that those under his authority have a need to know - without prior approval from the Department of State's Operations Center (S/ES-O). Similarly, information contained in NODIS telegrams may not be reproduced or used in other agencies' products without prior approval from S/ES-O. NODIS subcategory messages are of particular sensitivity and must be handled with the utmost care.

NODIS telegrams are not to be photocopied or further transmitted electronically and must be stored and safeguarded appropriately. We request that your agency classify or administratively control, as NOFORN, all NODIS telegrams. If more than one agency official has been authorized to see NODIS material, recipient agencies should maintain an official record of all those who read each incoming NODIS message.

Thank you for your vigilance and attention in safeguarding NODIS material.

CNSS Advisory Memorandum Information Assurance 01-10
December 2010

Advisory Memorandum
Reducing the Risk of Removable Media in National Security Systems
CNSS Advisory Memorandum Information Assurance 01-10

NATIONAL MANAGER

FOREWORD

1. Using removable media presents serious risks to the security of National Security Systems (NSS). Risks include the loss/compromise of data and the unauthorized transfer of classified national security information. This Advisory Memorandum establishes additional criteria for using removable media with NSS. (For additional information please reference CNSSP 26, "National Policy on Reducing the Risk of Removable Media" (Reference a).)
2. I encourage dissemination of the contents of this Advisory Memorandum to all Government entities, contractors, or agents engaged in Information Assurance (IA) activities associated with NSS.
3. In addition to this Advisory Memorandum, further configuration guidance is available to assist operators and users of NSS with mitigating the threats named herein. The National Security Agency (NSA) is available to provide technical consulting to CNSS members to assist in threat mitigation. For further information, please contact your IAD Client Advocate office at (410) 854-4790 or call the CNSS at (410) 854-6805.
4. Additional copies of this Advisory Memorandum may be obtained at www.cnss.gov.

FOR THE NATIONAL MANAGER:
//s//
DEBORA A. PLUNKETT CNSS Advisory Memorandum Information Assurance 01-10

Advisory Memorandum
Reducing the Risk of Removable Media in National Security Systems

SECTION I - APPLICABILITY

1. This Advisory Memorandum is issued under the authority of Reference b and applies to all Executive Departments and Agencies and to all U.S. Government contractors and agents who operate or use National Security Systems (NSS) as defined in Reference c.

SECTION II – BACKGROUND

2. The use of removable media resulting in unauthorized data transfers on classified networks is a serious risk to the security of NSS and, thus, of great concern to all Executive Departments and Agencies. In addition to the requirements found in Reference a, the following guidelines are intended to reduce and mitigate the unauthorized release of sensitive or classified data from NSS and thereby increase their security. This guidance is based on current best practices for limiting the security risks of using removable media on NSS. As stated in Reference a, a layered defense that addresses training, technology, procedures and personal accountability is encouraged to manage risks to NSS that result from the use of removable media.

3. Removable media is defined as portable electronic storage media such as magnetic, optical, and solid state devices, which can be inserted into and removed from a computing device, and which is used to store text, video, audio, and image information. Such devices have no independent processing capabilities. Examples include hard disks, floppy disks, zip drives, compact disks (CDs), DVDs, thumb drives, pen drives, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) (to include smart phones) and similar USB storage devices.

SECTION III – GUIDANCE

4. Operators and users of NSS should begin using physical configuration, software settings, a capability such as a Host-Based Security System (HBSS) (a DoD capability designed to address exploit traffic on network hosts), or any combination of these, to disable all "write" privileges for all forms of removable media devices on NSS. Ensure all removable media is prohibited from use on all NSS workstations unless specifically authorized by appropriate authority.

5. The following functions should be performed to prevent unauthorized data transfers from occurring on NSS:

a) Direct all personnel to cease data transfers on NSS unless approved by appropriate authority and until adequate technical measures are put in place.
b) Implement technical capabilities to limit write functionality (Windows, Mac, Linux, Unix, etc.) to only those authorized servers, systems, and stand-alone workstations which have a valid operational need and mission requirement.

c) Provide written authorization to the organization's Information Assurance Manager (IAM) for each user approved to use removable media.

d) Provide written authorization to the organization's Information Assurance Manager (IAM) for each server, system, and stand-alone workstations approved to use removable media.

e) Set guidelines and procedures for approval/disapproval of removable media use on NSS.

f) Write access auditing should be enabled for all removable USB, Firewire, Windows Portable Devices (WPD) (including MP3 players and PDAs) and PC Cards. In addition, this audit log should be reviewed on a weekly basis to ensure only authorized users are performing these write functions, and looking for any abnormal large file transfers to these media types.

g) Identify and report violations of requirements and procedures identified in this document to the organization's senior leadership to determine needed corrective action.

h) Ensure the acceptable use and approval process for the use of removable media devices is included in the organization's network user training programs.

i) Maintain a list of all personnel and systems that have been authorized to use removable media devices on NSS within their environment, and review and update on a regular basis.

j) Conduct random and periodic inspections to ensure compliance with organization policy and report findings to appropriate authorities.

6. Operators and users of NSS should establish a program for authorized personnel responsible for conducting "read/write/download" data transfers within their area of responsibility. The authorized personnel should be required to:

a) Agree to comply with organizationally-directed rules for conducting data transfers on NSS via user agreement.

b) Acquire prior written approval from the appropriate authority before conducting data transfers to or from NSS.
c) Only use removable media in manner specifically authorized by the appropriate authority.

d) Identify and report any violations within their authority.

e) Physically protect removable media used in NSS.

f) Report lost/stolen removable media used in NSS.

g) Ensure all data transfers on NSS are authorized by appropriate authority.

h) Only perform approved data transfer requests.

i) Request a read receipt verifying only the intended recipient has received the transferred data.

j) Record all data transfers performed and provide status to the organization's leadership every 30 days.

7. Operators and users should label and use removable media devices as follows:

a) Ensure all removable media devices are clearly labeled and traceable by a bar code tag or a serial number to an assigned authorized individual.

b) For small devices, provide clearly labeled lanyards or other attached external marking to reduce the risk of misplacement or theft.

c) Ensure proper classification markings, storing, transportation, and destruction of all removable media.

d) Ensure removable media that are US Government-owned have been purchased from an authorized and trusted source.

e) Scan removable media for malicious software using approved methods before introducing the media into any NSS.

f) Limit use of removable media to authorized personnel with appropriate training.

g) Sanitize, destroy, and/or dispose of removable media used in NSS in accordance with an approved method, if the media are no longer required.
h) Implement a program to track, account for, and safeguard all acquired removable media, as well as to track and audit all data transfers.

i) Conduct both scheduled and random inspections to ensure compliance with applicable guidance regarding the use of removable media.

j) Implement system-level software restriction rules in order to significantly reduce the potential for malicious code execution by removable media.

k) Maintain a consistent operating system image that reflects the enterprise's secure default configuration for all software that the enterprise uses.

8. Operators and users of NSS are strongly recommended to: a) Implement this guidance, evaluate its effectiveness and share lessons learned and best practices with other operators and users of NSS.

b) Ensure resources are available to implement this guidance.

c) Incorporate the content of this guidance into user training and awareness programs.

d) Publish and implement emergency response procedures.

9. Further configuration guidance is available to assist operators and users of NSS with mitigating the threats named in this Advisory Memorandum. The National Security Agency (NSA) is available to provide technical consulting to CNSS members to assist in threat mitigation. For further information, please contact your IAD Client Advocate office at (410) 854-4790 or call the CNSS at (410) 854-6805.

SECTION V – REFERENCES

10. The following references apply to this directive: a) CNSSP No. 26, "National Policy on Reducing the Risk of Removable Media," dated November 2010.

b) National Security Directive 42, "National Policy for the Security of National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems," dated July 5, 1990.

c) CNSS Instruction No. 4009, "National Information Assurance Glossary," dated April 26, 2010.

From:	Champ, Billie
To:	Commission E-Reader Distribution; E-Reader Distribution
Subject:	COMMISSION E-READER....FRIDAY, MARCH 18, 2011
Date:	Friday, March 18, 2011 11:14:22 AM
Attachments:	Tab A 03-16-11 Senators Boxer and Feinstein 11-0127 .pdf Tab B 03-16-11 -- Merlino.pdf Tab C 03-14-11 Armijo.pdf Tab D 02-24-11 Ferriero-NARA 11-0121.pdf Tab E 02-15-11 Alexander-DOD 11-0123.pdf Tab F 03-17-11 FRN.pdf Tab G 03-16-11 FRN-10 Part 52.pdf

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~~INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

Some of the information contained in the Reader is not publicly available.
If there are any questions, please contact SECY.

READING FILE

INDEX

March 18, 2011

INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE

Tab "A" 03/16/11 -- Letter from Senators Barbara Boxer and Diane Feinstein, concerns the safety of nuclear power plants in the U.S. specifically, Diablo Canyon.

Tab "B" 03/16/11 -- Letter from Sandra Merlino, concerns Nye County Resolution No. 2011-21 supporting completion of the NRC's review of Yucca Mountain license application.

Tab "C" 03/14/11 -- Memorandum from Frank Armijo, concerns solicitation No. 33-11-325 entitled "Information Infrastructure Services and Support (ITISS)."

Tab "D" 02/24/11 -- Memorandum from David Ferriero, NARA, concerns checklist of current NARA bulletins and list of records management guidance in effect.

Tab "E" 02/15/11 -- Memorandum from Keith Alexander, DOD, requests nominations for the Annual Rowlett Information Assurance Awards.

OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE

Tab "F" 03/17/11-- Federal Register Notice: Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. .. Meeting Notice.

Tab "G" 03/16/11 -- Federal Register Notice: 10 CFR Part 52 ESBWR

EB/15

Design Certification.

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

March 16, 2011

The Honorable Gregory Jaczko
Chairman
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Chairman Jaczko:

The unfolding nuclear disaster in Japan has raised questions about the safety of nuclear power plants here in the U.S. As Senators from California, we are particularly interested in the safety of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, located in San Clemente, and the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant near San Luis Obispo, both of which are near earthquake faults.

Roughly 424,000 live within 50 miles of the Diablo Canyon and 7.4 million live within 50 miles of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station. Although many safety measures have been taken to address potential hazards associated with these facilities, we need to ensure that the risk is fully evaluated.

For example, a 2008 California Energy Commission report presented very clear warnings of potential threats at both of these plants. This report found that the San Onofre plant could experience "larger and more frequent earthquakes" than the maximum 7.0 magnitude earthquake predicted when the plant was designed. It is our understanding that the NRC has not taken action to address these warnings in the report. It is also our understanding that the 2008 report found that there is an additional fault near the Diablo Canyon plant that should be taken into consideration as part of NRC's relicensing process. We want to know if the NRC will address all of the threats, including seismic threats, described in the 2008 report at these facilities.

We ask that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) perform a thorough inspection at these two plants to evaluate their safety and emergency preparedness plans.

3/17...To EDO to Prepare Response for Chairman's Signature...Date due Comm: April 8...Cpy to: RF, OCA to Ack...11-0127 COMMISSION CORESPONDENCE

In addition, we ask the NRC to answer the questions below regarding plant design and operations, type of reactor, and preparedness to withstand an earthquake or tsunami and other potential threats.

Plant Design and Operations

1. What changes to the design or operation of these facilities have improved safety at the plants since they began operating in the mid-1980s?

2. What emergency notification systems have been installed at California nuclear power plants? Has there ever been a lapse of these systems during previous earthquakes or emergencies?

3. What safety measures are in place to ensure continued power to California reactors in the event of an extended power failure?

Type of Reactor

1. What are the differences and similarities between the reactors being used in California (pressurized water reactors) and those in Japan (boiling water reactors), as well as the facilities used to house the reactors, including the standards to which they were built and their ability to withstand natural and manmade disasters?

Earthquakes and Tsunamis

1. We have been told that both Diablo Canyon and San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station are designed to withstand the maximum credible threat at both plants, which we understand to be much less than the 9.0 earthquake that hit Japan. What assumptions have you made about the ability of both plants to withstand an earthquake or tsunami? Given the disaster in Japan, what are our options to provide these plants with a greater margin for safety?

2. Have new faults been discovered near Diablo Canyon or San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station since those plants began operations? If so, how have the plants been modified to account for the increased risk of an earthquake? How will the NRC consider information on ways to address risks posed by faults near these plants that is produced pursuant to state law or recommendations by state agencies during the NRC relicensing process?

3. What are the evacuation plans for both plants in the event of an emergency? We understand that Highway 1 is the main route out of San Luis Obispo, what is the plan for evacuation of the nearby population if an earthquake takes out portions of the highway and a nuclear emergency occurs simultaneously?

4. What is the NRC's role in monitoring radiation in the event of a nuclear accident both here and abroad? What is the role of EPA and other federal agencies?

5. What monitoring systems currently are in place to track potential impacts on the U.S., including California, associated with the events in Japan?

6. Which federal agency is leading the monitoring effort and which agencies have responsibility for assessing human health impacts? What impacts have occurred to date on the health or environment of the U.S. or are currently projected or modeled in connection with the events in Japan?

7. What contingency plans are in place to ensure that the American public is notified in the event that hazardous materials associated with the events in Japan pose an imminent threat to the U.S.?

The NRC was created in the mid-1970s specifically to ensure the protection of public health and safety with regard to civilian nuclear power. The Commission plays an essential role ensuring that we learn from nuclear accidents and near misses. We hope you agree that we must identify whatever lessons are to be learned from the disaster in Japan in order to make facilities in the United States as safe as possible.

We look forward to working with you to ensure the safety of our nation's nuclear power plants and to make the changes necessary to ensure a nuclear tragedy does not occur in this country.

Sincerely,

Barbara Boxer

Dianne Feinstein

OFFICE OF THE NYE COUNTY CLERK
SANDRA L. MERLINO
Nye County Courthouse
P.O. Box 1031
101 Radar Road
Tonopah, Nevada 89049
Phone: (775)482-8127
Fax: (775)482-8133
Pahrump: (775)751-7040

March 16, 2011

Sent by Certified Mail 7009 2250 0002 0430 2495

Dr. Janet Kotra
Senior Project Manager,
Division of High Level Waste Repository Safety
U.S. Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

RE: Nye County Resolution No. 2011-21

Dear Dr. Kotra,

I, Sandra L. Merlino, Nye County Clerk and Ex-Officio Clerk of the Nye County Board of Commissioners, Nye County, Nevada, have been asked to forward you a copy of Resolution No. 2011-21, a Resolution of the Nye County Board of Commissioners supporting completion of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's review of the Yucca Mountain License Application, which was adopted at its regularly scheduled meeting on March 15, 2011. Our Board would also like to ask that you please distribute copies of the Resolution to the Regulatory Commission.

Should you have any questions or need any additional information please contact me at (775) 482-8134.

Sincerely,

Sandra L. Merlino

Sandra L. Merlino
Nye County Clerk
and Ex-Officio Clerk of the Board

Enc.

Cc: Nye County Administration

3/18...PLACED IN THE COMMISSION E-READER AT THE REQUEST OF THE OEDO

NYE COUNTY RESOLUTION NO. 2011-21

A RESOLUTION OF THE NYE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS RESOLUTION SUPPORTING COMPLETION OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S REVIEW OF THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN LICENSE APPLICATION

WHEREAS, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, ("Act") selected Yucca Mountain, located in Nye County as the only site to be characterized as the nation's first high-level radioactive waste repository; and

WHEREAS, Congress in July 2002, in accordance with provisions of the Act, as amended, overrode Nevada's notice of disapproval; and

WHEREAS, Yucca Mountain was designated to be the site for development of a permanent repository for United States spent nuclear fuel and defense high level radioactive waste; and

WHEREAS, the U.S. Department of Energy ("USDOE"), in accordance with the Act, submitted a License Application (LA) to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); and

WHEREAS, that LA, in accordance with NRC regulations, was accepted for review by the NRC; and

WHEREAS, the USDOE has since requested withdrawal of its submission of the LA "with prejudice"; and

WHEREAS, the request for withdrawal has been denied by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) and challenged in Federal Court; and

WHEREAS, the Commissioners of the NRC have not issued a final ruling on their review of the ASLB decision that USDOE does not have the legal authority to withdraw the Yucca Mountain license application; and

WHEREAS, the nation needs to move forward on the established NWPA strategy that provides for the permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel and high level waste; and,

WHEREAS, the Nye County Board of Commissioners (Board) recognizes that further delays in the development of a permanent geologic repository will result in significant public expenditures and potentially jeopardizes the future expansion of nuclear power production and energy independence; and

WHEREAS, the Board is convinced that until such time as the NRC completes its review of the LA, Nye County, the State of Nevada and the nation will be denied a scientific and technical determination of the potential of the Yucca Mountain repository to be built and operated safely and successfully; and

WHEREAS, Nye County adopted Resolutions 2002-7, 2002-22 and 2004-25 defining the County's involvement as the site county for the nation's geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel and defense high level waste,

NOW THEREFORE, it hereby is resolved as follows:

1. The Yucca Mountain licensing proceedings should be restarted and the NRC should complete a thorough and detailed review of the License Application; and
2. If upon completion of the license application review by the NRC staff and the licensing proceeding before the ASLB, the conclusion is that the Yucca Mountain repository can be constructed and operated safely, Nye County reaffirms our prior resolutions and supports such construction and operation consistent with these prior resolutions ; and

APPROVED this 15th day of March, 2011.

NYE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS:

Gary Hollis, Chairman

ATTEST:

Sandra "Sam" L. Merlino, Nye County Clerk
And Ex-Officio Clerk of the Board

///

///

Lockheed Martin Corporation
2275 Research Boulevard, Rockville, MD. 20850

LOCKHEED MARTIN

March 14, 2011

To: Darren Ash, Deputy Executive Director for Corporate Management/CIO
Nuclear Regulatory Commission

From: Frank Armijo, Vice President of Energy Solutions

cc: Gregory B. Jaczko, Chairman
R. William Borchardt, Executive Director of Operations
Virginia Huth, Director of Contracts

cc: John Mengucci, IS&GS Civil President
Bob Weisenbeck, NRC Programs
Kevin Flynn, IS&GS Energy Solutions Contracts Director

Subj: Solicitation No. 33-11-325 Entitled "Information Infrastructure Services and Support (ITISS)

Lockheed Martin has partnered with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") since 2001 in the maintenance of over 100 of the NRC's Legacy Systems and in providing Development, Maintenance, Hosting and Help Desk services for NRC Mission Critical Systems like the National Source Tracking System (NSTS) and the Web Based Licensing (WBL) System. We have always met or exceeded the expectations of the NRC in performing this work.
It was therefore very disappointing to be informed by the NRC that we had not been selected for the award of Information Technology Infrastructure Services (ITISS) and to learn during the debrief discussions that we were ranked Number 1 in Technical Approach, submitted the lowest price and overall, were within 2 points of the winner.

