

Southern California Edison Company



P.O. BOX 800
2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE
ROSEMEAD, CALIFORNIA 91770

May 5, 1980

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region V
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Suite 202, Walnut Creek Plaza
1990 North California Boulevard
Walnut Creek, California 94596

Attention: Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director

Dear Sir:

DOCKET No. 50-206
SAN ONOFRE UNIT 1

By letter dated April 22, 1980, we provided prompt notification of a loss of all AC power to the site. For a four minute period on April 22, 1980, AC power was not provided to equipment required to be operable by Technical Specifications. This letter constitutes a follow-up report in accordance with the provisions of Section 6.9.2.a of Appendix A to the Provisional Operating License No. DPR-13.

On April 22, 1980 with the unit in cold shutdown for refueling, AC power was supplied to the site through one 220 KV switchyard PCB to auxiliary transformers A & B. Auxiliary transformer C and the No. 1 Diesel Generator were out of service for maintenance. Both Safeguard Load Sequencing Systems (SLSS) were also out of service for maintenance. This combination of power sources and equipment outages is permitted by the Technical Specifications.


At 1107, a test technician performing routine auxiliary transformer C relay testing failed to block open a set of relay contacts which subsequently tripped the 220KV PCB supplying power to auxiliary transformers A & B resulting in a loss of power to all 4KV and 480V buses. The inservice Diesel Generator (No. 2) was manually started by the control room operator; however, the diesel generator was not loaded to the bus as the control room restored offsite power at 1111. The 220 KV supply PCB to auxiliary transformers A & B was reclosed after verifying that the loss of power was not due to equipment malfunction.

A002
S
111

During this four minute period, no power was available to the operable CVCS charging pump, residual heat removal pumps, component cooling water pumps, and salt water cooling pumps. However, no significant temperature increases were noted in any of these systems during the loss of power. Furthermore, the operable diesel generator (No. 2) was manually started and ready to load should offsite power not have been restored. Following the event, your letter of April 23, 1980 to Dr. L. T. Papay set forth conditions on the availability of on-site and offsite power sources. These conditions have been implemented in changes to our operating instructions. In addition, a request to revise the Technical Specifications to incorporate the conditions will be submitted by September 1, 1980.

This event was the result of an error by a qualified, experienced technician. The event has been reviewed with the test technicians on-site to preclude recurrence. Should you have any questions regarding this event, please contact me.

Sincerely,



H. L. Ottoson
Manager of Nuclear Operations

Attachment: Licensee Event Report 80-013

cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30)
Director, Office of Management Information & Program Control (3)
Director, Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (1)