

Southern California Edison Company

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January 28, 1980

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region V
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Suite 202, Walnut Creek Plaza
1990 North California Boulevard
Walnut Creek, California 94596

Attention: Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director

Dear Sir:

Docket No. 50-206
San Onofre Unit 1

By letter dated January 18, 1980, we provided prompt notification of a unit trip caused by a construction worker making contact with a reactor protective system auxiliary relay. This letter constitutes a follow-up report in accordance with the provisions of Section 6.9.2.a(7) of Appendix A to the Provisional Operating License No. DPR-13. The description of the subsequent reactor coolant pump 'A' insulation fire is provided for your information and use.

With the unit at 100% power at 1219 on January 16, 1980, a construction worker bumped an auxiliary relay located behind the north vertical board of the control room. This relay picked up and closed the east feedwater pump discharge valve HV-852A. Feedwater flow decreased rapidly and resulted in a reactor/turbine trip from steam flow/feedwater flow mismatch.

Construction work in progress at that time in the control room and behind the vertical board included installing flame barriers (for the Fire Protection Project) and auxiliary feedwater controls and instrumentation (for the TMI Project). Protective barriers over exposed control and instrumentation components had been provided for these projects; however, to gain access to the north vertical board for TMI project work, one of the protective barriers had been removed.

After the incident, all construction work in the control room area was suspended until Monday, January 21 to permit station personnel to assess the significance of this event and means to prevent its recurrence.

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Further work is now allowed only when the station staff is satisfied that all prudent precautions have been taken by the work force. At a minimum, these precautions include limiting the "work force" size on any one activity, requiring physical separation between any adjacent activities, limiting the size of the overall work force in the control room area, and tailboarding new activities with station operating supervision.

Later in the day of the event, while the reactor was in hot shutdown preparatory to returning to service, maintenance workers inspecting reactor coolant pump motors inside containment notified the control room at 1452 of light smoke and a smoldering fire in the thermal insulation of reactor coolant pump 'A'. The station fire brigade was dispatched immediately by the control operator. The fire was extinguished with portable fire extinguishers and all affected insulation removed from the pump by 1520.

The cause of the fire was determined to be oil leakage from the reactor coolant pump motor oil lift pump filter. The leaking oil had collected in the pump insulation and was ignited by the hot pump casing. All contaminated pump insulation (approximately 10 square feet) was removed and the pump re-insulated. The leaking oil lift pump filter housing was replaced. As a precaution, similar filter housings on 'B' and 'C' reactor coolant pump motors were also replaced.

There was no loss of any safety systems as a result of either of these events; therefore, there was no degradation of plant safety. Should you have any questions regarding these events, please contact me.

Sincerely,



H. L. Ottoson
Manager, Nuclear Generation

Attachment: Licensee Event Report 80-02

cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (40)
~~Director~~, Office of Management Information & Program Control (3)
Director, Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (1)