UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY AND

SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-206

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 64
License No. DPR-13

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Southern California Edison Company and San Diego Gas and Electric Company (the licensees) dated December 8, 1981, Proposed Change Nos. 106 and 107; Amendment Application No. 101, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public; and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 3.B of Provisional Operating License No. DPR-13 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   B. Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 64 , are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern California Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Dennis M. Crutchfield

Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #5
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: October 6, 1982

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 64

PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-13

DOCKET NO. 50-206

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications and Bases by removing the following pages and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Pages	Insert Pages
7	7
7a	7a
7b	7b*
84	84

*This page is merely included for pagination purposes; there are no changes to the provisions contained thereon.

3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION (GENERAL)

Applicability: Applies to the operational requirements to be implemented when specific actions are not identified within individual Limiting Conditions for Operation.

Objective: To ensure that the station is placed in a safe condition when circumstances arise which are not identified within individual Limiting Conditions for Operation.

Specification:

A. When a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met, except as provided in the associated ACTION requirements, within one hour action shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in which the Specification does not apply by placing it, as applicable, in:

1. At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours,
2. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, and
3. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours.

Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation under the ACTION requirements, the ACTION may be taken in accordance with the specified time limits as measured from the time of failure to meet the Limiting Condition for Operation. Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual Specifications.

B. When a system, subsystem, train, component or device is determined to be inoperable solely because its emergency power source is inoperable, or solely because its normal power source is inoperable, it may be considered OPERABLE for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of its applicable Limiting Condition for Operation, provided: (1) its corresponding normal or emergency power source is OPERABLE; and (2) all of its redundant system(s), subsystem(s), train(s), component(s), and device(s) are OPERABLE, or likewise satisfy the requirements of this specification. Unless both conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied, within 2 hours action shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in which the applicable Limiting Condition for Operation does not apply by placing it as applicable in:

1. At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours,
2. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, and
3. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours.

This Specification is not applicable in MODES 5 or 6.

Basis: Specification A delineates the action to be taken for circumstances not directly provided for in the Action statements and whose occurrence would violate the intent of

the specification. For example, Technical Specification 3.3 requires in part that two recirculation pumps be Operable in order for the reactor to be made or maintained critical and provides explicit action requirements if one recirculation pump is inoperable. Under the terms of Specification A, if more than one recirculation pump is inoperable, action shall be initiated within one hour to place the unit in at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours, at least Hot Shutdown within the following 6 hours and in at least Cold Shutdown withing the following 24 hours unless corrective measures are completed. It is assumed that the unit is brought to the required mode of operation within the required times by promptly initiating and carrying out the appropriate action statement.

Specification B delineates what additional conditions must be satisfied to permit operation to continue, consistent with the Action statements for power sources, when a normal or emergency power source is not Operable. It specifically prohibits operation when one division is inoperable because its normal or emergency power source is inoperable and a system, subsystem, train, component, or device in another division is inoperable for another reason.

The provisions of this specification permit the Action statements associated with individual systems, subsystems, trains, components, or devices to be consistent with the Action statements of the associated electrical power source. It allows operation to be governed by the time limits of the Action statement associated with the Limiting Condition for Operation for the normal or emergency power souce, not the individual Action statements for each system, subsystem, train, component or device that is determined to be inoperable solely because of the inoperability of its normal or emergency power source.

For example, Specification 3.7 requires that two emergency diesel generators be Operable. The Action statement provides for a 72 hour out-of-service time when one emergency diesel generator is not Operable. If the definition of Operable were applied without consideration of Specification B, all systems, subsystems, train components and devices supplied by the inoperable emergency power source would also be inoperable. This would dictate invoking the applicable Action statements for each of the applicable Limiting Conditions for Operation. However, the provisions of Specification B permit the time limits for continued operation to be consistent with the Action statement for the inoperable emergency diesel generator instead, provided the other specified conditions are satisfied. In this case, this would mean that the corresponding normal power source must be Operable, and all redundant systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices must be Operable, or otherwise satisfy Specification B (i e., be capable of performing their design function and have at least one normal or one emergency power source Operable). If they are not satisfied, shutdown is required in accordance with this specification.

As a further example, Specification 3.7 requires in part that two physically independent offsite power lines be Operable. The Action statement provides a 24 hour out-of-service time when both required offsite power lines are not Operable. If the definition of Operable were applied without consideration of Specification B, all systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices supplied by the inoperable normal power sources, both of the offsite power lines, would also be inoperable. This would dictate invoking the applicable Action statements for each of the applicable LCOs. However, the provisions of Specification B permit the time limits for continued operation to be consistent with the Action statement for the inoperable normal power sources instead, provided the other specified conditions are satisfied. In this case, this would mean that for one division, the emergency power source must be Operable (as must be the components supplied by the emergency power source) and all redundant systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices in Specification B (i.e., be capable of performing their design functions and have an emergency power source Operable). In other words, both emergency power sources must be Operable and all redundant systems, subsystems, train, components and devices in both divisions must also be Operable. If these conditions are not satisfied, shutdown is required in accordance with this specification.

In the Cold Shutdown or Refueling modes of operation, Specification B is not applicable, and thus the individual Action statements for each applicable Limiting Condition for Operation in these modes of operation must be adhered to.

(4) Reactivity anomalies involving disagreement with the predicted value of reactivity balance under steady state conditions greater than or equal to 1% (delta k)/k; a calculated reactivity balance indicating a shutdown margin less conservative than specified in the technical specifications; short-term reactivity increases that correspond to a reactor period of less than 5 seconds or, if subcritical, an unplanned reactivity insertion of more than 0.5% (delta k)/k; or occurrence of any unplanned criticality.

(5) Failure or malfunction of one or more components which prevents or could prevent, by itself, the fulfillment of the functional requirements of system(s) used to cope with accidents analyzed in the SAR.

(6) Personnel error or procedural inadequacy which prevents or could prevent, by itself, the fulfillment of the functional requirements of systems required to cope with accidents analyzed in the SAR.

Note: For items 6.9.2.a.(5) and 6.9.2.a.(6) reduced redundancy that does not result in a loss of system function need not be reported under this section but may be reportable under items 6.9.2.b.(2) and 6.9.2.b.(3).below.

(7) Conditions arising from natural or man-made events that, as a direct result of the event require plant shutdown, operation of safety systems, or other protective measures required by technical specifications.

(8) Errors discovered in the transient or accident analyses or in the methods used for such analyses as described in the safety analysis report or in the bases for the technical specifications that have or could have permitted reactor operation in a manner less conservative than assumed in the analyses.

(9) Performance of structures, systems, or components that requires remedial action or corrective measures to prevent operation in a manner less conservative than assumed in the accident analyses in the safety analysis report or technical specifications bases; or discovery during plant life of conditions not specifically considered in the safety analysis report or technical specifications that require remedial action or corrective measures to prevent the existence or development of an unsafe condition.