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| 1 | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA | | | | | | |
| 2 | NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | | | | | | |
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| 4 | ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS | | | | | | |
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| 9 | OPEN SESSION | | | | | | |
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| 11 | FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 2013 | | | | | | |
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| 13 | ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND | | | | | | |
| 14 | The Subcommittee met at the Nuclear | | | | | | |
| 15 | Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North, Room T2B1, | | | | | | |
| 16 | 11545 Rockville Pike, at 8:30 a.m., Michael Corradini, | | | | | | |
| 17 | Chairman, presiding. | | | | | | |
| 18 | COMMITTEE MEMBERS: | | | | | | |
| 19 | MICHAEL L. CORRADINI, Chairman | | | | | | |
| 20 | J. SAM ARMIJO, Member | | | | | | |
| 21 | RONALD G. BALLINGER, Member | | | | | | |
| 22 | CHARLES H. BROWN, JR., Member | | | | | | |
| 23 | PETER RICCARDELLA, Member | | | | | | |
| 24 | STEPHEN P. SCHULTZ, Member | | | | | | |
| 25 | JOHN W. STETKAR, Member | | | | | | |
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COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 ACRS CONSULTANT:

BILL HINZE (via teleconference)

DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL:

MAITRI BANERJEE

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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

(8:30 a.m.)

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. The meeting will come to order.

This is a meeting of the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor or the ABWR Subcommittee.

My name is Mike Corradini, Chair of the Committee -- of the Subcommittee, excuse me.

Members in attendance, at least currently, are Sam Armijo, Pete Riccardella, Steve Schultz, Ron Ballinger, Charlie Brown, John Stetkar, and our consultant, Bill Hinze, will join us after lunch over the telephone.

We also have Ms. Maitri Banerjee as our Designated Federal Official for the meeting.

As announced in the Federal Register, on November 7, 2013, the subject of today's briefing is Chapter 3, excluding Sections 3.7 and 3.8, which we have looked at previously in our July 9th meeting. And this regards the COL application submitted by Nuclear Innovations of North America, or NINA, for the South Texas Project's Units 3 and 4, as well as the staff's final safety evaluation report.

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The rules for participation in today's meeting were announced in the Federal Register Notice of November 7th for an open or closed meeting. As noticed on the -- as you will see on the agenda, the meeting will go into closed session after the initial public opening statements by NINA and NRC staff, and then we will go into a briefing of Section 3.9.2, Dynamic Testing and Analysis.

I am asking at the appropriate time that the NRC staff and the applicant verify that only people with the required clearance and the need to know are present when we enter the closed session of the discussion.

We have a telephone bridge line for the public and stakeholders to hear the deliberations. This line will not carry any signal from this end, if we need to enter into the closed -- when we need to enter into the closed session of the meeting.

Also, to minimize disturbances, the line will be put in a listen-in-only mode until the end of the meeting, where we will provide time for public comments. We have allotted 10 minutes for that time period, so we will stay strictly to that.

At that time, any member of the public attending the meeting in person or through the bridge line can make a statement and provide comments as

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desired. We will check on those that want to make those comments as we get close to that time. And we also have a separate telephone line for our consultant, Dr. Hinze, to connect with us.

As the meeting is transcribed, I request that the participants in this meeting use microphones located throughout the room, which are highly sensitive, when addressing the Subcommittee. Participants should first identify themselves and speak with sufficient clarity and volume so they can be readily heard.

And please silence all cell phones, pagers, iPhones, iPads, i-things, and all appropriate appliances -- washers, dryers, et cetera.

We will now proceed with the meeting. I will call on Tom Tai of NRC to begin the presentation, and then after Tom I wanted just to remind the members of kind of where we sit relative to the review.

Tom.

MR. TAI: Thank you. Good morning. My name is Tom Tai. I am the Project Manager for Chapter 3. George Wunder was the lead PM, but he is not here today.

I want to thank the Subcommittee and NINA for allowing us to make this presentation on the Friday before Thanksgiving, so that's special.

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And so we have a lot of material to cover, and a lot of people who have worked hard -- and I thank them for it -- who know what to do. I will turn it over to the STP.

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. And before we take it over to STP, I want to remind at least the parts of -- the Subcommittee and other members that are in attendance, so this has been going on for a number of years, and I am new as Chairman, so I am trying to catch up.

So people will remember we have had two Subcommittees -- April on Chapter 2, July on Sections 3.7 and 3.8 of Chapter 3, and now we are covering other parts of Chapter 3. Prior to that, in 2010 primarily, we had a number of meetings on other parts of what I guess we'll call Phase 4 of the COL.

So when we come to the -- and we're coming close to the end game. I have talked with folks, so that I've got it right. We still have Fukushima-related issues and spent fuel issues that have to be addressed. All of that hopefully will come to fruition before September of '14. So we are actually in the end game.

I have asked Maitri to help me try to draft not a letter but we'll call it a summary document, since it has been going over five years of this. Not that I

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would expect the members have this totally perfectly in their minds, but at least where we sit, so everybody understands what is closed and what the remaining things are open. I just wanted to remind the members of that. So, Scott, it's all yours. MR. HEAD: Okay. Thank you very much for this opportunity to brief the Subcommittee. Today we do want to brief the Subcommittee on flow-induced vibration, and we are looking forward to discussion.

So the agenda for today, we will have an introduction and we'll go over the attendees, and then Section 3.9.2, which is the focus of the day. We'll have program overview, and obviously a technical evaluation.

The focus of the day is the dryer, steam dryer, and so that is the, you know, major amount of time that we have allotted to the discussion today.

We do have a presentation on line dryer components, and we are going to focus there on an interesting aspect of the ABWR, which is the reactor internal pumps, which is different than -- obviously than other domestic BWRs. And so that will be the focus of that discussion.

We do have -- as you'll see in a second, we

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do have a large contingent here today of people that can answer other questions. And so even though that's the focus of the presentation, we do hope to be able to answer any other questions that come up regarding other components.

And then we will cover the vibration measurement program and inspection program that we are expecting to do with respect to Units 3 and 4.

And the slide with the attendees -- like I say, we do have a rather robust group of people here today to help us go through this and answer any questions.

This first part of the --

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: I was going to say, you'll alert me when we want to do the check about being closed.

MR. HEAD: Yes, sir. I was going to say, my portion of it is not proprietary, unless we start getting questions, which, you know, we are hoping most of the questions we will be able to field later on in discussion. But we can -- you know, we can leave it open right now, and I'll just say we have already -- everyone that I know that is here is supposed to be here. So when it's time to close the meeting --

MEMBER ARMIJO: Well, I just noticed that starting with page 2 of your presentation it says

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| 1 | "Westinghouse Proprietary," so I don't know and every | | | | | | |
|----|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 2 | chart thereafter. So I don't know if we could be | | | | | | |
| 3 | semi-closed or chart by chart or what. | | | | | | |
| 4 | MR. HEAD: We could close it now. | | | | | | |
| 5 | MEMBER ARMIJO: Close it now is what I would | | | | | | |
| 6 | recommend. | | | | | | |
| 7 | MR. HEAD: Okay. | | | | | | |
| 8 | MEMBER ARMIJO: Yeah. Unless the Chairman | | | | | | |
| 9 | disagrees. | | | | | | |
| 10 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: I wanted to ask Scott | | | | | | |
| 11 | to make sure. So at this point, why don't we just go into | | | | | | |
| 12 | closed session, so because we are going to go into and | | | | | | |
| 13 | out of these issues, and I'd rather just do it now. | | | | | | |
| 14 | So can we do a doublecheck? Can you check | | | | | | |
| 15 | your people? And, Maitri I'll let you | | | | | | |
| 16 | MS. BANERJEE: Yeah. I just talked to | | | | | | |
| 17 | Theron. He is going to close the phone line. | | | | | | |
| 18 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. Do we get a | | | | | | |
| 19 | heads-up, or do we just assume it has happened? | | | | | | |
| 20 | MS. BANERJEE: I can go | | | | | | |
| 21 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Why don't you do that. | | | | | | |
| 22 | MS. BANERJEE: confirm. | | | | | | |
| 23 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Please. | | | | | | |
| 24 | (Whereupon, the proceedings in the foregoing matter went | | | | | | |
| 25 | into Closed Session at 8:38 a.m. and returned to Open | | | | | | |
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Session at 11:31 a.m.)

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. We will come back in session. Now we're in open session, and we're going to be speaking about -- well, I'll just say the rest of Chapter 3.

Tom, do you want to take us through that?

MR. TAI: That is correct. Back in 2010,
we brought Chapter 3 to ACRS as a Phase 2 product without
3.7, and 3.8, and 3.9.2.

So we finished 3.7 and 3.8 back in July and finished 3.9.2 this morning. And the rest of the presentation really is just a recap of what we did since the --

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: We need the reminder.

MR. TAI: The next two slides are basically stuff that we have as a confirmatory item and open items since 2010. And I am not going to go into that in detail, but I'd like to focus on the next one, which is -- these are the four open items that we had when we left in 2010.

The first one is on 3.4.2, and that one was -- we were asking STP to explain how they treat the Cat 1 building flood doors. And we didn't resolve it, but the resolution is they used a 40-feet design basis flood level, which is resulting from the MCR breach. So we resolved that one.

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| 1 | The next one, again, is |
|----|---|
| 2 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Just to say it again, |
| 3 | so it was resolved how? I'm sorry. |
| 4 | MR. TAI: Originally, they used something |
| 5 | like 30 feet was the flood level, to design a flood door, |
| 6 | and to we didn't like that answer, so because the |
| 7 | MCR breach is 40 feet. |
| 8 | MEMBER ARMIJO: That's the dike or whatever |
| 9 | that pool, pond |
| 10 | MR. TAI: That's right. The main cooling |
| 11 | reservoir. So we were happy with that. |
| 12 | And the next two are in 3.9.3. The first |
| 13 | one is we have to we want to review the design spec, |
| 14 | which wasn't available at the time. So the caution was, |
| 15 | what are the safety-significant components that you want |
| 16 | the design spec for us to review? And that is part of |
| 17 | the January 2011 audit, and we got that one. |
| 18 | And 3.9.3.7 is actually, we presented it |
| 19 | to you some time ago on Generic Issue 191. That is the |
| 20 | loading on the strainer. So we have so we resolved |
| 21 | that. |
| 22 | And the last open item is on 3.9.6. That |
| 23 | was the use of the OM code for in-service inspection, |
| 24 | in-service test. |
| | 1 |

And the other changes that we have made

since 2010, most of the chapter stays identical, with the exception of what we listed in here. 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 were interesting because these two sections were basically qualifications — all qual classification and seismic classification. These two sections were finished way before 3.7 and 3.8 even get started.

So we made a lot of -- we asked a lot of questions, and Rich Mannally was the reviewer. He has to ask questions because he had nothing to look at in 3.7 and 3.8. But those questions are really moot now that 3.7 and 3.8 are done. So we have to rewrite them just to get rid of some of the extra material, so to speak.

And 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.5.1.4, were revised because Reg Guide 1.221, which is hurricane wind, was issued in 2011. And, again, we just need to update these sections by adding a departure. There is not a whole lot of text change.

3.5.1.3 is interesting, because we had a discussion with ACRS at the time about the turbine maintenance program. There was no action, so to speak, but the discussion was, what did you guys do to allow STP to provide -- to submit the maintenance program three years after COL?

We looked at it in more detail and we decided that, well, nothing has really changed. So what we did

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is we imposed a license condition to ask them to do turbine inspection. If they want to submit that turbine maintenance program three years after COL, they can do license amendment and flip that.

So the review is identical. It is just that we made it a little bit more airtight by imposing the SRP guidance.

3.9.1, you heard in the 3.9.2 discussion

3.9.1, you heard in the 3.9.2 discussion they used the computer acoustic tool to do common pulse load, and we just need to revise and add to it. Originally, it was an IBR section.

3.9.4, originally, again, that was basically an IBR section. But because in the audit of the design spec we find something in the spec, we did revise it.

MEMBER STETKAR: Tom, before you -- go back. I wanted to let you get through all of the bullet items there.

On the turbine missile stuff, you know, we had discussions and everyone is aware that the turbine missile analysis, the failure to trip frequency, once they get around to submitting it and you get around to reviewing it, I'd just, again, like to get on the record, make sure it's complete that it's an end-to-end analysis that includes everything from the speed sensors all the

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way through to valves.

There is nothing that we can -- we are not going to see that, but I sure hope the staff and the applicant takes it to heart, because everything that I have seen is not a complete end-to-end analysis. But, again, it has not been officially submitted. So that's just speculation.