During the debriefing, the NRC disclosed several areas where the SEP identified weaknesses in the Lockheed Martin proposal that contributed to our marginally lower score, but for which the SEP failed to consider all the information provided to them. During the debrief, we were also provided information for areas within the Contracting Officer's Rationale for Award in which Perot Systems Government Services ("PSGS") was given added value credit, but for which Lockheed Martin offered the same or better services in our proposal but were not afforded any added value credits. We believe that this kind of inconsistency calls into question the validity of the source selection process and the ultimate award decision. Because of the long-term partnership Lockheed Martin has had with the NRC, we have elected not to formally protest this award. We do, however, request that you voluntarily review and reconsider the award decision based on the information provided below.

03/17...Commission E-READER for Information

On February 18th, Lockheed Martin was notified by the NRC that PSGS had been selected for the award and that "*Lockheed's proposal earned a consensus score of 93 points out of a possible 100 points. While the proposal was determined to have strengths, it also was determined to have weaknesses that were of concern to me as the source selection official.*"

During the review of debriefing material that was provided to Lockheed Martin on February 25th and the discussions held with the NRC on March 2nd, Lockheed Martin identified multiple areas where the SEP failed to consider all the information provided that would have offset some of the weaknesses identified and therefore would have improved our overall score. While the NRC attempted to minimize the importance and impact on the scoring of some of the weaknesses identified during the debriefing discussion on March 2nd, it is apparent from the concern expressed by the Contracting Officer in his letter of February 18th that these weaknesses were a significant factor in the loss of points and strongly influenced making a best value award to PSGS even though Lockheed Martin proposed a price more than $6.5 million lower than PSGS. The most significant areas of concern to Lockheed Martin that call into question the final evaluation, selection and award decision are reflected below:

LOCKHEED MARTIN ISSUE # 1
NRC's Evaluation - Contracting Officers Rationale for Award – Objective 1
NRC's Identified Rationale:
"*Regarding Objective 1, the PSGS and LM proposals both demonstrated the ability to provide these services at the required levels for a reasonable cost/price, but PSGS' proposal went further with its Service Desk offering. PSGS' proposal exceeded the requirement for Service desk operating hours by proposing year round, 24/7, Service Desk availability. This extra degree of availability provides significant value to the agency, as many NRC staff who will utilize the ITISS contract services has nontraditional work schedules.*"

DISCUSSION:
The contracting Officer indicated that PSGS proposal was considered to provide extra value for Objective 1, despite the fact the Lockheed Martin's proposal clearly also offered 24/7 services for all core services, which includes Service Desk. In addition to the more than 15 times our proposal refers to 24/7 support for core services, Lockheed Martin also specifically states in paragraph 1.3.9 of our proposal: "The LM Team maintains a continuous onsite presence during regular business hours, and extend the service desk services to 24/7 basis." In addition, Lockheed Martin also clearly priced 24/7/365 service desk support in our cost proposal.

LOCKHEED MARTIN'S POSITION:
The NRC overlooked the fact that Lockheed Martin also bid 24/7 Service Desk support and conceded this in the March 2nd discussions. PSGS proposal should not have been adjudged as providing an advantage for Objective 1 for offering "24/7 availability" when Lockheed Martin demonstrably offered and priced the exact same feature.

LOCKHEED MARTIN ISSUE # 2
NRC's Evaluation of LM's Proposed Technical Approach (23 out of 25 Points)
NRC's Identified Weakness:
"*The SEP concluded that there are risks for the agency associated with moving the service desk, network operations, and security operations to LM's Richland, WA facility. The SEP determined that moving these vital functions outside of the agency may create unexpected disruptions to services until they can be firmly established in the new location.*"

DISCUSSION:
During the NRC debriefing meeting, Lockheed Martin was told the technical proposal was evaluated based on three pieces: Core Services; Additional services; and IT Service Management Principles. The NRC informed us that LM "nailed it" for Core Services and Additional Services but that PSGS was a little bit better in the IT Service Management Principles piece. The NRC also indicated that we were number 1 technically overall. The Service Desk and NOSC are all part of Core Services. Even though we were number one technically, we lost two points – a full eight percent of the total available points for this sub factor - with the only weakness being the potential disruption to services until they can be firmly established in the new location. This was despite the fact that the transition of the Service Desk was discussed extensively in our proposal and the Transition Plan provided parallel operations and required NRC approval before it would be moved. During the debrief, it was noted by the SEP that "*although moving the help desk would present risk, the strengths far outnumber the risks*". The NRC acknowledged this first became a concern in the May/June 2010 timeframe with the original proposal submission. Until the written debriefing evaluation received February 25, 2011, Lockheed Martin was never notified that this was a weakness. In addition, despite the agency's attempts at the debriefing to downplay the significance of this weakness, the fact that this alleged weakness caused Lockheed Martin to lose eight percent of the available points for this sub factor, leads us to the conclusion that this was a significant weakness that should have been raised with Lockheed Martin in discussions.

LOCKHEED MARTIN'S POSITION:
The NRC did not give Lockheed Martin the opportunity to address this significant weakness even though it was first identified in the May/June 2010 timeframe. Had we had the opportunity, we would have been able to demonstrate that we addressed the transition of the Service Desk both in our proposal and in our Transition Plan and could have avoided the weakness and improved our technical score.

LOCKHEED MARTIN ISSUE # 3
NRC'S Evaluation for Lockheed Martin's Proposed Corporate Experience and Past Performance, Sub factor Past Performance (7 out of 10 Points)
NRC Identified Weakness:
"*LM has struggled historically in meeting their projected small business goals on other contracts which raises a concern about their past commitment to providing subcontracting opportunities to all categories of small businesses (LM 3.2.4, p.74, Figure 3.2-3):*

- *US Air Force 2009 target of 26%, achieved 21.8%*
- *NASA ODIN 1 2009 target of 70%, achieved 60.9%*
- *NASA ODIN 2 2009 target of 70%, achieved 51.3%*"

DISCUSSION:
As part of our past performance references, we cited the above 3 contracts as examples of contracts where the scope of work was similar to ITISS and our small business utilization for 2009 for these 3 contracts all exceeded the 20% small business goal established by the NRC both of the ODIN contracts achieved more than double the 25% small business goal Lockheed Martin committed to for ITISS. Despite the fact that these three programs were 2009 snapshots, the NRC has asserted that Lockheed Martin *historically* struggles to meet small business goals. This finding contradicted the NRC identified strength and scores (20 of 20 points) in the Subcontracting factor that "*LM exceeded their corporate 2009 small business subcontracting goals (27.8%) by achieving 33.5% small business participation (LM 5.2, p.95) increasing the*

feasibility that they will be able to hit their proposed targets." As indicated in our original proposal submission (Figure 3.2-2. Lockheed Martin Corporate 2009 Small Business Summary Performance) and in spite of these three programs used as past performance references, Lockheed Martin still demonstrated that we exceeded small business goals for 2009. As a result of the question being asked by the NRC, our October 2010 BAFO response provided 14 additional small business citations where we exceeded small business goals on programs of similar in size and scope. This clearly demonstrated that the three programs were an exception to the assertion that Lockheed Martin historically struggles to meet small business goals. During the debrief discussions, the NRC acknowledged that the SEP inexplicably did not consider the 14 additional program citations provided in the Lockheed Martin response to Question B.25. The SEP also did not take into consideration that for the 2 ODIN references, we far exceeded the ITISS small business objective of 25% by achieving 60.9% and 51.3% small business participation respectfully on these 2 programs.

LOCKHEED MARTIN'S POSITION:

The SEP failed to consider these 14 additional citations, as verbally acknowledged by the NRC attendees in the debrief, that were provided in BAFO B.25 response (October 2010), and that they failed to recognize in our original proposal that we exceed our corporate small business goals as indicated in Figure 3.2-2, which demonstrated that missing a small business goal is an exception not the rule. As a result of this oversight by the NRC, the Lockheed Martin score in this area should have been higher.

LOCKHEED MARTIN ISSUE # 4

NRC's Debrief Evaluation - Contracting Officers Rationale for Award – Objective 3

NRC's Identified Rationale:

"*Regarding Objective 3, LM and PSGS have both proposed labor hour task orders as the tool through which to address changes to the infrastructure. This method is similar to what is currently done under the ISSC contract. PSGS' proposal, however, goes further through its use of the performance-based management approach (P3MM) in all operational tasks. P3MM is a series of best practices for project management that share many principles with ITIL v3. Specifically, P3MM includes measures to regularly assess task effectiveness and suggest improvements. By using P3MM as a framework for its overall Program Management, PSGS has folded some of the process of continual improvement into its fixed costs. This means that the NRC could consult with PSGS on its suggestions for improvements, and approve PSGS' implementation without having to create task orders and spend money through the use of contractor labor hours. Beyond the potential cost savings, the P3MM approach proposed by PSGS aligns more closely with ITIL v3's continual service improvement best practice, and suggests a more proactive stance from PSGS regarding process improvement.*"

DISCUSSION:

Lockheed Martin takes exception to the NRC assertion that the P3MM more closely aligns to ITIL v3 than Lockheed Martin's proven performance based program management lifecycle TTPR methodology which aligns 100% to ITIL v3. There is no industry data to support such an assertion nor can it be supported by Gartner. The Lockheed Martin proposed organization is fully aligned to ITIL v3 framework with a dedicated "Continuous Service Improvement (CSI) Manager" and team entirely funded in our fixed unit price. Additionally, each of the Core Services in Lockheed Martin's proposal response has CSI as part of the core service solution. It was obvious in the debriefing that the SEP chair (D. Curtis) did not concur with the Contracting

Officer's rationale for this evaluation issue since he quickly responded that "the language in the award rationale was Jordan Pulaski's, not his, and he therefore would not respond to the specific P3MM methodology reasoning." During the debrief discussions, the NRC was unable to tell Lockheed Martin if we had received extra value credit for the 7 major Integration Tasks that we had included in our Fixed Unit Price cost, described in our original proposal submission and again on page 12, paragraph 2.0 No Hidden Costs, of our December 30 response to additional discussion items.

LOCKHEED MARTIN'S POSITION:

Lockheed Martin's methodology and organizational structure fully aligns to ITIL v3 and CSI is clearly and inherently part of our Core Solution offering and fully covered in our fixed unit price. In addition, as acknowledged in the Contracting Officers Rationale for Award for Objective 5, Lockheed Martin offered the resources of the Lockheed Martin NexGen Cyber Innovation and Technology Center to explore new technologies which our proposal clearly demonstrates that this was at no additional cost. In addition, unless PSGS included similar Integration Tasks as part of their fixed unit price, Lockheed Martin should have been given extra value credit for including these 7 tasks as part of our fixed unit price.

LOCKHEED MARTIN ISSUE # 5:

NRC's Debrief Evaluation - Contracting Officers Rationale for Award – Objective 5

NRC's Identified Rationale:

"*Regarding Objective 5, proposals from both PSGS and LM were innovative in different ways. LM stressed the introduction of new technologies (VMWare Virtualization, NetApp Digital Storage, and future technologies evaluated at their NexGen Cyber Innovation and Technology facility, etc.) as a way to increase productivity, reduce costs, and maintain customer satisfaction. LM's proposal, if implemented, would create an advanced infrastructure for the NRC. PSGS, on the other hand, proposed some new technologies, but focused on leveraging the parts of the NRC infrastructure that are currently available. It is my view that PSGS' proposal showed a greater understanding of the NRC landscape. For example, both LM and PSGS propose an upgrade to Windows 7 for the agency, but PSGS then also discusses NRC legacy systems that would be affected – which ones could be kept, and which ones would have to be replaced. While both proposals meet the Objective from the PSOW, I believe PSGS' solution shows a greater attention to detail and appreciation for the NRC environment.*"

DISCUSSION:

The NRC rationale contradicts the identified NRC findings in the Technical Approach sub factor for which the SEP confirmed during the debriefing that Lockheed Martin had the best Core and Additional Services technical solution which is the purpose of objective 5. Lockheed Martin's proposed solution also leveraged significant parts of the NRC infrastructure. Lockheed Martin's proposal also discussed NRC legacy systems that would be affected, which ones could be kept, and which ones would have to be replaced in each technical solution section. Finally, the NRC acknowledged the Lockheed Martin solution would create an advanced infrastructure for the NRC at a lower price. The concern expressed by the SEP in the debriefing was that Lockheed Martin would implement this "advanced infrastructure" too fast and the SEP believes they need to fix what they have before moving forward with new technologies.

LOCKHEED MARTIN'S POSITION:

The Contracting Officer's rationale is contradicted by the fact that the Lockheed Martin proposal was rated number 1 for Core and Additional Services and throughout our proposal we propose to work with the NRC on the implementation of our proposed solution and that any changes to the NRC Infrastructure must be approved by the NRC before it is implemented

Lockheed Martin values our long relationship as a valued partner to the NRC. It is because of this rich tradition that we elected not to lodge a formal protest of this procurement. Nevertheless, we believe that our proposal was not fully and fairly evaluated in this case. We believe that if the mistakes identified above had not been made, Lockheed Martin would have received a numerical score equivalent to or better than that received by PSGS. Because Lockheed Martin's proposed price was more than $6.5 million lower than that submitted by PSGS, we believe that by rectifying these issues, the NRC will conclude that Lockheed Martin's proposal indisputably provided the NRC with the best value for these services. Accordingly, we respectfully urge you voluntarily to reconsider your award decision in light of these concerns.

Lockheed Martin thanks you in advance for your prompt time and attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,

Frank Armijo
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Rockville, MD. 20850
Telephone: 301-519-5474
Frank.armijo@lmco.com

National Archives and
Records Administration
Washington, DC 20408

NARA BULLETIN
NO. 2011-01

February 24, 2011

TO: Heads of Federal agencies

SUBJECT: Checklist of current NARA bulletins and list of records management guidance in effect

EXPIRATION DATE: September 30, 2011

1. What is the purpose of this bulletin?

This bulletin lists National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) bulletins that are in effect. It also defines the structure for NARA records management guidance and lists the guidance. The first table in this bulletin lists previously-issued NARA bulletins that are currently in effect. The second table identifies NARA records management guidance which is fundamental and required for sound records management practice. The third table identifies other guidance products which provide additional context, address specific implementation issues and describe recommended practices. The fourth table identifies FY10 updates to the General Records Schedules.

2. What are NARA bulletins?

a. The Archivist of the United States uses NARA bulletins to transmit fundamental records management guidance to agencies or to remind agencies of specific records management responsibilities. This guidance helps agencies comply with recordkeeping laws and regulations. You can find more information about NARA's records management regulations in 36 CFR, Chapter XII, Subchapter B. The first bulletin of the fiscal year is a checklist of current bulletins and records management guidance.

b. Other NARA bulletins typically remain in effect for three years. Upon expiration, fundamental guidance remains in effect until superseded. NARA may re-issue bulletins when guidance warrants particular attention due to circumstances (e.g. election, natural disasters, etc.) or changes in laws and regulations.

3. What other vehicles does NARA use to promulgate records management guidance?

NARA also uses Memos to Records Officers from the Director of Modern Records Programs to convey recommended records management practices that agencies should consider incorporating into their recordkeeping operations. This category of guidance is contained in the third table.

3/17...To EDO for Appropriate Action..Cpy to: RF...11-0121

4. How can I get more information about NARA bulletins?

For more information about specific NARA bulletins, call the Lifecycle Management Division at 301-837-3560 or send your question to RM.Communications@nara.gov.

5. How do I know which records management guidance is required?

NARA will identify in its promulgating document (NARA bulletin or Memo to Records Officers) whether newly-issued guidance is fundamental and required, or recommended practice. NARA also provides many timely and relevant information products to assist Federal agencies in performing their statutorily-required records management functions. NARA records management guidance is available on the NARA web site at http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/policy/guidance-regulations.html. Agencies may also wish to consult the media-specific Toolkit for Managing Electronic Records (http://toolkit.archives.gov) which identifies NARA records management guidance products and other tools applicable to electronic records. The Toolkit includes not only NARA products but also products from Federal agencies, academia, and other sources.

6. How do I obtain copies of NARA bulletins?

a. Paper copies. We send paper copies of our bulletins to the heads of Federal agencies. You can obtain additional paper copies by contacting the NARA Lifecycle Management Division at 301-837-3560.

b. Electronic copies. We send electronic copies of our bulletins to Federal agency records officers. We also post all NARA bulletins on the NARA web site at http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/bulletins/.

7. How do I correct any mistakes in the mailing address?

To correct the mailing address for the head of your Federal agency, contact NARA's Policy and Planning Staff at 301-837-1850. To correct the mailing address for the agency records officer, contact RM.Communications@nara.gov.

