

Southern California Edison Company

P O BOX 800
2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE
ROSEMEAD, CALIFORNIA 91770

August 18, 1980

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region V
Suite 202, Walnut Creek Plaza
1990 North California Boulevard
Walnut Creek, California 94596

Attention: Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director

Docket No. 50-206
San Onofre Unit 1

Dear Sir:

This letter describes a reportable occurrence involving the failure of a containment isolation valve to close on demand. Submittal is in accordance with the reporting requirements stipulated in Section 6.9.2.b of Appendix A to our Provisional Operating License DPR-13.

On July 17, 1980 it was noted by operations personnel that containment isolation valve CV-537, service water to containment, was stuck in the mid open position. Attempts to close the valve utilizing the containment isolation panel switch were unsuccessful. An investigation revealed that desiccant from the air dryers had entered the solenoid valve core and prevented it from operating. The solenoid core was thoroughly cleaned and returned to service. An identical failure of this valve was previously reported in LER 80-003.

The failure of the solenoid valve occurred while a blowdown of the instrument air header was in progress. This blowdown was conducted as a corrective measure to remove air dryer desiccant from the air header. A small amount of the desiccant had apparently entered the solenoid air supply line as it was blown past the supply line connection.

Further investigation revealed that the pressure in the air supply header was higher than the maximum design operating pressure of the solenoid. A discussion with the valve manufacturer indicated that a pressure regulator had not been specified with the original valve design. Discussions with the solenoid manufacturer indicate that this

8008250 643

S

A002
S/11


condition could prevent the solenoid from operating properly. To correct this deficiency, a filter type pressure regulator will be installed to ensure that clean air at the correct pressure is supplied to the solenoid valve.

Measures to remove desiccant from the instrument air header and air supply lines are still in progress. Corrective action will include verification that each air operated safety related valve functions properly and that solenoids for these valves are operating with the correct air pressure. All corrective actions will be completed during the present refueling outage.

At the time of the CV-537 failure the reactor shutdown margin was greater than 10% $\Delta K/K$ with all control rods inserted. During these conditions containment integrity is not required. There was no degradation of plant safety as a result of this event.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me.

Sincerely,



H. L. Ottoson

Manager of Nuclear Operations

Attachment: Licensee Event Report 80-032

cc: Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation (30)
Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3)
Director, Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (1)