However, something I wanted to ask you as the staff, if now imposed a license condition that requires weekly testing of the turbine stop valves, control valves, intercept -- whatever they call them, intermediate stop valves, intercept valves, and extraction steam non-return valves, have you evaluated the increase in risk that you were imposing on this plant by requiring that testing?

MR. TAI: I'm not sure it's a week-to-week inspection. I though the inspection was --

MEMBER STETKAR: I'm sorry. It says "weekly valve testing."

Once a week, I have to cycle those valves. Have you evaluated the increase in risk that the staff is imposing on the South Texas plant by requiring that testing?

MR. TAI: Okay. Well, I'm not too sure we --

MEMBER STETKAR: Because there is a

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| measurable increase in the plant trip frequency as |
| result of turbine valve testing. So, therefore, before |
| I imposed a weekly test interval, I would go back and loo |
| at how frequently you would expect the plant to trip an |
| what the increase in risk will be, and whether that i |
| warranted for weekly versus monthly versus, you know |
| some other frequency. |
| MR. TAI: I'll take that as an action, t |
| make sure the |
| MEMBER STETKAR: Thanks. Because weekl |
| valve testing is pretty often. |
| MEMBER BALLINGER: I would be curious t |

know if that's common.

MEMBER STETKAR: Weekly is not -- people don't like to test these valves that frequently because it trips the plant. And people use these turbine missile analyses to tune -- you know, to tune the testing frequency. But the staff is just imposing a weekly test frequency and saying that that is --

MEMBER BALLINGER: I came into this very late, so I'm part of the unwashed here, so I'm just curious to know why in this case a weekly test versus -- because I've visited the plant before, and I can guarantee you that --

MEMBER STETKAR: The key is that the --

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| 1 | MEMBER BALLINGER: you put these things | | | | | | |
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| 2 | up, you run them, you don't mess around with the valves. | | | | | | |
| 3 | MEMBER STETKAR: The key is the turbine | | | | | | |
| 4 | missile analysis determines the test frequency based on | | | | | | |
| 5 | the expected reliability of the valves, the electronics, | | | | | | |
| 6 | the pickup stuff, the intermediate hydraulic fluid, and | | | | | | |
| 7 | all of that kind of stuff. So in some sense it is | | | | | | |
| 8 | plant-specific because it depends on the inventory of | | | | | | |
| 9 | equipment that you have and its logical configuration, | | | | | | |
| 0 | and might have been to get certain types of things. | | | | | | |
| .1 | So it's not one size fits all. | | | | | | |
| _2 | MEMBER BALLINGER: It's driven by some | | | | | | |
| _3 | other thing. | | | | | | |
| 4 | MEMBER STETKAR: No. It's driven by | | | | | | |
| _5 | reliability of | | | | | | |
| - 6 | MEMBER BALLINGER: Reliability of | | | | | | |
| - 7 | MEMBER STETKAR: of the whole thing. Of | | | | | | |
| . 8 | the whole thing. Not just the end user valves. It's the | | | | | | |
| 9 | whole thing. And then you set up you kind of optimize | | | | | | |
| 20 | your test frequency so that you test often enough to | | | | | | |
| 21 | maintain the overall reliability, but not | | | | | | |
| 22 | MEMBER BALLINGER: I understand all of | | | | | | |
| 23 | that, but I'm curious why for this plant and not others. | | | | | | |
| 2 4 | Weekly is pretty short. | | | | | | |
| 5 | MEMBER STETKAR. That's right Other | | | | | | |

plants tune their testing intervals based on a turbine missile analysis. And NINA has not performed that analysis yet, and does not plan to submit that analysis until three years after the COL is issued. So now the staff is saying, well, you need to do -- you need to give us some assurance of valve testing.

I understand the need to have some sort of

I understand the need to have some sort of valve -- nominal valve testing interval that applies until that turbine missile analysis is submitted and reviewed by the staff. The question is just nominally imposing a weekly testing interval has -- may have some negative risk connotation to it, and there is --

MEMBER BALLINGER: It's an artificial imposition.

MEMBER STETKAR: This is the staff's imposition. And it's stated as a weekly testing interval. I mean, it could be a monthly testing interval. It could have been a 10-year testing interval.

MEMBER RICCARDELLA: But that is only in place until the turbine missile analysis is completed.

MEMBER STETKAR: That's right. However, this is the safety evaluation that has to be issued for NINA to receive the combined license. And NINA has made it clear that they will not submit the turbine missile

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| 1 | analysis until three years after the license is issued. | | | | | | |
|----|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 2 | So there is this timing problem. The staff actually is | | | | | | |
| 3 | in a bind because there has to be some specified testing | | | | | | |
| 4 | frequency. | | | | | | |
| 5 | MS. BANERJEE: But I was wondering this | | | | | | |
| 6 | is Maitri Banerjee how much of that three years is | | | | | | |
| 7 | spent in construction and | | | | | | |
| 8 | MEMBER STETKAR: It doesn't make any | | | | | | |
| 9 | difference. There is | | | | | | |
| 10 | MS. BANERJEE: They are not going to be | | | | | | |
| 11 | operating | | | | | | |
| 12 | MEMBER ARMIJO: There has got to be a better | | | | | | |
| 13 | administrative thing than imposing that kind of | | | | | | |
| 14 | (Laughter.) | | | | | | |
| 15 | for the license, that kind of license | | | | | | |
| 16 | condition. | | | | | | |
| 17 | MEMBER STETKAR: It doesn't make any | | | | | | |
| 18 | difference. The staff has to issue a safety evaluation | | | | | | |
| 19 | to issue the COL, and there has to be some justification | | | | | | |
| 20 | for assurance that indeed the turbine missile damage | | | | | | |
| 21 | frequency is less than an acceptable value. I | | | | | | |
| 22 | understand the problem that the staff is in. | | | | | | |
| 23 | MR. TAI: Basically, it said submit that | | | | | | |
| 24 | thing and they | | | | | | |
| 25 | MEMBER STETKAR: I understand the bind that | | | | | | |

the staff is in. I'm just questioning the basis for that weekly testing frequency. CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Do you understand his question? 4 5 MR. TAI: Yes, sir. 6 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. 7 MEMBER ARMIJO: I don't understand. 8 put all sorts of requirements before you allow them to 9 load fuel. Why couldn't this just be 10 requirement of something that has to be submitted prior to fuel loading? 11 MR. TAI: Well, because that's what we -- we 12 13 run into this. The IBR -- the DCD -- legally, they have 14 that right, and the DCD did submit the analysis three 15 years after COL. So --16 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: But don't 17 understand that answer to Sam's question. You could change the license condition to what is being -- and that 18 19 is much cleaner, unless I misunderstand something. 20 MR. TAI: Well, we could. We could change 21 it. We could submit it to the missile program three 22 years after the COL. Sure, we could do that. But the 23 SRP basically is saying that you can do either one. 24 we feel that, well, it is a little bit easier because that 25 three-year schedule and the program, really, it's an

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option. So either way -- we can word it either way. 3 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. understand John's question. 5 MR. TAI: Yes, sir. 6 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. justification for this value seems arbitrary, 8 stringent maybe to --9 MEMBER ARMIJO: It certainly gets your 10 attention. It is likely to be --11 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: But what worries me beyond arbitrary is the implication is that it could be 12 actually more damaging. 13 14 MEMBER BALLINGER: But it is likely to be 15 basically a paper shuffling exercise, because they are 16 never going to operate the plant before they submit 17 the -- before they actually -- anyway, okay. MR. TAI: You are exactly true, because 18 19 that is --MEMBER STETKAR: All of that is true. 20 21 the other hand, if the staff is issuing something that 22 has a very specific requirement -- and what I'm asking 23 the staff is, have they done -- have they thought about 24 that requirement from an integrated perspective,

integrated plant safety perspective?

| 1 | MEMBER SCHULTZ: It could be taken out of | | | | | | |
|-----|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 2 | context as a good idea. | | | | | | |
| 3 | (Laughter.) | | | | | | |
| 4 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. John, did | | | | | | |
| 5 | you | | | | | | |
| 6 | MEMBER STETKAR: I have nothing else. | | | | | | |
| 7 | Good discussion, though. | | | | | | |
| 8 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Next page. | | | | | | |
| 9 | MR. TAI: These are the three action items | | | | | | |
| 10 | that we took from the last ACRS. 3.4 is we finished | | | | | | |
| 11 | that because those are the WCAPs for the 3.9.2 program. | | | | | | |
| 12 | And 86 Dr. Abdel-Khalik was asking that question about | | | | | | |
| 13 | the turbine plate material. He is asking now that we | | | | | | |
| 14 | change some of these requirements should be changed | | | | | | |
| 15 | to SRP. | | | | | | |
| 16 | We talked to NRR folks, and they | | | | | | |
| 17 | acknowledged that they don't have any plan or schedule | | | | | | |
| 18 | revise the SRP right now. | | | | | | |
| 19 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Remind us about this | | | | | | |
| 20 | one. I would say remind me because I'm | | | | | | |
| 21 | MR. TAI: We were talking about the turbine | | | | | | |
| 22 | rotor at the time. | | | | | | |
| 23 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. So we're going | | | | | | |
| 2 4 | to talk about | | | | | | |
| 25 | MEMBER BALLINGER: This monobloc, right? | | | | | | |

| 1 | MR. TAI: Yeah. Yeah. That's right. | | | | | | |
|-----|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 2 | That's right. And we see here that these are different | | | | | | |
| 3 | now. So Dr. Abdel-Khalik's question was, now that it's | | | | | | |
| 4 | different, should you will you be revising the SRP to | | | | | | |
| 5 | reflect the latest technology? And obviously we can't | | | | | | |
| 6 | answer those questions because we are NRO. And NRR folks | | | | | | |
| 7 | are aware of that. And because they have no schedule | | | | | | |
| 8 | planned, but they said they would consider that when they | | | | | | |
| 9 | do it. | | | | | | |
| 10 | So our analysis is really it's an open | | | | | | |
| 11 | item still. But for the agency to take that up. | | | | | | |
| 12 | MEMBER ARMIJO: That's a generic. | | | | | | |
| 13 | MR. TAI: It is a generic. Yeah. It's not | | | | | | |
| 14 | an STP question. | | | | | | |
| 15 | MEMBER ARMIJO: Yeah. | | | | | | |
| 16 | MS. BANERJEE: Now, I'm sorry, I have a | | | | | | |
| 17 | question on this 107 that you are going to go into. | | | | | | |
| 18 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: I don't think he is | | | | | | |
| 19 | going to go into it now. We have to wait until | | | | | | |
| 20 | Professor | | | | | | |
| 21 | MS. BANERJEE: Hinze comes | | | | | | |
| 22 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: is coming. Yeah. | | | | | | |
| 23 | MS. BANERJEE: That's all I wanted to say. | | | | | | |
| 24 | MR. TAI: Okay. | | | | | | |
| 25 | MS. BANERJEE: Thank you. | | | | | | |
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CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: So just to review, we're done with 34, in essence, before we have had this discussion; 86 is still an open item; and 107 we will take up in the afternoon. MR. TAI: Right. CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. MR. TAI: And that's basically what we have 8 done in Chapter 3. There is no more technical items. still maybe 9 is one or two confirmatory 10 items -- actually, one in 3.9.6. We received Revision 11 10 of the FSAR last month. We need to negotiate with Tom how we close that confirmatory item. It's editorial. 12 13 It's a typo probably. 14 And we add two license conditions to the review. One is determined roller, and the 3.9.2, which 15 16 we just talked about this morning, the power ascension 17 test. Are there any other questions? 18 19 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Any other questions for Tom? 20 21 (No response.) 22 So just to review for the Subcommittee, we 23 will take up the other action items that we still have on the docket from 2010-ish timeframe with NINA after 24 25 lunch.

| 1 | MR. HEAD: Yes, sir. And I would note we | | | | | | |
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| 2 | are also going to we have a slide on 107, so when the | | | | | | |
| 3 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Right. | | | | | | |
| 4 | MR. HEAD: Dr. Hinze is on, you probably | | | | | | |
| 5 | can close it then, instead of Tom having to come back up. | | | | | | |
| 6 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Yeah, that's fine. | | | | | | |
| 7 | We'll do that. But we have to do it after lunch because | | | | | | |
| 8 | that's just how we scheduled Professor Hinze to come. | | | | | | |
| 9 | MR. HEAD: Okay. | | | | | | |
| 10 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Any other questions | | | | | | |
| 11 | for Tom at this point? | | | | | | |
| 12 | (No response.) | | | | | | |
| 13 | MR. TAI: And I have an action item to | | | | | | |
| 14 | follow up. | | | | | | |
| 15 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Indeed. That one we | | | | | | |
| 16 | are not going to let go of. | | | | | | |
| 17 | MR. TAI: All right. | | | | | | |
| 18 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: All right. With | | | | | | |
| 19 | that, we'll take off for lunch. Be back at 1:00. | | | | | | |
| 20 | (Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., the proceedings recessed for | | | | | | |
| 21 | lunch.) | | | | | | |
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CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: We are back in session.

