

Southern California Edison Company


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SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
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H. B. RAY
MANAGER

TELEPHONE
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March 2, 1982



U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368

Attention: Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director

DOCKET No. 50-206
SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 1

Dear Sir:

This letter describes an occurrence involving the Containment Spray System. This occurrence is not reportable in accordance with the requirements of the Provisional Operating License DPR-13 but is considered significant and is, therefore, being provided for your information.

On November 20, 1981, preventive maintenance was conducted on the Refueling Water Pumps. As a part of the procedure, the pumps were started. This resulted in a decrease in Refueling Water Tank level and actuation of a Sphere Sump Pump. It was suspected that the water had gone into containment through one or both of the Containment Spray block valves CV-82 & CV-114. Containment entries were made which verified that the water had come out through the containment spray header, collected outside the secondary shield, and drained to the containment sump. Upon external inspection and cycling, no indications of valve failure were observed.

Due to the apparent external pressure source to the spray system, valve positions on connected systems were checked and the hot leg recirculation system isolation valve was found slightly open. This line is pressurized to 350 psi by the letdown line and via the open isolation valve, could have raised the containment spray header pressure to an abnormally high (but within design) value.

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Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director

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Based on the above data, the most probable event scenario was that due to the combined effects of the refueling water pump operation and the slightly open hot leg recirculation valve, CV-82 & CV-114 leaked by and allowed water into the containment spray header.

This occurrence does not indicate a loss of containment spray capability and so does not have safety implications. To avoid recurrence, the procedure for equipment control implementation has been revised to ensure that the refueling water pumps are not tested for operability without having their discharge valves closed. In addition, a detailed containment inspection will be conducted during the March 1982 outage. This inspection will be accomplished to determine the presence and evaluate the potential adverse impact of any remaining boric acid deposits on plant equipment.

Sincerely,



Encl: Licensee Event Report 82-006

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Management Information & Program Control (MIPC)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

Nuclear Safety Analysis Center

L. F. Miller (USNRC) San Onofre Unit 1 Resident Inspector)