



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY

SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-206

AMENDMENT TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 58
License No. DPR-13

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Southern California Edison Company and San Diego Gas and Electric Company (the licensees) dated May 7, 1981, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 3.B of Provisional Operating License No. DPR-13 is hereby amended to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 58, are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern California Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective 30 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

for *Thomas V. Wambach*
Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #5
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: November 6, 1981

Table 4.1.1 (cont'd)

No.	Channels	Action	Minimum Frequency
14.	Residual Heat Pump Flow	Calibration	At each refueling shutdown
15.	Refueling Tank Level	Calibration Test	At each refueling shutdown Once per month during operation
16.	Volume Control Tank Level	Calibration Test	At each refueling shutdown Once per month during operation
17.	Deleted		
18.	Area Radiation Monitors	Calibration Test	Once per month Once per day
19.	Hydrazine Tank Level	Calibration Test	At each refueling shutdown One per month during operation

3.5.5 Containment Isolation Instrumentation

Applicability: Applies to instrumentation which actuates the containment sphere isolation valves, containment sphere purge and exhaust valves, and containment sphere instrumentation vent header valves.

Objective: To ensure reliability of the containment sphere isolation provisions.

- Specification:
- A. The instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.5.5-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.5.5-2.
 - B. With an instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the Allowable Values column of Table 3.5.5-2, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable Action requirement of Table 3.5.5-1 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint Value.
 - C. With an instrumentation channel inoperable, take the action shown in Table 3.5.5-1.

Basis: The operability of these instrumentation systems ensure that 1) the associated action will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters.

The operability of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy, and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

References: (1) NRC letter dated July 2, 1980, from D. G. Eisenhut to all pressurized water reactor licensees.

TABLE 3.5.1
INSTRUMENT OPERATING CONDITIONS

Functional Unit	COLUMN I Minimum Operational Channels	COLUMN II Minimum Redundancy^a Required	COLUMN III Required Operating Action if Column I or Column II Cannot be Met
1. Nuclear Power-Critical	3	For 3-Channel Operation --1 For 4 Channel Operation --2	Maintain hotstandby conditions.
-Subcritical	3	1	Maintain hot standby if at least one source and one intermediate channel are available; otherwise maintain 10% Δk/k shutdown margin.
2. Pressurizer Variable Low Pressure	2	1	Maintain load below 10% F. P.
3. Pressurizer Fixed High Pressure	2	1	Maintain hot standby conditions.
4. Pressurizer High Level	2	1	Maintain hot standby conditions.
5. Reactor Coolant Flow -- 3-Loop Operation	3	100/2000	Maintain load below 10% F. P.
6. Deleted.			

^a Redundancy is defined as $N-M$, where N is the number of channels in operation, and M is the number of channels in operation which, when tripped, will cause an automatic shutdown.

^{aa} For operation at <50% of full power

^{aaa} For operation at >50% of full power.

TABLE 3.5.1 (continued)

INSTRUMENT OPERATING CONDITIONS

Functional Unit	COLUMN I Minimum Operational Channels	COLUMN II Minimum Redundancy ^a Required	COLUMN III Required Operating Action if Column I or Column II Cannot be Met
7. Deleted.			
8. Manual Trip	1		Maintain hotstandby conditions.
9. Deleted.			
10. Steam Feed-Water Flow Mismatch	3	1	Operator shall assume continuous surveillance and actuate manual scram if required.

^a Redundancy is defined as $N-M$ where N is the number of channels in operation, and M is the number of channels in operation which, when tripped, will cause an automatic shutdown.

TABLE 3.5.5-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

ACTION STATEMENTS

ACTION A - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.1.4.

ACTION B - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour.

ACTION C - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, operation may continue provided the containment purge and exhaust valves (POV-9 & POV-10) are maintained closed.

ACTION D - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

3.1.5 Pressurizer Relief Valves

Applicability: Applies to the power operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves for MODES 1, 2 and 3.

Objective: To ensure reliability of the PORVs and block valves.