So, Scott, you're going to lead us through a discussion of action items?

MR. HEAD: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay.

A-F-T-E-R-N-O-O-N S-E-S-S-I-O-N

MR. HEAD: We have three of them we were going to cover today, and the first one is number 87 on turbine overspeeds. And I'm going to turn it over to Steve Thomas to address that one. This should be the

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(1:00 p.m.)

lengthier part of the discussion. The other two are relatively --CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: I don't expect it to be very lengthy. 4 5 MR. HEAD: Good. 6 (Laughter.) 7 Certainly more interesting. How about 8 that? More interesting. 9 MEMBER BALLINGER: Send Stetkar out for 10 coffee. 11 (Laughter.) MR. THOMAS: My name is Steve Thomas. 12 an engineering manager for STP 3 and 4. I have a B.S. 13 14 degree in Mechanical Engineering from Georgia Tech, and 15 I've been in the nuclear industry for 40-plus years, 16 starting with the U.S. Navy, three utilities, and one 17 small private company for a short period of time. 18 I spent the last 20 years at South Texas 19 Project. First 14 or 15 of those was at Units 1 and 2 20 as the design engineering manager, and then more recently 21 the engineering manager for our new project, STP 3 and 22 4. 23 I have been staring at this question now for 24 the better part of a month and a half, maybe two months, 25 and I've read the transcripts. Two other people who have

attempted to address this are no longer on the project. 1 (Laughter.) 3 Scott asked me to take a shot at it. 4 It's a good question. It's a difficult 5 And like most difficult questions, I don't question. 6 have an easy black and white answer. So what I do on the 7 next slide was try to rephrase the question, perhaps into 8 one I think I might be able to answer. 9 MEMBER BROWN: Even though it's not exactly 10 the --11 MR. THOMAS: It's not the same thing. MEMBER BROWN: This sounds familiar. 12 13 Let's -- if you don't like that question, let's phrase 14 it into something we can answer. 15 (Laughter.) 16 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: It. sounds like 17 something that we're used to. Seriously, I have thought 18 MR. THOMAS: 19 about this a great deal. The approach I have tried to 20 take on this issue is to put myself in a position that 21 I have been in many times when we have a situation at the 22 plant that requires some judgment to deal with. And I 23 have thought, you know, how am I going to respond to this issue? 24 25 I am going to put myself in the position,

as the engineering manager at the plant, talking to the plant manager or senior executive at the plant and say, "How are we going to deal with this situation?" It's a difficult question. And, again, I don't have a black and white answer. But I think that this approach will give us some insight as to -- into the issue and I hope put us at a point where we are comfortable in moving forward with the plan.

Is that okay?

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: I'm going to listen.

MR. THOMAS: Okay. I want to repeat some Let's go back to that one. I'm just going to read this question that I restated and see if it makes any sense. Since the normal emergency trip function with three active speed sensors produces an alarm for abnormal speed signals, and a turbine trip for two out of three abnormal speed signals, and since the backup primary trip function only provides alarms, no trip function for abnormal speed signals, if we were in this situation, and we got an alarm that says, "One of my speed sensors is not working," and we decided to troubleshoot and take the system out of service for some period of time, why is removing the backup primary overspeed trip system from service for troubleshooting -- why is that Is it acceptable? And, if so, why is it? acceptable?

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And the reason that I have restated the question is because the question -- your question asked, you know, demonstrate that we have no common mode failure potential in this situation and I can't do that.

MEMBER BROWN: Okay. Let me -- just addressing your restating the question, the fundamental philosophy, the basis for the question in the first place, was basic philosophy, at least in my experience, for operating high-speed rotating machines, big ones like turbines, generators, other pieces of equipment, is that your overspeed trips should be independent of the normal speed control function.

Fundamental philosophy, philosophical point.

When you look at your design as it presently sits, you meet that for normal operation. You have a primary -- you have a normal speed control function, which has three active sensors. And you have -- and the sensors themselves are not the issue here. Okay? They are just part of the means for the problem, that's all, like anything else.

The passive system is the primary passive sensors. They are totally separate, separate power supplies, separate sensors from the normal speed control function. There is no problem with that mode, you know,

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about -- you are crunching along, everything is totally independent. They are both electrical.

That, in itself, was one of the generating things, since if you'll look at the SRP, the general requirements in there, or the thing they review for, is to have a mechanical and an electrical -- mechanical device as well as if you want to have an electrical -- you've got to have a mechanical overspeed trip as one of the two items.

You chose not to do that. You are not the only one that has chosen not to do that. So with that in mind, then you made a statement in one of your all's responses that says, "Gee, when we have two active speed sensors" -- now we're just talking about sensors -- "fail, or indicate a failure, you get a trip of the turbine generator, of the main generator."

And I asked a question about if you have two of your primary overspeed trip sensors fail, do you get a trip of the main turbine? The answer was no, and that was all we got in the first round of this.

Subsequent answers -- responses came through, of which those individuals are now gone, as you noted, posited some other circumstances relative to if you see something going on that you shouldn't, you are directed by procedure to operate quickly, by procedure

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to do something and refer to a table in I guess it's the ITAAC. It's Table 3.5-1, which referred you then -- well, no, that's not it. It was 3.XXX. I'm sorry. That was the table in the -- something that was in one of the documents that you all submitted, one of the RAIs.

And that is -- your all's positions -- or presentations then referred also to a Table 3.5-1, which is in the DCD. It talks about probabilities of missile generation, and if you have p-1, p-2, p-3, p-4, where if your probability is p-1, you can operate for a couple of years.

If your probability is less than two -- I've forgotten what -- 10 to the minus two -- I'm sorry, 10 to the minus fourth and 10 to the minus two, then you had to go through a process. You have six days in order to bring the plant into a shutdown condition, which is kind of reasonable. Okay? You just don't go scram the plant. You put yourself in the condition -- the manager -- but you do something in a timely manner.

So the fundamental issue here is the independence of your overspeed trip function, regardless of where it resides, either the primary or the emergency, its independence from the normal speed control function.

And the second part of the issue arises

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from -- we are not talking about an individual sensor failure or an individual processor failure. The issue that drives part of that question is, if you have -- because they are software-driven, if you -- and your power supplies are also common, by the way, on the normal system between the emergency and the normal control functions, or at least based on other conversations.

And the three active sensors, both of those, that is okay depending on what they do when they get inside the box called "emergency trip monitor box." You provided another figure in one of your presentations which was cancelled, the overall meeting was cancelled, which showed the three sensors come in to the overspeed trip function, and each sensor feed -- all three trip monitors, all three speed monitors are fed by all three sensors.

MEMBER STETKAR: Charlie, for the rest of us who don't understand what you are talking about, pull up Slide Number 7 on your presentation.

MEMBER BROWN: Yep, yep, yep. Slide 7?

MEMBER STETKAR: It just gives -- it gives you a picture of what he's talking about, so the rest of us who don't understand this can look at it.

MEMBER BROWN: The top part is the normal

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control. That's the three active sensors. And the EHC is electro-hydraulic control/emergency trip function. The bottom part is the independent primary function with primary sensors. Does that help calibrate here, Mike, or whoever --CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Ι just wanted

something in front of us because we are not going to talk --

MEMBER BROWN: That's a great question. I didn't get past page 5 of the presentation when I was thumbing through it.

If you'll look inside, that bottom box, you don't care as long as all of the systems are operational. I've got two independent functions, so I can live with that. If that bottom box is out of service, for whatever reason, sensor failures, processor failures, fuse blows --

MR. THOMAS: Surveillance testing.

MEMBER BROWN: -- whatever testing, says it's not working right, now you decide to go on and continue to operate with the upper system. What is not shown in the top box is there are -- those three sensors feed -- or upper and lower. Those are normal control boxes. There's three of -- there are two or three of those. Don't remember exactly the number.

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The bottom part of that upper section there's three things called speed monitors. All three of those sensors feed all three of the speed monitors. So they are all tied together. Those three speed sensors also feed the normal mode of operation. How they are tied together -- I think they are tied together in the upper one. I never got a figure of that, but based on the text that I was able to read in a few places, it looks like it's done by both -- there's a backup and -- there's a normal and a backup channel, and all three feed all in -- you pick the median. MR. THOMAS: You have -- a signal from each sensor goes into its processor. MEMBER BROWN: That's right.

MR. THOMAS: And then that processor sends that signal to the other two processors.

it MEMBER **BROWN:** However happens, it's -- that's not show anywhere. It just shows a line coming off the sensors going into the other boxes. detail is not clear as to how they're hooked up in the normal function.

The problem is they are all hooked up. Based on your picture that you gave us, they are all hooked up to all three monitors in the overspeed trip function, electrical -- the emergency one.

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So if you have what I would call not a failure of a sensor or a processor per se, but an anomalous noise, some other interaction from the sensor getting fed into those three speed monitors, they can be told, "I didn't see a trip." I'm not calling it a software failure; it's just that you can provide a signal, a noise. I've seen it happen, and that's the other genesis of the concern I have.

That same noise gets into -- or that bogus signal, corrupt signal, gets into the processors for the normal speed control. It can tell those, "Raise the speed of the TG set."

And I've been asked how in the world -- that is just never going to happen. Well, in fact, it really happened, real life. I had just finished a review of a major governor program for the Navy, said, "Guys, you don't have independence. They auctioneered their suppliers, fed them to both places. Explain to me, Brown" -- that's what the contractor and the Navy said to me -- "how this -- have you ever seen this happen?" Of course I hadn't seen it happen.

So they went ahead with the design, coupled through the power supplies. About five months later one of the ships had a major overspeed -- I mean, a major overspeed action based on noise coming out of the power

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supplies, which disabled the overspeed trip and told the normal speed control to raise the frequency -- to increase steam. I won't say raise the frequency; I will say increase speed -- increase steam to the turbine.

In the process of troubleshooting, somebody pulled one particular power supply, which happened to be the good one, which was holding the machine down -- in other words, it was overriding the noise. As soon as they pulled that out, the machine went to 149 percent overspeed. Just managed to be tripped by an operator who was standing out there.

So people -- and now the Navy went into a major upgrade of all of their electronic speed controls, and overspeed controls, to eliminate the lack of independence from -- in other words, independence really means independence. It doesn't mean common things feeding common stuff, you know, both functions.

So that's the genesis of my overall concern is, once the passive is out of service, with the existing design, you no longer have an independent -- totally independent overspeed function, electrical -- emergency overspeed function from the normal control function.

And if the answer to this is, "Hold it." If we take the passive one out of service for some reason, we have three days to get it fixed or five days to get

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38 it fixed, the answer is, I probably wouldn't object because there is a reasonable -- although I'm rarely ever referred to as being reasonable, I would consider that a reasonable thought process for an engineering manager to go through and say, "Hey, look, see if it's something simple that we can recover and finish operating through the entire cycle." But when somebody says it's okay to go for six months or a year, or two years, through the entire operating cycle, that seems -- and that is what was implied by Table 3.5-1 in Chapter 3 of the DCD.

You've made MR. THOMAS: Okay. presentation.

MEMBER BROWN: I thought I'd try to --MR. THOMAS: No, that's truly where I was going to go. So let me go there real quickly and --MEMBER BROWN: One other point is that --CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Short point.

MEMBER BROWN: No. This is whatever time it takes me to put this point out. I have worked on this now for four different Subcommittee meetings. I don't want to do it again. Okay? Please. It will be short.

As is my normal approach to doing business, viewgraphs don't -- and people telling me how something is really going to happen don't play a whole lot based

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on -- I mean, somebody has to go out and design this stuff, and it becomes disconnected from a discussion at a Subcommittee meeting or even if -- and it's not in an RAI any place right now where somebody can go grab their hands.

And I noticed based on some other stuff you all had made some changes to the DCDs requirements, either the ITAACs and/or the whatever to show certain things that the staff had brought up. And it is my hope that whatever you are going to say would be reflected either in the COL or documents or in the DCD documents. Now, it is probably too late for the DCD documents. I don't know; it was in Chapter 10. But I never -- with this, I don't think anything is ever too late.