DAVID S. FERRIERO
Archivist of the United States

Table 1

BULLETIN NUMBER AND TITLE		ISSUED	EXPIRES
2008-06	Records Storage Facility Standards	**8/25/2008**	**8/31/2011**
2008-07	Endorsement of DoD Electronic Records Management Software Applications Design Criteria Standard, version 3	**9/10/2008**	**9/30/2011**
2009-02	Guidance concerning managing records in multi-agency environments	**6/18/2009**	**6/30/2012**
2009-03	Pre-accessioning permanent electronic records	**7/30/2009**	**7/31/2012**
2010-02	Continuing Agency Responsibilities for Scheduling Electronic Records	**2/5/2010**	**2/28/2013**
2010-03	Flexible Scheduling	**5/3/2010**	**5/31/2013**
2010-04	Guidance Concerning Notifications for Previously Scheduled Permanent Records	**9/10/2010**	**8/31/2013**
2010-05	Guidance on Managing Records in Cloud Computing Environments	**9/30/2010**	**9/30/2013**
2011-02	Guidance on Managing Records in Web 2.0/Social Media Platforms	**10/20/2010**	**10/31/2013**
2011-03	Guidance concerning the use of e-mail archiving applications to store e-mail	**12/22/2010**	**11/30/2013**

Table 2

FUNDAMENTAL GUIDANCE	URL
Disposition of Federal Records (1997) (2000 Web Edition)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/publications/disposition-of-federal-records/index.html
Electronic Information Management Standards – DoD 5015.2 (ver. 2, 2002; ver. 3, 2007)	http://jitc.fhu.disa.mil/recmgt/standards.html
Electronic Records Management Guidance on Methodology for Determining Agency-unique Requirements (2004)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/policy/requirements-guidance.html
Expanding Acceptable Transfer Requirements: Transfer Instructions for Existing E-mail Messages with Attachments (2002)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/initiatives/email-attachments.html
Expanding Acceptable Transfer Requirements: Transfer Instructions for Existing Permanent Electronic Records Scanned Images of Textual Records (2002)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/initiatives/scanned-textual.html
Expanding Acceptable Transfer Requirements: Transfer Instructions for Permanent Electronic Records Digital Photographic Records (2003)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/initiatives/digital-photo-records.html
Expanding Acceptable Transfer Requirements: Transfer Instructions for Permanent Electronic Records in Portable Document Format (PDF) (2003)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/initiatives/pdf-records.html
Expanding Acceptable Transfer Requirements: Transfer Instructions for Permanent Electronic Records Digital Geospatial Data Records (2004)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/initiatives/digital-geospatial-data-records.html
Expanding Acceptable Transfer Requirements: Transfer Instructions for Permanent Electronic Records Web Content Records (2004)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/initiatives/web-content-records.html
Guidance for Coordinating the Evaluation of Capital Planning and	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt /policy/cpic-guidance.html

Investment Control (CPIC) Proposals for ERM Applications (2003)	
NARA Guidance on Managing Web Records (2005)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/policy/managing-web-records-index.html
Records Management Guidance for Agencies Implementing Electronic Signature Technologies (2000)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/policy/electronic-signature-technology.html
Records Storage Facility Standards Toolkit (2008)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/storage-standards-toolkit

Table 3

RECOMMENDED PRACTICE/GUIDANCE	URL
Documenting Your Public Service (2000)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/publications/documenting-your-public-service.html
Federal Enterprise Architecture (FEA) Records Management Profile: Electronic Records Management and Recordkeeping Requirements Checklists: Business Process Design (BPD) Checklist (2007)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/initiatives/bpd-checklist.pdf
Federal Enterprise Architecture (FEA) Records Management Profile: Electronic Records Management and Recordkeeping Requirements Checklists: Capital Planning and Investment Control (CPIC) Checklist (2007)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/initiatives/cpic-checklist.pdf
Federal Enterprise Architecture (FEA) Records Management Profile: Electronic Records Management and Recordkeeping Requirements Checklists: Systems Development Life Cycle (SDLC) Checklist (2007)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/initiatives/sdlc-checklist.pdf
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) About Changes to Previously Approved Schedule Items (2010)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/faqs/previously-approved-schedule-items-faq.html
Frequently Asked Questions About Managing Federal Records In Cloud Computing Environments (2010)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/faqs/cloud.html
Frequently Asked Questions About Digital Audio and Video Records (2007)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/initiatives/dav-faq.html
Frequently Asked Questions About Federal Document Management Systems (FDMS) Recordkeeping (2008)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/faqs/pdf/fdms-faq.pdf
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) about Flexible Scheduling (2010)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/faqs/flexible-scheduling.html
Frequently Asked Questions About Imaged Records (2005)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/faqs/imaged.html
Frequently Asked Questions About Instant Messaging	http://www.archives.gov/records

(2006)	-mgmt/initiatives/im-faq.html
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) About Media Neutral Schedule Items (2010)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/faqs/media-neutral.html
Frequently Asked Questions About Optical Storage Media: Storing Temporary Records on CDs and DVDs (2007)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/initiatives/temp-opmedia-faq.html
Frequently Asked Questions About Records Management (2006)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/faqs/
Frequently Asked Questions About Records Scheduling and Disposition (2006)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/faqs/scheduling.html
Frequently Asked Questions About Selecting Sustainable Formats for Electronic Records (2007)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/initiatives/sustainable-faq.html
Frequently Asked Questions about Transferring Permanent Records in PDF/A-1 to NARA (2007)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/initiatives/pdf-faq.html
Guidance for Building an Effective Enterprise-wide Electronic Records Management (ERM) Governance Structure (2005)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/policy/governance-guidance.html
Guidance on Transferring Electronic Records to NARA (2006)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/initiatives/erecords-information.html
Implications of Recent Web Technologies for NARA Web Guidance (2007)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/initiatives/web-tech.html
Recommended Practice: Analysis of Lessons Learned for Enterprise-wide ERM Projects (2006)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt /policy/lessons-learned.html
Recommended Practice: Developing and Implementing an Enterprise-wide Electronic Records Management (ERM) Proof of Concept Pilot (2006)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt /policy/pilot-guidance.html
Recommended Practice: Evaluating Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Electronic Records Management (ERM) Applications (2005)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt /policy/cots-eval-guidance.html
Records Management Guidance for PKI Digital Signature Authenticated and Secured Transaction Records (2005)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/policy/pki.html
Records Management Guidance For PKI-Unique	http://www.archives.gov/records

Administrative Records (2003)	-mgmt/policy/pki-guidance.html
Records Management Self-Evaluation Guide (2001)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/publications/records-management-self-evaluation-guide.html
Vital Records and Records Disaster Mitigation and Recovery: An Instructional Guide (1999)	http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/vital-records/index.html

Table 4

RECENT UPDATES TO GENERAL RECORDS SCHEDULES	URL
GRS Transmittal No.22, revisions to General Records Schedules (2010)	Transmittal: http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/grs/grs-trs22.html GRS: http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/grs/

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

15 February 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Request for Nominations for the Annual Rowlett Information Assurance Awards – ACTION MEMORANDUM

I am pleased to announce the call for nominations for the 21st annual Frank B. Rowlett Awards. The Rowlett Awards serve to recognize major contributions by individuals and organizations whose efforts have significantly enhanced the advancement of information assurance in security-related areas, either classified or unclassified.

To ensure that all deserving individuals and organizations in the community have an opportunity to compete, I urge you to nominate those whose accomplishments in information assurance most warrant recognition. Nominations are due by Friday, 6 May 2011. Nomination information can be found at http://www.nsa.gov/ia/ia_at_nsa/rowlett_awards/nomination_procedure.shtml. There, you will find guidance and forms for submitting your nominations. For classified submissions, you can access the web page on SIPRNET at http://www.iad.nsa.smil.mil/programs/rowlett/nom_procedures.cfm. If you have any questions, please call the IAD Leadership Support Team at 410-854-1650 or email I03L_All@nsa.gov.

On 17 November 2011, we will hold the Frank B. Rowlett Awards ceremony at the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, at which time we will formally recognize the awardees. Celebrating these achievements will stimulate even greater interaction among information systems security users, planners, and producers and lead to a more secure electronic environment for our nation in the 21st century.

KEITH B. ALEXANDER
General, U.S. Army
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

3/17...To EDO for Appropriate Action...Cpy to: RF...11-0123
Nomination due by Friday, May 6, 2011

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[7590-01-P]

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS

Notice of Meeting

In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) will hold a meeting on April 7-9, 2011, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The date of this meeting was previously published in the Federal Register on Thursday, October 21, 2010 (74 FR 65038-65039).

THURSDAY, APRIL 7, 2011, CONFERENCE ROOM T2-B1, 11545 ROCKVILLE PIKE, ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND

8:30 A.M. - 8:35 A.M.: Opening Remarks by the ACRS Chairman (Open) - The ACRS Chairman will make opening remarks regarding the conduct of the meeting.

8:35 A.M. - 10:30 A.M.: Selected Chapters of the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) with Open Items Associated with the Calvert Cliffs, Unit 3 Combined License Application Referencing the U.S. Evolutionary Power Reactor (EPR) (Open/Closed) - The Committee will hear presentations by and hold discussions with representatives of the NRC staff, UniStar, and AREVA regarding Chapters 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, and 19 of the SER with Open Items associated with the Calvert Cliffs, Unit 3 combined license application referencing the U.S. EPR design. **[NOTE: A portion of this session may be closed to discuss and protect information that is designated as proprietary by AREVA and its contractors pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(4).]**

10:45 A.M. - 12:45 P.M.: Commission Paper on Emergency Planning for Small Modular Reactors (Open) – The Committee will hear presentations by and hold discussions with representatives of the NRC staff regarding a draft Commission Paper on emergency planning for small modular reactors.

1:45 PM - 4:15 PM: Draft Final Regulatory Guide 1.152, "Criteria for Use of Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," and Cyber Security Related Activities (Open) - The Committee will hear presentations by and hold discussions with representatives of the NRC staff regarding draft final Regulatory Guide 1.152, "Criteria for Use of Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," the staff's resolution of public comments, and cyber security related activities.

4:30 P.M. - 7:00 P.M.: Preparation of ACRS Reports (Open/Closed) - The Committee will discuss proposed ACRS reports on matters discussed during this meeting. **[NOTE: A portion of this session may be closed to discuss and protect information that is designated as proprietary by AREVA and its contractors pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(4).]**

FRIDAY, APRIL 8, 2011, CONFERENCE ROOM T2-B1, 11545 ROCKVILLE PIKE, ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND

10:00 AM – 10:05 AM.: Opening Remarks by the ACRS Chairman (Open) - The ACRS Chairman will make opening remarks regarding the conduct of the meeting.

10:05 AM - 11:30 AM: Human Factors Considerations in Emerging Technology in Nuclear Power Plants (Open) – The Committee will hear presentations by and hold discussions with representatives of the NRC staff regarding human factors considerations in emerging technology in nuclear power plants.

1:00 PM - 2:30 PM: Future ACRS Activities/Report of the Planning and Procedures Subcommittee (Open/Closed) - The Committee will discuss the recommendations of the Planning and Procedures Subcommittee regarding items proposed for consideration by the Full Committee during future ACRS Meetings, and matters related to the conduct of ACRS business, including anticipated workload and member assignments. **[NOTE: A portion of this meeting may be closed pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552b (c) (2) and (6) to discuss organizational and personnel matters that relate solely to internal personnel rules and practices of ACRS, and information the release of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.]**

2:30 P.M. - 2:45 P.M.: Reconciliation of ACRS Comments and Recommendations (Open) - The Committee will discuss the responses from the NRC Executive Director for Operations to comments and recommendations included in recent ACRS reports and letters.

3:00 PM – 4:00 PM: Preparation for Meeting with the Commission (Open) - The Committee will discuss the topics for an upcoming meeting with the Commission.

4:00 PM – 7:00 PM: Preparation of ACRS Reports (Open/Closed) - The Committee will continue its discussion of proposed ACRS reports. **[NOTE: A portion of this session may be closed in order to discuss and protect information designated as proprietary by AREVA, pursuant to 5 U.S.C 552b(c)(4).]**

SATURDAY, APRIL 9, 2011 CONFERENCE ROOM T2-B1, 11545 ROCKVILLE PIKE, ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND

8:30 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.: Preparation of ACRS Reports (Open/Closed) - The Committee will continue its discussion of proposed ACRS reports. **[NOTE: A portion of this session may be closed in order to discuss and protect information designated as proprietary by AREVA and its contractors pursuant to 5 U.S.C 552b(c)(4).]**

1:00 P.M. - 1:30 P.M.: Miscellaneous (Open) - The Committee will continue its discussion related to the conduct of Committee activities and specific issues that were not completed during previous meetings.

Procedures for the conduct of and participation in ACRS meetings were published in the *Federal Register* on October 21, 2010, (75 FR 65038-65039). In accordance with those procedures, oral or written views may be presented by members of the public, including representatives of the nuclear industry. Persons desiring to make oral statements should notify Ms. Ilka Berrios, Cognizant ACRS Staff (Telephone: 301-415-3179, E-mail: Ilka.Berrios@nrc.gov), five days before the meeting, if possible, so that appropriate arrangements can be made to allow necessary time during the meeting for such statements. In view of the possibility that the schedule for ACRS meetings may be adjusted by the Chairman as necessary to facilitate the conduct of the meeting, persons planning to attend should check with the Cognizant ACRS staff if such rescheduling would result in major inconvenience.

Thirty-five hard copies of each presentation or handout should be provided 30 minutes before the meeting. In addition, one electronic copy of each presentation should be emailed to the Cognizant ACRS Staff one day before meeting. If an electronic copy cannot be provided within this timeframe, presenters should provide the Cognizant ACRS Staff with a CD containing each presentation at least 30 minutes before the meeting.

In accordance with Subsection 10(d) Public Law 92–463, and 5 U.S.C. 552b(c), certain portions of this meeting may be closed, as specifically noted above. Use of still, motion picture, and television cameras during the meeting may be limited to selected portions of the meeting as determined by the Chairman. Electronic recordings will be permitted only during the open portions of the meeting.

ACRS meeting agenda, meeting transcripts, and letter reports are available through the NRC Public Document Room at pdr.resource@nrc.gov, or by calling the PDR at 1-800-397-4209, or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS) which is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html or http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/ACRS/.

Video teleconferencing service is available for observing open sessions of ACRS meetings. Those wishing to use this service for observing ACRS meetings should contact Mr. Theron Brown, ACRS Audio Visual Technician (301-415-8066), between 7:30 a.m. and 3:45 p.m. (ET), at least 10 days before the meeting to ensure the availability of this service.

Individuals or organizations requesting this service will be responsible for telephone line charges and for providing the equipment and facilities that they use to establish the video teleconferencing link. The availability of video teleconferencing services is not guaranteed.

Date 3/17/11

Andrew L. Bates
Advisory Committee Management Officer

[7590-01-P]

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 52

RIN 3150-AI85

NRC-2010-0135

ESBWR Design Certification

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) proposes to amend its regulations to certify the Economic Simplified Boiling-Water Reactor (ESBWR) standard plant design. This action is necessary so that applicants or licensees intending to construct and operate an ESBWR design may do so by referencing this design certification rule (DCR). The applicant for certification of the ESBWR design is GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH). The public is invited to submit comments on this proposed DCR, the generic design control document (DCD) that would be incorporated by reference into the DCR, and the environmental assessment (EA) for the ESBWR design.

DATES: Submit comments on the DCR, DCD and/or EA by **[insert date 75 days after publication in the *Federal Register*]**. Submit comments specific to the information collections aspects of this rule by **[insert date 30 days after publication in the *Federal Register*]**. Comments received after the above dates will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given to comments received after these dates.

This FRN is available in its entirety in SECY (ML110610353)

ADDRESSES: Please include Docket ID NRC-2010-0135 in the subject line of your comments. For instructions on submitting comments and accessing documents related to this action, see Section I, "Submitting Comments and Accessing Information" in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document. You may submit comments by any one of the following methods.

- **Federal rulemaking Web site:** Go to *http://www.regulations.gov* and search for documents filed under Docket ID NRC-2010-0135. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher, telephone: 301-492-3668; e-mail: *Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov*.
- **Mail comments to:** Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
- **E-mail comments to:** *Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov*. If you do not receive a reply e-mail confirming that we have received your comments, contact us directly at 301-415-1966.
- **Hand Deliver comments to**: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852 between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. during Federal workdays (telephone: 301-415-1966).
- **Fax comments to:** Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 301-415-1101.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: George M. Tartal, Office of New Reactors, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-0016; e-mail: *george.tartal@nrc.gov;* or Bruce M. Bavol, Office of New Reactors, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-6715; e-mail: *bruce.bavol@nrc.gov*.

From: Johnson, Michael
To: NRO_SES Distribution
Subject: FW: COMMISSION E-READER.....MONDAY, MARCH 21, 2011
Date: Monday, March 21, 2011 12:31:59 PM
Attachments: Tab A 03-18-11 Markey.pdf
Tab B 3-18-11 Schneiderman.pdf
Tab C 03-16-11 Abdel-Khalik -ACRS 11-0131.pdf
Tab D 03-18-11 Ltr to Governors.pdf

FYI.

From: Champ, Billie
Sent: Monday, March 21, 2011 11:50 AM
To: Commission E-Reader Distribution; E-Reader Distribution
Subject: COMMISSION E-READER.....MONDAY, MARCH 21, 2011

~~INTERNAL USE ONLY~~
Some of the information contained in the Reader is not publicly available.
If there are any questions, please contact SECY.

READING FILE

INDEX

March 21, 2011

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Tab "A" 03/18/11 -- Letter from Congressman Markey, requests information regarding NRC's current assessments of damage as well as an assessment of the potential worst-case consequences associated with the nuclear emergency in Japan.

Tab "B" 03/18/11 -- Letter from Eric Schneiderman, concerns seismic risk at Indian Point.

Tab "C" 03/16/11 -- Letter from Said Abdel-Khalik, ACRS, SECY-11-0024, "Use of Risk Insights to Enhance the Safety Focus of Small Modular Reactor Reviews."

OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE

Tab "D" 03/18/11 -- Letter to the Governors, requests appointment of a State Liaison Officer to act as the primary liaison to the NRC.

EB/16

COMMITTEES

NATURAL RESOURCES
RANKING DEMOCRAT

ENERGY AND COMMERCE

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http://markey.house.gov

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-2107

March 18, 2011

The Honorable Greg Jaczko
Chairman
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852

Dear Chairman Jaczko:

I write to request information regarding the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) current assessments of damage as well as an assessment of the potential worst-case consequences associated with the current nuclear emergency in Japan. As reports have noted, there has been some conflicting information regarding the status of the meltdowns and condition of the spent nuclear fuel ponds at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.

As you know, focus of late has shifted to two questions: First, whether containment has been breached at any of the units, and second, whether there remains water (and if so how much) in the spent nuclear fuel ponds, especially in units 3 and 4. However, conflicting information is being provided by different parties.

For example, in your testimony in front of the House Energy and Commerce Committee on Wednesday, you indicated, with regard to unit 4, that you believed that "There is no water in the spent fuel pool and we believe that radiation levels are extremely high, which could possibly impact the ability to take corrective measures."

Following your statement, representatives from Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the plant's operator stated that "We can't get inside to check, but we've been carefully watching the building's environs, and there has not been any particular problem," Hajime Motojuku, a spokesman for Tokyo Electric, said Thursday morning in Japan. After that, a spokesman for Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) said that, "Because we have been unable to go to the scene, we cannot confirm whether there is water left or not in the spent fuel pool at Reactor No. 4."[1] Later that evening, a press release issued by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) stated that both TEPCO and NISA had refuted your statement, and that the spokesmen had stated that "the situation at

[1] http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/world/asia/18nuclear.html?pagewanted=2&hp

Unit 4 has changed little during the day today and water remained in the fuel pool. However, both officials said that the reactor had not been inspected in recent hours."[2]

A similar situation exists with respect to the extent of damage to the containment structures of units 2 and 3. Numerous press reports have speculated that the hydrogen explosions experienced at these units may have created a path for radioactive materials to escape containment. One of these reports[3] states that officials have concluded that "the chambers surrounding units 2 and 3 now have been cracked, allowing radiation to escape." During a conference call on March 17 with Congressional staff, NRC staff indicated that the NRC believes that there has been a breach in or damage to the primary and/or secondary containment structures in units 1, 2 and 3. Yet earlier that day, the NEI released a statement[4] that said (in part), on the Fukushima Daiichi plant, that:

> "The reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi plant are in stable condition and are being cooled with seawater, but workers at the plant continue efforts to add cooling water to fuel pools at reactors 3 and 4.... Reactor 2 is in stable condition with seawater injection continuing. The reactor's primary containment may not have been breached, Tokyo Electric Power Co. and World Association of Nuclear Operators officials said on Thursday. Containment pressure is at 65 psig, an indication that containment has not been breached. Access problems at the site have delayed connection of a temporary cable to restore offsite electricity. The connection will provide power to the control rod drive pump, instrumentation, batteries, and power to the control room. Power has not been available at the site since the earthquake on March 11. Reactor 3 is in stable condition with seawater injection continuing. The primary containment is believed to be intact. Pressure in the containment has fluctuated due to venting of the reactor containment structure, but has been as high as 83 psig."

The information that is being received on a daily basis by Congress is currently limited to daily emails from the State Department, which contains some information related to the nuclear crisis in addition to the earthquake and tsunami relief and consular information provided. This is supplemented by multiple daily emails from the NEI, which as the principal trade association for manufacturers of nuclear power-plants, equipment, nuclear fuel, and owners of utilities which own nuclear plants (including Tokyo Electric Power, which owns the Fukushima Daiichi plants), has a clear vested interest in providing a highly optimistic assessment of the situation.

