U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION V

Report No. 50-206/79-12

Docket No. 50-206 License No. DPR-13 Safeguards Group

Licensee: Southern California Edison Company
2244 Walnut Grove Avenue
Rosemead, California 91770

Facility Name: San Onofre Unit 1

Inspection at: San Onofre

Inspection conducted: July 31 - August 2, 1979

Inspectors: L. F. Miller, Reactor Inspector — 20 Sept 1979 (Date Signed)

M. J. Bagaglio, Reactor Inspector — 20 September 1979 (Date Signed)

Date Signed

Approved By: B. H. Faulkenberry, Chief, Reactor Projects Section #2, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch — 21 September 1979 (Date Signed)

Summary:

Inspection on July 31 - August 2, 1979 (Report No. 50-206/79-12)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of personnel qualification; calibration; organization and administration; procurement; receipt, storage and handling of equipment and materials; follow-up on inspector identified items; licensee bulletin response follow-up; review of plant operations; QA/QC administration program; and independent inspection effort. The inspection involved 36 inspector-hours by two NRC inspectors.

Results: Two apparent items of noncompliance were found, one a deficiency (failure to include all safety-related equipment in the implementing procedure for the Quality Assurance Program), and one an infraction (failure to observe procedural requirements for calibration of prime standards).

RV Form 219(2)

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

*J. Curran, Plant Manager
*R. Brunet, Superintendent, Unit 1
R. Santosuosso, Supervisor of Plant Instrumentation
R. Surgott, Instrument Foreman
*M. A. Wharton, Supervising Engineer
B. Curtis, Supervising Engineer
*J. D. Dunn, Quality Assurance Supervisor
*G. W. McDonald, Quality Assurance Engineer
*W. Frick, Engineer
*B. Matter
*E. Rinard, Jr.
*D. L. Bertram

The inspectors also interviewed several other licensee employees including licensed operators and warehouse personnel.

*Denotes attendance at Exit Interview.

2. Quality Assurance/Quality Control Administration Program

A review of the quality assurance administrative procedures was conducted. The scope of the inspection included the approved technical specifications, the licensee Final Safety Analysis Report, and the following station orders defining and implementing the Quality Assurance Program:

S-A-111 (Rev 4)	Station Quality Assurance Organization
S-A-112 (Rev 3)	Station Quality Assurance Program
S-A-113 (Rev 7)	Procurement Document Control
S-A-115 (Rev 5)	Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and Service
S-A-117 (Rev 3)	Packing, Shipping, Receiving, Storage, and Handling of Material
S-A-120 (Rev 5)	Quality Assurance Corrective Action
S-A-128 (Rev 0)	Identification and Control of Materials, Parts, and Components
S-E-117 (Rev 7)	Station Inspection Plan
S-XI-1.11 (Rev 0)	Storage and Handling of Safety Related Material
S-XI-1.12 (Rev 0)	Receiving of Safety Related Material
S-XI-1.13 (Rev 0)	Packaging and Shipping of Safety Related Material
S-XII-1.5 (Rev 0)	Qualification of Quality Control Personnel

During the course of the review, the inspector determined that Station Order S-A-112, "Station Quality Assurance Program," omitted three items of safety-related equipment.

This is an apparent item of noncompliance (Deficiency, 79-12-01).

3. Personnel Qualification Program

An inspector conducted a review of the site personnel qualification program for quality assurance personnel which included a review of records and personnel interviews.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4. Procurement

An inspection of material procurement procedures was conducted that included the review of site and corporate administrative procedures, personnel interviews, procurement documentation for safety-related equipment, and a survey of materials currently stored in the warehouse.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5. Receipt, Storage, and Handling of Equipment and Materials Program

An inspection was conducted of the site materials warehouse and administration procedures which govern the handling of quality related equipment. The inspector conducted several personnel interviews concerning both warehouse management and use.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Calibration

An inspector conducted a review of routine prime standards gage calibrations. During the course of this review, it was noted that four Roylyn pressure gages, designated Type A and used exclusively for calibrating safety-related equipment, had last been calibrated on or before January 31, 1978. Station Order S-E-115, "Requirements for the Calibration and Control of Measuring and Test Instrumentation," requires that Type A measuring instrumentation be calibrated at six month intervals.