If your proposal is that -- not proposal, but if your final part is it's only going to be for a limited time, and we will limit it by procedure, which people if it's out of service and they have some, you know, less than infinite time to operate in that mode, then it's a pretty straightforward approach. So that's my short point.

MR. THOMAS: Okay. I went through exactly that same thought process to -- struggling with this question, and I think I wound up almost exactly the same place. So I'm going to go through this real quickly and

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show you how I got there, and then we will talk about the very last point that you made. MEMBER BROWN: Okay. 4 MR. THOMAS: So maybe we ought to back up 5 a couple of slides. I know I'm going to repeat some 6 things here for the benefit of everybody else here, and I'm going to do it very quickly. 8 We do have four functions that are speed 9 controlling functions that are very similar to the AP1000 10 design, for example. You have a normal speed control 11 system, which is designed --12 MEMBER BROWN: One point. 13 MR. THOMAS: Yes, sir. 14 MEMBER BROWN: I did look at the AP1000 15 design two and a half years ago, three years ago, whatever 16 They were in the unfortunate circumstance that 17 they didn't provide enough detail in their write-ups that looked pretty simple based similar to your picture right 18 19 here without the internal boxes. And I didn't ask the 20 right question. 21 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Let him go through it, 22 though. Just so --23 MEMBER BROWN: I am. I'm just saying, I 24 just -- I don't want to use AP1000 as a basis for saying 25 I think --

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: And I think that is his point. 3 MR. THOMAS: I only bring that up to say 4 that this design is not unusual. It is probably --5 MEMBER BROWN: Pretty much the same. 6 MR. THOMAS: -- the standard for, you know, 7 modern turbines today. But there are four speed control 8 functions -- the normal speed control and emergency trip 9 system, and power load on unbalance. Those are the 10 functions that are controlled by the EHC controller. 11 And as you pointed out, then there is an independent and diverse, completely separate from the other system 12 of -- what is called a primary trip function. I think 13 14 unfortunately that may be a little bit of a misnomer, but it is a backup. It is completely independent and 15 16 diverse. 17 MEMBER BROWN: It is lower than the 18 emergency --19 MR. THOMAS: It's 110. 20 MEMBER BROWN: That is 111, and so that 21 is --22 MR. THOMAS: But the point is, 23 separate, it's independent, it's an additional layer of 24 protection that depends on nothing from the other system. 25 So there are four speed control functions that we're

talking about.

Now, go to the next slide. This is describing the DCD. The first line of defense -- in other words, if you do have an overspeed event, what is expected to protect the machine first is the normal speed control system, which limits the speed within these parameters. And the power load on balance function, which is basically a rapid load loss such as loss of the generator breaker opening, it detects a difference between your steam turbine chest pressure and generator current, and actuates fast-acting solenoid valves to dump the EHC system and protect you from overspeed.

And on the next slide we have what is called second line of defense, which is the emergency trip function. Again, that is associated with the primary control system, and then the primary diverse trip function.

They each employ two out of three logic, or two -- or I'm not going to go through the details here. There are multiple solenoid valves to ensure that you don't have inadvertent tripping, but also to ensure that you do get a trip function when one is required.

Let's go to the next slide. We have seen this before. Now let's move on. So if we take out the primary trip function, that added layer of protection,

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we are still left with three speed control functions.

Now, this is when I start to put myself in the position of talking to the plant manager. How long can we continue to operate like this?

Clearly, you have removed an important safety function from the machine, and you want to understand, you know, what condition you are in, how long can we continue to operate like this.

I'm not going to hypothesize too many circumstances. It could, of course, depend upon what you found, whether it's something you think is simple to fix, whether you've got spare parts available, whether you think you can do it online or you've got to take the machine offline, but there could be a variety of circumstances feeding into that decision-making process.

If we go to the next slide, generally, this is acceptable. It is not an unacceptable position to be in. First of all, these things are designed to be taken out of service for surveillance testing. These are requirements that we have to do. So periodically, for short periods of time, you would take the system out of service to test it and rely upon the other functions to provide a degree of protection that you think is acceptable.

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So operation for a "limited period of time" with the primary trip system out of service is 3 acceptable. And this term "limited" is not defined, and I think that is the question. What is reasonable? What 5 is appropriate? If we go to the next slide --6 7 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: So before you go to 8 the next slide, are you two on the same page? 9 MEMBER BROWN: Roughly. I have a little 10 bit of disagreement on the power load on balance. 11 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: But at least for what 12 he brought up, you're on the same page? 13 MEMBER BROWN: Yeah. 14 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. 15 MEMBER BROWN: For the most part. 16 if you look at it from the standpoint of standard part 17 failures, then, yes. If you look for what I would call unusual anomalies that may occur, then not necessarily 18 19 until I heard the end. 20 MR. THOMAS: I didn't want to get into the 21 discussion about, you know, we are still connected to the 22 grid and that. I think the power --23 MEMBER BROWN: There are different things 24 that happen if you are on the grid or off the grid. 25 MR. THOMAS: other There are some

considerations. And in researching this, you know, I wanted to see, well, what does our insurer require? There certainly -- obviously, this is a very expensive machine. It's an important machine. And our insurer is not comfortable with us operating in a condition like this for a continued period of time. That's the term that they use here.

And they require us to notify them if we were going to do something like that, and there would be some consequences associated with that. I don't know exactly what those might be, but I point that out just to say clearly there are other factors, in addition to the ones that you brought up, that would be factored into this decision.

Now, I think, finally, that we do, again, periodically take these things out of service. The terms "limited" and "continued operation" are not explicitly defined. And in talking through this, really, with myself and Scott and some others that are familiar with these type of circumstances, I think my advice to the plant manager under these circumstances is that you can't operate like this for six months. You can't operate like this for a month.

I think that this is something you can fix today or tomorrow or, if we have a spare part that we have

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to get in and we can fix it this weekend when we can bring the machine down during a low power situation, that a period of five or six days would be reasonable under these circumstances.

And my advice to him would be anything longer than that would not be reasonable under these circumstances.

So I think, you know, we have come to pretty much the same place. You know, I would not be comfortable recommending to my plant that we can operate like this for an extended period of time. It's a significant layer of protection, and you should not operate with that not present, not functioning properly under those conditions for a long period of time.

So I think I'm in pretty much agreement with everything that you've said. Now --

MEMBER BROWN: With the exception of, how do you determine "limited" and "continued operation" are not explicitly defined. I mean, I have no problem with what you just said. Five or six days, if I was in your situation -- or that position, that is probably the ballpark. You know, how long does it take me to get the parts? What is this? Blah, blah, blah. Walkthrough, is it simple to do once we -- but if it's longer than five or six days, we've got to do something because we're

putting ourselves in jeopardy for whatever the circumstances are.

But relying on that without some licensing condition or something, goes past it into a little bit more formal context, to me is -- it's kind of saying, "Well, trust me. This will work just fine. And don't worry about it." And I guess I have a hard time walking away from that standpoint.

I agree with you philosophically all the way down with what you've said.

MR. THOMAS: The situation is not dissimilar to -- I mean, I think we had the discussion that this primary trip device, this independent device, is sort of the equivalent of the mechanical trip device.

MEMBER BROWN: That was the argument we --

MR. THOMAS: There are circumstances where that device might not be working, and you could find yourself in exactly the same situation with a mechanical trip device out there, which is common throughout most of the fleet at the present time. But I don't know that there are any particular restraints or tech spec requirements or license conditions associated with that situation that would be applicable to this situation. I don't understand why this situation would be any different.

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MEMBER BROWN: Let me answer that. It depends, again, on -- and, again, this is -- what do the backup systems look like, and what are their potential vulnerabilities. If I had looked at your emergency speed, overspeed, trip function, all three active sensors coming in, also going to the normal but going into the three-speed monitors, instead of all three feeding each one, going to all of them, instead you see one sensor going to each speed monitor and one power supply independent going to each of those speed monitors.

I would have said, okay, because it is fundamentally independent. The only connection is the output of the active devices to the normal speed control. But each of the trip functions, two out of three downstream from that, are independent. They're not -- from circumstances which I have actually encountered in real life, not necessarily a single individual failure of --

MR. THOMAS: Well, I believe they are independent. They are not diverse.

MEMBER BROWN: Put the diverse aside. Look, I'm not wrapped around the axle, once you get to this point, on the diverse part. The real issue, the protection, the major basis for operating safety systems that are software -- particularly software-based ones,

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is independence. And it means independence. 1 Once you start contaminating cross-feeding 3 data from one processor to another, where part of that data could not only impair its own but impair the other 5 two, becomes a major problem. That is a real problem. That is a real problem, and that is the point of my -- I 6 7 am -- pardon? 8 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: So I didn't want to 9 I have been counseled that we want to let you 10 have your --11 MEMBER BROWN: My day in court? CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: That would be a word. 12 13 But I just want to make sure, are you --14 MEMBER BROWN: Yeah. You've heard -- I've 15 got it on the record --16 MR. HEAD: We have a little bit more to add, but that's -- and I would like to add that there are 17 18 two -- at least two regulations that are in play right 19 now. Okay? One is called the maintenance rule, okay, 20 and one is called the corrective action program. If we 21 have -- you know, if we have not made the decisions that 22 we just heard said, that we discussed, and we somehow 23 justified a six-month -- you know, being in this

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condition for six months, I think that there are a number

of opportunities for that to undergo NRC scrutiny.

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50 A corrective action program that allows this to take place, especially if we have, you know, other individuals on the site that say, "Hey, that's -- we should be in that condition," I think those are there, and they're real. And I think they in many ways trump even a redesign of this system, and that's the way -- the reason we can talk this is that's the way we live right now at an operating plant. And so --CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: I think I know what he just said, Charlie. Are you on the same page? MEMBER BROWN: Those are amorphous. CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Let me try -- let me

just say as a third party, what I think Scott is saying is your interpretation of this is correct. You guys seem to be on the same page. So I don't understand it enough to disagree. On the other hand, what you say is limited and needed to be defined, Scott is saying can be defined by an analysis through the maintenance rule, so that something greater than X, whatever X is, is not going to be allowed. That's what I interpret --

MEMBER BROWN: It's not clear that that would happen through the maintenance rule.

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: To me, on -- you asked. The basis for the thing is safety systems should be independent of your normal control modes.

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MEMBER STETKAR: Can I try something? Number one, for the record, this is not a safety system. 3 It is not a safety system, Charlie. MEMBER BROWN: Well, John, I am not going 4 5 to argue with you on that point. Safety system applied to the main turbine --6 7 MEMBER STETKAR: It's a protection system 8 for the main generator. 9 MEMBER BROWN: That's fine. It's an 10 overspeed trip. It's a safety system from that 11 standpoint. 12 MEMBER STETKAR: In your FSAR, there is 13 Table 3.5-1. That's in your final safety analysis 14 report, which is a licensing document, correct? 15 MR. HEAD: Yes, sir. 16 MEMBER STETKAR: Your final safetv 17 analysis report is a licensing document? 18 MR. HEAD: Yes, sir. 19 MEMBER STETKAR: Thank you very much. 20 There is a table that indeed applies criteria that are 21 indexed to -- I'll call them reliability numbers. But 22 they are indeed criteria that are in a licensing document 23 that says, "I can operate for an infinite amount of time 24 if I satisfy Criterion A. I can operate until the next

outage if I satisfy Criterion B. I can operate for 60

days if I satisfy Criterion C. And I can only operate for six days if I satisfy Criterion D."

It is incumbent on you to demonstrate that indeed you satisfy Criterion A, B, C, or D. But this is pretty clear. It is not in something that is called the technical specifications, which are written for the safety-related stuff that is included in the design basis safety evaluation in Chapter 15 and Chapter 6.

But it is certainly -- and, in fact, it is more restrictive than some of the maintenance rule stuff. It is sort of analogous to the -- and I always forget the words that people use, but the reliability criteria that they apply to the design reliability assurance program equipment that some licensee -- some applicants have proposed in their applications.

So there is, in a licensing document, a commitment to apply these criteria, which is auditable and enforceable by the staff. And it's incumbent on the eventual licensee to demonstrate that indeed they meet these criteria, which involves, you know, doing some sort of an analysis work, and their criteria would apply if something is out of service for maintenance, something fails, something -- you know, anything. Anything that can trigger you from Criterion A to B to C to D would need to be evaluated.

