

Southern California Edison Company

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

P. O. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92674-0128

R. W. KRIEGER
STATION MANAGER

TELEPHONE
(714) 368-6255

February 6, 1991

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-206
30-Day Report
Licensee Event Report No. 91-001
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(d), this submittal provides the required 30-day written Licensee Event Report (LER) for an occurrence involving the incorrect coupling of a containment spray flow limiter valve actuator. Our investigation into the safety significance of this event is continuing. The results of this investigation, including the root cause and corrective actions to prevent recurrence, will be provided in a supplement to this LER. Neither the health nor the safety of plant personnel or the public was affected by this occurrence.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,



cc: C. W. Caldwell (USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)
J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, USNRC Region V)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Facility Name (1) SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1					Docket Number (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 0 6					Page (3) 1 of 0 1		
Title (4) Containment Spray Flow Limiter Valve Actuator Incorrectly Coupled												

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
Month	Day	Year	Year	/// Sequential Number	/// Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names		Docket Number(s)
0	1	0	7	9	1	9	1	9	NONE		0 5 0 0 0
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OPERATING MODE (9) 6		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)																			
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(a)(1)(i)	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	20.405(a)(1)(v)	20.405(c)	50.36(c)(1)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	73.71(b)	73.71(c)	Other (Specify in Abstract below and in text)
										X											
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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)											
Name R. W. Krieger, Station Manager								TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 7 1 4 3 6 8 - 6 2 5 5			

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	//////	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	//////
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)								Expected Submission Date (15)	Month	Day	Year
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input type="checkbox"/> NO									0	2	1
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)											

On 12/23/90, with Unit 1 in Mode 6, an evaluation of the performance of a Refueling Water Pump (RWP) (which provides containment spray) full flow Inservice Test (IST) revealed that position indication for flow restricting ball valve CV-518 was reversed (i.e., the valve indicated open when in the closed position and vice versa). This dual function valve is designed to open to increase flow to the containment spray header during Loss of Coolant (LOCA) and Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) accidents, and close to reduce flow during recirculation. On 1/7/91, following investigation and analysis, it was determined that this condition existed during plant operation, and would have affected the response of the Containment Spray System (CSS) and the Containment Recirculation System (CRS) to a LOCA or MSLB inside containment.

During a February 1989 maintenance activity in which the actuator was removed from the valve, the position of the valve was improperly changed resulting in misalignment of the valve and actuator when the actuator was reinstalled. The cause of this event included procedural deficiencies, maintenance implementation deficiencies, deficient design characteristics, and a missed opportunity to identify the misaligned valve. Corrective actions to prevent recurrence include: procedural reviews and changes, training, and design changes.

SCE's assessment of the safety significance of this event is currently being completed and will be included in the supplemental report scheduled for submittal by 2/11/91.