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Docket No. 50-206

NOV 17 1978

Southern California Edison Company  
ATTN: Mr. James H. Drake  
Vice President  
2244 Walnut Grove Avenue  
Post Office Box 800  
Rosemead, California 91770

Gentlemen:

Enclosure 1 to this letter provides a summary of the open items in our review of your fire protection program for San Onofre, Unit 1 (S0-1). Enclosure 2 revises our staff position, PF-27A (Item 27) to further clarify our concern with the "Cable Spreading Area". Enclosure 2 also identifies an additional staff position PF-51, "Containment", as a result of a survey of the areas inside containment, conducted during our site visit on October 19, 1978.

Your response to the staff positions in Enclosure 2 is requested by November 27, 1978. This will allow consideration of your responses in the preparation of our draft Safety Evaluation of your fire protection program for S0-1.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

*Thomas V. Wambach*  
Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief for  
Operating Reactors Branch #2  
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:

- 1. Summary
- 2. Staff Positions

cc w/enclosures:  
See next page

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DATE →	11/17/78	11/17/78	11/17/78		

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cc w/enclosures:

Rollin E. Woodbury, Vice President  
and General Counsel  
Southern California Edison Company  
Post Office Box 800  
Rosemead, California 91770

David R. Pigott  
Samuel B. Casey  
Chickering & Gregory  
Three Embarcadero Center  
Twenty-Third Floor  
San Francisco, California 94111

David W. Gilman  
Robert G. Lacy  
San Diego Gas & Electric Company  
P. O. Box 1831  
San Diego, California 92112

Mission Viejo Branch Library  
24851 Chrisanta Drive  
Mission Viejo, California 92676

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Robert J. Pate  
Post Office Box 4167  
San Clemente, California 92672

ENCLOSURE 1

SUMMARY OF OPEN ITEMS ON

SAN ONOFRE FIRE PROTECTION REEVALUATION

1. NRC letter dated September 30, 1978:  
Summary of August 29, 1978 Meeting:
  - a) Item 27 - We do not find that the response provided by the licensee in the meeting notes is adequate to address the staff concern. Attached is a revised statement of the staff position, PF-27A, which further clarifies our concern.
  - b) Item 44 - As indicated, further analysis is required by the licensee on this item.
2. SCEC letter dated September 30, 1978:
  - a) As indicated, the results of the evaluation to determine the appropriate fire rating to be assigned to penetration seals will be provided.
  - b) As indicated, a conceptual proposal, for an alternate shutdown method not dependent upon the test pump, will be provided by the licensee by January 15, 1979, following an investigation of the systems required for safe shutdown.
3. On October 19, 1978, a site visit was conducted to survey systems located inside containment. The attached staff position, PF-51 was discussed with the licensee at this time.

ENCLOSURE 2

FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM REVIEW

STAFF POSITION

SAN ONOFRE, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-206

PF-27A Cable Spreading Area

Staff Concern:

The cable spreading area is located in the upper half of the 4160 volt switchgear room which has a ceiling height of approximately 20 feet. Cables for redundant divisions of safety related systems are routed in open ladder cable trays in close proximity. The combustible loading in the area consists of 31,500 lb. of electrical cable insulation consisting of PCV, butyl rubber, neoprene, and other materials that do not meet current flame test requirements. This insulation gives an average fire loading of 172,000 BTU/ft<sup>2</sup> and equates to a fire severity in excess of two hours. Electrical cables consist of instrument, control, and power cables. This area contains both divisions of 4160 volt switchgear and associated power and control cables. The availability of both the normal offsite power and emergency onsite power to all safety-related and shutdown systems is dependent upon systems in this area.

The licensee is completing modifications to provide the capability to shutdown with offsite power, independent of fire damage in this area, by the use of suitable casualty procedures.

Fire detection is provided by ceiling mounted smoke detectors. Manual fire fighting is provided by hose stations located outside the area. The effectiveness of manual fire fighting is limited by the following considerations: Access to the upper elevations of the room would be required in order to direct water from hose stations on a cable fire due to the congestion of cable trays which would prevent such operations from the floor below. Visibility in this situation would be greatly reduced due to the accumulation of smoke from a fire at the upper elevation of the room. This environment would require the fire brigade to use self contained breathing apparatus which would restrict their mobility in using fire ladders to gain access with a hose line. Water from hose streams if used in large quantities increases the potential of water damage to redundant divisions of essential switchgear.

An automatic total flooding Halon 1301 suppression system is a planned modification for the combined switchgear room and cable spreading area, however, additional passive measures are appropriate to prevent a major electrical cable fire in the cable spreading area for the following reasons:

1. The high fire loading due to cable insulation materials.

2. The difficulties which would be encountered in combating a major cable fire in this area by manual means.
3. The vital nature of the area to effect safe shutdown without resorting to casualty procedures to effect safe shutdown.

**Staff Position:**

Passive measures should be taken to prevent a major electrical cable fire in the cable spreading areas. These measures should consist of the application of a flame retardant coating to electrical cables or the combination of fire stops in cable trays and the use of suitable fire barriers to prevent fire propagation between adjacent cable trays.

**PF-51 Containment**

**Staff Concern:**

Cable trays are routed such that electrical cable insulation provides a continuity of combustibles between redundant divisions of cable trays. This situation would permit an unmitigated fire in one division of safety related cables to propagate to the redundant division of cable trays. Due to the increased difficulty of normally suppressing fires within containment, passive measures should be provided to prevent fire propagation between redundant divisions of electrical cables.

**Staff Position:**

Fire stops should be provided in cable trays to prevent fire propagation between redundant divisions of cable trays.