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MEMBER BROWN: This table that you are referring to is a requirement for probability of missile generation for the ABWR standard plant. 500-missile generation. It is not for other safety functions. It's applied to the rotating machines. CORRADINI: isn't CHAIRMAN But that -- isn't these total -- aren't these all -- we're talking the same thing. Well, I'm talking about MEMBER BROWN: rotating machines. That's what the issue is here. sounded like it was being applied on a larger scale relative to overall analyses of things relative to safety of the plant. CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: But, I mean, turbine missiles would fit within this criterion is what I'm --MEMBER BROWN: Oh, no. This table that he talking about, it applies to the generation of -- missile generation. CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. MEMBER BROWN: Okay? I'm not arguing with It's just that this thing goes on to say that the licensee is required to provide his calculational methodology to the NRC -- that is stated somewhere in here -- after the license is granted, whatever that

means.

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And I have a hard time believing that the thought process and concept of independence is going to be cranked into this calculation of the ability to -- of probability.

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: But I guess -- I'm not an expert at all on this, but I think your worry fits into the broader worry we had before of we want to see a complete turbine missile analysis. And in the missile analysis they are going to have to show that "limited" falls into some category. Otherwise, they have to take the system down. That's my interpretation.

MEMBER STETKAR: The turbine -- let me just -- you know, I'm an analytical guy. I'm a PRA guy. Nothing to me is independent. Something can always have a common cause. I don't care whether it's hardware, software, or anywhere.

The key is that if you do develop -- and you do need to develop -- a turbine missile, quantitative turbine missile analysis, and if that turbine missile analysis is a true -- an end-to-end analysis, it goes all the way from the speed sensors out through the stop valves and all that kind of stuff.

You need, in that analysis, to account for stuff called common cause failure. Charlie's concern is one element of one type of common cause failure

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associated with the signal processing logic. Another element is common cause failure of similar types of -- you know, whether it's solenoid-operated valves, or whatever other kind of operated valves. That is an analytical requirement.

Charlie is saying he basically wants to make sure that you account for that. If you do -- in other words, if that analysis passes the completeness test, in a sense, then that analysis forms the basis for you determining whether you're in each of those different operating -- whatever they're called -- criteria, whether you meet the operating criteria A, B, C, or D that are listed in that table.

So it's important that that analysis that you submit, you know, three years after the COL is issued is indeed complete, and somehow addresses these concerns. After that, you know, if indeed that is the case, this table in your licensing document does indeed apply specific criteria for operating times in various levels of degraded conditions.

MR. THOMAS: Well, that calculation you mentioned I think would -- for missile generation from turbines would address fatigue, stress corrosion cracking, and overspeed type events. And those have to be combined to come up with the numbers here.

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My understanding -- I don't know this for a fact because we haven't done that calculation yet -- is generally overspeed is a relatively small contribution to that. No?

MEMBER STETKAR: It's usually the biggest one, actually.

MR. THOMAS: Okay.

MEMBER STETKAR: It is usually -- especially on monoblock rotors like you -
MR. THOMAS: I was just going to say, the monoblock rotors are fairly --

MEMBER STETKAR: It's the overspeed -- the stuff that we're talking about here is typically what drives the boat.

MR. THOMAS: But I don't know that the calculation would cover the scenario that we have postulated here. It would generally, I assume, consider -- and the system is designed to be able to withstand any single failure, and it would probably credit the overspeed protection capability based on that single failure. I think that the situation we have here where we take a system out of service, and then we postulate some other possible failures, is probably a little bit beyond what might normally be included in that calculation.

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But I'm kind of on Charlie's side on that table. I'm not sure that even if I came up with a number greater than that that would put me in some other category that I would sit there and tell my plant manager, "You can operate for a month or six weeks or six months with this situation," which is why I'm trying to tell you what my judgment would be under the circumstances that you postulated in this question. And I think that I'm in agreement with you.

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: But I just wanted to make sure that we're all -- I mean, I understand -- I think I've got Charlie's point. But are you and John on the same page that it does fit within --

MEMBER BROWN: No. What he says -- he said he likes the analytical PRA approach, and I believe that at some point in the hierarchy of the architecture of your basic systems that you depend on to prevent bad things from happening, there is a streak of deterministic thought process that fundamental design architecture principles, as I have stated for reactor protection systems, safeguard systems, "independence" means independence. It doesn't mean passing information from protection channel to protection channel.

So that's -- I don't think you ought to set yourself up for the possibility of failure. So

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| 1 | that's you asked me if John and I were on the same page, |
|----|--|
| 2 | and I would say for the most part, yes, but we have an |
| 3 | endpoint slightly different approach to satisfying the |
| 4 | end requirement. |
| 5 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. |
| 6 | MEMBER SCHULTZ: So you prefer a design |
| 7 | change |
| 8 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Or a definition of |
| 9 | "limited." |
| 10 | MEMBER BROWN: There are two points a |
| 11 | definition of "limited" or a minor design change. This |
| 12 | is disconnecting some wires. |
| 13 | MEMBER RICCARDELLA: Maybe I need to be |
| 14 | educated on this a little bit. You know, plants that I |
| 15 | work with a lot of times, you know, when they have a leak |
| 16 | in one of their pipes, or a vessel is cracked or something |
| 17 | like that, they tell me I'm going into something called |
| 18 | an LCO, a limited condition of operation, and |
| 19 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: That is for safety. |
| 20 | MEMBER RICCARDELLA: Well, okay. I mean, |
| 21 | would you be happy if they said, "Well, if this happens, |
| 22 | I'm an LCO and" |
| 23 | MEMBER BROWN: Yeah. |
| 24 | MEMBER RICCARDELLA: then I could only |
| 25 | operate for a certain number of days? |

| 1 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: I am looking at the |
|----|---|
| 2 | person on the left and I would say no. |
| 3 | MR. HEAD: I am not going to put this system |
| 4 | in tech specs. That's what you would |
| 5 | MEMBER BROWN: I knew that would be the |
| 6 | answer. That's why |
| 7 | MEMBER STETKAR: It is not a safety system. |
| 8 | On the other hand, there is a licensing document that has |
| 9 | certain requirements in that. |
| 10 | MEMBER RICCARDELLA: So Category D in |
| 11 | that |
| 12 | MEMBER STETKAR: Category D says that, you |
| 13 | know, people don't believe in numbers. If the |
| 14 | probability of a missile ejection event gets as high as |
| 15 | 10 to the minus three per year, an increase of factor |
| 16 | of 100, you need to take the turbine offline within six |
| 17 | days or get back to your factor of 100. That's what this |
| 18 | says. |
| 19 | Now, it's not it is not a technical |
| 20 | specification. It is not a limiting condition of |
| 21 | operation, because those regulatory things don't apply |
| 22 | to this. But this is something that is auditable by |
| 23 | MEMBER RICCARDELLA: It's a two-inch pipe, |
| 24 | so |
| 25 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: It's different, but |

it's similar. But I think what I'm hearing between 1 Charlie -- I just want to make sure I qualify what is 3 agreed to and what is not agreed to. I guess what I'm hearing from Charlie -- I want to make sure because we're 5 not going to settle this. I just want to make sure I 6 understand it, so that I can get it captured, which is Charlie feels he'd like to see a number. 8 And John's point --9 MEMBER BROWN: Or --10 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: -- or a change in 11 design. To preserve independence. 12 MEMBER BROWN: 13 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: I got it. From 14 John's standpoint, Table 3.5.1 goes far enough to define a probability, or I'll call it a reliability window that 15 16 if you don't fit into it you might shut down. And that 17 protects --MEMBER RICCARDELLA: Within a certain 18 19 number of days. 20 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: -- within a certain 21 number of days. 22 MEMBER BROWN: And the caveat 23 that -- wasn't quite sure whether this overspeed trip 24 system function, that would really be captured in this

analysis.

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: And I hear 1 the applicant being totally agreeable to how you interpret 3 the design --MEMBER BROWN: Yes. 5 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: -- as we know it. MEMBER BROWN: Yes. 6 7 MR. THOMAS: Not quite there on the signal 8 independence, but fundamentally I think we're in 9 agreement. 10 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. So I'm not 11 sure we can go any further on this one today. understand it. I'm looking at Scott. 12 13 MR. HEAD: Well, I want to circle back to 14 the regulations, because we --15 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: I was waiting for you 16 to do that. 17 MR. HEAD: -- we can make a design change to address this issue, and then I think there is another 18 19 issue. And that's why the maintenance rule is there for 20 any condition. That's the corrective action program is 21 there for any condition. And I really believe 22 that -- and, you know, Steve is speaking from experience, 23 that the people that are operating the plant, that 24 understand the exposure, can apply the expectations that

come with at least those two regulations and come up with

the appropriate decisions based on whatever equipment is out of service for this condition or some other condition.

And I think that, like I say, we've been living with those regulations for a number of years now. They have been I think beneficial for the station and public health and safety, and I think they're there. And I don't think -- you know, they are not amorphous, and they are real and decisions are made based on those every day. So this would just be another decision.

Steve has been speaking more or less from the heart from what he would be doing at the time, or has done, and I think -- you know, I just -- I would like the regulations to be on the table as we make this decision or as you deliberate on this decision.

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Understood. Anybody else?

MEMBER ARMIJO: I just hear -- I've been listening to all of this stuff trying to figure out what would be the best thing to do. Wouldn't it be fundamentally better to just have the design, whether it's governed by regulations or not, just if you had --

MR. HEAD: I don't think we are poised to agree that the design that was being suggested is in fact better. I don't think we are poised to do that.

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| 1 | MEMBER ARMIJO: Okay. So you disagree |
|----|---|
| 2 | that, you know, it's independence and |
| 3 | MR. HEAD: Now, there may be a design |
| 4 | uncertainty of |
| 5 | MEMBER ARMIJO: this is |
| 6 | MR. HEAD: scenarios that are better, |
| 7 | but we have chosen this design and we believe it is the |
| 8 | design that for the majority, overall design is what |
| 9 | we want to protect our turbine. |
| 10 | MEMBER ARMIJO: Okay. |
| 11 | MEMBER RICCARDELLA: Is this substantially |
| 12 | different from the 100 or so operating plants that are |
| 13 | out there? |
| 14 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: No. |
| 15 | MR. HEAD: What is different is this |
| 16 | clearly won't have the mechanical overspeed. |
| 17 | MEMBER RICCARDELLA: It has got two |
| 18 | electrical overspeeds as opposed to one electrical and |
| 19 | one mechanical? |
| 20 | MR. HEAD: Yes. Which we believe and I |
| 21 | think most people say is an enhancement to the protection |
| 22 | of the turbine, and that's why we're doing this. |
| 23 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. |
| 24 | ACTION DATE THOUSE DATE IN THE |
| | MEMBER BALLINGER: But the mechanical |

| 1 | MEMBER BROWN: Well, they don't have one if |
|----|--|
| 2 | that's |
| 3 | MEMBER BALLINGER: No, but I'm saying that |
| 4 | is an independent thing. |
| 5 | MEMBER RICCARDELLA: If that goes out of |
| 6 | service for some reason, if they are taken out of service, |
| 7 | then it's just like this, right? |
| 8 | MR. HEAD: Sometimes they go out of service |
| 9 | and you don't know it. |
| 10 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Right. |
| 11 | MEMBER STETKAR: Everybody presumes that |
| 12 | this Rube Goldberg chunk of weights and stuff is the most |
| 13 | reliable thing in the world. It isn't. |
| 14 | MEMBER BALLINGER: It has only been for the |
| 15 | last 50 years. |
| 16 | MEMBER BROWN: Try 80 or 90 years. |
| 17 | MEMBER BALLINGER: Okay. Well, I'm 67, |
| 18 | so |
| 19 | MEMBER BROWN: It relies on |
| 20 | (Simultaneous speaking.) |
| 21 | MEMBER BALLINGER: And I was not rating |
| 22 | turbines when I was 12. |
| 23 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: I sense that we've |
| 24 | gone as far as we're going to go. So I suggest that we |
| 25 | go to another action item. I think I've captured it, and |
| | NEAL D. ODOGG |

| 1 | I'm sure my colleagues will make sure if I didn't capture |
|----|---|
| 2 | it they will capture me. So let's move on. |
| 3 | MR. THOMAS: All right. You wanted this |
| 4 | for your |
| 5 | MEMBER BROWN: I am glad you appreciate |
| 6 | them, even though others don't. |
| 7 | (Laughter.) |
| 8 | MR. THOMAS: This one we have covered, you |
| 9 | know, before. There's a water level discussion. |
| 10 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: I thought we had |
| 11 | covered this. |
| 12 | MR. HEAD: We had, but we had a followup |
| 13 | action for us to put all of that information in the COLA, |
| 14 | because at the time the 3.7/3.8 review was going on, and |
| 15 | we explained to you what we did, and those changes have |
| 16 | been made, and, therefore, this and as Tom said this |
| 17 | morning, you know, this chapter is prepared to be closed. |
| 18 | So, but we have made those changes. We updated the COLA. |
| 19 | And the last one is for Dr. Hinze, if he is |
| 20 | on the line. |
| 21 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: I hope he is on the |
| 22 | line. |
| 23 | MS. BANERJEE: Dr. Hinze, can you hear us, |
| 24 | please? |
| 25 | (No response.) |

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: We may need to ask them to unmute him. MS. BANERJEE: Yeah. 4 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: We don't want to drag 5 him here from wherever he is. MR. HEAD: Oh, I understand. As we took 6 7 the action item, it was simply to update the COLA with 8 a description of why two earthquakes is acceptable. 9 (Pause.) 10 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Give us one more 11 minute, and let us see if we can find our consultant. 12 (Pause.) 13 MR. HINZE: Hello? 14 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Professor? Are you there? 15 MR. HINZE: This is Bill Hinze. 16 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Hi, Professor Hinze. 17 This is Mike. Nice to have you with us. 18 19 MR. HINZE: I am sorry, Mike, but I was 20 given the wrong number passcode, and I've been sitting 21 here trying to connect up to you people but without 22 success. So --23 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Well, this is the 24 government, so we're doing very well. At least it's the 25 right day.

