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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION V

Report No. 50-206/80-15

Docket No. 50-206 License No. DPR-13 Safeguards Group _____

Licensee: Southern California Edison Company
2244 Walnut Grove Avenue
Rosemead, California 91770

Facility Name: San Onofre Unit 1

Inspection at: Camp Pendleton, California

Inspection conducted: May 28-30, 1980

Inspectors: *R.C. Hagman* *June 20, 1980*
for D. P. Haist, Reactor Inspector Date Signed

Date Signed

Date Signed

Approved By: *R.C. Hagman* *June 20, 1980*
for R. T. Dodds, Chief, Engineering Support Section Date Signed

Summary:

Inspection on May 28-30, 1980 (Report No. 50-206/80-15)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of steam generator Eddy Current inspection activities associated with IE Bulletin 79-13, cracking in feedwater system piping and licensee action on outstanding items of noncompliance and unresolved items.

The inspection involved 18 inspector hours onsite by one NRC inspector.

Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

a. Southern California Edison (SCE)

- *R. R. Brunet, Superintendent
- *D. E. Nunn, Manager, Quality Assurance
- *J. D. Dunn, Project Quality Assurance Supervisor
- *G. W. McDonald, Quality Assurance/Quality Control Supervisor
- *B. L. Curtis, Engineering Supervisor
- *M. A. Wharton, Supervising Engineer
- *W. Frick, Nuclear Engineer
- M. P. Short, Nuclear Engineer

b. Westinghouse Electric Corporation

- H. Houserman, Refueling Coordinator
- P. Brennan, Supervisor, Eddy Current

In addition, Level I, II and III Westinghouse personnel and a Level II Zetec Corporation employee were contacted.

c. Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)

- C. Peltomaa, Superintendent
- J. Sherman, Quality Assurance
- R. Garcia, Lead Welding Field Engineer

*Denotes attendance at management interview on May 30, 1980.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

a. (Closed) Noncompliance (50-206/79-10/02) Weld Rod Control

During the feedwater piping system reducer modification in June, 1979 and during the auxiliary feedwater system modifications in January 1980, uncontrolled weld filler material was identified by the inspector.

The licensee's corrective action included proper disposal of all weld rod stubs and a search for and disposal of all uncontrolled weld filler metal. Bechtel Work Plan/Procedure 19.20 "Control of Welding Filler Metal" was revised to: (1) standardize the quantity of weld rod issued; (2) include a daily check of each Bechtel welder to ensure that the total of unused rods and stubs in the welder's possession is in agreement with the quantity issued; and (3) provide a check at the end of each shift or welding operation to assure that all weld rod stubs have been removed from the job. The inspector verified that the weld filler metal control procedure revisions have been incorporated and that craftsmen have received training on the revised procedure. The inspection verified that the filler metal accountability system is in place and operating. This item of noncompliance is considered closed.

b. (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-206/79-10/01) Safety related activities missing from special engineering procedure

The licensee had prepared a special engineering procedure (SPE-157) to control safety-related activities during replacement of the feedwater nozzle reducers. Various safety-related activities had not been included in the procedure. The inspector previously verified portions of the corrective action taken by the licensee (report No. 50-206/80-03). The licensee had committed to clearly define the responsibilities and modes of operation of quality control and quality assurance for the various station activities within 60 days.

The licensee clarified their commitment, stating that the definition of responsibilities for quality control and quality assurance for the April 1980 refueling outage activities would take place within 60 days. The inspector verified that this commitment was met. The licensee had prepared a matrix listing the work activity, the work responsibility, and the responsibility for quality control and quality assurance.

The licensee also produced documents which assign reviewing inspection responsibility to the quality assurance/quality control group for safety related components and which transfer the Construction and Material Inspection (CMI) nuclear quality control group to the quality assurance organization.