Specification:

- A. Two PORVs and their associated block valves shall be OPERABLE.
- B. With one or more PORV(s) inoperable, within 1 hour either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve(s) and remove power from the block valve(s); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- C. With one or more block valve(s) inoperable, within 1 hour either restore the block valve(s) to OPERABLE status or close the block valve(s) and remove power from the block valve(s); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

Basis: The power operated relief valves (PORVs) operate to relieve RCS pressure below the setting of the pressurizer code safety valves. These relief valves have remotely operated block valves to provide a positive shutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable. The air supply for both the relief valves and the block valves is capable of being supplied from a backup passive nitrogen source to ensure the ability to seal this possible RCS leakage path.

References: (1) NRC letter dated July 2, 1980, from D. G. Eisenhut to all pressurized water reactor licensees.

TABLE 1.1

FREQUENCY NOTATION

<u>NOTATION</u>	<u>FREQUENCY(1)</u>
S	At least once per 12 hours.
D	At least once per 24 hours.
W	At least once per 7 days.
BW	At least once per 14 days.
M	At least once per 31 days.
Q	At least once per 92 days.
SA	At least once per 184 days.
R	At least once per 18 months.
S/U	Prior to each reactor startup.
P	Completed prior to each release.
N.A.	Not applicable.

(1) For each frequency, the allowable extension is 25%. The total allowable extension for three consecutive frequency intervals is 3.25 times the interval.

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 58

PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-13

DOCKET NO. 50-206

Revised Appendix A Technical Specifications and Bases by removing the following pages and by inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages contain the captioned amendment number and marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

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29
30
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34
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42
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47
48
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71
72a
88

[89 (currently unnumbered
and contains Section 6.12)]

INSERT

1b
18a
18b
29
30
33j - 33r
34
35a - 35c
42
44b*
44c - 44k
47
48
51a - 51c
71
72a
88**
89

*Merely reserves Section 4.1.3 for Technical Specifications which remain under review.

**There are no changes to the provisions contained on this page; it is merely included for the purpose of reformatting (Section 6.12).

3.1.6 Pressurizer

Applicability: Applies to the pressurizer heaters and pressurizer water level for MODES 1, 2 and 3.

Objective: To ensure that pressurizer heaters are available during a loss of offsite power condition.

Specification:

- A. The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with at least 125 kilowatts of pressurizer heaters and a water level between 5 percent and 70 percent.
- B. With the pressurizer inoperable due to the loss of capability to energize the pressurizer heaters from an emergency diesel generator, either restore the capability to energize the pressurizer heaters from an emergency diesel generator within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours. With the pressurizer otherwise inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY with the reactor trip breakers open within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

Basis: The requirement that 125 kw of pressurizer heaters and their associated controls be capable of being supplied electrical power from an emergency diesel generator provides assurance that these heaters can be energized during a loss of offsite power condition to maintain natural circulation at HOT STANDBY.

References:

- (1) NRC letter dated July 2, 1980, from D. G. Eisenhut to all pressurized water reactor licensees.
- (2) SCE letter dated October 17, 1979, from J. H. Drake to D. G. Eisenhut, "Responses to NRC Requirements Related to the Three Mile Island Accident," Item 2.1.1 of the enclosure.

3.6.3 Hydrogen Monitors and Hydrogen Recombiners

Applicability: Applies to containment sphere hydrogen monitors and hydrogen recombiners for MODES 1 and 2.

Objective: To ensure the capability to maintain the hydrogen concentration within the containment sphere below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions.

- Specification:
- A. Two independent containment hydrogen monitors shall be OPERABLE.
 - B. With one hydrogen monitor inoperable, restore the inoperable monitor to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.
 - C. Two independent containment hydrogen recombiner systems shall be OPERABLE.
 - D. With one hydrogen recombiner system inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

Basis:

The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit (or the purge system) is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with radiolytic decomposition of water and corrosion of metals within containment. (Cumulative operation of the purge system with the heaters on for 10 hours over a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters.) These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA," March 1971.

The hydrogen mixing systems are provided to ensure adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere following a LOCA. This mixing action will prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen from exceeding the flammable limit.

References:

- (1) Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA," March, 1971.