MEMBER STETKAR: And you're in the right country.

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. All right. We're all set. Scott.

MR. HEAD: We'll start with just some background on 107 -- was in our discussion, previous discussion, on 3.7/3.8 it was noticed that there were two different seed earthquakes used, one by one of our -- the architect-engineer, and another one by someone who is supporting a different part of the project. And there was two -- basically two different seed time histories that were provided or used, and the question was asked by Dr. Hinze about, why is that acceptable? And in that meeting, we conveyed our rationale of why that's appropriate and acceptable and give reasonable results.

And at the end of that, there was a request that we would, you know, update a licensing document to state that. And we went ahead and chose to update the COLA and Section 3A.16.2. This is Rev 10 that went in a couple of weeks ago, and so there is a -- you know, a paragraph that describes, you know, the basis for doing that, and why that is acceptable. So we've -- that has been -- and the staff has reviewed it and confirmed that it's there and it's acceptable. So --

MR. HINZE: May I ask if the word "basis"

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| 1 | is the same as "reason"? Did you give a reason why there |
|----|--|
| 2 | were two different ones used? Because this is unusual |
| 3 | and potentially confusing. |
| 4 | MR. HEAD: Do you mean why from a business |
| 5 | perspective we had two different |
| 6 | MR. HINZE: Well, why from a scientific |
| 7 | perspective or from any perspective. Why were two |
| 8 | different seeds used? |
| 9 | MR. HEAD: Well, either one would have been |
| 10 | acceptable by either organization. And so since it was |
| 11 | acceptable to use either one, either company would have |
| 12 | been free to do that. And so we haven't put a business |
| 13 | decision as to why we did that, and |
| 14 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Can I say it |
| 15 | differently? You're saying that either would have been |
| 16 | acceptable. It just turned out that two different bases |
| 17 | were used? |
| 18 | MR. HEAD: Yes, sir. |
| 19 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. |
| 20 | MR. HEAD: I mean, they could have used the |
| 21 | same one, but, you know, that would have been, you know, |
| 22 | just by luck. |
| 23 | MR. HINZE: Did you compare the spectra of |
| 24 | the two averages that you used? |
| 25 | MR. HEAD: I don't believe we |

compared -- what we've said is that both organizations went back and --

MR. HINZE: Excuse me, but we were told -- we were told at the July meeting that the results would come out within one percent. But how was that determined?

MR. HEAD: I'm going to dive into this, Steve. You're going to have to help me.

MR. THOMAS: I'll try.

MR. HEAD: When you go through this process, at the end of it all you have to still validate that your earthquake and the results from that are consistent with what you would expect. And both organizations did that -- that after going through the process, that there were consistent results.

MR. HINZE: I don't know what about what they expect, but if -- if -- we are trying to determine the very best possible ground motion response spectra, and there is very little expectation there.

Well, I thoroughly agree that both the North Ridge and the current are potentially useful for this purpose. And I am pleased that you did make reference to the basis for this, and I was hoping that you would explain in the FSAR why the two different ones were used, because I think that would be helpful to the person that

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analyzes the documents. But so be it. 1 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: So, I'm sorry. So you're all right with the fact that two bases are used, not because --5 MR. HINZE: Well, you know, I really believe that both of them are useful in this regard. I 6 think the problem here, at least to my feeling, is that 8 you have used two without saying why you have used two, 9 and the net result is that anyone analyzing this would 10 have to raise a question about, would these produce the 11 same results. And in the FSAR -- I have not seen what you 12 13 have written, but in the FSAR you pointed out that they 14 are -- give the same results or some percentage that give the same results, and define how you arrived at that. 15 16 MR. HEAD: We didn't -- you know, there were 17 two different sets of buildings, two different organizations that did it. There was really --18 19 MR. HINZE: But there were two different 20 organizations that did it. So it was a selection that 21 was made by an individual. 22 MR. HEAD: By individuals. 23 All right. By individuals. MR. HINZE: 24 By a group that did the analysis for the diesel oil 25 facilities and for the containment building.

| 1 | MR. HEAD: Yes, sir. |
|-----|---|
| 2 | MR. HINZE: So there were two different |
| 3 | groups that did that. Is that what you're saying? |
| 4 | MR. HEAD: Yes, sir. Yes, sir. At two |
| 5 | different times for two different project reasons. |
| 6 | MR. HINZE: I see. So |
| 7 | MR. HEAD: Go off and do a certain set of |
| 8 | work, and they chose two different seed time histories, |
| 9 | and then go through the process to validate and this |
| 0 | is what I meant by the word "expected," that the results, |
| .1 | after you've done all of that, are consistent or as |
| 2 | expected, that you have built the appropriate result. |
| _3 | And there is a process to go through that that I |
| 4 | really you know, I really can't, you know, describe |
| _5 | in much detail. |
| - 6 | MR. HINZE: Well, let me ask a question, |
| - 7 | then. How consistent are the ground motion response |
| . 8 | spectra at the diesel oil facility and oil fuel oil |
| 9 | facility and the containment? How consistent are they? |
| 20 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: I don't think they |
| 21 | have I think, Bill, they don't have that in front of |
| 22 | them now. |
| 23 | MR. HEAD: And I don't know what |
| 24 | consistent |
| 25 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: By "consistent," do |

| 1 | you mean if the |
|----|--|
| 2 | MR. THOMAS: Well, one is the site-specific |
| 3 | analysis, and one was the one done for the generic DCD. |
| 4 | And so they're different in |
| 5 | MR. HINZE: They are site-specific, are |
| 6 | they not? |
| 7 | MR. THOMAS: Really, there is no apples |
| 8 | comparison. |
| 9 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: I think you guys are |
| 10 | talking over each other. Can you repeat, Steve, |
| 11 | what can you repeat to Professor can you repeat what |
| 12 | you said? |
| 13 | MR. THOMAS: The original seed history used |
| 14 | by GE in developing the DCD was a generic for hypothesized |
| 15 | ground motion response spectra. The one that we did for |
| 16 | STP was a site-specific ground motion response spectra |
| 17 | developed through the Shack II process. So, I mean, the |
| 18 | results would not be comparable, and there would be no |
| 19 | real expectation that you would choose the same seed time |
| 20 | histories in doing those two different results. One is |
| 21 | generic for the .3G DCD, and the other is site-specific |
| 22 | for the .15G13 site-specific. |
| 23 | MR. HINZE: Right. |
| 24 | MR. THOMAS: So I think the fact that those |
| 25 | were done by different organizations at different times |

for different purposes really -- there was no underlying expectation that they would choose the same time 3 histories to do that. But I think the underlying understanding is 5 that if they had used the same seed histories they would 6 have gotten comparable results. But we really don't 7 have anything that we could compare to say that it came 8 within one percent or two percent or any other numerical 9 comparison. 10 MR. HINZE: Mike, I am satisfied that the 11 applicant has provided a basis for the use of the two in 12 the SAR, and I think we will bring this to a conclusion 13 as far as I am concerned. 14 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Well, why don't we at 15 least -- let's close the loop by at least getting into 16 the language that is in Revision 10, so you can see what 17 was --I would very much appreciate 18 MR. HINZE: 19 that. 20 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: I think that is 21 probably the way that I would make sure that you're 22 comfortable with this, because given the fact that we're 23 two different groups with two different ways in which 24 this was started, I don't see how -- unless they purposely 25 try to compare them, I don't think one can say they are

comparable or not comparable. So I think the best thing to do is to see what's written. MR. THOMAS: Please read the change in 4 context with the whole section, not just by itself. 5 MR. HINZE: That's very reasonable. 6 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. 7 MEMBER RICCARDELLA: Is it expected that 8 these ground motion response spectra are going to be 9 updated as a result of some of the ongoing work? I mean, 10 the NRC, the USGS, they are all updating their ground 11 motion responses. No, sir. It's not that, but 12 MR. HEAD: we're previewing a February ACRS meeting, which I have 13 14 previewed before, that as part of one of the Fukushima 15 ACRS meetings we will show you the original ground 16 motion -- the original limiting curve that we are using 17 for the site, and we will show you the results of the CEUS, the new source model, and the results of the new ground 18 19 motion attenuation. And we will show you there that our 20 original curve is still valid. 21 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. And that's --22 MR. HINZE: I would also add that there is 23 an increasing amount of strong motion information

available in COSMOS that is available generally, coming

from the CEUS, the Central and Eastern U.S. And this is

24

much more applicable than would be trying to modify the Western U.S. results. And I think we will -- as I stated in my 4 report, I believe we will see that coming to fruition in 5 the -- hopefully in the near future. CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: I think that -- I 6 7 think what you're saying is right. I just want to remind 8 everybody that we have a meeting scheduled, 9 Subcommittee, specifically about what Scott had 10 mentioned. 11 MS. BANERJEE: February 20th? Well, that's what I have been 12 MR. HEAD: 13 told is currently scheduled. You don't have the SER on 14 it, so, I mean, you know, it's --15 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: February? 16 MS. BANERJEE: February 20th is tentative date for that presentation of Chapter 2.5, Section 2.5. 17 MR. HEAD: Which will be combined with the 18 19 Fukushima discussion, because of the earthquake aspect. 20 My only offer on this is that, you know, we 21 have submitted this to the staff, and so I really think 22 it's more appropriate for the staff --23 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Ι said it 24 incorrectly. The staff can pass this on to us. We 25 don't -- we don't need it from you.

| 1 | MS. BANERJEE: Yeah. I'll get Section 3A, |
|-----|--|
| 2 | Appendix 3A, and send it to Dr. Hinze. |
| 3 | MR. HEAD: And I apologize, our expectation |
| 4 | for this, at least originally, was us just to confirm we |
| 5 | had done it. And I'm confirming that, but, obviously |
| 6 | MR. THOMAS: We didn't bring any experts |
| 7 | with us is what he's trying to say. |
| 8 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. I think that's |
| 9 | it on your list. Is that correct? |
| 10 | MR. THOMAS: Yes, sir. We're done. |
| 11 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: So I don't have |
| 12 | anything. I'll turn to Tom. Tom, do you have anything |
| 13 | you want to talk about in terms of the action items? |
| 1 4 | MR. TAI: Yes. |
| 15 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Relative to 34 and 86? |
| 16 | MR. TAI: Yes. This morning someone asked |
| 17 | about |
| 18 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Do you want to come up |
| 19 | here, or do you want to just take it from there? |
| 20 | MR. TAI: No. I think we can take it from |
| 21 | here. |
| 22 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. Go ahead. |
| 23 | MR. TAI: The question was, with respect to |
| 24 | the turbine inspection program, by doing leaky valve |
| 25 | inspection testing, is it going to impose additional |
| | |

| risk? |
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I have John Honcharik here from the Materials Branch, and maybe he can explain it, give you a better answer than I did this morning.

MR. HONCHARIK: Hi. My name is John Honcharik, and I think the issue was that they said they didn't submit a turbine missile analysis. So part of that was to put it in the license condition, and basically the wording, the way it finally fell out, was that -- use the language that is in the SRP about that they would have to inspect their turbine rotor every other outage, and also do the valve testing weekly for the SRP.

