

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION V

Report No. 50-206/79-03

Docket No. 50-206

License No. DPR-13

Safeguards Group _____

Licensee: Southern California Edison Company

P. O. Box 800 - 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue

Rosemead, California 91770

Facility Name: San Onofre Unit 1

Inspection at: Camp Pendleton, California

Inspection conducted: January 22-27, 1979

Inspectors: L. A. Menslawski

for J. R. Curtis, Radiation Specialist

2/21/79
Date Signed

Date Signed

Approved By: A. E. Book

H. E. Book, Chief, Fuel Facility and Materials
Safety Branch

2/21/79
Date Signed

Summary:

Inspection on January 22-27, 1979 (Report No. 50-206/79-03)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of emergency planning including the status of facilities, equipment and procedures for emergency response; followup on critique items from a recent exercise; coordination with offsite support agencies and units; status of changes and revisions to overall Emergency Plan; and investigation of the status of followup activity on Licensee Event Reports related to environmental monitoring. The inspection involved 47 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.

Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

- *J. Curran, Plant Manager
- *R. Brunet, Superintendent, Unit 1
- *M. Sullivan, Chemical-Radiation Protection Supervisor
- J. Mortenson, Chemical-Radiation Protection Engineer
- G. Peckham, Chemical-Radiation Protection Engineer
- H. Huettemeyer, Steam Division, SCE Rosemead
- J. P. Chard, M.D., Contract Physician, SONGS-1
- R. Lacey, Office of Emergency Services, San Diego County
- A. Strachen, Shacken, Supervising Research Scientist, SCE Rosemead
- R. Groves, Oceanographer, SCE Rosemead
- D. Rundstrom, Marine Biologist, SCE Rosemead
- J. Tate, Watch Engineer, SONGS-1
- R. Schell, Watch Engineer, SONGS-1

The inspector also interviewed other SONGS-1 staff and support personnel.

*Denotes those attending the exit interview.

2. General Operations - Conditions

The SONGS-1 plant was operational, running at fully licensed power. No unusual conditions or problems were observed by the inspector or reported by licensee representatives during the inspection.

The Chemical and Radiation Protection Foreman for Unit-1 has accepted a position in the safety organization at the SCE Rosemead headquarters. He will be leaving the site in the month of February. Plans for temporary and permanent replacement were discussed with the Chem-Radiation Protection Supervisor.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

3. Emergency Planning - Facilities, Equipment and Procedures

The present status of facilities, equipment and procedures that are utilized in the Emergency Response Plan was reviewed. Recent changes were discussed and emergency equipment was examined.

The licensee maintains a first-aid room and numerous first-aid lockers around the station for use in response to injury emergencies. Special radiation protection and monitoring equipment is kept in kits at strategic locations within the plant (control room, radiation protection office at controlled area entry point, and first-aid room), and offsite at the SCE offsite command post, and the South Coast Community Hospital. Emergency equipment was examined. Instruments and dosimeters are rotated through the kits, calibrated and kept operational by the Chemical-Radiation Protection staff.

Radiation monitoring instrumentation and meteorological instrumentation used for emergency condition evaluation were discussed and had been observed in action during a recent exercise. Instruments are on routine maintenance schedules calling for operability and calibration checks at monthly and semiannual intervals.

Emergency procedures are generated and published as a group identified as S.A. VIII and are sequentially numbered 1.1 through 1.18. Individual procedures are reviewed by Chemical-Radiation Protection engineers on a biannual schedule. Revisions resulting from this review are presented to the On-Site Review Committee (OSRC) for approval. The inspector reviewed selected procedures related to emergency response and offsite communication and coordination. Excessive nonemergency telephone listings on an emergency call list were noted and discussed with licensee representatives. The Emergency Response Call List will be separated from other contact numbers and the associated references in procedures will clearly identify persons or positions to be called to expedite emergency response action.

The SONGS first-aid room contains first-aid equipment, a contaminated personnel carrier with special stretcher, gurney and contamination control equipment. The SCE/Helgeson whole body counter for internal dose assessment is also housed there. This equipment was being maintained in a "ready to use" condition.

Emergency plan and first-aid training is given to site personnel in routinely scheduled sessions as part of the SCE Monthly Safety Meeting series. Operators have additional review and training as part of their requalification program.

Offsite agencies are responsible for their own training. Coordinated exercises or drills with appropriate pre and post drill meetings with offsite support groups are used to accomplish refresher-retraining objectives.

