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Docket No.: 50-424

NL-14-0055

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant-Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 2013-001-00
Failure to Comply with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.4

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report. This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please contact Doug McKinney at (205) 992-5982.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "T. E. Tynan".

T. E. Tynan
Vice President – Vogtle

TET/GWG

Enclosure: Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2013-001-00

cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company
Mr. S. E. Kuczynski, Chairman, President & CEO
Mr. D. G. Bost, Executive Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer
Mr. B. L. Ivey, Vice President – Regulatory Affairs
Mr. D.R. Madison, Vice President – Fleet Operations

Mr. C.R. Pierce, Regulatory Affairs Director
Mrs. M. A. Cline, Vogtle OE Coordinator
RType: CVC7000

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Mr. V. M. McCree, Regional Administrator
Mr. R. E. Martin, NRR Senior Project Manager - Vogtle
Mr. L. M. Cain, Senior Resident Inspector – Vogtle

**Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Plant – Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 2013-001-00
Failure to Comply with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.4**

Enclosure

Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2013-001-00

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocollects.resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME Vogtle Electric Generating Plant – Unit 1	2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000-424	3. PAGE 1 OF 3
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4. TITLE
Failure to Comply with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.4

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
11	27	2013	2013	- 01 -	00	01	16	2014	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

9. OPERATING MODE 1	11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)									
10. POWER LEVEL 100	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(I)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(I)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(II)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(II)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(II)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(I)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(I)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(III)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(II)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(II)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(IV)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(III)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(V)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)						
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(IV)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(II)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(V)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)							
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(V)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(I)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(V)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER							
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(VI)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(I)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(V)(D)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 368A							

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

FACILITY NAME Vogtle Electric Generating Plant / George Gunn, Licensing Supervisor	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (706) 826-3596
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13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
B	EJ	BYC	A363	Y					

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED <input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On November 27, 2013, an internal wiring discrepancy was discovered on Class 1E battery charger 1AD1CB [EJ] following the trip of the battery charger AC input breaker. The wiring discrepancy prevented the battery charger from performing all required functions of LCO 3.8.4, DC Sources - Operating. One of two redundant battery chargers and one battery per train must be operable to meet the requirements of LCO 3.8.4. Subsequent review of battery charger maintenance activities determined that on September 30, 2013 the remaining redundant operable battery charger was removed from service for maintenance activities for approximately 14.5 hours. LCO 3.8.4, DC Sources – Operating requires restoration of the inoperable DC source within 2 hours or entry into Mode 3 within the next 6 hours, and entry into Mode 5 within the following 30 hours. Although the degraded charger was able to maintain battery terminal voltage within limits under minimal loading condition, the DC source was inoperable for a time greater than allowed by Technical Specification.

The safety significance of this event is very low. Unit 2 was not affected and there were no adverse effects to the health and safety of the public.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET**

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE		
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant – Unit 1	05000-424	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2	OF	3
		2013	- 01	- 00			

NARRATIVE

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per 10 CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) based on the Train A 125 VDC Source being inoperable for a duration greater than the allowed out of service time of Technical Specification LCO 3.8.4.

B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

Mode 1, 100% power

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On November 27, 2013, an internal wiring discrepancy was discovered on Class 1E battery charger 1AD1CB following the trip of the battery charger AC input breaker. Each battery charger is equipped with two rectifier bridges, a master and a slave rectifier bridge. The wiring discrepancy affected the slave rectifier bridge and prevented the battery charger from performing all required functions of LCO 3.8.4, DC Sources - Operating. Subsequent investigation determined the wiring discrepancy was the result of rolled electrical leads on the slave rectifier bridge performed by the manufacturer prior to shipping. The manufacturer rolled the leads to ensure proper rectifier operation but did not notify Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) to update affected design drawings.

During the battery charger receipt inspection, SNC personnel identified that the as-built configuration did not match the design drawings and actions were taken to correct the as-built condition to match design drawings. This wiring discrepancy did not initially result in a degradation that prevented the battery charger from providing proper output float and equalizing voltage during subsequent maintenance testing. A review of the operating history of the battery charger determined the charger was operating in a degraded but operable condition until the slave rectifier degraded to a point that resulted in an overvoltage trip of the battery charger AC input breaker.

Subsequent review of battery charger maintenance activities determined that on September 30, 2013 the remaining redundant operable battery charger was removed from service for maintenance activities for approximately 14.5 hours. LCO 3.8.4, DC Sources – Operating requires restoration of the inoperable DC source within 2 hours or entry into Mode 3 within the next 6 hours, and entry into Mode 5 within the following 30 hours. Although the degraded charger was able to maintain battery terminal voltage within limits under minimal loading condition, the DC source was inoperable for a time greater than allowed by Technical Specification.

All other safety-related battery chargers were inspected to confirm proper master and slave rectifier operation. No other issues were identified and this is considered to be an isolated event.

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NARRATIVE

D. CAUSE OF EVENT

The direct cause of the event was a wiring error on the battery charger slave rectifier bridge, with failure to properly address the wiring error upon discovery during the receipt inspection and a less than adequate functional test prior to placing the battery charger in service.

E. SAFETY ASSESSMENT

This event was evaluated using the internal events Probabilistic Risk Assessment model and the Incremental Core Damage Probability was determined to be less than 1E-06; therefore, this event is of very low safety significance. The Class 1E batteries are rated for 2.75 hours of continuous operation under full load, accident conditions. The redundant, operable battery charger, once the loss of DC source was identified, was returned to service in less than 45 minutes. Therefore under accident conditions an operable DC source could have been established in a timely manner.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTION

The functional test procedure for installation of future battery chargers and the battery charger calibration procedures will include adequate checks for proper rectifier operation. In addition, engineering personnel have been briefed on this event including consequences and lessons learned.

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1) Failed Components:

AMETEK 125 VDC Battery Charger

2) Previous Similar Events:

None

3) Energy Industry Identification System Code:

[EJ] – DC Power Systems, Class 1E

4) Other Systems Affected:

None

5) Commitment Information:

This report does not create any commitments.