MEMBER STETKAR: What section, John, of the SRP? I did a little search at noon, and I couldn't find that quickly, certainly not in the section you referred to.

MR. HONCHARIK: Oh.

MEMBER STETKAR: So what section of the SRP is it actually specified in?

MR. HONCHARIK: It's in SRP 3.5.1.3.

MEMBER STETKAR: You know, I looked that up

at noontime and --

MR. HONCHARIK: And it's on page --

MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.

MR. HONCHARIK: -- 8.

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MEMBER STETKAR: I'm sorry. 3.5.1.3, page 8. MR. HONCHARIK: Right. Thank you. I must have 4 MEMBER STETKAR: 5 missed it. So basically we 6 MR. HONCHARIK: 7 enforced it to say you shall do what the SRP says until 8 you submit that. 9 MEMBER STETKAR: What is the basis for the 10 SRP? 11 MR. HONCHARIK: Well, that has been gone for a long time. 12 13 MEMBER STETKAR: I don't care. What's the 14 basis for the SRP? We are dealing -- we are living in 15 We claim that we use the year 2013 right now. 16 risk-informed regulation, and it is well-known, at least 17 to those of us who do risk assessment, that every time you trip the plant you are increasing the risk of an 18 accident. 19 20 So anything that you do to increase the rate 21 at which you trip that plant is increasing risk. And I 22 submit that a weekly test of those turbine valves, regardless of materials, regardless of thermal cycles, 23 24 regardless of any deterministic analyses, is increasing

the risk to the health and safety of the public.

| | 50 I d like to understand now the stall |
|-----|--|
| 2 | justifies putting the plant at that increased risk, |
| 3 | regardless of what is said in some piece of paper |
| 4 | somewhere. I'd throw that back as a challenge to the |
| 5 | staff. It has nothing to do with materials. It has |
| 6 | everything to do with plant safety. |
| 7 | MR. HONCHARIK: I mean, I hear you. But, |
| 8 | I mean, we just have to get back to you on that. Other |
| 9 | than that, I have no |
| 10 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. But just from |
| 11 | the standpoint just so we have it down in our heads, |
| 12 | that kind of comes back to the thing we left Tom with |
| 13 | earlier this morning, which was that this weekly testing |
| 14 | requirement, although there, just has to be we have |
| 15 | to understand the justification. Whether it be the |
| 16 | staff justification or the SRP's justification, it would |
| 17 | confusing to us. |
| 18 | MR. HONCHARIK: Okay. But you are asking, |
| 19 | what is the justification for the SRP? |
| 20 | MEMBER STETKAR: Essentially. |
| 21 | MR. HONCHARIK: What is the basis for the |
| 22 | SRP? |
| 23 | MEMBER STETKAR: Yeah. Yeah. |
| 2 4 | MR. HONCHARIK: Because basically, you |
| 25 | know, the applicant will be submitting an analysis on |
| - 1 | |

MEMBER STETKAR: We all understand that, but the concern is putting something in a license condition, regardless of whatever our expectation is in terms of a submittal or the timing of that submittal versus startup of the plant.

We want to be sure that something that is specified by the staff in a license condition is indeed not averse to plant safety. I mean, that's the bigger issue here.

MR. HONCHARIK: Right. Yeah. Because I know, I mean, it was based -- there was a lot of information that was happening in the `80s and `90s. You know, that happened. There were a lot of instances of, you know, some overspeeds. Okay. And there were numerous NUREGs, so, I mean, to go back to that, you know, level of detail I don't know if that's the kind of level of detail that you want or --

MEMBER STETKAR: Well, the problem is, back in the `80s, I, you know, was a senior reactor operator at a plant in the late `70s and early `80s, and, indeed, each of our units -- it was at Zion, so I can talk about; it doesn't exist anymore -- used to pretty much trip once every six weeks or so from a variety of causes.

So a slight increase in the expected trip frequency -- and, in fact, measurably, I was involved in

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one, testing the turbine valves occasionally was one of the causes for those trips. I've forgotten how frequently we used to test ours. I think it was once a month, not four times a month.

Current plants pretty much run breaker to breaker, most of them, without tripping. So we are talking about zero trips in a year and a half to two years or maybe one. So if we're making newer plants more vulnerable to tripping two or three times a year, through turbine -- you know, requiring people to cycle those valves 50 times a year, we need to think about that.

So in the context of 2013, not in the context of data from the `70s.

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: So I guess I have a different way of thinking about it, because you weren't here earlier when we were asking about this. If you view this as a requirement that will be easily satisfied because it won't be built by the time it is -- by the time this is satisfied, why not make this a fuel loading condition? Why specify an arbitrary weekly testing regimen, which you don't think will be exercised anyway?

MR. HONCHARIK: Are you saying, why didn't we have a licensing condition to submit the analysis and have it approved with the maintenance program?

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Yes.

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MR. HONCHARIK: Well, funny that you ask that, but that's the way I had written it. (Laughter.) But the lawyers got to it and said, "Well, 5 we can't do that. Let's reverse it." So, I mean, I hear That's how I had it originally specified, so I guess I could take that back. CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: And this is because 8 9 the reg guide is simply written differently, and this is 10 what was within your purview to do? 11 MR. HONCHARIK: Right. CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. All right. 12 That's fair. Thank you. 13 MEMBER ARMIJO: You are vindicated. 14 15 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: We've just gone full 16 circle to try to understand the justification. Ιt 17 passes back down to the SRP. Okay. Fine. 18 Tom, go ahead. I'm sorry. We --19 MR. TAI: No. I think we're done. 20 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Do you want to say 21 anything else about 107, since we went roundabout with Scott over it? 22 23 MR. TAI: Okay. Well, I think I have our 24 reviewer here. Samir, are you still here? Can you add 25 a little bit more to those?

is MR. CHAKRABARTI: This Samir Chakrabarti. I was not the reviewer for 3.7, but I was the reviewer for 3.8. CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: You've got to get 5 closer to the mic. MR. CHAKRABARTI: Yeah. I was --CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: I am hard of hearing. 8 MR. CHAKRABARTI: I was not the reviewer 9 for Section 3.7. I reviewed Section 3.8 of the SRP. And 10 I had a discussion about the 3.7 reviewer on this issue, 11 and what I understand -- that the user completely satisfied the SRP criteria for meeting the motion that 12 13 matches the response written. 14 And, yes, we did not also ask STP to make a comparison that if same seed was used, what would be 15 16 the impact on the results? Because we did not believe 17 it was needed, and that is how we would have done in any case. So, yes, the same could be used, but use of two 18 19 different seeds. Even you can use results also that 20 matches our -- or satisfies the data. So we are happy with that. 21 22 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. Thank you. 23 All right. Thank you. Professor Hinze? 24 MR. HINZE: Yes. 25 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Did you hear all of

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| 1 | that? |
|-----|---|
| 2 | MR. HINZE: No, sir. Couldn't hear it. |
| 3 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. So let me try |
| 4 | to repeat it. What was said is the staff were fine with |
| 5 | the different seeds. They did not expect a comparison, |
| 6 | and they are happy with the explanation given by the |
| 7 | applicant. |
| 8 | MS. BANERJEE: Because it meets the SRP |
| 9 | criteria. |
| 0 | MR. HINZE: Fine. Good. |
| .1 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. Tom, anything |
| 2 | else? |
| _3 | MR. TAI: No, I don't. But I'd like to |
| 4 | reiterate the two actions that I have. I can provide |
| _5 | Maitri with the 3-Alpha for Dr. Hinze. |
| 6 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. |
| 7 | MR. TAI: And I will follow up with John on |
| 8 _ | the justification for the weekly testing. |
| 9 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: And then on |
| 20 | our that's fine. That's good. What I have is we |
| 21 | ourselves have to do our own internal discussion about |
| 22 | how we interpret Table 3.5.1 and our own philosophy |
| 23 | differences. All right? |
| 24 | Okay. Do you have any other closing |
| 25 | statements? Otherwise, I was going to go around the |

| 1 | Committee. |
|----|---|
| 2 | MR. TAI: No, I don't. But I would just |
| 3 | like to say |
| 4 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Oh, excuse me. I'm |
| 5 | sorry. We have a public comment. I apologize. |
| 6 | MR. TAI: Okay. |
| 7 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: I forgot. But go |
| 8 | ahead and finish, Tom. I'm sorry. |
| 9 | MR. TAI: Okay. No, I really don't have |
| 10 | much to add to it. But I would like to thank everybody. |
| 11 | Two persons I want to bring to ACRS Committee's attention |
| 12 | is Jennifer Dixon and Terry Spicher, who started the |
| 13 | review of the steam dryer. If it was not for these two |
| 14 | guys, I think we are in a lot of trouble. So appreciate |
| 15 | that. |
| 16 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. Thank you. |
| 17 | So |
| 18 | MS. BANERJEE: Can I ask you a question? |
| 19 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Sure. |
| 20 | MS. BANERJEE: The safety reason for |
| 21 | requiring all instrument measurements on Unit 4 to be the |
| 22 | same as Unit 3, what is this 3.9.2 question that Sam |
| 23 | asked? |
| 24 | MEMBER ARMIJO: Yeah. I'm going to bring |
| 25 | it up |

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: I don't have to worry about it being an action item. This is internal to the Committee. I rest assured that Sam is going to bring it up. 5 Okay. MS. BANERJEE: Thank you. CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: I am not worried about 6 7 him forgetting about it. 8 MEMBER ARMIJO: I won't. 9 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. Right. So 10 can we open the line? Because I am informed that we 11 have --12 MR. HEAD: Can I ask a question? 13 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: 14 MR. You know, on the turbine HEAD: 15 overspeed, we are in sort of an unusual place, at least 16 from my perspective, and I'm just wondering, will we be 17 informed of how we're going to receive some feedback as to, you know, what is our path forward? I mean, I can 18 19 see different scenarios that would be, you know, 20 time-consuming or, you know, that --21 CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: I think the purpose of 22 at least -- and the Subcommittee will do this -- to get 23 everything out in the open, so at least I understand it, I think -- now I think Charlie understood it from his 24 25 perspective, John understands it, I think I want to make

more of the Subcommittee kind of get on the same plane with it.

So I don't really know if I can tell you where we are going to come down on it. My sense is that we have to discuss it.

MR. HEAD: Not where, but just --

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: But when we do come down about it, you'll hear about it immediately.

MR. HEAD: Okay.

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: So my thought is -- and, again, I am just projecting -- we have a meeting scheduled in February. We are trying to write something up, so we bring the whole new Committee, the new members as well as the members that forget, up to speed on where we sit about any sort of open items or internal discussions we have. This will be one of them.

MR. HEAD: Okay.

analysis is one. The turbine overspeed some of us think fits into the turbine missile analysis. It might fit separately, but that was one. The issues relative to the steam dryers is another. So we will have this sort of discussion when we bring up kind of this internal document to kind of get ourselves up to speed on the history. And that will be probably in the next couple

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| 1 | of months. |
|-----|---|
| 2 | MR. HEAD: Okay. So if there is feedback |
| 3 | available at that meeting, we'll get it. |
| 4 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: You betcha. |
| 5 | MR. HEAD: Okay. Thank you. |
| 6 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: And that is in the |
| 7 | third week of February. |
| 8 | MS. BANERJEE: February 20th. |
| 9 | MR. HEAD: Okay. |
| 10 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay? |
| 11 | MR. HEAD: Thank you. |
| 12 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: No problem. So I |
| 13 | think before I go to the Committee comments, I want |
| 1 4 | to get the public comment, if I could. And I think |
| 15 | somebody is on the line listening. Can we open the line |
| 16 | up so we can get the public comment? I don't know who |
| 17 | is |
| 18 | MR. HINZE: No one is on the bridge. |
| 19 | CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Oh. No one is on the |
| 20 | bridge. Okay. So we have no one. Okay. |
| 21 | So now, with that, you can close the bridge |
| 22 | line, and we'll go around to hear from the Committee. |
| 23 | Professor Hinze, did you have any more that you wanted |
| 2 4 | to say? |
| 25 | MR. HINZE: No, I don't believe so. Thank |

you.

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CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Okay. But we will see you in February, I know, because you'll want to hear about these various seismic issues.

MR. HINZE: Amen.

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Did you say "Amen"?

MR. HINZE: I did that.

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Amen, then.

Pete?

MEMBER RICCARDELLA: I don't have any comments. It looks like a lot of great work. I just hope we get around to building this plant in my lifetime.

MR. HEAD: Thank you, sir.

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: John. Or Ron.

MEMBER BALLINGER: I don't have any comments. I hope they build the plant, too.

