Southern California Edison Company

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August 18, 1980

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region V Suite 202, Walnut Creek Plaza 1990 North California Boulevard Walnut Creek, California 94596

Attention: Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director

Docket No. 50-206 San Onofre Unit 1

Dear Sir:

This letter describes a reportable occurrence involving the failure of a containment isolation valve to close on demand. Submittal is in accordance with the reporting requirements stipulated in Section 6.9.2.b of Appendix A to our Provisional Operating License DPR-13.

On July 17, 1980 it was noted by operations personnel that containment isolation valve CV-537, service water to containment, was stuck in the mid open position. Attempts to close the valve utilizing the containment isolation panel switch were unsuccessful. An investigation revealed that desiccant from the air dryers had entered the solenoid valve core and prevented it from operating. The solenoid core was thoroughly cleaned and returned to service. An identical failure of this valve was previously reported in LER 80-003.

The failure of the solenoid valve occurred while a blowdown of the instrument air header was in progress. This blowdown was conducted as a corrective measure to remove air dryer desiccant from the air header. A small amount of the desiccant had apparently entered the solenoid air supply line as it was blown past the supply line connection.

Further investigation revealed that the pressure in the air supply header was higher than the maximum design operating pressure of the solenoid. A discussion with the valve manufacturer indicated that a pressure regulator had not been specified with the original valve design. Discussions with the solenoid manufacturer indicate that this

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condition could prevent the solenoid from operating properly. To correct this deficiency, a filter type pressure regulator will be installed to ensure that clean air at the correct pressure is supplied to the solenoid valve.

Measures to remove desiccant from the instrument air header and air supply lines are still in progress. Corrective action will include verification that each air operated safety related valve functions properly and that solenoids for these valves are operating with the correct air pressure. All corrective actions will be completed during the present refueling outage.

At the time of the CV-537 failure the reactor shutdown margin was greater than 10% AK/K with all control rods inserted. During these conditions containment integrity is not required. There was no degradation of plant safety as a result of this event.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me.

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H. L. Ottoson Manager of Nuclear Operations

Attachment: Licensee Event Report 80-032

cc: Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation (30) Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3) Director, Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (1)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC FORM 366 (7.77) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: ┛ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) **]** (5) ASO 0 CON'T
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0 1 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) 0 2 | During cold shutdown conditions with the shutdown margin greater than 10% $\Delta K/K$, | CV-537, isolation valve for service water to containment, failed to close upon de-03 | mand. Containment integrity was not required at the time of this event. There was 04 | no degradation of plant safety as a result of this event. This report is per Tech-0 5 nical Specification 6.9.2(b). Reference LER 80-003. 06 07 0 8 COMP SYSTEM CODE CAUSE SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE CODE |L |V |O |P |(14) | Z | (16) | E |(12) | X | (13) ۱V F (15) S D (11 А 18 19 REVISION OCCURRENCE SEQUENTIAL REPORT REPORT NO CODE EVENT YEAR TYPE LER/RO Ŏ 01 3 0 | 3 | 2 \mathbf{L} (17) REPORT 8 0 NUMBER 30 28 22 NPRD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER ACTION FUTURE EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED COMPONENT HOURS (22) MANUFACTURER 9 (26) (21) **Y** (23)](24) (25) 9 9 (18) X (20) 0 Ω 0 N 7. CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) 10 During removal of air dryer desiccant from instrument air header a small amount of desiccant entered the solenoid and prevented solenoid operation. Investigation 1 1 also revealed that a pressure regulator for solenoid supply had not been specified 1 2 in the original valve design. A filter type pressure regulator will be installed 1 3 4 to prevent a recurrence of this event. 80 9 METHOD OF DISCOVERY FACILITY OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) % POWER _(28) 5 B (31) Valve failed to close H 80 9 10 ACTIVITY CONTENT LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) RELEASED_OF RELEASE _] 33 LZ 34) N<u>.</u>A N.A 10 45 44 11 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (39) NUMBER TYPE <u>Z</u> (38) 0[37] 7 01 0 N.A 11 12 PERSONNEL INJURIES 80 DESCRIPTION (41) NUMBER <u>0</u>(40) 8 01 N.A. 11 12 80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)DESCRIPTION Z (42) 9 N.A. 10 80 PUBLICITY NRC USE ONLY DESCRIPTION (45) 917-92 2 0 N.A. 69 80 68 (714) 492-7700 J. M. Curran PHONE: NAME OF PREPARER