Now that NRC staff is on the ground in Japan, it is my hope that it will be able to add to the information that is currently being provided to Congress and the public on a daily basis. While I appreciate the daily conference calls your staff has begun to hold, I

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[2] NEI's **Update 9:00pm March 16** Information on the Japanese Earthquake and Reactors in that Region

[3] http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/IAEA-Chief-Heads-to-Japan-to-Assess-Nuclear-Crisis-118105754.html

[4] NEI's Update 11:45am March 17 Information on the Japanese Earthquake and Reactors in that Region

believe that it is vitally important to all those who may be considering leaving the vicinity of the impacted reactors to be receiving accurate and unbiased written assessment of current conditions. It is also important that the American public fully understand the potential magnitude and timing associated with a worst-case core melt-down and radiation release or spent fuel fire. Members of Congress must also be kept similarly informed so that they can assist any of their constituents who may have family members currently in the impacted areas and so that they can continue their oversight efforts in assuring the safety of our domestic nuclear reactors. Consequently, I ask for your prompt response to the following questions:

1) I request that you please begin to provide Congress and the public with a daily "situation report" or other similar document that contains your staff's assessment of the conditions at the impacted reactors, the radiation readings at each unit, the status of efforts to halt the melt-downs and radiation releases from the spent-fuel storage areas, and any reports of radiation exposures experienced by those working at or located in the vicinity of the impacted reactors.
2) Please provide me with your assessment of the worst-case potential consequences (including the total radiation that could be released as well as the possible timing for such an event based on current situational awareness), for each of the Daiichi units regarding
    a. The loss of water in the spent fuel cooling ponds and subsequent fire and/or release of radiation
    b. A full core melt-down assuming that no further breaches in containment occur
    c. A full core melt-down assuming that the containment structures are breached.

Thank you very much for your prompt attention to this matter. Please provide me with your initial response to question 1 by close of business on Monday March 21, 2011 and on an ongoing basis thereafter. Please provide me with your response to question 2 by Friday March 25, 2011. If you have any questions or concerns, please have your staff call Dr. Michal Freedhoff of my staff at 202-225-2836.

Sincerely,

Edward J. Markey

Edward J. Markey

STATE OF NEW YORK
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL

DIVISION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION BUREAU

March 18, 2011

Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko
Commissioner Kristine L. Svinicki
Commissioner George Apostolakis
Commissioner William D. Magwood, IV
Commissioner William C. Ostendorff
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555
Via electronic and U.S. Mail

Re: Seismic Risk at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station

Dear Chairman Jaczko and Commissioners Svinicki, Apostolakis, Magwood, and Ostendorff:

I am writing you as a nuclear crisis, initiated by the March 11 earthquake and subsequent tsunami in Northern Japan, is still unfolding. In addition to its potentially devastating impact on the people of Japan, this crisis serves as a graphic demonstration that nuclear power facilities in the U.S. may be vulnerable to seismic activity and experience catastrophic failures that compromise their ability to control and cool multiple nuclear reactors. Data from your staff analysis (GS-199), which demonstrates an increased risk of seismic activity at some nuclear power plants in the country add to my concern.

These factors underscore the importance of a fair, open, and full assessment of seismic risks in the relicensing of Indian Point.

New York State has raised concerns about seismic risk and other issues in relation to the relicensing of Indian Point with your staff on numerous occasions. At each turn, however, the NRC has refused to consider these critical issues in the relicensing review process.

As you know, the Indian Point nuclear power station in Buchanan, New York sits 24 miles from New York City. Of all the power reactors in the United States, the two operating Indian Point reactors have the highest surrounding population both within a 50-mile radius and a 10-mile radius. Seventeen million people live within 50 miles of these reactors. Indian Point Units 2 and 3, which initially came on line in 1973 and 1975, are currently the subject of an adjudicatory proceeding to extend their license by another 20 years (Unit 1 ceased generating in the 1970s).

As the NRC has acknowledged, Indian Point Unit 1, which was authorized in 1956, was built prior to any specific requirement for earthquake protection. Although the NRC revoked the operating license for the Indian Point Unit 1 power reactor in 1980, many of Unit 1's system, structures, and components were conjoined to Unit 2 and Unit 3 and are still in use today. These aging Unit 1 systems, structures, and components were built to inferior seismic specifications, and Unit 2 and Unit 3's continued reliance on these systems today poses significant safety questions.

The NRC has consistently blocked consideration of New York's seismic concerns, as well as related concerns about population, emergency evacuation, fire safety, and site security.

In November of 2007, the Attorneys General of New York, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, and Vermont submitted a letter to the NRC which expressed the states' serious concerns about the NRC's failure to confront issues such as local seismic activity when deciding whether to renew the operating license of a nuclear power plant beyond its initial forty-year term. The states requested that the NRC expand relicensing criteria to include seismic analysis. On December 30, 2007, the NRC rejected this request.

The NRC also disregarded New York's "scoping" comments in 2007, which noted that the Indian Point operator's Environmental Report and Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports do not reflect seismic information developed after the early 1980s, and which asked the NRC to require the owner to revise those outdated documents. The NRC subsequently issued a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DSEIS) based on this out-of-date information. The DSEIS failed to mention new information regarding seismic activity developed recently by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) that included the area around Indian Point or to account for the findings of Columbia's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory 2008 study. In fact, the NRC has not revised any of its Indian Point-related environmental analyses to take into account findings from this important independent study.

Perhaps most egregious is the NRC Staff's issuance of the Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (FSEIS) for Indian Point, which it issued three months after Staff issued the GS-199 analysis on seismic activity. The FSEIS did not make any reference to the NRC's own findings of increased seismic risk at Indian Point.

In November of 2007, the state submitted two contentions in the license renewal proceeding arguing that the applicant's "Updated" Safety Evaluation Report and Environmental Report insufficiently analyzed alternatives for mitigation of severe accidents like earthquakes in that it (1) failed to include recent information regarding the type, frequency, and severity of potential earthquakes and (2) failed to include an analysis of mitigation measures which could reduce the effects of an earthquake damaging the parts of inactive Indian Point Unit 1 which are currently in use at Units 2 and 3. The NRC Staff opposed acceptance of these contentions, and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board excluded them from consideration in the adjudicatory proceeding because, it said, the state did not suggest feasible alternatives to address risks posed by the new data, or estimate the cost of the increased margin of safety that would result from any

severe accident mitigation action. This burden is clearly not the public's to bear and these contentions were excluded in error.

Earlier this week, in testimony before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Chairman Jaczko stated the NRC's intention to conduct a review of the earthquake-related risks faced by nuclear power facilities operating in the central and eastern U.S. He stated that this review would take one to two years to complete, followed by a similar period of time to consider and implement mitigation measures. Indian Point Units 2 and 3 are currently the subject of a proceeding to extend their licenses by another 20 years – a proceeding in which the NRC has consistently ignored serious consideration of the risks that earthquakes and related issues pose to the Indian Point facility.

NRC should not contemplate relicensing Indian Point without first completing an open and public review of earthquake-related risks faced by this facility.

For this reason, the NRC must undertake an immediate, full, fair, and open assessment of all public health and safety risks that earthquakes pose to this facility, and provide the public an opportunity to fully review and comment on all phases of this review.

In addition, the NRC must take the following actions:

1. Promulgate an amendment to Part 54 and any other relevant regulations, which exclude seismicity analysis from the scope of safety review in relicensing proceedings, to specifically require the preparation of a public site-specific seismic analysis for the Indian Point and other reactors;

2. Open up the GS-199 seismic analysis proceeding for meaningful participation by states and the public so that all assumptions can be identified and tested and ensure that all information used in this proceeding is made available in the public record;

3. Address the risk posed by the Indian Point Unit 1 facilities, which share many common components and systems with the other Indian Point units, in a complete and transparent way;

4. Incorporate USGS findings and Columbia Lamont-Doherty's findings into the Indian Point FSEIS for license renewal and re-issue the document for additional public review and comment;

5. Make public immediately the Commission's plans, in their entirety, for addressing seismic risk at all three Indian Point plants; and

6. Maximize public involvement in the Commission's and the NRC Staff's actions regarding seismic risk at Indian Point.

Whether or not one supports the re-licensing of Indian Point Units 2 and 3, we can all agree that we must protect the health, safety, and environment of the nearly 20 million people

living in close proximity to the facility. Only through a full, fair, and open assessment of the earthquake and related security risks surrounding this uniquely-situated plant – one that precedes any consideration of approving an extension of the Indian Point facility for another 20 years – can we provide these fundamental protections.

I thank you for your attention this request, and please do not hesitate to contact me at any time if I can provide additional information or you would like discuss this matter in greater detail.

Sincerely,

Eric T. Schneiderman
Attorney General

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

CHAIRMAN

March 18, 2011

The Honorable Jerry Brown
Governor of the State of California
State Capitol Building
Sacramento, CA 95814

Dear Governor Brown:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am writing to request your appointment of a State Liaison Officer to act as the State of California's primary liaison to the NRC. James D. Boyd, Commissioner of the California Energy Commission, was previously appointed as the State Liaison Officer for California. The NRC will continue to work with Commissioner Boyd unless you appoint a new State Liaison Officer. I am providing you with two copies of the NRC brochure entitled, "State Liaison Officer Program," which provides background information on, and describes the role of, the State Liaison Officer. I am also enclosing a copy of the NRC "2010-2011 Information Digest," which provides information describing NRC's mission and its regulatory programs.

In 1976, the NRC adopted a recommendation from several State organizations, including the National Governors Association, that we request each State to appoint a single person to act as a liaison to the NRC to help improve Federal/State cooperation. The NRC looks to the Governor-appointed State Liaison Officer to provide the primary communication channel between the State and the NRC. The State Liaison Officer serves as the key person in the State to keep the Governor informed about issues under the NRC's jurisdiction (specifically matters addressing nuclear regulation, nuclear security, nuclear emergency preparedness, and radiological public health and safety) and to provide the NRC with State information on particular nuclear safety, security, and environmental issues.

Since inception of the State Liaison Officer Program, State Liaison Officer responsibilities have continued to evolve. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the NRC increased its security-related communications with the Governor-appointed State Liaison Officers. Your appointed State Liaison Officer will serve as the recipient for sensitive unclassified information, including Safeguards Information (SGI), from the NRC. SGI is a special category of sensitive unclassified information authorized by Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to be protected from inadvertent release and unauthorized disclosure. Although SGI is sensitive unclassified information, it is handled and protected more like classified National Security Information.

NRC also concluded that there is an increased need to ensure that other authorized State officials have access to SGI. Because State Homeland Security Advisors are responsible for homeland security activities in the States, these State officials may also receive copies of NRC security information in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security. This will help ensure that the State Homeland Security Advisor has knowledge of, and access to, this information and can share such information with other authorized State officials.

We will keep you informed of our programs and activities through Commissioner Boyd or your appointed designee. At the same time, we will continue to work with other individuals in State agencies with whom we have established relationships. If you or your staff have any questions concerning this correspondence or wish to obtain additional information about the State Liaison Officer program, please contact Dr. Josephine Piccone, Director, Division of Intergovernmental Liaison and Rulemaking, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, at (301) 415-7278 or by email at Josephine.Piccone@nrc.gov.

I thank you in advance for your assistance. The Commission looks forward to your response and to continuing an excellent working relationship with the State of California.

Sincerely,

Gregory B. Jaczko

Enclosures:
1) NRC Brochure, "State Liaison Officer Program"
2) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2010-2011 Information Digest, NUREG-1350, Volume 22

cc w/o enclosures:
J. Boyd, State Liaison Officer

Similar letter sent to:

The Honorable Jerry Brown
Governor of the State of California
State Capitol Building
Sacramento, CA 95814
cc: J. Boyd, State Liaison Officer

The Honorable John Hickenlooper
Governor of the State of Colorado
136 State Capitol
Denver, CO 80203
cc: S. Tarlton, State Liaison Officer

The Honorable Dannel P. Malloy
Governor of the State of Connecticut
210 Capitol Avenue
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cc: E. Wilds, Jr., State Liaison Officer

The Honorable Rick Scott
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The Honorable Terry Branstad
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The Honorable Sam Brownback
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The Honorable Paul R. LePage
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cc: J. Hyland, State Liaison Officer

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cc: J. Stine, State Liaison Officer

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Governor of the State of Nevada
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Carson City, NV 89701
cc: K. Beckley, State Liaison Officer

The Honorable Andrew M. Cuomo
Governor of the State of New York
State Capitol Executive Chamber
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cc: F. Murray, State Liaison Officer

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Governor of the State of North Dakota
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Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
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cc: D. Allard, State Liaison Officer

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The Honorable Dennis Daugaard
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The Honorable Scott Walker
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cc: J. McNees, Director

The Honorable Nathan Deal
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cc: J. Hardeman, Chief

The Honorable Neal Abercrombie
Governor of the State of Hawaii
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cc: K. Yale, Acting Section Chief

The Honorable Susana Martinez
Governor of the State of New Mexico
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Santa Fe, NM 87501
cc: R. Solomon, Deputy Secretary

The Honorable Bill Haslam
Governor of the State of Tennessee
State Capitol
Nashville, TN 37243-0001
cc: D. Shults, Director

The Honorable Lincoln Chafee
Governor of the State of Rhode Island
State House, 82 Smith Street
Providence, RI 02903
cc: J. Smith, Executive Director

The Honorable Peter Shumlin
Governor of the State of Vermont
109 State Street, 5th Floor
Montpelier, VT 05609
cc: E. Miller, Commissioner

The Honorable Matthew Mead
Governor of the State of Wyoming
200 West 24th Street, Room 124
Cheyenne, WY 82002
cc: L. Majerus, Interim Director

Originating Office: EDO

CORR-11-0020
Chairman Correspondence

OFC	SECY	OCM/GBJ	OCM/GBJ		
NAME	Billie C. Lopes	JMonninger	GBJaczko		
DATE	3/7/11	03/9/11	03/18/11		

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

From:	McKelvin, Sheila
To:	Commission E-Reader Distribution; E-Reader Distribution
Subject:	Tuesday, March 22, 2011 E-Reader - Re-Issued
Date:	Tuesday, March 22, 2011 12:31:58 PM
Attachments:	Tab A - 03-21-11 Thomas 11-0142.pdf Tab B 3-18-11 Schneiderman 11-0133.pdf Tab C 03-18-11 Wallace.pdf Tab D 03-21-11 Ltr to Sen. Barrasso.pdf Tab E - 03-21-11 Ltr to Sen. Enzi.pdf

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E-Reader is being re-issued to include a new Tab C – Letter from Edward Wallace, NuScale Power.

~~INTERNAL USE ONLY~~
Some of the information contained in the Reader is not publicly available.
If there are any questions, please contact SECY.

READING FILE

INDEX

March 22, 2011

INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE

Tab "A" 03/21/11 - E-mail from Glen Thomas, DHS, provides invitation to the National Tabletop Exercise to be held on Wednesday, April 13, 2011.

Tab "B" 03/18/11 - Letter from Attorney General Eric Schneiderman, State of New York, concerns Seismic Risk at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station.

Tab "C" 03/18/11 - Letter from Edward Wallace, NuScale Power, re: Suspension of review of activities for NuScale Power Pre-Application Project (NRC Project: 0769)

OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE

Tab "D" 03/21/11 - Letter to Senator John Barrasso, responds to the letter to the President concerning uranium recovery licenses in Wyoming now controlled by a Russian corporation.

Tab "E" 03/21/11 - Letter to Senator Michael Enzi, responds to the letter to the President concerning uranium recovery licenses in Wyoming now controlled by a Russian corporation.

EB/17

Mike, Linda

From: Glen, Thomas [Thomas.Glen@dhs.gov] on behalf of FEMAExecSec [femaexecsec@dhs.gov]
Sent: Monday, March 21, 2011 4:39 PM
To: NRCExecSec Resource; usdaexecsec@usda.gov; docexecsec@doc.gov; edexecsec@ed.gov; doeexecsec@hq.doe.gov; hhsexecsec@hhs.gov; DNDO Exec Sec; USCG Exec Sec; NPPDExecSec; I&A Exec Sec; OGC Exec Sec; ohaexecsec; arcexecsec@usa.redcross.org; hudexecsec@hud.gov; dojexecsec@usdoj.gov; dolexecsec@dol.gov; dosexecsec@state.gov; dotexecsec@dot.gov; execsec2@do.treas.gov; epaexecsec@epa.gov; peggy.deprospero@gsa.gov; uspsexecsec@usps.gov; sbaexecsec@sba.gov; vaexecsec@va.gov; opmexecsec@opm.gov; faaexecsec@faa.gov; TSAExecSec; OPA Exec Sec; susan_long@ios.doi.gov; OPS Exec Sec; (b)(6)
Cc: FEMAExecSec; Price, Alyson; Debrot, Marjorie; Glen, Thomas
Subject: Invite: National Tabletop Exercise (Wed, April 13, 2011)
Attachments: 3212011_14935PM_Signed Letter - F-898983.pdf; NTTX Logistics Information.doc

Dear Exec Secs,

The attached letter invites your Assistant Secretaries to participate in the National Tabletop Exercise (NTTX) for National Level Exercise 11 that is being held in the National Capitol Region on Wednesday, April 13, 2011. For your information, I have also attached logistical information relevant to the exercise. FEMA would very much appreciate your assistance in ensuring the letter is forwarded appropriately.

Among other things, the letter requests that you please identify up to three participants for your organization (including at least one senior leader at the Assistant Secretary-level or designee) and submit their names and position titles to nep@dhs.gov.

NTTX participants should be those who would likely have a lead role with the Domestic Readiness Group, Unified Area Coordination Group, and National Response Coordination Center / Emergency Support Function Leaders Group during a catastrophic disaster.

Should anyone have questions regarding the NTTX, please contact:
Mr. Paul Bertovich, FEMA / National Exercise Division, (202) 786 9682 or paul.bertovich@dhs.gov;
Ms. Stacey Burger, NLE 11 Exercise Support Team, (440) 477 5088 or Stacey_burger@sra.com; or
Ms. Rebecca Weissman, NLE 11 Exercise Support Team, (703) 284 6090 or Rebecca_weissman@sra.com.

Thank you in advance for your assistance.

3/22...To EDO/Chairman for Appropriate Action...Copy to: RF...11-0142
(NOTE Registration - RSVP by Wednesday, March 23, 2011)

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20472

FEMA

March 21, 2011

Dear Colleague:

You are cordially invited to attend the upcoming **National Tabletop Exercise (NTTX) on Wednesday, April 13, 2011**. This event is an essential component of the 2011 National Level Exercise (NLE 11) and is by invitation only. Your participation is vital to the successful execution of this event, and will help ensure our nation is prepared for the largest and most complex NLE undertaken to date.

The NTTX will take the form of a rehearsal of concept (ROC) drill. During this one-day, facilitated discussion-based event, we will exercise key policy, command, and operational activities associated with the execution of the Federal Interagency Response Plan – Earthquake 2011, the Joint State-Regional Operational Plans for a New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) Earthquake, and key aspects of the developing Whole Community response concept. Participants will move between tables to discuss and resolve issues.

