



**Southern California Edison Company**

P. O. BOX 800

2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE

ROSEMEAD, CALIFORNIA 91770

M. O. MEDFORD  
MANAGER OF NUCLEAR ENGINEERING  
AND LICENSING

TELEPHONE  
(818) 302-1749

August 31, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attention: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Subject: Docket No. 50-206  
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station  
Unit 1

By letter dated April 5, 1988, SCE committed to provide the design description for the modification of refueling water storage tank isolation valve MOV-883. Accordingly, the design description is provided as an enclosure to this letter. This modification will resolve the single failure susceptibility identified in Licensee Event Report No. 87-015, Revision 1, dated May 17, 1988 and is scheduled to be implemented in the upcoming refueling outage.

If you have any questions or require additional information on this subject, please contact me.

Very truly yours,

Enclosure

cc: J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator, NRC Region V  
F. R. Huey, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 1, 2 and 3

8809020259 880831  
PDR ADOCK 05000206  
P PNU

*Accol*  
*11*

Cycle X Modification  
Design Descriptions  
For  
RWST Isolation Valve  
MOV-883  
San Onofre Unit 1

Introduction

By Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 87-015 Revision 1, dated May 17, 1988, SCE identified a single failure susceptibility of the containment spray system. This susceptibility involves inadvertant closure of MOV-883 which would result in loss of the suction path from the refueling water storage tank to the containment spray system. This susceptibility was discovered during SCE's recent review of the environmental qualification for 480V MCC-3 located in the south end of the turbine building. The failure of this valve was previously identified in the 1976 Emergency Core Cooling System Single Failure Analysis and a modification to lock out control power was implemented. During the environmental qualification review, the control power lockout design was reviewed again and modified single failure criteria was applied. SCE identified a new failure mechanism which involved spurious closure of the motor controller contacts. Since motive power is not locked out, this new failure mechanism could result in the inadvertant closing of the valve. The modification to correct the newly identified single failure susceptibility of MOV-883 is provided below.

RWST Isolation Valve MOV-883

- 1) Add a second set of relays and contacts in series with the existing valve closing circuitry. This change will prevent a single failure of the existing closing relay and contacts from causing MOV-883 to inadvertently close.
- 2) The added relay and contacts will be located in the same breaker enclosure as the existing relay in MCC-3.
- 3) All work will be classified Safety-Related Seismic Category A.