



Southern California Edison Company

P. O. BOX 800
2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE
ROSEMEAD, CALIFORNIA 91770

M. O. MEDFORD
MANAGER OF NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
AND LICENSING

TELEPHONE
(818) 302-1749

April 26, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Subject: Docket No. 50-206
Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
Unit 1

By letters dated March 30, 1988 and April 1, 1988 SCE indicated that a comprehensive program was being initiated to address the issue of 10 CFR 50.49(b)(2) equipment environmental qualification. Subsequent to submittal of those letters SCE has decided to perform this program on an accelerated schedule prior to Unit 1 restart. The program is expected to be complete by May 10, 1988.

The objective of the (b)(2) evaluation process is to identify and resolve potential electrical interactions between environmentally qualified (b)(1) equipment and non-qualified equipment located in a harsh environment. Potential (b)(2) items are identified by first identifying all non-qualified equipment connected to the electric power supply circuit for a qualified (b)(1) item. Potential (b)(2) items are defined as those items connected to the (b)(1) circuit which are located in a harsh post-accident environment and, whose failure could impact operation of the associated (b)(1) device(s) under postulated harsh accident conditions.

Once identified, such potential (b)(2) items will be resolved through an appropriate method of electrical isolation, to prevent impact on the (b)(1) function. Potential options may include fuse isolation, relocation of the (b)(2) device to another circuit or environmental qualification of the (b)(2) device. In order to verify the adequacy of both the existing and to-be-added isolation devices, a fuse-breaker coordination analysis will be performed. This analysis will verify that the characteristics of any isolation device

8805030188 880426
PDR ADOCK 05000206
P PDR

A048
110

April 26, 1988

credited for (b)(2) isolation are such that failure of a (b)(2) device will not disrupt power to the associated (b)(1) equipment.

As stated in our prior correspondence on this subject, any (b)(2) interactions identified will be dispositioned in accordance with the NRC's regulations.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please let me know.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "M. E. Medford".

cc: J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator, NRC Region V
F. R. Huey, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 1, 2 and 3