This is an apparent item of noncompliance in that Technical Specification 6.8.1 states that (the requirements and recommendations of) Section 5.3 of ANSI N18.7-1976 will be implemented by the licensee. Section 5.3.7 of ANSI N18.7-1976 requires, "Procedures shall also be provided for periodic calibration of measuring and test equipment used in activities affecting the quality of (safety-related) system."

This item is an infraction (79-12-02).

7. Action on Previous Inspection Findings

a. (Closed) Unresolved Item (79-09-04)

This item concerned the fact that apparently no corrective action was taken by the licensee to investigate an out-of-specification data point during a prime standard calibration check performed by the licensee on a 0-60 psig Roylyn pressure gage used on safety related equipment.

The inspector reviewed additional calibration data and administrative procedures governing prime standards calibration requirements. During the review the inspector noted that a calibration conducted by a certified calibration facility subsequent to the licensee's calibration check was performed satisfactorily. In addition the inspector observed that the licensee has revised his prime standard calibration procedures to replace periodic licensee calibration checks with more frequent calibrations by a certified calibration facility.

This item is considered resolved.

b. (Open) Infraction (79-04-03)

The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the Notice of Violation dated March 6, 1979 regarding the requalification program. The licensee issued revised procedures on July 18, 1979 to require written acknowledgement by licensed personnel that they have reviewed design changes to the facility. The implementation of these procedures by the licensee will be reviewed at the next inspection.

8. Bulletins and Circulars

The licensee's responses to several NRC Bulletins and Circulars were reviewed:

a. (Open) Circular 79-05

Licensee personnel stated that the previously submitted environmental qualification reports, and the SEP review addressed the possibility of steam/moisture incursion through stranded conductors. They were not able to specifically reference where this problem had been addressed. The inspector stated that the inclusion of the steam/moisture incursion problem in the various environmental qualification submittals would be verified at a subsequent inspection.

b. (Closed) Circular 79-02

Licensee personnel stated that time delay circuitry was not used in their inverter units, that the inverters had no AC input voltage, that there had been no inexplicable transfers in the ASCO transfer switches at the facility, and that administrative controls to ensure the operability of safety systems following maintenance or testing were being revised in response to IE Bulletin 79-06A Item 10. The inspector stated that these actions appeared to adequately respond to the Circular.

c. (Closed) Circular 79-04

Licensee personnel stated that all Limitorque operators of the types mentioned were inspected for locking nut security, and that all

locking nuts which were unstaked were staked per the vendor's recommendation. The inspector stated that these actions appeared to adequately respond to the Circular.

d. (Closed) Circular 78-15

Licensee personnel stated that, although no Anchor-Darling tilting disc check valves of 8 inch diameter were installed, all tilting disc check valves at the facility had been verified to operate properly in their respective systems, generally by an operational check on the system. The inspector stated that this action appeared to appropriately respond to the Circular.

e. (Closed) Circular 79-09

The inspector determined through interviews with licensee personnel that this Circular was not applicable to the facility because the described respiratory devices are not used at the facility.

f. (Closed) Circular 79-12

The inspector determined through interviews with licensee personnel that this Circular was not applicable to the facility because the facility does not have EMD diesel engines.

g. (Closed) Circular 79-13

The inspector determined that this Circular was not applicable to this facility because this facility does not have diesel fire pumps.

h. (Closed) Bulletin 79-09

The inspector had no further questions on the licensee's response, which stated that no breakers of the type specified had been used at the facility.

i. (Closed) Bulletin 79-07

The inspector discussed the licensee's response with licensee personnel. The inspector stated that the response appeared technically adequate and provided the information requested.