The inspector met with the licensee representative from the Rosemead headquarters office who is coordinating the revision of the SONGS-1 Emergency Plan. Proposed changes are being formalized and will

be reviewed and presented to the OSRC for their review and formal approval. It is intended that revisions and changes will be formally incorporated into the plan prior to the next exercise involving offsite support agencies, tentatively scheduled for mid-April.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4. Emergency Planning - Tests and Drills

The inspector reviewed the formal written report on the most recent emergency response exercise and critique held December 22, 1978. Observations and corrective action proposals were documented. The inspector discussed the status of the corrective actions prescribed in the document. Specific staff members had been assigned responsibility for followup and in some cases corrective action had been initiated.

The inspector discussed the status and proposed schedule for the next emergency drill with the SCE staff members coordinating interaction with offsite support agencies. The next drill is planned for mid-April; the scenerio will allow for alerting offsite agencies and they will be invited to participate in the exercise. A technically oriented person, with a working knowledge of the plant, will be dispatched to the location designated by offsite groups as their command post. This SCE representative will establish liaison with the SCE response groups and will provide technical advice to offsite response groups.

5. Emergency Planning - Coordination with Offsite Agencies

The inspector utilized licensee call lists to contact the offsite response groups who would be alerted and/or expected to respond to a major incident in which evacuation of people is a possibility. The call list contained excessive listings of telephone numbers. There was no priority list containing only the telephone number and principal contact for the primary offsite response groups. This topic was discussed in Paragraph 3. Primary offsite response group telephone numbers and principal contacts will be separated from other call list numbers in the next revision of procedure S.A.VIII.1.1.

When contacted, offsite response groups reported that coordination was being adequately maintained. The inspector visited representatives of the hospital administration and made contact with one of the physicians who provides medical service to the site. Persons contacted were aware of the existing plan and their role in emergency response involving contaminated injuries. The hospital representative indicated that recent personnel changes in the

emergency room medical staff had drawn attention to the need for scheduling additional training and orientation sessions for medical and administrative staff before the next exercise in mid-April.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Licensee Event Followup

The status of three items reported by the licensee as reportable occurrences was investigated. Two items were related to environmental data loss in ocean temperature and settling plate studies performed as part of the requirements in SCE's Environmental Technical Specifications. The other item was concerned with the overflow of a hydrazine storage tank that resulted in the release of a small volume of hydrazine solution slightly contaminated with radioactivity from an interconnected refueling water storage tank.

- a. In the case of the loss of ocean temperature data, the licensee has identified the mode of failure and the component involved, and initiated action to secure improved temperature data retrieval systems. Meanwhile, the faulty units were replaced with devices using stripchart data recording components. This information was related to the inspector by the SCE oceanographer responsible for the program.
- b. In the case of the loss of environmental data due to disruption and loss of settling plates, the licensee had discussed the history of the problem, its cause, and the value of the data in any environmental impact assessment with personnel at DOR in NRC headquarters and has prepared a formal request to delete the studies and eliminate their requirement in the Appendix B Technical Specification. The inspector discussed the status of this effort with the SCE marine biologist and was advised that the request letter was generated and submitted to the SCE regulatory liaison representative for submittal to NRC. He indicated that the overall ETS revision program may have delayed this specific item but that it had been submitted through channels. The status of this item will be examined in a subsequent inspection (79-03-01).
- c. In the case of the backup and overflow of one of the hydrazine storage tanks, the licensee reported the occurrence because the tank, a redundant one of two storage tanks, was part of the Spray Hydrazine Addition system. The event was reviewed with the licensee from the viewpoint of an unplanned release of radioactivity. The overflow occurred as a consequence of an incompletely closed isolation valve in a line between the

hydrazine tank and the refueling water storage tank. The amount of overflow and the radioactivity content of the liquid was calculated using conservative assumptions. The "release" was mentioned in the report but was not considered as a reportable release. The inspector interviewed the senior operator and watch engineer who were on duty at the time of the event, visited the site of the event and verified the reported conditions. The inspector discussed the corrective action taken and established that presently existing level alarms and daily visual checks provide adequate monitoring to maintain control over any release paths in the system.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7. Exit Interview

An exit interview was held with SONGS-1 staff and management personnel (denoted in Paragraph 1) to review the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee was advised that no items of non-compliance or deviations were identified.