These measures improved separating of engineering and inspection responsibilities but do not formally result in use of the quality assurance organization for inspection of all safety related activities. The licensee expects these objectives to be formally realized within 60 days after startup following this refueling outage. In the interim, the licensee committed to maintain a inspection responsibility matrix similar to that prepared for the refueling outage for safety related activities. The area of quality control inspection responsibilities for safety related activities will be examined during a subsequent inspection. (50-206/80-15/01)

3. Followup on IE Bulletins

(Open) IE Bulletin 79-13 - 50-206/79-17/04 - Cracking in Feedwater System Piping

The inspector reviewed available radiographs of portions of the feedwater system that were required to be examined in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-13, including radiographs of the steam generator nozzle-to-reducer and reducer-to-pipe welds which were repaired in June 1979 (reference report No. 50-206/79-10). Radiographs of the following welds were reviewed:

<u>Weld No.</u>	<u>Description</u>
393-10	Steam Generator "A" - nozzle to reducer weld.
393-9	Steam Generator "A" - reducer to pipe weld.
392-14	Steam Generator "B" - nozzle to reducer weld.
392-13	Steam Generator "B" - reducer to pipe weld.
391-10	Steam Generator "C" nozzle to reducer weld.
391-9	Steam Generator "C" reducer to pipe weld.

These radiographs show no apparent deterioration of the welds installed in June 1979. The licensee's contractor Level III radiographer reviewed these radiographs against those taken in June 1979 and reported no changes.

Additionally, radiographs of welds 393-6 and 393-7 were reviewed. The radiograph of weld 393-6 revealed a 1/8 - inch long linear indication at the weld root and apparent incomplete penetration 3/4-inch long. The licensee promptly notified the NRC and will follow this with a Licensee Event Report. This item will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection. (50-206/80-15/02)

The inspector questioned the sensitivity of the radiographs since the 2T penetrometer hole was not visible. 2T sensitivity is required by IE Bulletin 79-13. The licensee apparently failed to communicate this information to the inspection contractor. The Level III radiographer feels that 2T sensitivity may exist at the weld; the penetrameters were placed to the edge of the film on the film side. The licensee will have radiographs taken to demonstrate that 2T sensitivity exists at the weld for each diameter and wall thickness of feedwater piping already radiographed. The licensee further stated that quality assurance procedures will be revised to require quality assurance review and acceptance of all safety-related nondestructive examination (NDE) records. The demonstration of 2T sensitivity on feedwater piping radiographs in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-13 and procedure revisions to require quality assurance review of NDE records will be reviewed during a future inspection. (50-206/80-15/03)

The inspector noted that the radiographic examination of the ten-inch feedwater pipe weld No. 392-13 was made with four exposures as required by the radiography procedure but that the examination of the ten-inch feedwater pipe weld No. 391-9 was made with only three exposures. The Level III radiographer stated that this was a procedure violation by his technicians of which he was aware. A new examination will be made using the correct four exposures. These radiographs will be examined during a future inspection. (50-206/80-15/04)

4. Inservice Inspection - Eddy Current Testing of Steam Generator Tubes

a. Review of Quality Assurance Implementing Procedures

The inspector reviewed the following Eddy Current testing procedures for conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.83 and the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI, Appendix IV, 1977 edition:

<u>Procedure No.</u>	<u>Title</u>
MRS 2.4.2 Gen-23	Multi-frequency Eddy Current Inspection of Steam Generator Tubing
OPR 610-3	Control of Field Service Activities

In addition the site specific job data sheets were reviewed. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

b. Observation of Work and Work Activities

The inspector observed data collection activities for steam generators "A" and "C". The inspector also observed calibration verification at magnetic tape change for steam generator "A" data collection activities. Data collection was performed by Level II examiners in accordance with the applicable procedures. Equipment and calibration standard certification were reviewed and found current and accurate.

The inspector reviewed data evaluation activities and found the evaluations being performed by certified level II A data evaluators. Equipment certifications were reviewed and found accurate.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5. Exit Interview

The inspector met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on May 30, 1980. The scope and findings of the inspection were summarized as stated in this report. This exit interview was held in conjunction with the NRC resident inspectors' exit interview.