The exercise incorporates one hour of special-topic briefings and six hours of exercise to allow participants, seated in functional/operational nodes, to focus on lifesaving, life-sustaining, communications, and mass care activities during the first 72 hours of a NMSZ event.

The three-fold purpose of this event is to: cultivate strong relationships among interagency leadership; to identify and explore select policy-level issues surrounding the response to a NMSZ catastrophic earthquake; and to identify opportunities for improvement to be incorporated into NLE 11.

In preparation for the NTTX, please identify up to three participants for your organization (including at least one senior leader at the Assistant Secretary-level or designee) and submit their names and position titles to nep@dhs.gov.

NTTX participants should be those who would likely have a lead role with the Domestic Readiness Group, Unified Area Coordination Group, and National Response Coordination Center/Emergency Support Function Leaders Group during a catastrophic disaster. Please note that this will be an active exercise. All participants should be prepared to address and discuss the details of their organization and the appropriate plans, policies, and procedures for a response to a catastrophic earthquake scenario.

Registration: Registration begins at 7:00 am on April 13, 2011. To confirm participation and receive meeting location information, applicable read-ahead materials, exercise agenda, directions, and parking information, we request each Agency's three representatives RSVP to https://www.seeuthere.com/event/m2c640-5CTJFONK63RAK by **Wednesday, March 23, 2011**.

In preparation for the NTTX, an exercise rehearsal/walk-thru for Agency representatives (excluding Assistant Secretary-level principals) is scheduled for **April 8, 2011**, from 9:00am to 12:00 pm at FEMA Headquarters, 500 C Street, SW, Washington, D.C. There will also be a webinar and conference-call line available for virtual attendance.

If you have any questions about the NTTX, please contact:

- Mr. Paul Bertovich, FEMA/National Exercise Division, (202) 786-9682 or Paul.Bertovich@dhs.gov ;
- Ms. Stacey Burger, NLE 11 Exercise Support Team, (440) 477-5088 or Stacey_Burger@sra.com; or
- Ms. Rebecca Weissman, NLE 11 Exercise Support Team, (703) 284-6090 or Rebecca_Weissman@sra.com.

We look forward to your participation in this important event.

Sincerely,

W. Craig Fugate
Administrator

National Tabletop Exercise (NTTX) Date: April 13, 2011, from 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.

NTTX Location: Sheraton National Hotel (900 South Orme Street, Arlington, VA 22204)
(703) 521-1900 http://www.sheratonnational.com/

NTTX Room Block: NTTX Meeting

NTTX Registration: To confirm participation and receive applicable read-ahead materials we request each Agency's representatives RSVP to https://www.seeuthere.com/event/m2c640-5CTJFONK63RAK by **Wednesday, March 30, 2011**.

NTTX Directions and Transportation

Metro/Pentagon City Mall

The hotel provides a free shuttle service between the Pentagon City Metro (Blue and Orange Lines)/Pentagon City Fashion Mall, which is also adjacent to the Pentagon Row Shopping and Dining. The Pentagon City Metro station can be accessed across the street (S. Hayes Street) or from the lower level of the Pentagon City Fashion Mall.

On the days of the Senior Leaders' Seminar (SLS) and the NTTX (April 12–14, 2011), the shuttles will run continuously based on the schedule below. At other times, the shuttle will run every 30 minutes.

Tuesday: 6 a.m.–8:30 a.m., 4:30 p.m.–6 p.m.
Wednesday: 7 a.m.–9 a.m., 4 p.m.–5:30 p.m.
Thursday: 7 a.m.–9 a.m., 4 p.m.–5:30 p.m.

DRIVING

From Points North: Take I-395 South to Exit 8 – Washington Boulevard Travel. Stay in the far right-hand lane for ¼ mile, and take the Columbia Pike/Navy Annex exit. The hotel will be directly across from you.

From Points South: Take I-95 North to I-395 and take Exit 8A - Washington Boulevard. Stay in the far right-hand lane for ¼ mile, and take the Columbia Pike/Navy Annex exit. The hotel will be directly across from you.



From Points East: Take I-95 South to I-495 West to George Washington Parkway. Follow the Parkway for eight miles to I-395 South/Route 27 (Lyndon B. Johnson Exit). Stay right at the fork, and take the exit for Route 224 West (Columbia Pike/Navy Annex). The hotel is on the right.

From Points West: Take I-66 East to Route 110/Pentagon Boulevard. Stay in the right lane, and take the Washington Boulevard exit to the Columbia Pike/Navy Annex. The hotel will be directly in front of you.

Parking: Parking is available, on a first-come-first-served basis, for $8 per day.

FROM LOCAL AIRPORTS

From Washington Dulles International Airport: Take Route 66 East to Route 110/Pentagon. Stay in the right lane, and continue to the Washington Boulevard exit. Continue to the Columbia Pike/Navy Annex exit. The hotel will be directly in front of you.

From Washington National Airport-Shuttle Service: If you are flying into Ronald Reagan National Airport, the hotel provides complimentary shuttle service every 30 minutes from 6 a.m. until 11 p.m. Simply call the hotel from the courtesy phones available at each terminal for shuttle pickup.

Local Attractions and Dining

Pentagon City Mall Directory: http://www.simon.com/mall/malldirectory.aspx?id=157

Pentagon Row Directory: http://www.pentagonrow.com/shopping/

Restaurants along Columbia Pike (2-mile round-trip walk) include:

Bangkok 54: http://www.bangkok54restaurant.com/index.htm

Lost Dog Café: http://www.lostdogcafe.com/about_south.htm

Arlington Cinema & Draft House: http://www.arlingtondrafthouse.com/

P Brennan's Irish Pub & Restaurant: http://www.pbrennans.com/

STATE OF NEW YORK
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL

DIVISION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION BUREAU

March 18, 2011

Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko
Commissioner Kristine L. Svinicki
Commissioner George Apostolakis
Commissioner William D. Magwood, IV
Commissioner William C. Ostendorff
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555
Via electronic and U.S. Mail

Re: Seismic Risk at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station

Dear Chairman Jaczko and Commissioners Svinicki, Apostolakis, Magwood, and Ostendorff:

I am writing you as a nuclear crisis, initiated by the March 11 earthquake and subsequent tsunami in Northern Japan, is still unfolding. In addition to its potentially devastating impact on the people of Japan, this crisis serves as a graphic demonstration that nuclear power facilities in the U.S. may be vulnerable to seismic activity and experience catastrophic failures that compromise their ability to control and cool multiple nuclear reactors. Data from your staff analysis (GS-199), which demonstrates an increased risk of seismic activity at some nuclear power plants in the country add to my concern.

These factors underscore the importance of a fair, open, and full assessment of seismic risks in the relicensing of Indian Point.

New York State has raised concerns about seismic risk and other issues in relation to the relicensing of Indian Point with your staff on numerous occasions. At each turn, however, the NRC has refused to consider these critical issues in the relicensing review process.

As you know, the Indian Point nuclear power station in Buchanan, New York sits 24 miles from New York City. Of all the power reactors in the United States, the two operating Indian Point reactors have the highest surrounding population both within a 50-mile radius and a 10-mile radius. Seventeen million people live within 50 miles of these reactors. Indian Point Units 2 and 3, which initially came on line in 1973 and 1975, are currently the subject of an adjudicatory proceeding to extend their license by another 20 years (Unit 1 ceased generating in the 1970s).

03/21...To EDO/OGC for Direct Reply... Suspense date: April 4... Copy to: OGC, RF, SECY to Ack
11-0133...EDO should coordinate response with OGC...Commission is to review response prior to dispatch.

120 Broadway, 26th Fl. New York, N.Y. 10271-0332 • Phone (212) 416-8446 • Fax (212) 416-6007 • WWW.AG.NY.GOV

As the NRC has acknowledged, Indian Point Unit 1, which was authorized in 1956, was built prior to any specific requirement for earthquake protection. Although the NRC revoked the operating license for the Indian Point Unit 1 power reactor in 1980, many of Unit 1's system, structures, and components were conjoined to Unit 2 and Unit 3 and are still in use today. These aging Unit 1 systems, structures, and components were built to inferior seismic specifications, and Unit 2 and Unit 3's continued reliance on these systems today poses significant safety questions.

The NRC has consistently blocked consideration of New York's seismic concerns, as well as related concerns about population, emergency evacuation, fire safety, and site security.

In November of 2007, the Attorneys General of New York, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, and Vermont submitted a letter to the NRC which expressed the states' serious concerns about the NRC's failure to confront issues such as local seismic activity when deciding whether to renew the operating license of a nuclear power plant beyond its initial forty-year term. The states requested that the NRC expand relicensing criteria to include seismic analysis. On December 30, 2007, the NRC rejected this request.

The NRC also disregarded New York's "scoping" comments in 2007, which noted that the Indian Point operator's Environmental Report and Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports do not reflect seismic information developed after the early 1980s, and which asked the NRC to require the owner to revise those outdated documents. The NRC subsequently issued a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DSEIS) based on this out-of-date information. The DSEIS failed to mention new information regarding seismic activity developed recently by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) that included the area around Indian Point or to account for the findings of Columbia's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory 2008 study. In fact, the NRC has not revised any of its Indian Point-related environmental analyses to take into account findings from this important independent study.

Perhaps most egregious is the NRC Staff's issuance of the Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (FSEIS) for Indian Point, which it issued three months after Staff issued the GS-199 analysis on seismic activity. The FSEIS did not make any reference to the NRC's own findings of increased seismic risk at Indian Point.

In November of 2007, the state submitted two contentions in the license renewal proceeding arguing that the applicant's "Updated" Safety Evaluation Report and Environmental Report insufficiently analyzed alternatives for mitigation of severe accidents like earthquakes in that it (1) failed to include recent information regarding the type, frequency, and severity of potential earthquakes and (2) failed to include an analysis of mitigation measures which could reduce the effects of an earthquake damaging the parts of inactive Indian Point Unit 1 which are currently in use at Units 2 and 3. The NRC Staff opposed acceptance of these contentions, and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board excluded them from consideration in the adjudicatory proceeding because, it said, the state did not suggest feasible alternatives to address risks posed by the new data, or estimate the cost of the increased margin of safety that would result from any

severe accident mitigation action. This burden is clearly not the public's to bear and these contentions were excluded in error.

Earlier this week, in testimony before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Chairman Jaczko stated the NRC's intention to conduct a review of the earthquake-related risks faced by nuclear power facilities operating in the central and eastern U.S. He stated that this review would take one to two years to complete, followed by a similar period of time to consider and implement mitigation measures. Indian Point Units 2 and 3 are currently the subject of a proceeding to extend their licenses by another 20 years – a proceeding in which the NRC has consistently ignored serious consideration of the risks that earthquakes and related issues pose to the Indian Point facility.

NRC should not contemplate relicensing Indian Point without first completing an open and public review of earthquake-related risks faced by this facility.

For this reason, the NRC must undertake an immediate, full, fair, and open assessment of all public health and safety risks that earthquakes pose to this facility, and provide the public an opportunity to fully review and comment on all phases of this review.

In addition, the NRC must take the following actions:

1. Promulgate an amendment to Part 54 and any other relevant regulations, which exclude seismicity analysis from the scope of safety review in relicensing proceedings, to specifically require the preparation of a public site-specific seismic analysis for the Indian Point and other reactors;

2. Open up the GS-199 seismic analysis proceeding for meaningful participation by states and the public so that all assumptions can be identified and tested and ensure that all information used in this proceeding is made available in the public record;

3. Address the risk posed by the Indian Point Unit 1 facilities, which share many common components and systems with the other Indian Point units, in a complete and transparent way;

4. Incorporate USGS findings and Columbia Lamont-Doherty's findings into the Indian Point FSEIS for license renewal and re-issue the document for additional public review and comment;

5. Make public immediately the Commission's plans, in their entirety, for addressing seismic risk at all three Indian Point plants; and

6. Maximize public involvement in the Commission's and the NRC Staff's actions regarding seismic risk at Indian Point.

Whether or not one supports the re-licensing of Indian Point Units 2 and 3, we can all agree that we must protect the health, safety, and environment of the nearly 20 million people

living in close proximity to the facility. Only through a full, fair, and open assessment of the earthquake and related security risks surrounding this uniquely-situated plant – one that precedes any consideration of approving an extension of the Indian Point facility for another 20 years – can we provide these fundamental protections.

I thank you for your attention this request, and please do not hesitate to contact me at any time if I can provide additional information or you would like discuss this matter in greater detail.

Sincerely,

Eric T. Schneiderman
Attorney General

NP-LO-0311-182

NUSCALE POWER

March 18, 2011

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
One White Flint North
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852-2738

SUBJECT: Suspension of review activities for NuScale Power Pre-Application Project (NRC Project: 0769)

We regret to inform you that NuScale wishes to suspend pre-application interactions with the NRC at this time. NuScale has not been able to satisfactorily resolve our financial issues in as timely a manner as we forecast previously. We therefore formally request that the NRC suspend all review activities in an orderly manner on the NuScale design.

We appreciate the priority the NRC has given to this project in terms of time and resources and will inform you as soon as there is any change in our current situation.

Sincerely,

Edward G. Wallace
Senior Vice President, Regulatory Affairs

Distribution:

Michael Mayfield, NRC, TWFN-6 E04
Stuart Magruder, NRC, TWFN-9 F27
Greg Cranston, NRC, TWFN-9 F27

Added to the E-Reader at the request of OEDO.

NuScale Power, Inc.
1000 NE Circle Blvd., Building 10, Suite 302 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.207.3931 Fax 541.207.3928
www.nuscalepower.com

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

CHAIRMAN

March 21, 2011

The Honorable John Barrasso
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Barrasso:

I am responding to your December 21, 2010, letter to President Barack Obama regarding the uranium recovery licenses in Wyoming now controlled by JSC Atomredmetzoloto (ARMZ), a Russian corporation.

Last November, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved the transfer of control of the licenses from Uranium One USA, Inc. and Uranium One Americas, Inc. to ARMZ. At that time, we determined that the U.S. subsidiaries of Uranium One Inc. (the formerly Canadian, now Russian-owned firm that is the parent of the two U.S. subsidiaries) would remain the licensees and continue to be qualified to conduct the uranium recovery operations. As a condition of our approval, we required the licensees to notify the NRC before ARMZ appoints, hires, or designates personnel to perform NRC-licensed activities.

Once fully operational, the ARMZ licenses will represent approximately 20 percent of the currently licensed uranium in-situ recovery production capacity in the U.S. The licensed Willow Creek facility (formally known as Irigaray and Christensen Ranch) is expected to start producing uranium in 2011, and the licensed Moore Ranch facility is in the initial stages of construction.

At this time, neither Uranium One Inc. nor ARMZ holds a specific NRC export license. In order to export uranium from the United States, Uranium One, Inc. or ARMZ would need to apply for and obtain a specific NRC license authorizing the export of uranium for use in reactor fuel. Before issuing such a license, the NRC would have to determine that the proposed export would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States. Under existing NRC regulations, this means that any uranium proposed for export to Russia for use in nuclear fuel would be made subject to the U.S.-Russia Atomic Energy Act Section 123 agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation and confirmed in case-specific, government-to-government assurances for each proposed export. Russia would be required to commit to use the material only for peaceful purposes (not for development of any nuclear explosive device), to maintain adequate physical protection, and not to retransfer it to a third country or alter it in form or content without the prior consent of the U.S.

Every application submitted to the NRC for a specific export or import license is made available to the public on the NRC's web site, and the NRC welcomes public comment on such applications. Our regulations outline in detail procedures for public participation concerning these license applications.

As you note in your letter, there is considerable interest in the area of uranium recovery, and we are now expecting as many as 16 new applications by 2013 for new recovery facilities or for expanding existing uranium recovery facilities, in addition to those we have already received. Since October 2007, we have received seven new facility applications (six in Wyoming) and four applications to expand or restart an existing facility. Of the new facility applications received, one has been licensed, two are nearing completion of their reviews and licensing decisions are expected in 2011, two others are under review, one has been deferred at the applicant's request, and one was withdrawn. Of the four expansions and restarts, we authorized the restart of the Uranium One Inc., Willow Creek facility in Wyoming, which had ceased operations in 2000, and authorized a plant upgrade for another licensee. The remaining two expansion applications are under review. For future reference, the NRC maintains the status of its application reviews on the agency's web site.

Under its governing statutes, the NRC regulates to assure the safe use of nuclear materials, but does not have a role in promoting any particular use of those materials. With respect to your request for cooperation with the Executive Branch in fostering a robust domestic uranium industry, the Department of Energy would be the agency responsible for such concerns. If you need any additional information, please contact me or Ms. Rebecca Schmidt, Director of the Office of Congressional Affairs, at (301) 415-1776.

Sincerely,

Gregory B. Jaczko

Originating Office: EDO
REF: CORR-11-0019
Chairman Correspondence

ADAMS Accession No.: ML11063A005

OFC	SECY	OGA	OCM/GBJ	OCM/GBJ	
NAME	SMckelvin	for R. Schwartz	JMonninger	GBJaczko	
DATE	03/11/2011	03/16/11	03/ /2011	03/ /2011	

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

10453944

JOHN BARRASSO M.D.
WYOMING
307 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
202-224-6441

United States Senate

COMMITTEES:
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
FOREIGN RELATIONS
INDIAN AFFAIRS
RANKING

December 21, 2010

President Barack Obama
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am contacting you to express my strong concerns regarding the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) recent decision to approve the sale of American uranium reserves to Atomredmetzoloto (ARMZ).

ARMZ is owned by the Russian government and has sought to acquire a controlling stake in the Canadian owned Uranium One, Inc. This transaction would give the Russian government control over a sizable portion of America's uranium production capacity. Equally alarming, this sale gives ARMZ a significant stake in uranium mines in Kazakhstan.

As you know, Russia has a disturbing record of supporting nuclear programs in countries that are openly hostile to the United States. Russia has directly aided Iran's nuclear development and agreed on October 15, 2010 to help develop Venezuela's nuclear program. This record is at great odds with our own national security.

America's national and energy security must be paramount in any future decisions by your administration. As was communicated to the NRC by my staff prior to the sale, I remain concerned with any attempt to grant an export license to ARMZ which would allow the Russian government to ship U.S. uranium overseas. I would request immediate notification should ARMZ file for a license with the NRC to export U.S. uranium.

In light of this recent NRC decision, developing U.S. uranium is critical. The U.S. imports nearly 90 percent of the uranium used in America's nuclear power plants. Currently more than a dozen license applications are pending with the NRC for uranium mines in Wyoming. These delayed applications, dating back as far as 2007, are unacceptable. I ask that you work with me to ensure an active and strategic domestic uranium industry that lessens our dangerous dependence on foreign imports.

Thank you for your attention to this pressing matter.

