



**UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

REGION III  
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210  
LISLE, IL 60532-4352

January 16, 2014

Mr. Michael J. Pacilio  
Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation Co., LLC  
President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear  
4300 Winfield Road  
Warrenville, IL 60555

SUBJECT: NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT NO. 3-2013-008

Dear Mr. Pacilio:

This refers to an investigation conducted by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (OI) to determine: (1) whether an equipment operator at the Braidwood Generating Station (Braidwood) willfully failed to close a 2A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) jacket water heat exchanger drain valve as required prior to signing a clearance order indicating that the activity had been completed; (2) whether an equipment operator at Braidwood willfully failed to check that the 2A EDG jacket water heat exchanger valve was closed as required by the clearance activity and human performance standards, but signed the clearance order indicating the activity was completed; and (3) whether there was willful misconduct involved whereby an equipment operator acting as the "performer" signed in the "verifier" location on the clearance order, and the equipment operator acting as the "verifier" signed in the "performer" location on the clearance order. Based on the evidence developed during the investigation, we did not substantiate the allegations. The synopsis from the OI Report of Investigation is enclosed. Our conclusions concerning any non-willful violations of NRC requirements will be provided in a future inspection report.

If you have any questions or comments regarding this matter, please contact an NRC Region III Office Allegation Coordinator by calling (800) 522-3025. The NRC Region III Office Allegation Coordinators are Jim Heller, Paul Pelke, Magdalena Gryglak, and Sarah Bakhsh.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room). You should note that final NRC documents, including the final OI reports, may be made available to the public under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) subject to redaction of information pursuant to the FOIA. Requests under the FOIA should be

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made in accordance with 10 CFR 9.23, Request for Records. The instructions for making a request for information under the FOIA are accessible at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/foia/foia-request.html>.

Sincerely,

***/RA/***

Eric Duncan, Chief  
Branch 3  
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-456 and 50-457  
License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-77

Enclosure:  
OI Synopsis

cc w/encl:  
Associate General Counsel, Exelon  
Director, Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, Exelon

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**/RA/**

Eric Duncan, Chief  
Branch 3  
Division of Reactor Projects

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Enclosure:  
OI Synopsis

cc w/encl:  
Associate General Counsel, Exelon  
Director, Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, Exelon

bcc w/encl: AMS File No. RIII-2012-A-0066

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| OFFICE | RIII     | N | RIII     | N | OI:RIII  | N | RIII     | N | RIII     | N |
| NAME   | Bakhsh   |   | Ng       |   | Goetz*   |   | Orth**   |   | Duncan   |   |
| DATE   | 01/14/14 |   | 01/14/14 |   | 01/14/14 |   | 01/15/14 |   | 01/16/14 |   |

**OFFICIAL RECORD COPY**

\* For permission to release OI synopsis. \*\* The 3-week email has expired.

## OI SYNOPSIS

This investigation was initiated on January 31, 2013, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Investigations, Region III, to determine: (1) whether an equipment operator at the Braidwood Generating Station (Braidwood) willfully failed to close a 2A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) jacket water heat exchanger drain valve as required prior to signing a clearance order indicating that the activity had been completed; (2) whether an equipment operator at Braidwood willfully failed to check that the 2A EDG jacket water heat exchanger valve was closed as required by the clearance activity and human performance standards, but signed the clearance order indicating the activity was completed; and (3) whether there was willful misconduct involved whereby an equipment operator acting as the “performer” signed in the “verifier” location on the clearance order, and the equipment operator acting as the “verifier” signed in the “performer” location on the clearance order.

Based on the evidence, this investigation did not substantiate the allegation that an equipment operator at Braidwood willfully failed to close a 2A EDG jacket water heat exchanger drain valve prior to signing a clearance order indicating that the activity had been completed.

Based on the evidence, this investigation did not substantiate the allegation that an equipment operator at Braidwood willfully failed to check that the 2A EDG jacket water heat exchanger drain valve was closed as required by the clearance activity and human performance standards, but signed the clearance order indicating that the activity was completed.

Based on the evidence, this investigation did not substantiate the allegation that equipment operators willfully falsified the clearance order when the equipment operator acting as the “performer” signed the “verifier” location, and the equipment operator acting as the “verifier” signed in the “performer” location.