j. (Closed) Bulletin 79-10

The inspector reviewed the statistics supplied by the licensee. The licensee's response provided the information requested.

k. (Closed) Bulletin 79-11

The inspector discussed the licensse's response with licensee personnel. They stated that all existing overcurrent trip device

test dates had been reviewed since the end caps were replaced in response to IE Bulletin 73-1. No degradation in the trip devices' delay times was observed. They also stated that Station Procedure S-M-5, "Testing of Safety-Related Circuit Breakers," was being revised to assure that all safety-related circuit breakers would be checked at each refueling outage. The inspector stated that the licensee's response appeared technically adequate and satisfied the requirements established in the bulletin.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

9. (Closed) Verification of Administrative Controls on Defeat of Safety Actuation Signals During Containment Purging (TI 2515/26)

The inspector verified that the licensee had received the NRR generic letter, had reviewed it and had modified S-0-104, "Reactor Standard for Operation," to caution the operator to not improperly defeat safety actuation signals. Licensee personnel also stated that manually blocking any containment isolation actuation signal (i.e., high containment pressure, high containment radiation, control board actuation, or safety injection) would not block any other containment isolation actuation signal.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

10. (Open) Critical Fire Protection Area Inspection (TI 2515/19)

The inspector toured the 4160 V Switchgear Room and the Turbine Lube Oil Reservoir Area. He noted that housekeeping in these areas was adequate, fire extinguishers were unobstructed and appeared operable.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

11. Organization and Administration

The inspector reviewed the changes in the facility organization structure and assignments which had occurred since IE Inspection 50-206/78-10. The licensee noted that Amendment 42 to the facility license had a significant typographical error on Page 5-5, which substituted the OSRC membership for the NARC membership, in error. The inspector notified the NRC Project Manager for San Onofre of this error, and he agreed to correct it immediately. The inspector verified that the individual newly assigned to the position of Supervisor of Plant Operations met the qualification requirements of the Technical Specifications. A licensee representative stated that the position of Training Administrator, required by the Technical Specifications, would be filled with a fulltime employee by January 1, 1980, or in the event that a suitable individual was not available by that date, the Regional Office would be informed and provided with a revised hiring date. (79-12-03)

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

12. Independent Inspection

The inspector reviewed with licensee personnel the plans to revise the operating procedures to caution operators regarding the potential for erroneous steam generator levels following steam generator depressurization. The licensee stated that these procedures were in the final comment stage of preparation, and that a copy of the change would be forwarded to the regional office when it was issued by the licensee. (79-12-04)

The inspector also noted that the control room copy of the Technical Specifications had an erroneous figure for the allowable pressurizer cooldown rate. A licensee representative stated that this error was being corrected but that the change had not been issued in final form. (79-04-01)

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

13. Review of Plant Operations

A review of plant operations was conducted, including control room indications, operator awareness of plant status, a plant tour, and a log review. The log review encompassed the Temporary Modifications Log, and for the period July 10-20, 1979, the "Requests for Equipment Repair", Watch Engineer's Log, Control Operator's Log and Control Room Daily Log Sheet. During the plant tour, the monitoring instrumentation, fire protection in critical fire areas, radiation controls, housekeeping, seismic restraints, and alarms were observed and discussed with licensee personnel. In addition Temporary Operating Memorandums 221, 224, 225-6, 228, 230-2 were reviewed to ensure that they conformed to the Technical Specifications.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

14. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted Paragraph 1) on August 2, 1979 to summarize the purpose, scope and the findings of the inspection.

Licensee representatives stated that they believed that quality assurance procedures had been applied to the boric acid transfer pump motor, refueling water pump motor, and recirculation pump and motor, and they subsequently confirmed that the onsite spares for these items were controlled as safety related equipment (Paragraph 2).

They also stated that the indoctrination given to the previously unqualified special auxiliary feedwater valve operators required by IE Bulletin 79-06A would be formally documented. (79-12-05)