TABLE 3.5.5-1

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>CHANNELS TO TRIP</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>APPLICABLE MODES</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
<u>Containment Isolation</u> (Valves listed in Table 3.6.2-1)					
a) Manual	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	D
b) Containment Pressure-High	3/train	2/train	2/train	1, 2, 3	B
c) Sequencer Subchannels	2/sequencer	2/sequencer	2/sequencer	1, 2, 3, 4	A
d) Safety Injection					
1) Containment Pressure-High	3/train	2/train	2/train	1, 2, 3	B
2) Pressurizer Pressure-Low	3/train	2/train	2/train	1, 2, 3	B
<u>Purge and Exhaust Isolation</u> (POV-9, POV-10, CV-10, CV-40, CV-116)					
a) Manual	1	1	1	1, 2, 3, 4	C
b) Containment Radioactivity-High	1	1	1	1, 2, 3, 4	C

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TABLE 3.5.5-2

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SET POINTS

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TRIP SETPOINT</u>	<u>ALLOWABLE VALUES</u>
<u>Containment Isolation</u>		
a) Manual	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
b) Containment Pressure-High	≤ 1.4 psig	≤ 2.0 psig
c) Sequencer Subchannels	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
d) Safety Injection		
1) Containment Pressure-High	≤ 1.4 psig	≤ 2.0 psig
2) Pressurizer Pressure-Low	≥ 1685 psig	≥ 1675 psig
<u>Purge and Exhaust Isolation</u>		
a) Manual	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
b) Containment Radioactivity-High	≤ 2 x Background	≤ 2.5 x Background

3.5.6 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation

Applicability: Applies to the accident monitoring instruments shown in Table 3.5.6-1 for MODES 1, 2 and 3.

Objective: To ensure reliability of the accident monitoring instrumentation.

- Specification:
- A. The accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.5.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.
 - B. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the Total Number of Channels shown in Table 3.5.6-1, either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
 - C. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE requirements of Tabel 3.5.6-1, either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

Basis: The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables during and following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations."

References: (1) NRC letter dated July 2, 1980, from D. G. Eisenhut to all pressurized water reactor licensees.

3.6.2 Containment Isolation Valves

Applicability: Applies to the containment isolation valves listed in Table 3.6.2-1 for MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

Objective: To provide assurance that containment isolation will function when initiated by appropriate sensors.

Specification: A. The containment isolation valves specified in Table 3.6.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.

B. With one or more of the isolation valve(s) specified in Table 3.6.2-1 inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and either:

1. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or
2. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or
3. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange, or
4. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

Basis: The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment. Containment isolation ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

References: (1) NRC letter dated July 2, 1980, from D. G. Eisenhut to all pressurized water reactor licensees.

TABLE 3.5.6-1

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>
Pressurizer Water Level	3	2
Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Indication*	2 per steam generator	1 per steam generator
Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor	2	1
PORV Position Indicator (Limit Switch)	1/valve	1/valve
PORV Block Valve Position Indicator (Limit Switch)	1/valve	1/valve
Safety Valve Position Indicator (Limit Switch)	1/valve	1/valve

* Auxiliary feedwater flow indication for each steam generator is provided by one channel of steam generator level and one channel of auxiliary feedwater flow rate. These comprise the two channels of auxiliary feedwater flow indication for each steam generator.

3.5.7 Auxiliary Feedwater Instrumentation

Applicability: Applies to automatic initiation of the auxiliary feedwater pumps.

Objective: To ensure reliability of automatic initiation of the auxiliary feedwater pumps.

- Specification:
- A. The instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.5.7-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.5.7-2.
 - B. With an instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.5.7-2, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.5.7-1 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint Value.
 - C. With one instrumentation channel inoperable, take the action shown in Table 3.5.7-1.
 - D. With more than one channel inoperable, take ACTION G of Table 3.5.7-1.

Basis: The OPERABILITY of the auxiliary feedwater instrumentation ensures that 1) the associated action will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of this instrumentation is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy, and diversity assumed available for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The operation of this instrumentation is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

References: (1) NRC letter dated July 2, 1980, from D. G. Eisenhut to all pressurized water reactor licensees.