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October 31, 1986

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: G. E. Lear, Director
PWR Project Directorate No. 1
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Subject: Docket No. 50-206
Transamerica Delaval, Inc. (TDI) Diesel Generators
Recent 10 CFR 21 Reports from TDI
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
Unit 1

- References:
- (A) Letter J. A. Zwolinski (NRC) to K. P. Baskin (SCE), dated June 17, 1985 Transamerica Delaval, Inc. (TDI) Diesel Generators-Recent 10CFR Part 21 Reports from TDI
 - (B) Letter M. O. Medford (SCE) to J. A. Zwolinski (NRC), dated August 14, 1985, Transamerica Delaval, Inc. (TDI) Diesel Generators Recent 10CFR21 Reports from TDI

By Reference (A) you requested Southern California Edison (SCE) to identify 10 CFR Part 21 reports issued by TDI since April 1984 which concerned problems potentially applicable to San Onofre Unit 1, but which were not addressed in the DR/QR report for Unit 1. You also requested that SCE describe actions taken to assess whether these potential problems exist at San Onofre Unit 1, causes of any such problems, short and long term corrective actions to be taken and implementation schedules. By Reference (B), SCE provided this information to you.

As further requested by Reference (A), our Reference (B) letter provided a commitment to update the above information regarding any subsequent TDI 10 CFR Part 21 reports, pending issuance of the NRC's safety evaluation

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Add:	IE/DEPER/EAG	1	1
	IE/DQAVT/VPB	1	1
	NRR PWR-A AOTS	1	1
	NRR/DSDR DIR	1	1


Mr. G. E. Lear .

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for the San Onofre Unit 1 diesel generators. Accordingly, enclosed is information describing SCE's actions relative to TDI 10 CFR Part 21 notifications that were issued between August 1, 1985 and August 30, 1986.

If you have any questions, please let me know.

Very truly yours,



Enclosure

cc: R. F. Dudley, NRC Project Manager, San Onofre Unit 1
F. R. Huey, Senior NRC Site Inspector, San Onofre

TABLE SHOWING SCE'S ACTIONS RELATIVE TO TDI 10 CFR 21 REPORTS

(a) DATE OF 10CFR21 REPORT	(b) POTENTIAL PROBLEM, CAUSES & TDI'S RECOMMENDATION	(c) SCE'S ACTIONS TO ASSESS IF POTENTIAL PROBLEM EXISTS AT SAN ONOFRE UNIT 1	(d) SHORT & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS	(e) IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULES
11/1/85	<p>A potential problem exists with American Air Filter (AAF) Model TDM and FTDM intake silencers, as reported in AAF to NRC letter dated 9/3/85. It is remotely possible that the intake silencer has an internal part not welded in place. If the part is not welded in place as required by the design, it is possible for it to be ingested into the engine upon startup. AAF recommended physical inspection of the silencers to verify that both end caps of the centerline "bullet" of the silencer are properly welded on to the cylindrical section.</p>	<p>On 12/10/85, subject welds were inspected on DG#1. All welds were satisfactory. On 4/12/86, subject welds were inspected on DG#2. All welds were satisfactory.</p>	NONE	N/A
11/6/85	<p>A potential problem exists with the engine's intake and exhaust valve springs which could result in engine non-availability. The valve springs are manufactured by Betts Spring Co. and are identified by a white stripe painted on the spring. On one ship, eleven springs failed within a short time. Failure was after 5,000 to 7,000 operating hours. Preliminary indications revealed material impurities, draw marks from the manufacturing process and incomplete shot peening. TDI requested all users to inspect their engines for broken springs.</p>	<p>On 12/2/85 all springs on DG#1 were inspected for color code, cracked or broken springs and shot peening uniformity. All springs had white stripes. All springs were satisfactory. On 3/11/86 all springs on DG#2 were inspected for color code, cracked or broken springs and shot peening uniformity. All springs had white stripes. All springs were satisfactory.</p>	<p>Short Term: None Long Term: Selectively replace Betts springs with qualified replacement springs.</p>	<p>Minimum of 25% spring change out on each engine at the next refueling outage. Remaining springs to be changed at subsequent refueling intervals. NOTE: If engine Group I heads are replaced with Group III heads, the springs in the Group III heads will be new and qualified for nuclear service.</p>

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(a) DATE OF 10CFR21 REPORT	(b) POTENTIAL PROBLEM, CAUSES & TDI'S RECOMMENDATION	(c) SCE'S ACTIONS TO ASSESS IF POTENTIAL PROBLEM EXISTS AT SAN ONOFRE UNIT 1.	(d) SHORT & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS	(e) IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULES
3/10/86	A potential problem could exist with the Lube Oil (LO) Sump Tank Foot Valve. At Carolina Power and Light's Shearon Harris plant, the elastomer liner in the foot valve mounted in the LO Sump Tank was found in pieces. TDI recommended that all affected utilities inspect the condition of the foot valve liners.	San Onofre Unit 1 was erroneously placed on TDI's list of affected nuclear sites. By notification dated 5/8/86, TDI informed the NRC of this error.	Based on significant design differences between the diesel generator lube oil system in use at Shearon Harris and that at San Onofre Unit 1, the potential problem identified in the notification has been determined to be not applicable to San Onofre Unit 1.	N/A
7/2/86	A potential problem exists with the fastening of the engine's connecting rod assembly, which could result in engine non-availability. In two separate ship propulsion applications, rod assemblies were found cracked after 13,000 hours and 21,800 hours of operation. TDI investigations revealed that the connecting rod cracking was caused by insufficient clamping force applied through the rod bolting. On 8/13/86, TDI issued inspection procedures for connecting rod washer replacement and connecting rod bolt inspection, repair and reinstallation. TDI recommended that these procedures be implemented at the next scheduled connecting rod inspection.	In May 1986 SCE completed connecting rod inspections recommended by the DRQR report. All connecting rod fasteners were torqued to TDI specifications and the torque verified by SCE and by Failure Analysis Associates using ultrasonic method.	Short Term: None Long Term: Per TDI inspection procedures dated 8/13/86, i) Change out all connecting rod washers to new style electroless nickle plated washers (P/N R-1317) ii) Inspect connecting rod bolts, repair or replace as necessary and then reinstall.	At next connecting rod inspection, which is scheduled to take place at Cycle X refueling outage.