Sincerely,

John Barrasso

John Barrasso, MD
United States Senator

100 EAST B STREET
SUITE 2201
CASPER, WY 82602
307-261-6413

2120 CAPITOL AVENUE
SUITE 2013
CHEYENNE, WY 82001
307-772-2451

325 WEST MAIN STREET
SUITE F
RIVERTON, WY 82501
307-856-6642

2632 FOOTHILL BOULEVARD
SUITE 101
ROCK SPRINGS, WY 82901
307-362-5012

2 NORTH MAIN STREET
SUITE 205
SHERIDAN, WY 82801
307-672-6456

WYOMING
TOLL FREE
1-866-235-9553
WWW.BARRASSO.SENATE.GOV

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

CHAIRMAN

March 21, 2011

The Honorable Michael B. Enzi
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Enzi:

I am responding to your December 27, 2010, letter to President Barack Obama regarding the uranium recovery licenses in Wyoming now controlled by JSC Atomredmetzoloto (ARMZ), a Russian corporation.

Last November, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved the transfer of control of the licenses from Uranium One USA, Inc. and Uranium One Americas, Inc. to ARMZ. At that time, we determined that the U.S. subsidiaries of Uranium One Inc. (the formerly Canadian, now Russian-owned firm) would remain as the licensees and continue to be qualified to conduct the uranium recovery operations. As a condition of our approval, we required the licensees to notify the NRC before ARMZ appoints, hires, or designates personnel to perform NRC-licensed activities.

Once fully operational, the ARMZ licenses will represent approximately 20 percent of the currently licensed uranium in-situ recovery production capacity in the U.S. The licensed Willow Creek facility (formally known as Irigaray and Christensen Ranch) is expected to start producing uranium in 2011, and the licensed Moore Ranch facility is in the initial stages of construction.

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Every application submitted to the NRC for a specific export or import license is made available to the public on the NRC's web site, and the NRC welcomes public comment on such applications. Our regulations outline in detail procedures for public participation concerning these license applications.

As you note in your letter, there is considerable interest in the area of uranium recovery, and we are now expecting as many as 16 new applications by 2013 for new recovery facilities or for expanding existing uranium recovery facilities, in addition to those we have already received. Since October 2007, we have received seven new facility applications (six in Wyoming) and four applications to expand or restart an existing facility. Of the new facility applications received, one has been licensed, two are nearing completion of their reviews and licensing decisions are expected in 2011, two others are under review, one has been deferred at the applicant's request, and one was withdrawn. Of the four expansions and restarts, we authorized the restart of the Uranium One Inc., Willow Creek facility in Wyoming, which had ceased operations in 2000, and authorized a plant upgrade for another licensee. The remaining two expansion applications are under review. For future reference, the NRC maintains the status of its application reviews on the agency's web site.

Under its governing statutes, the NRC regulates to assure the safe use of nuclear materials, but does not have a role in promoting any particular use of those materials. With respect to your request for cooperation with the Executive Branch in fostering a robust domestic uranium industry, the Department of Energy would be the agency responsible for such concerns. If you need any additional information, please contact me or Ms. Rebecca Schmidt, Director of the Office of Congressional Affairs, at (301) 415-1776.

Sincerely,

Gregory B. Jaczko

Originating Office: EDO
REF: CORR-11-0018
Chairman Correspondence

ADAMS Accession No.: ML110600960

OFC	SECY	OGC	OCM/GBJ	OCM/GBJ	
NAME	SMcKelvin	RSchmidt	JMonninger	GBJaczko	
DATE	03/11/2011	03/18/11	03/21/2011	03/ /2011	

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

1045348

OFFICES:
Gillette 307-682-6268
Cheyenne 307-772-2477
Casper 307-261-6572
Cody 307-527-9444
Jackson 307-739-9507
D.C. 202-224-3424
website enzi.senate.gov

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-5004

MICHAEL ENZI
WYOMING

COMMITTEES:
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions
Ranking Member
Finance
Small Business
Budget

December 27, 2010

President Barack Obama
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am contacting you regarding my concerns with the acquisition of a significant amount of America's uranium reserves by Atomredmetzoloto (ARMZ), which is owned by the Russian government. I emphatically oppose granting an export license to ARMZ, which would allow the Russian government to ship U.S. uranium overseas. I request that your Administration inform me immediately should ARMZ file a request for a license with the NRC to export U.S. uranium.

ARMZ has acquired a 52 percent stake in Uranium One, Inc. Uranium One, Inc. owns significant uranium assets in the United States through its subsidiary Uranium One USA. This transaction gives the Russian government control over a sizeable portion of America's uranium production capacity. I have concerns regarding this transaction given Russia's record of supporting nuclear programs in countries that are openly hostile to the United States. Russia has directly aided Iran's nuclear development and agreed on October 15, 2010 to help develop Venezuela's nuclear program. With a record that suggests support for interests that are at odds with our national security, I urge you to take every precaution and to prohibit the export of the U.S. uranium assets by an entity of the Russian government.

Domestic uranium production is important to U.S. energy security. It also provides good paying jobs in Wyoming. The U.S. currently imports nearly 90 percent of the uranium used in America's nuclear power plants. We must promote U.S. uranium development by eliminating permitting delays that hinder the industry's growth. There are currently more than a dozen license applications pending at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for uranium mines in Wyoming. These applications date back as far as 2007. Proposed mines are also facing permitting delays from the Bureau of Land Management. Instead of allowing for domestic uranium to be shipped overseas, I hope we can work together to ensure that our domestic industry can grow in an expeditious manner to lessen our nation's dependence on foreign uranium.

America's national and energy security must be paramount in this matter. Thank you for your attention to this letter.

Sincerely,

Michael B. Enzi

Michael B. Enzi
United States Senator

Taylor, Renee

From: Borchardt, Bill
Sent: Sunday, March 13, 2011 10:07 PM
To: Weber, Michael
Subject: Fw:

Bill Borchardt
Via blackberry

----- Original Message -----
From: Jaczko, Gregory
To: Borchardt, Bill
Sent: Sun Mar 13 22:00:59 2011
Subject:

bill -- anything we can do to assist lyons's request:

Greg
A thought and request: could nrc fill in acronyms and email this back to nitops and to me and Dan (all copied above)??

I know most, not all, acronyms. I think this is significant progress!
Thx
Pete

----- Original Message -----
From:
To: Lyons, Peter
Sent: Sun Mar 13 20:44:33 2011
Subject:

Dear Pete;

I am sorry. I made some mistakes. The following data is quick and rough summary of the situation. Good news is that they are starting the cooling of S/C using final heat sink. They are continuing to do so in other unit.

Bad news is as in the past they are wondering what to do next, observing parameters.

Yours, Shunsuke

Current Status (5:00, 2011/03/14)

As for 2F, unit 1 started S/C cooling, recovering final heat sink.

1F Unit 1
1) Water injection status
Sea water is being injected through fire-fighting water line (since 20:20 03/13)
2) Pressure in RPV
0.378MPa -> 0.304
3) Water level in RPV
Down scale (region A)
-1700 mm (region B)

EB/18

Note: Sea water injection rate is about 20-60 ton/hr. We do not know the reason why the level is not recovered though the estimated volume of water injected has exceeded the volume of RPV (120 ton). Considering the radiation level change due to venting, it is difficult to say that melt through of RPV due to core melt has occurred. Most plausible explanation is the stuck open of S/R valve.

4) Pressure in D/W

D/W 0.605 MPa->0.490

S/C 0.600 MPa

Note; Explosion at Reactor Building caused wound and exposure of the public stayed in the neighborhood.

Note: the fraction of core damage was estimated to be 55% based on the measurement by CAMAS (unconfirmed, private company source)

1F Unit 2

1) Water injection status

RCIC in operation

2) Pressure in RPV

5.85MPa=>5.4

3) Water level in RPV

Region A: No information (loss of battery?

Region B: + 3750 mm

4) Pressure in RCV: Design pressure: D/W: 0.38 MPa, S/C: 0.43 MPa D/W 0.400 MPa => 0.467

S/C no data

Note: as the RCIC will be lost in due course, the drywell venting operation is in preparation. Also in preparation is sea water injection

1F Unit 3

5) Water injection status

D/D fire fighting pump has inject pure water since 09:08 and sea water since 13:12.

6) Pressure in RPV

0.18MPa

7) Water level in RPV

Region A: -1500 mm

Region B: -2000 mm

8) Pressure in RCV: Design pressure: D/W: 0.38 MPa, S/C: 0.43 MPa

D/W 0.35 MPa=> 0.365

S/C: 0.30MPa

Note: CV vent started at 09:20

Note: Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano announced that though hydrogen explosion may occur at 1F3 as in the case of 1F1, there will be no major impact on the public health as the public has already been evacuated at 15:38(3/13)

Radiation level at Monitoring Points (micro SV/hr) at the site boundary

MP1 17 (11:40), 23(10:00)

MP4 78(03:38), 40.4 (21:33), 596(1355), 1557(13:52), 46 (12:42) 52.8(11:18)

MP6 66.3(2:50 3/14), 650 (5:00) 951 (3:00 3/14) 5.5 (12:00) 5.6(07:30)

MP7 0.04 (13:00) 0.04(11:55)

MP8 5.6 (07:30) 5.6(07:30)

Iodine at MP6: Bq/ cm3

2.6x10-3 (11:10), 6.7x10-4(10:10)

Messured levels are fluctuating in accordance with the change of wind direction: peak values have been about 1000 for 10 min or so.

It was reported from Onagawa NPP at 12:50 03/13 that the radiation level of several monitoring points was increased from below 100 nGy/hr to more than 10000 nGy/hr in the midnight peaking at 02:00 03/13 and the NPP reported the site emergency (preparation level) to the officials. The levels now decreased to several thousand nGy levels.

From:	Brenner, Eliot
To:	Akstulewicz, Brenda; Chandrathil, Prema; McIntyre, David; Screnci, Diane; Harrington, Holly; Couret, Ivonne; Janbergs, Holly; Ledford, Joey; Sheehan, Neil; Hannah, Roger; Burnell, Scott; Uselding, Lara; Shannon, Valerie; Dricks, Victor; Mitlyng, Viktoria
Subject:	FW: COMMISSION E-READER....WEDNESDAY, MARCH 23, 2011
Date:	Wednesday, March 23, 2011 12:20:39 PM
Attachments:	Tab A 03-15-11 Blumenthal.pdf Tab B 03-11-11 Obama 11-0141.pdf Tab C 03-11-11 Bady 11-0140.pdf

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From: Champ, Billie
Sent: Wednesday, March 23, 2011 11:47 AM
To: Commission E-Reader Distribution; E-Reader Distribution
Subject: COMMISSION E-READER....WEDNESDAY, MARCH 23, 2011

~~INTERNAL USE ONLY~~
Some of the information contained in the Reader is not publicly available.
If there are any questions, please contact SECY.

READING FILE

INDEX

March 23, 2011

INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE

Tab "A" 03/15/11 – Letter from Senator Richard Blumenthal, requests information regarding the NRC's oversight of nuclear power plants in the U.S.

Tab "B" 03/11/11 -- Memorandum from President Barack Obama, Government Reform for Competitiveness and Innovation.

Tab "C" 03/11/11 -- Memorandum from Robert Bady, Safe & Green Campaign, concerns letters from Town Selectboards regarding closure and decommissioning of Vermont Yankee nuclear power station.

EB/19

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL
CONNECTICUT

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

March 15, 2011

The Honorable Gregory B. Jaczko
Chairman
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Stop O-16G4
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Chairman Jaczko:

I am writing to request information regarding the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) oversight of nuclear power plants in the United States.

The ongoing crisis at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant has raised concerns – expressed to me by Connecticut residents – about whether a similar problem could occur in the United States. Like all Americans, I express my condolences and support for the Japanese victims and their families. This tragic occurrence raises difficult questions and concerns that should be addressed as soon as possible.

I would appreciate your responses to the following questions, which I believe will help Members of Congress and the public have a better understanding of the current environment in which these plants are operating:

- What insights has the NRC gained and what lessons have been learned from the tragic experience in Japan that can be applied to the safe operation of American nuclear plants?
- The German government recently announced that it would temporarily suspend operations at nuclear plants constructed before 1980, pending a safety review. Has the NRC contemplated steps along the same lines for any American nuclear plants?
- Do American nuclear facilities utilize any particular design characteristics or operational methods that make a Fukushima Daiichi-like crisis less likely to occur?
- What design or construction features, or practices and policies in connection with crisis response, could be implemented to better protect health and safety in the event of a similar emergency occurring here?

I will supplement these questions with others as more becomes known about the unfolding events in Japan.

While nuclear power has an important role in America's energy resource mix, we must ensure the safety and security of all our nuclear power facilities, especially for people who work and live in surrounding areas.

Thank you for your attention to this request and for your continuing work to ensure that America's nuclear industry operates in a safe and reliable manner.

Sincerely,

Richard Blumenthal
United States Senate

3/22...To EDO to Prepare Response for Signature of the Chairman..Date due Comm: April 13...Cpy to: RF, OCA to Ack....11-0143..Commission Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 11, 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Government Reform for Competitiveness and Innovation

As I outlined in my State of the Union address to the Congress on January 25, 2011, winning the future in the global economy will require reducing our deficit while investing in areas critical to long-term economic growth and competitiveness such as education, innovation, and infrastructure. By out-educating, out-innovating, and out-building our competitors, we will enable our Nation to grow, create jobs, and thrive in the years ahead.

At the same time, we cannot win the future with a government built for the past. We live and do business in the information age, but the organization of the Federal Government has not kept pace. Government agencies have grown without overall strategic planning and duplicative programs have sprung up, making it harder for each to reach its goals. Already, my Administration has taken on this waste and duplication. My current budget proposes more than 200 terminations, reductions, and savings in agency programs totaling approximately $30 billion in fiscal year 2012. And in areas as varied as surface transportation to job training, public health, and education, I have proposed to consolidate scores of programs into more focused, effective, and streamlined initiatives.

But we must go further. Winning the future will take a government that judiciously allocates scarce government resources to maximize its efficiency and effectiveness so that it can best support American competitiveness and innovation. Now is the time to act to consolidate and reorganize the executive branch of the Federal Government in a way that best serves this goal.

03/22... To EDO/CFO/OIP for Information... Copy to: RF... 11-0141

By this memorandum, I assign our Nation's first Chief Performance Officer, who also serves as the Deputy Director for Management of the Office of Management and Budget (the "Chief Performance Officer"), the responsibility of leading the effort to create a plan for the restructuring and streamlining of the executive branch of the Federal Government. The first focus of this effort shall be on the executive departments and agencies and the functions that support one of our most important priorities -- increasing trade, exports, and our overall competitiveness ("trade and competitiveness").

Accordingly, I direct the following:

(1) The Chief Performance Officer shall establish a Government Reform for Competitiveness and Innovation Initiative, led by an Executive Director, to conduct a comprehensive review of the Federal agencies and programs involved in trade and competitiveness, including analyzing their scope and effectiveness, areas of overlap and duplication, unmet needs, and possible cost savings.

(2) As part of this review, the Chief Performance Officer and Executive Director shall confer broadly with the heads and staff of executive departments and agencies, including the offices and agencies within the Executive Office of the President (collectively, the "agencies"). They should also consult broadly with external stakeholders, including Members of Congress, business leaders, unions, nongovernmental organizations, and government reform experts, to hear their individual and independent perspectives on what we are doing well and where we could improve our effectiveness and efficiency.

(3) Within 90 days from the date of this memorandum, the Chief Performance Officer shall submit recommendations to me for presidential and, ultimately, congressional action to restructure and streamline Federal Government programs focused on trade and competitiveness, based on the following principles:

(a) the functions of the executive branch of the Federal Government involved in trade and competitiveness should be organized so that the Federal Government can most efficiently and effectively facilitate the competitiveness of American businesses, large and small, and American workers in the changing global economy;

(b) the responsibilities, authorities, programs, and requirements of agencies should be transparent, understandable, and easily accessible to the American public; and

(c) agencies and programs should be organized to reduce inefficiencies and overlapping responsibilities or functions, maximize return on taxpayer dollars, and best serve the American public.

(4) Agencies shall provide, consistent with law, information and assistance requested by the Chief Performance Officer and Executive Director to inform their work as directed by this memorandum.

(5) Agencies shall carry out the provisions of this memorandum to the extent permitted by law and consistent with their statutory and regulatory authorities and their enforcement mechanisms.

(6) This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

(7) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget is hereby authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the *Federal Register*.



Safe & Green Campaign
c/o Robert Bady, Vermont Coordinator
167 Sunset Lake Road
Brattleboro, VT 05301
<bobbady@gmail.com>

TO: Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee
Vermont Public Service Board
Senator John Campbell, President Pro Tempore, Vermont Senate
Representative Shap Smith, Speaker, Vermont House of Representatives
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

FROM: Safe & Green Campaign

SUBJECT: **Letters from Town Selectboards *re* Closure and Decommissioning of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station**

DATE: March 11, 2011

We have been asked to forward to you the enclosed letters from selectboards in Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire towns in close proximity to the Vermont Yankee nuclear power station in Vernon, Vermont. The letters are from the following towns:

Buckland, MA
Colrain, MA
Dummerston, VT
Gill, MA
Leverett, MA
Marlboro, VT
Montague, MA
New Salem, MA
Putney, VT
Richmond, NH
Westminster, VT
Winchester, NH
Warwick, MA
Wendell, MA

At least six other town selectboards in the tri-state area, as far as we know, will be considering sending you similar letters within the next couple months.

For those not familiar with selectboards and/or the Safe & Green Campaign, the former constitute the governing bodies of most New England towns and are usually comprised of three or five elected members. The latter is a three-year-old, non-profit, and largely volunteer, citizens environmental group based in the tri-state area of southeastern Vermont, northwestern Massachusetts, and southwestern New Hampshire.

All of the enclosed letters are based on, or a response to, an original draft that was prepared by the Safe & Green Campaign in consultation with five current or former selectboard members. Thus, all of the letters express similar concerns about the forthcoming closure and decommissioning of Vermont Yankees. Because the letters are not identical, we encourage you to read all of them.

cont'd...

03/22... To EDO for Direct Reply.... Due date: 04/14... Copy to: RF, SECY to Ack...11-0140

We hope you will respond to these letters by writing directly to each of the above-named town selectboards. However, if you prefer, you may send a response to the Safe & Green Campaign and we will mail it to each selectboard.

Thank you for your attention to the concerns raised in these letters.