MEMBER ARMIJO: Yeah. I think they have a great steam dryer. Other than that, I'll move on.

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Steve?

MEMBER SCHULTZ: I didn't have the time this morning to thank both the applicant as well as the staff on the detailed not only calculations and work that they have done related to the steam dryer and the reactor internals, but also the presentations that were given to us this morning. I really appreciated the level of

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detail and the expertise that went into all of that. So
I thought that was good, and I think, from my perspective,
we have the closed items that have been addressed, and
we have some open items that have been listed. I am glad
that we are putting together a document that is going to
bring everyone up to speed. I think that's a good idea.

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: John?

MEMBER STETKAR: I don't have anything
more. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: Charlie?

MEMBER BROWN: Nothing.

CHAIRMAN CORRADINI: You two are awful silent. That concerns me.

Okay. So I have from my list, I wanted to thank NINA and the staff for today and talking about Section 3.9.2. I kind of agree with Sam that I think this is a fairly robust design, and, really, I don't see any concerns.

I know what I have listed is things that we will bring up, hopefully we will have something to comment back to you by February, is the question about how far we go relative to additional confidence for the steam dryer. And Sam will -- I think Sam has kind of volunteered to take the action item to remind us of that when we have further discussion.

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We will want to write something, whenever we have a formal letter report, about the turbine missile are looking forward to analysis. And we justification as to why the licensing condition is what it is. And then I think we still owe NINA and the staff some sort of Committee posture on this turbine overspeed. I think I finally understand where Charlie is coming from, and the different ways to look at it. So I appreciate Charlie's time on that. Other than that, I don't have any other

Thank you all very much, and I think we can adjourn early.

(Whereupon, at 2:22 p.m., the proceedings in the foregoing matter were adjourned.)

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Presentation to the ACRS Subcommittee

South Texas Units 3 and 4 COL Application Review

SER Phase 4 Chapter 3 "Design of Structures, Components, Equipment, and Systems"

November 22, 2013



Staff Review Team

Project Managers

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George Wunder, Lead PM, DNRL/LB3

ᆂ

Tom Tai, Chapter PM, DNRL/LB3

Technical Staff Presenter

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Samir Chakrabarti, SEB2

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Overview of Chapter 3 COLA

| | | Open Items or Confirmatory Items | | |
|---------|---|----------------------------------|-------------------|--|
| | SRP Section/Application Section | Item Numbers | Status | |
| 3.1 | Conformance with NRC GDC | None | | |
| 3.2.1 | Seismic Classification | CI 03.02.01-2 | All confirmed and | |
| | | CI 03.02.01-3 & | closed | |
| | | CI 03.02.01-5 | | |
| 3.2.2 | Group Classification | CI 03.02.02-10 | All confirmed and | |
| | | CI 03.02.02-11 | closed | |
| 3.3.1 | Wind Loadings | CI 03.03.01-1 | All confirmed and | |
| | | CI 03.03.01-9 | closed | |
| 3.3.2 | Tornado Loadings | CI 03.03.02-4 | All confirmed and | |
| | | CI 03.03.02-6, | closed | |
| | | CI 03.03.02-7, & | | |
| | | CI 03.03.02-9 | | |
| 3.4.1 | Flood Protection | None | | |
| 3.4.1 | Flood Protection | None | | |
| 3.4.2 | Analytical and Test Procedures | OI 03.04.02-9 | Closed | |
| 3.5.1.1 | Internally-Generated Missiles (Outside Containment) | None | | |

| 3.5.1.2 | Internally-Generated Missiles (Inside Containment) | None | |
|---------|---|------------------|-----------------------|
| 3.5.1.3 | Turbine Missiles | CI 03.05.01.03-1 | Confirmed and closed. |
| 3.5.1.4 | Missiles generated by Natural Phenomena | None | |
| 3.5.1.5 | Site Proximity Missiles Except Aircraft | None | |
| 3.5.1.6 | Aircraft Hazards | None | |
| 3.5.2 | SSCs to be Protected from Externally-Generated Missiles | None | |
| 3.5.3 | Barrier Design Procedures | CI 03.05.03-2 | Confirmed and closed. |
| 3.6.1 | Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Inside and Outside of Containment | CI 03.06.01-3 | Confirmed and closed. |
| 3.6.2 | Determination of Break Locations and Dynamic Effects Associated with the Postulated Rupture of Piping | CI 03.06.02-1 | Confirmed and closed. |

| 3.7.1 | Seismic Input | None | |
|-------|---|----------------------------------|------------------|
| 3.7.2 | Seismic System Analysis | None | |
| 3.7.3 | Seismic Subsystem Analysis | None | |
| 3.7.4 | Seismic Instrumentation | None (IBR) | |
| 3.8.1 | Concrete Containment | None | |
| 3.8.2 | Steel Components of the Reinforced Concrete Containment | None | |
| 3.8.3 | Concrete and Steel Internal Structures of Steel or Concrete Containments | None | |
| 3.8.4 | Other Seismic Category I Structures | None | |
| 3.8.5 | Foundations | None | |
| 3.9.1 | Special Topics for Mechanical Components | None | |
| 3.9.2 | Dynamic Testing and Analysis | None | |
| 3.9.3 | ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 Components, Component Supports, and Core Support Structures | OI 03.09.03-6 & OI 03.09.03-7 | Closed Closed |

| 3.9.4 | Control Rod Drive (CRD) | CI 03.09.03-4 | Confirmed and closed. |
|-------|---|--------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 3.9.5 | RPV Internals | None | |
| 3.9.6 | Testing of Pumps and Valves | CI 03.09.06-1, -2, -3, -4, -6, | All confirmed and closed. |
| | | OI 03.09.06-5 | Closed |
| 3.10 | Seismic and Dynamic Qualification of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment | CI 03.10-1 | Confirmed and closed. |
| 3.11 | Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Mechanical and Electrical Equipment | CI 03.11-7 & 3.11-7 | Confirmed and closed. |
| 3.12 | Tunnels | CI 03.12-1 | Confirmed and closed. |
| 3.12S | Piping Design Review | None | |
| 3.13 | Secondary Containment and Divisional Separation Zones-Barrier Considerations | None | |
| 3.13S | Threaded Fasteners – ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 | None | |



Chapter 3 Phase 2 (October 2010) Open Items

| Open Items | Issue and Resolution |
|------------|---|
| 03.04.02-9 | Design control and verification of Category I water-tight doors. STP considered the 40 ft. DBFL as the design basis. |
| 03.09.03-6 | Availability of risk-significant component design specifications. Issued resolved by January 2011 audit. |
| 03.09.03-7 | Pressure loading on the strainer from SRV discharge and the basis for this load. ITAAC (Table 3.0-14) added to verify in design report. |
| 03.09.06-5 | IST table (3.9-8) to reflect latest ASME OM code IST program requirements. |



Chapter 3 Subsections with Significant Revisions Since Phase 2

Subsections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2

Revised for clarity and reflect status of other subsections

Subsections 3.3.1, 3.3.2, and 3.5.1.4

Revised to add departure STD DEP 3.5-2 addressing hurricane wind (RG 1.221 issued October 2011)

Subsection 3.5.1.3

Revised to include a LC to impose inspection of the turbine rotor every other outage and weekly valve testing until a turbine missile analysis is submitted for approval consistent with SRP

Subsection 3.9.1

Revised to add computer code ACSTIC2 identified in 3.9.2 review

Subsection 3.9.4

Revised to address audit issues identified in 3.9.3 review



Chapter 3 ACRS Action Items

- ACRS Action Item 34 Provide ACRS 3.9.2 Technical Reports
 Submitted all WCAPs in October 2013
- ACRS Action Item 86 WRT turbine rotor consider SRP revision to address changing technology related to FATT and Cv energy at minimum operating temperature

Coordinated with NRR and acknowledged the request and need.

 ACRS Action Item 107 – STP seismic design includes two earthquake seeds

STP FSAR 3A.16.2 has been revised to provide basis for using two earthquake seeds (Northridge Earthquake for site specific structures). Two time-histories meet SRP acceptance criteria.



Conclusion

- No open technical issues in Chapter 3 review
- Two license conditions identified in Phase 4
 - In Subsection 3.5.1.3 to impose turbine rotor inspection and valve testing intervals consistent with SRP until turbine missile analysis is submitted for approval
 - In Subsection 3.9.2 to impose power ascension test to ascertain loads on steam dryer and reactor internals are acceptable
- Revision 10 of the FSAR received 10/29/2013



South Texas Project Units 3 & 4 Presentation to ACRS ABWR Subcommittee:

ACRS Action Items





ACRS Action Item #87

Show that other trip functions preclude any common mode failure (e.g., generating a false input of "zero turbine rpm") of normal turbine speed control and emergency overspeed trip functions, while the primary overspeed trip function is taken offline (passive sensors, no automatic trip).

Restating the Question

Since the normal EHC/Emergency Trip Function with three active speed sensors produces an alarm for an abnormal speed input and a turbine trip for 2/3 abnormal speed inputs, and since the backup Primary Trip Function only provides alarms (no turbine trip) for speed sensor failures, then, why is removing the backup Primary overspeed trip system from service for trouble shooting acceptable?



Background

Similar to the AP1000 design and others, the turbine control system has four functions to protect against turbine overspeed.

- 1. Normal Speed Control,
- 2. Emergency Trip System,
- 3. Power Load Unbalance (PLU),
- Primary Trip Function (Independent and Diverse)



Speed Control Functions

First Line of Defense (Limits speed to 2% below 110% trip setpoint)

- A. Normal Speed Control
 - At 105% EHC closes Turbine Control Valves
 - At 107% EHC closes Intercept Valves
- B. Power Load Unbalance
 - At 40% difference between power (high pressure turbine exhaust steam pressure) and load (generator current), fast closure of turbine control and intercept valves (fast acting solenoids)

Speed Control Functions (Cont'd)

Second Line of Defense (Limits speed to 120% of rated speed)

- A. EHC/Emergency Trip Function (111%)
- B. Primary (Diverse) Trip Function (110%)

Each system:

- Employs 2/3 logic
- Trips two solenoids on the respective Emergency Trip Device (ETD)
- Closes Turbine Stop, Control, Intermediate Stop, Control Valves and Extraction Steam Non-Return Valves

Turbine Overspeed Trip Systems




Figure 10.2-5 Turbine Overspeed Trip System Functional Diagram



Available Protection Without Primary Trip System

If the Primary Trip Function is out of service, there are three operable speed limiting control functions remaining:

Normal Speed Control (active speed sensors, normal valve closure)

Power Load Unbalance (does not rely on speed sensors, fast acting solenoid valve closure)

Emergency Trip Function (active speed sensors, emergency trip valve)



Designed for Required Out-of-Service Periods

- As described in the FSAR, many of the components of the various turbine control systems are routinely taken out of service for a "limited" period of time for testing.
- This is acceptable because other redundant functions are available to provide adequate protection.



Conclusions

Operation for a "limited" period of time with the Primary Trip System out of service is acceptable due to the availability of the

- (1) normal speed control,
- (2) power load unbalance, and
- (3) emergency trip system functions to prevent turbine overspeed.



Other Considerations

Insurance Loss Control Standards require that owners SHALL report Adverse Conditions to Nuclear Service Organization (NSO) when they are identified.

Reportable conditions are those which, if allowed to continue uncorrected, could result in a significant property damage incident or loss and may include ... continued operation with failed or defeated safety devices (except those undergoing routine maintenance or calibration), which could lead to a turbine water induction incident or turbine overspeed event.



Closing Thoughts

- The purpose of online diagnostics, surveillance testing and alarms is to alert the operator of an abnormal condition.
- The objective is to restore the equipment to an operable condition.
- Online troubleshooting and repairs can be accomplished in a reasonable time, if reasonable protection exists.
- The terms "limited" and "continued operation" are not explicitly defined.



ACRS Action Item #58

During the November 30, 2010 ACRS
Subcommittee meeting NINA clarified various
water level parameters discussed in Chapter 3
and how they were derived. Action Item #58
was closed pending NRC verification that
COLA changes were made.

The COLA changes to Chapter 3.0 were made and are reflected in COLA Revision 10.



ACRS Action Item #107

During the July 9, 2013 ACRS Subcommittee Meeting, NINA clarified why two different seed time histories were used in the COLA. The follow-up action from the meeting was for NINA to provide a clarifying discussion in the COLA.

The Revision 10 of the COLA contains a discussion in Section 3A.16.2 "Design Time Histories" regarding the use of the two different seed time histories.



Questions and Comments