###

Copies of these letters have been sent to:

U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders (VT)
U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy (VT)
U.S. Representative Peter Welch (VT)
VT Governor Peter Shumlin
VT State Senator Peter Galbraith
VT State Senator Jeanette White
VT State Representative Sarah Edwards
VT State Representative Molly Burke
VT State Representative David Dean
VT State Representative Michael Mrowicki
VT State Representative Matt Trieber
VT State Representative Richard Marek
VT State Representative Ann Manwaring
VT State Representative Carolyn Partridge

U.S. Senator Scott Brown (MA)
U.S. Senator John Kerry (MA)
U.S. Representative John Olver (MA)
MA Governor Deval Patrick
MA State Senator Stan Rosenberg
MA State Representative Steve Kulik
MA State Representative Paul Mark
MA State Representative Denise Andrews

U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen
U.S. Senator Kelly Ayotte
U.S. Representative Charlie Bass
NH Governor John Lynch
NH State Senator Molly Kelly
NH State Representative William Butynski
NH State Representative Henry A. L. Parkhurst
NH State Representative Edwin O. Smith
NH State Representative Richard J. Dwinell

Windham County Regional Commission (VT)
Franklin Regional Council of Governments (MA)
Southwest Regional Planning Commission (NH)

TOWN OF BUCKLAND
MASSACHUSETTS

December 14, 2010

TO: Those With Authority Over the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station in Vernon, including the Entergy Nuclear Corporation, the Vermont Legislature and Public Service Board, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

FROM: Selectboards and Town/City Councils of Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts Towns and Cities Within 20 Miles of Vermont Yankee

CONCERNING: Effects of the Scheduled Closure of Vermont Yankee on Workers, Residents, and the Environment of our Towns and Cities

As of February 24, 2010, when the Vermont Senate voted 26-4 in opposition to the extended operation of Vermont Yankee's original 40-year license on March 21, 2012, the plant is now scheduled to cease operation on or before that date. This scheduled closure is likely to affect nearby towns and cities in the tri-state area in a number of ways. Because it is the responsibility of local selectboards and town/city councils to protect and enhance the safety and well-being of our towns and cities, we are writing this letter to urge all the appropriate authorities to take whatever steps may be necessary in order to minimize any negative impacts that Vermont Yankee's closure may have on its workers, local residents, and the environment.

Our concerns include the following:

- that Vermont Yankee workers, many of whom live in our towns and cities, be given first preference when workers are hired for the multi-year decommissioning and site clean-up process.

- that during this post-shutdown period, when the reactor's radioactive components will be dismantled and removed or stored on site, workers remaining on the site receive the maximum protection from radiation exposure.

- that those workers whose jobs are discontinued or who choose not to accept employment during this post-shutdown period be guaranteed a generous severance package of pay and benefits as well as opportunities for re-training for available jobs at decent wages, including jobs in the rapidly expanding "green energy" sector.

- that during this final period as the reactor continues to age and minor accidents and radioactive leakages continue to occur (if they do), residents and officials of nearby towns and cities be assured that there will be extra attention to maintenance and repair of all systems associated with the reactor, coupled with heightened inspections, monitoring, and testing to minimize the possibility of a major accident and ensure that people, animals, and the environment are not exposed to any additional risks of breathing, drinking, or otherwise ingesting radioactivity.

- that any tendency to delay or cancel needed maintenance and repairs during the reactor's final months of operation be strenuously resisted, and that if circumstances warrant, Vermont Yankee be shut down permanently *before* its scheduled retirement date.

- that during the decommissioning and site clean-up process, when toxic radioactive components are likely to be shipped from the reactor site to nuclear waste repositories in other states *via* roads and railways passing through our towns and cities, local residents as well as local selectboards, city councils, and relevant town and city departments (police, fire, and emergency medical, etc.) be notified in advance so as to provide maximum protection for people, wildlife, and the local environment in the event of a transportation accident.

Finally, we respectfully request that all local selectboards and town/city councils be kept informed in a timely way (as happens now regarding "significant events") of all relevant plans, decisions, and other developments related to Vermont Yankee that might affect our towns and cities during the reactor's final phase of operation and during the subsequent period of decommissioning and site clean-up.

We also propose that a *citizens advisory board* be formed, with its members appointed by local selectboards and town/city councils, so as to facilitate on-going, two-way communication regarding all of these matters.

Thank you in advance for your consideration of our concerns.

Sincerely,

Buckland Board of Selectmen

Stefan G. Racz, Chair | Kevin P. Fox | Robert A. Dean

cc: Town Boards of Health within close proximity to Vermont Yankee
Windham County Regional Commission (VT)
Franklin Regional Council of Governments (MA)
Southwest Regional Planning Commission (NH)
Elected local, state, and federal officials representing VT, MA, and NH towns within 20 miles of Vermont Yankee

17 STATE STREET - BUCKLAND • SHELBURNE FALLS, MA •01370
PHONE: (413) 625-6330 • FAX: (413) 625-8570

Town of Colrain

Board of Selectmen
55 Main Road
Colrain, Massachusetts 01340

Telephone (413) 624-6306
Fax (413) 624-8852
E-mail bos@colrain-ma.gov

Town Where A U.S. Flag Was First Raised
Over A Public School, May, 1812

February 7, 2011

TO: Those With Authority Over the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station in Vernon, including the Entergy Nuclear Corporation, the Vermont Legislature and Public Service Board, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

FROM: Selectboards and Town/City Councils of Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts Towns and Cities Within 20 Miles of Vermont Yankee

CONCERNING: Effects of the Scheduled Closure of Vermont Yankee on Workers, Residents, and the Environment of our Towns and Cities

As of February 24, 2010, when the Vermont Senate voted 26-4 in opposition to the extended operation of Vermont Yankee's original 40-year license on March 21, 2012, the plant is now scheduled to cease operation on or before that date. This scheduled closure is likely to affect nearby towns and cities in the tri-state area in a number of ways. Because it is the responsibility of local selectboards and town/city councils to protect and enhance the safety and well-being of our towns and cities, we are writing this letter to urge all the appropriate authorities to take whatever steps may be necessary in order to minimize any negative impacts that Vermont Yankee's closure may have on its workers, local residents, and the environment.

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- that those workers whose jobs are discontinued or who choose not to accept employment during this post-shutdown period be guaranteed a generous severance package of pay and benefits as well as opportunities for re-training for

available jobs at decent wages, including jobs in the rapidly expanding "green energy" sector.

- that during this final period as the reactor continues to age and minor accidents and radioactive leakages continue to occur (if they do), residents and officials of nearby towns and cities be assured that there will be extra attention to maintenance and repair of all systems associated with the reactor, coupled with heightened inspections, monitoring, and testing to minimize the possibility of a major accident and ensure that people, animals, and the environment are not exposed to any additional risks of breathing, drinking, or otherwise ingesting radioactivity.

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- that during the decommissioning and site clean-up process, when toxic radioactive components are likely to be shipped from the reactor site to nuclear waste repositories in other states *via* roads and railways passing through our towns and cities, local residents as well as local selectboards, city councils, and relevant town and city departments (police, fire, and emergency medical, etc.) be notified in advance so as to provide maximum protection for people, wildlife, and the local environment in the event of a transportation accident.

Finally, we respectfully request that all local selectboards and town/city councils be kept informed in a timely way (as happens now regarding "significant events") of all relevant plans, decisions, and other developments related to Vermont Yankee that might affect our towns and cities during the reactor's final phase of operation and during the subsequent period of decommissioning and site clean-up.

We also propose that a *citizens advisory board* be formed, with its members appointed by local selectboards and town/city councils, so as to facilitate on-going, two-way communication regarding all of these matters.

Thank you in advance for your consideration of our concerns.

Sincerely,

BOARD OF SELECTMEN OF THE TOWN
OF COLRAIN

Michael J. Beausoleil, Chair

Mark A. Thibodeau

Duane L. Scranton

Town of Dummerston

1523 Middle Road East Dummerston, Vermont 05346

TO: Those With Authority Over the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station in Vernon, Including the Entergy Nuclear Corporation, the Vermont Legislature and Public Service Board, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

FROM: Selectboards and City Councils of Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts Towns and Cities Within 20 Miles of Vermont Yankee

CONCERNING: Effects of the Scheduled Closure of Vermont Yankee on Workers, Residents, and the Environment of our Towns and Cities

As of February 24, 2010, when the Vermont Senate voted 26-4 in opposition to the extended operation of Vermont Yankee's original 40-year license on March 21, 2012, the plant is now scheduled to cease operation on or before that date. This scheduled closure is likely to affect nearby towns and cities in the tri-state area in a number of ways. Because it is the responsibility of local Selectboards and city councils to protect and enhance the safety and well-being of our towns and cities, we are writing this letter to urge all the appropriate authorities to take whatever steps may be necessary in order to minimize any negative impacts that Vermont Yankee's closure may have on its workers, local residents, and the environment.

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- that those workers whose jobs are discontinued or who choose not to accept employment during this post-shutdown period be guaranteed a generous severance package of pay and benefits as well as opportunities

Telephone: (802) 257-1496 FAX: (802) 257-4671

for re-training for available jobs at decent wages, including jobs in the rapidly expanding "green energy" sector.

- that during this final period as the reactor continues to age and minor accidents and radioactive leakages continue to occur (if they do), residents and officials of nearby towns and cities be assured that there will be extra attention to maintenance and repair of all systems associated with the reactor, coupled with heightened inspections, monitoring, and testing to minimize the possibility of a major accident and ensure that people, animals, and the environment are not exposed to any additional risks of breathing, drinking, or otherwise ingesting radioactivity.

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We also propose that a *citizens' advisory board* be formed, with its members appointed by local Selectboards and city councils, so as to facilitate on-going, two-way communication regarding all of these matters.

Thank you in advance for your consideration of our concerns.

Sincerely,

Andrew MacFarland
Chair, Dummerston Selectboard

TOWN OF GILL

MASSACHUSETTS

www.gillmass.org

DATE: February 14, 2011

TO: Those With Authority Over the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station in Vernon, including the Entergy Nuclear Corporation, the Vermont Legislature and Public Service Board, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

CONCERNING: Effects of the Scheduled Closure of Vermont Yankee on Workers, Residents, and the Environment of our Towns and Cities

On February 24, 2010, the Vermont Senate voted 26-4 to deny the extension of Vermont Yankee's original 40-year license that expires on March 21, 2012. The reactor is now scheduled to cease operation on or before that date. This scheduled closure is likely to affect nearby towns and cities in the tri-state area in a number of ways. Because it is the responsibility of local selectboards and town/city councils to protect and enhance the safety and well-being of our towns and cities, we are writing this letter to urge all the appropriate authorities to take whatever steps may be necessary in order to minimize negative impacts that Vermont Yankee's closure may have on its workers, local residents, and the environment.

Our expectations include the following:

- that Vermont Yankee workers, many of whom live in our towns and cities, be given first preference when workers are hired for the multi-year decommissioning and site clean-up process.

- that during this post-shutdown period, when the reactor's radioactive components will be dismantled and removed or stored on site, workers remaining on the site receive the maximum protection from radiation exposure.

- that those workers whose jobs are discontinued or who choose not to accept employment during this post-shutdown period be treated fairly.

- that during this final period, as the reactor continues to age and minor accidents and radioactive leakages continue to occur (if they do), residents and officials of nearby towns and cities be assured that there will be extra attention to maintenance and repair of all systems associated with the reactor, coupled with heightened inspections, monitoring, and testing to minimize the possibility of a major accident and ensure that people, animals, and the environment are not exposed to any additional risks of breathing, drinking, or otherwise ingesting radioactivity.

Telephone 413-863-9347 325 Main Road, Gill MA 01354 Fax 413-863-7775
This institution is an equal opportunity provider and employer.

towns and cities be assured that there will be extra attention to maintenance and repair of all systems associated with the reactor, coupled with heightened inspections, monitoring, and testing to minimize the possibility of a major accident and ensure that people, animals, and the environment are not exposed to any additional risks of breathing, drinking, or otherwise ingesting radioactivity.

- that any tendency to delay or cancel needed maintenance and repairs during the reactor's final months of operation be strenuously resisted, and that if circumstances warrant, Vermont Yankee be shut down permanently *before* its scheduled retirement date.

- that during the decommissioning and site clean-up process, when toxic radioactive components are likely to be shipped from the reactor site to nuclear waste repositories in other states *via* roads and railways passing through our towns and cities, local residents as well as local selectboards, city councils, and relevant town and city departments (police, fire, and emergency medical, etc.) be notified in advance so as to provide maximum protection for people, wildlife, and the local environment in the event of a transportation accident.

Finally, we respectfully request that all local selectboards and town/city councils be kept informed in a timely way (as happens now regarding "significant events") of all relevant plans, decisions, and other developments related to Vermont Yankee that might affect our towns and cities during the reactor's final phase of operation and during the subsequent period of decommissioning and site clean-up.

We also propose that a *citizens advisory board* be formed, with its members appointed by local selectboards and town/city councils, so as to facilitate on-going, two-way communication regarding all of these matters.

Thank you in advance for your consideration of our concerns.

Sincerely,

Leverett Selectboard:

Richard P. Brazeau | Peter d'Errico | Julie Shively

cc: Town Boards of Health within close proximity to Vermont Yankee
Windham County Regional Commission (VT)
Franklin Regional Council of Governments (MA)
Southwest Regional Planning Commission (NH)
Elected local, state, and federal officials representing VT, MA, and NH towns within 20 miles of Vermont Yankee

TOWN OF MARLBORO
SELECT BOARD
PO BOX 518
MARLBORO, VT 05344
marlboroselectboard@gmail.com

November 23, 2010

TO: Those With Authority Over the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station in Vernon, including the Entergy Nuclear Corporation, the Vermont Legislature and Public Service Board, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

CONCERNING: Effects of the Scheduled Closure of Vermont Yankee on Workers, Residents, and the Environment of our Towns and Cities

As of February 24, 2010, when the Vermont Senate voted 26-4 in opposition to the extended operation of Vermont Yankee's original 40-year license on March 21, 2012, the plant is now scheduled to cease operation on or before that date. This scheduled closure is likely to affect nearby towns and cities in the tri-state area in a number of ways. Because it is the responsibility of local selectboards and city councils to protect and enhance the safety and well-being of our towns and cities, we are writing this letter to urge all the appropriate authorities to take whatever steps may be necessary in order to minimize any negative impacts that Vermont Yankee's closure may have on its workers, local residents, and the environment.

The Marlboro Select Board supports this letter proposed by the Safe and Green Campaign. The support is based upon the affirmative votes on two Marlboro Town Meeting articles passed in 2003 and 2009. Following is the language of the articles:

2003: Be it resolved that the voters of the Town of Marlboro, Vermont, request the Legislature of the State of Vermont to take action immediately to bar re-licensing of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, whose current license expires in 2012; to bar the licensing of any other nuclear generating station in the State of Vermont; and to proceed forthwith in implementing a state energy plan that relies upon renewable energy sources to supply Vermont's energy needs.

2009: The voters of the Town of Marlboro request the Vermont legislature to:

1. Recognize that the 2% of our New England region's power grid supply that is provided by Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant can be replaced with a combination of local,, renewable electric and efficiency measures, along with the purchase of hydro generated electricity, and excess power already in the New England electricity market;

2. Given the viable alternatives and the risks posed by continued operation ensure that Vermont Yankee will cease operation in March, 2012 after having completed its 40 year design life by not granting approval for operation of the plant after that date and by not determining that further operation will promote the general welfare;

3. Hold the Entergy Corporation, which purchased Vermont Yankee in 2002, responsible to fully fund the plant's clean-up and decommissioning when the reactor closes, as the corporation pledged to do when it purchased Vermont Yankee.

Our concerns include the following:

- that during this final period as the reactor continues to age and minor accidents and radioactive leakages continue to occur (if they do), residents and officials of nearby towns and cities be assured that there will be extra attention to maintenance and repair of all systems associated with the reactor, coupled with heightened inspections, monitoring, and testing to minimize the possibility of a major accident and ensure that people, animals, and the environment are not exposed to any additional risks of breathing, drinking, or otherwise ingesting radioactivity.

- that any tendency to delay or cancel needed maintenance and repairs during the reactor's final months of operation be stremouslyresisted, and that if circumstances warrant, Vermont Yankee be shut down permanently *before* its scheduled retirement date.

- that during the decommissioning and site clean-up process, when toxic radioactive components are likely to be shipped from the reactor site to nuclear waste repositories in other states *via* roads and railways passing through our towns and cities, local residents as well as local selectboards, city councils, and relevant town and city departments (police, fire, and emergency medical, etc.) be notified in advance so as to provide maximum protection for people, wildlife, and the local environment in the event of a transportation accident.

Finally, we respectfully request that all local selectboards and town/city councils be kept informed in a timely way (as happens now regarding "significant events") of all relevant plans, decisions, and other developments related to Vermont Yankee that might affect our towns and cities during the reactor's final phase of operation and during the subsequent period of decommissioning and site clean-up.

We also propose that a *citizens advisory board* be formed, with its members appointed by local selectboards and town/city councils, so as to facilitate on-going, two-way communication regarding all of these matters.

Thank you in advance for your consideration of our concerns.

Sincerely,

TOWN OF MONTAGUE

Patricia A. Allen | Mark Fairbrother | Christopher Boutwell, Sr.

cc: Town Boards of Health within close proximity to Vermont Yankee
Windham County Regional Commission (VT)
Franklin Regional Council of Governments (MA)
Southwest Regional Planning Commission (NH)
Elected local, state, and federal officials representing VT, MA, and NH towns within 20 miles of Vermont Yankee

TOWN OF NEW SALEM
MASSACHUSETTS
01355

OFFICE OF THE SELECTBOARD
TEL: (978) 544-6437 • FAX: (978) 544-6428

TO: Those With Authority Over the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station in Vernon, including the Entergy Nuclear Corporation, the Vermont Legislature and Public Service Board, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

FROM: Selectboards and Town/City Councils of Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts Towns and Cities Within 20 Miles of Vermont Yankee

CONCERNING: Effects of the Scheduled Closure of Vermont Yankee on Workers, Residents, and the Environment of our Towns and Cities

As of February 24, 2010, when the Vermont Senate voted 26-4 in opposition to the extended operation of Vermont Yankee's original 40-year license on March 21, 2012, the plant is now scheduled to cease operation on or before that date. This scheduled closure is likely to affect nearby towns and cities in the tri-state area in a number of ways. Because it is the responsibility of local selectboards and town/city councils to protect and enhance the safety and well-being of our towns and cities, we are writing this letter to urge all the appropriate authorities to take whatever steps may be necessary in order to minimize any negative impacts that Vermont Yankee's closure may have on its workers, local residents, and the environment.

Our concerns include the following:

- that Vermont Yankee workers, many of whom live in our towns and cities, be given first preference when workers are hired for the multi-year decommissioning and site clean-up process.

- that during this post-shutdown period, when the reactor's radioactive components will be dismantled and removed or stored on site, workers remaining on the site receive the maximum protection from radiation exposure.

- that those workers whose jobs are discontinued or who choose not to accept employment during this post-shutdown period be guaranteed a generous severance package of pay and benefits as well as opportunities for re-training for available jobs at decent wages, including jobs in the rapidly expanding "green energy" sector.

- that during this final period as the reactor continues to age and minor accidents and radioactive leakages continue to occur (if they do), residents and officials of

nearby towns and cities be assured that there will be extra attention to maintenance and repair of all systems associated with the reactor, coupled with heightened inspections, monitoring, and testing to minimize the possibility of a major accident and ensure that people, animals, and the environment are not exposed to any additional risks of breathing, drinking, or otherwise ingesting radioactivity.

- that any tendency to delay or cancel needed maintenance and repairs during the reactor's final months of operation be strenuously resisted, and that if circumstances warrant, Vermont Yankee be shut down permanently *before* its scheduled retirement date.

- that during the decommissioning and site clean-up process, when toxic radioactive components are likely to be shipped from the reactor site to nuclear waste repositories in other states *via* roads and railways passing through our towns and cities, local residents as well as local selectboards, city councils, and relevant town and city departments (police, fire, and emergency medical, etc.) be notified in advance so as to provide maximum protection for people, wildlife, and the local environment in the event of a transportation accident.

Finally, we respectfully request that all local selectboards and town/city councils be kept informed in a timely way (as happens now regarding "significant events") of all relevant plans, decisions, and other developments related to Vermont Yankee that might affect our towns and cities during the reactor's final phase of operation and during the subsequent period of decommissioning and site clean-up.

We also propose that a *citizens advisory board* be formed, with its members appointed by local selectboards and town/city councils, so as to facilitate on-going, two-way communication regarding all of these matters.

Thank you in advance for your consideration of our concerns.

Sincerely,
The New Salem Selectboard

Anthony Palmieri

Mark LeBoeuf

cc: Town Boards of Health within close proximity to Vermont Yankee
Windham County Regional Commission (VT)
Franklin Regional Council of Governments (MA)
Southwest Regional Planning Commission (NH)
Elected local, state, and federal officials representing VT, MA, and NH towns within 20 miles of Vermont Yankee

Town of Putney

P.O. Box 233
Putney, Vermont 05346
802-387-5862

TO: Those With Authority Over the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station in Vernon, including the Entergy Nuclear Corporation, the Vermont Legislature and Public Service Board, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

FROM: Joshua Laughlin, Chair, R. Scott Henry, and Bradley King; Putney Selectboard

CONCERNING: Effects of the Scheduled Closure of Vermont Yankee on Workers, Residents, and the Environment of our Towns and Cities

As of February 24, 2010, when the Vermont Senate voted 26-4 in opposition to the extended operation of Vermont Yankee's original 40-year license on March 21, 2012, the plant is now scheduled to cease operation on or before that date. This scheduled closure is likely to affect nearby towns and cities in the tri-state area in a number of ways. Because it is the responsibility of local selectboards and city councils to protect and enhance the safety and well-being of our towns and cities, we are writing this letter to urge all the appropriate authorities to take whatever steps may be necessary in order to minimize any negative impacts that Vermont Yankee's closure may have on its workers, local residents, and the environment.

Our concerns include the following:

- that Vermont Yankee workers, many of whom live in our towns and cities, be given first preference when workers are hired for the multi-year decommissioning and site clean-up process.

- that during this post-shutdown period, when the reactor's radioactive components will be dismantled and removed or stored on site, workers remaining on the site receive the maximum protection from radiation exposure.

- that those workers whose jobs are discontinued or who choose not to accept employment during this post-shutdown period be guaranteed a generous severance package of pay and benefits as well as opportunities for re-training for available jobs at decent wages, including jobs in the rapidly expanding "green energy" sector.

- that during this final period as the reactor continues to age and minor accidents and radioactive leakages continue to occur (if they do), residents and officials of nearby towns and cities be assured that there will be extra attention to maintenance and repair of all systems associated with the reactor,

127 Main Street • fax: 802-387-4708

coupled with heightened inspections, monitoring, and testing to minimize the possibility of a major accident and ensure that people, animals, and the environment are not exposed to any additional risks of breathing, drinking, or otherwise ingesting radioactivity.

- that any tendency to delay or cancel needed maintenance and repairs during the reactor's final months of operation be strenuously resisted, and that if circumstances warrant, Vermont Yankee be shut down permanently *before* its scheduled retirement date.

- that during the decommissioning and site clean-up process, when toxic radioactive components are likely to be shipped from the reactor site to nuclear waste repositories in other states *via* roads and railways passing through our towns and cities, local residents as well as local selectboards, city councils, and relevant town and city departments (police, fire, and emergency medical, etc.) be notified in advance so as to provide maximum protection for people, wildlife, and the local environment in the event of a transportation accident.

Finally, we respectfully request that all local selectboards and city councils be kept informed in a timely way (as you do now regarding "significant events") of all relevant plans, decisions, and other developments related to Vermont Yankee that might affect our towns and cities during the reactor's final phase of operation and during the subsequent period of decommissioning and site clean-up.

We also propose that a *citizens advisory board* be formed, with its members appointed by local selectboards and city councils, so as to facilitate on-going, two-way communication regarding all of these matters.

Thank you in advance for your consideration of our concerns.

Sincerely,

Joshua D. Laughlin, Chair

R. Scott Henry

Bradley M. King

TOWN OF RICHMOND
NEW HAMPSHIRE
Office of Selectmen

Mike Colomb, Site Vice President
Entergy Nuclear Northeast
P.O. Box 250
Governor Hunt Road
Vernon, VT 05354.

January 31, 2011

Dear Mr. Colomb:

Because the Vermont Senate voted not to extend the license for Entergy's Vermont Yankee Nuclear Facility past 2012, we are writing as neighbors within a twenty mile radius of the Vermont Yankee nuclear reactor plant to urge you to take whatever steps necessary to minimize any negative impacts that closure of the Vermont Yankee nuclear plant may have on surrounding towns, your workers and the environment. You have been a good neighbor in the past and we expect nothing less if and when the facility is decommissioned.

We are confident that between now and then your vigilance and attention to maintenance and repairs of all systems associated with the reactor will continue. To minimize any possibility of accident, exposure or other risk to public health during this period, we expect you to strenuously resist any tendency to delay or cancel needed maintenance and repairs.

Further, we ask that the Town of Richmond be kept informed of relevant plans and decisions that might affect our town and that we are notified in advance if any radioactive components are to be moved offsite during site clean-up. We have no doubt that during this period you will have the best interests of your employees in mind to insure their continued health and safety.

105 Old Homestead Highway * Richmond, NH 03470 * (603) 239-4232 * www.richmondnh.us

TOWN OF RICHMOND
NEW HAMPSHIRE
Office of Selectmen

Enclosed please find petitions signed by thirty-four residents of Richmond, whom we represent.

Sincerely,

Selectmen, Town of Richmond

J.C. Boudreau, Chairman

Wes Vaughan

Sandra Gillis

Cc: Hon. Jeanne Shaheen, US Senator
Hon. Molly Kelly, State Senator
Hon. Richard Dwinell, State Representative
Hon. Aaron Patt, County Commissioner
Hon. Barbara Richardson, former State Representative
Tim Murphy, Southwest Region Planning Commission

Town of Warwick

Town of Warwick
12 Athol Road
Warwick, MA 01378

Phone: 978-544-6315
FAX: 978-544-6408
coordinator@town.warwick.ma.us
narguimbau@town.warwick.ma.us
dmagi@town.warwick.ma.us

Selectboard:
Nicholas C. Arguimbau, chair
Patricia Lemon, vice-chair
K. Dawn Magi, clerk
Town Coordinator: J. David Young

February 8, 2011

TO: Those With Authority Over the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station in Vernon, including the Entergy Nuclear Corporation, the Vermont Legislature and Public Service Board, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

FROM: Selectboards and Town/City Councils of Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts Towns and Cities Within 20 Miles of Vermont Yankee

CONCERNING: Effects of the Scheduled Closure of Vermont Yankee on Workers, Residents, and the Environment of our Towns and Cities

As of February 24, 2010, when the Vermont Senate voted 26-4 in opposition to the extended operation of Vermont Yankee's original 40-year license on March 21, 2012, the plant is now scheduled to cease operation on or before that date. This scheduled closure is likely to affect nearby towns and cities in the tri-state area in a number of ways. Because it is the responsibility of local selectboards and town/city councils to protect and enhance the safety and well-being of our towns and cities, we are writing this letter to urge all the appropriate authorities to take whatever steps may be necessary in order to minimize any negative impacts that Vermont Yankee's closure may have on its workers, local residents, and the environment.

Our concerns include the following:

- that Vermont Yankee workers, many of whom live in our towns and cities, be given first preference when workers are hired for the multi-year decommissioning and site clean-up process.

- that during this post-shutdown period, when the reactor's radioactive components will be dismantled and removed or stored on site, workers remaining on the site receive the maximum protection from radiation exposure.

- that those workers whose jobs are discontinued or who choose not to accept employment during this post-shutdown period be guaranteed a generous severance package of pay and benefits as well as opportunities for re-training for available jobs at decent wages, including jobs in the rapidly expanding "green energy" sector.

- that during this final period as the reactor continues to age and minor accidents and radioactive leakages continue to occur (if they do), residents and officials of

nearby towns and cities be assured that there will be extra attention to maintenance and repair of all systems associated with the reactor, coupled with heightened inspections, monitoring, and testing to minimize the possibility of a major accident and ensure that people, animals, and the environment are not exposed to any additional risks of breathing, drinking, or otherwise ingesting radioactivity.

- that any tendency to delay or cancel needed maintenance and repairs during the reactor's final months of operation be strenuously resisted, and that if circumstances warrant, Vermont Yankee be shut down permanently *before* its scheduled retirement date.

- that during the decommissioning and site clean-up process, when toxic radioactive components are likely to be shipped from the reactor site to nuclear waste repositories in other states *via* roads and railways passing through our towns and cities, local residents as well as local selectboards, city councils, and relevant town and city departments (police, fire, and emergency medical, etc.) be notified in advance so as to provide maximum protection for people, wildlife, and the local environment in the event of a transportation accident.

Finally, we respectfully request that all local selectboards and town/city councils be kept informed in a timely way (as happens now regarding "significant events") of all relevant plans, decisions, and other developments related to Vermont Yankee that might affect our towns and cities during the reactor's final phase of operation and during the subsequent period of decommissioning and site clean-up.

We also propose that a *citizens advisory board* be formed, with its members appointed by local selectboards and town/city councils, so as to facilitate on-going, two-way communication regarding all of these matters.

Thank you in advance for your consideration of our concerns.

Sincerely,

TOWN OF WARWICK

Nicholas Arguimbau
Chairman

cc: Town Boards of Health within close proximity to Vermont Yankee
Windham County Regional Commission (VT)
Franklin Regional Council of Governments (MA)
Southwest Regional Planning Commission (NH)
Elected local, state, and federal officials representing VT, MA, and NH towns within 20 miles of Vermont Yankee

TOWN OF WENDELL MASSACHUSETTS 01379
TOWN OFFICE BUILDING 978-544-3395 fax: 978-544-7467

TO: Those With Authority Over the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station in Vernon, including the Entergy Nuclear Corporation, the Vermont Legislature and Public Service Board, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

FROM: Selectboards and Town/City Councils of Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts Towns and Cities Within 20 Miles of Vermont Yankee

CONCERNING: Effects of the Scheduled Closure of Vermont Yankee on Workers, Residents, and the Environment of our Towns and Cities

As of February 24, 2010, when the Vermont Senate voted 26-4 in opposition to the extended operation of Vermont Yankee's original 40-year license on March 21, 2012, the plant is now scheduled to cease operation on or before that date. This scheduled closure is likely to affect nearby towns and cities in the tri-state area in a number of ways. Because it is the responsibility of local selectboards and town/city councils to protect and enhance the safety and well-being of our towns and cities, we are writing this letter to urge all the appropriate authorities to take whatever steps may be necessary in order to minimize any negative impacts that Vermont Yankee's closure may have on its workers, local residents, and the environment.

Our concerns include the following:

- that Vermont Yankee workers, many of whom live in our towns and cities, be given first preference when workers are hired for the multi-year decommissioning and site clean-up process.
- that during this post-shutdown period, when the reactor's radioactive components will be dismantled and removed or stored on site, workers remaining on the site receive the maximum protection from radiation exposure.
- that those workers whose jobs are discontinued or who choose not to accept employment during this post-shutdown period be guaranteed a generous severance package of pay and benefits as well as opportunities for re-training for available jobs at decent wages, including jobs in the rapidly expanding "green energy" sector.

- that during this final period as the reactor continues to age and minor accidents and radioactive leakages continue to occur (if they do), residents and officials of nearby towns and cities be assured that there will be extra attention to maintenance and repair of all systems associated with the reactor, coupled with heightened inspections, monitoring, and testing to minimize the possibility of a major accident and ensure that people, animals, and the environment are not exposed to any additional risks of breathing, drinking, or otherwise ingesting radioactivity.

- that any tendency to delay or cancel needed maintenance and repairs during the reactor's final months of operation be strenuously resisted, and that if circumstances warrant, Vermont Yankee be shut down permanently *before* its scheduled retirement date.

- that during the decommissioning and site clean-up process, when toxic radioactive components are likely to be shipped from the reactor site to nuclear waste repositories in other states *via* roads and railways passing through our towns and cities, local residents as well as local selectboards, city councils, and relevant town and city departments (police, fire, and emergency medical, etc.) be notified in advance so as to provide maximum protection for people, wildlife, and the local environment in the event of a transportation accident.

Finally, we respectfully request that all local selectboards and town/city councils be kept informed in a timely way (as happens now regarding "significant events") of all relevant plans, decisions, and other developments related to Vermont Yankee that might affect our towns and cities during the reactor's final phase of operation and during the subsequent period of decommissioning and site clean-up.

We also propose that a *citizens' advisory board* be formed, with its members appointed by local selectboards and town/city councils, so as to facilitate on-going, two-way communication regarding all of these matters.

Thank you in advance for your consideration of our concerns.

Sincerely,

The Wendell Selectboard

Christine Heard | Daniel Keller | Jeoffrey Pooser

cc: Town Boards of Health within close proximity to Vermont Yankee
Windham County Regional Commission (VT)
Franklin Regional Council of Governments (MA)
Southwest Regional Planning Commission (NH)
Elected local, state, and federal officials representing VT, MA, and NH towns within 20 miles of Vermont Yankee

TOWN OF WESTMINSTER
P.O. BOX 147 WESTMINSTER, VT 05158
Tel. 802-722-4255 Fax 802-722-9816

TO: Those With Authority Over the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station in Vernon, including the Entergy Nuclear Corporation, the Vermont Legislature and Public Service Board, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

FROM: Selectboards and City Councils of Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts Towns and Cities Within 20 Miles of Vermont Yankee

CONCERNING: Effects of the Scheduled Closure of Vermont Yankee on Workers, Residents, and the Environment of our Towns and Cities

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Our concerns include the following:

• that Vermont Yankee workers, many of whom live in our towns and cities, be given first preference when workers are hired for the multi-year decommissioning and site clean-up process.

• that during this post-shutdown period, when the reactor's radioactive components will be dismantled and removed or stored on site, workers remaining on the site receive the maximum protection from radiation exposure.

• that those workers whose jobs are discontinued or who choose not to accept employment during this post-shutdown period be guaranteed a generous severance package of pay and benefits as well as opportunities for re-training for available jobs at decent wages, including jobs in the rapidly expanding "green energy" sector.

• that during this final period as the reactor continues to age and minor accidents

and radioactive leakages continue to occur (if they do), residents and officials of nearby towns and cities be assured that there will be extra attention to maintenance and repair of all systems associated with the reactor, coupled with heightened inspections, monitoring, and testing to minimize the possibility of a major accident and ensure that people, animals, and the environment are not exposed to any additional risks of breathing, drinking, or otherwise ingesting radioactivity.

• that any tendency to delay or cancel needed maintenance and repairs during the reactor's final months of operation be strenuously resisted, and that if circumstances warrant, Vermont Yankee be shut down permanently *before* its scheduled retirement date.

• that during the decommissioning and site clean-up process, when toxic radioactive components are likely to be shipped from the reactor site to nuclear waste repositories in other states *via* roads and railways passing through our towns and cities, local residents as well as local selectboards, city councils, and relevant town and city departments (police, fire, and emergency medical, etc.) be notified in advance so as to provide maximum protection for people, wildlife, and the local environment in the event of a transportation accident.

Finally, we respectfully request that all local selectboards and city councils be kept informed in a timely way (as you do now regarding "significant events") of all relevant plans, decisions, and other developments related to Vermont Yankee that might affect our towns and cities during the reactor's final phase of operation and during the subsequent period of decommissioning and site clean-up.

We also propose that a *citizen's advisory board* be formed, with its members appointed by local selectboards and city councils, so as to facilitate on-going, two-way communication regarding all of these matters.

Thank you in advance for your consideration of our concerns.

Sincerely,

Westminster Selectboard, November 30, 2010

Toby Young

Toby Young, Chair

TOWN OF WINCHESTER

INCORPORATED JULY 2ND 1753

1 Richmond Road • Winchester, New Hampshire 03470
Voice: (603) 239-4951 • Fax: (603) 239-4710 • TDD Access: Relay NH 1-800-735-2964
selectmen@winchester.nh.gov • www.winchester-nh.gov

January 5, 2011

To: Those with authority over the Vermont Yankee Nuclear power station on Vernon, including Entergy Nuclear Corporation, the Vermont Legislature and Public Service Board and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

From: Winchester Board of Selectmen

Concerning: Effects of the Scheduled Closure of Vermont Yankee on Workers, Residents, and the Environment of our towns and cities

As of February 24, 2010, when the Vermont Senate voted 26-4 in opposition to the extended operation of Vermont Yankee's original 40-year license ending on March 21, 2012, the plant is now scheduled to cease operation on or before this date. This scheduled closure is likely to affect nearby towns and cities in the tri-state area in a number of ways. Because it is the responsibility of local select boards and city councils to protect and enhance the safety and well being of our towns and cities, we are writing this letter to urge all the appropriate authorities to take whatever steps may be necessary in order to minimize any negative impacts that Vermont Yankee's closure will have.

Very briefly, our concerns include the following:

- That Vermont Yankee workers, many of whom live in our towns and cities, be given first preference when workers are hired for the multi-year process of decommissioning the site clean-up that will follow the closure of the reactor in 2012; that during this post-shutdown period, when the reactor's radioactive components will be dismantled and removed or stored on site, workers remaining on the site receive the maximum protection from radiation exposure; and that those workers whose jobs are discontinued or who choose not to accept employment during this shut down period be guaranteed a severance package of pay and benefits as well as opportunities for re-training for available jobs.

- That during this final period, residents and officials of nearby towns and cities must be assured that there will be continued maintenance and repair of all systems associated with the reactor, coupled with inspections, monitoring and testing to minimize the possibility of an accident and ensure that people, animals and the environment are not exposed to any additional risks.

- That during the decommissioning and site clean up process when and if radioactive components are to be shipped from the reactor site to nuclear waste repositories, towns and cities, select boards, city councils and relevant town and city departments (police, fire and emergency medical, etc.) should be notified in advance so as to provide maximum protection for people, wildlife and the local environment in the event of a transportation accident.

- If radioactive components are to be stored on site the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Entergy Nuclear Corp. The Town of Vernon and the State of Vermont should provide protection of storage site for the long term.

We respectfully request that all local select boards and city councils be kept informed in a timely way of all relevant plans, decisions relating to Vermont Yankee that might affect our communities during the reactor's final phase of operation.
Thank you in advance for your consideration of our concerns,

TOWN OF WINCHESTER BOARD OF SELECTMEN

Sherman Tedford, Chairman

Gustave Ruth, Selectman

Theresa Sepe, Selectman

Roberta Fraser, Selectman

Kenneth Gardner, Selectman

2-9-11
Date Signed