

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION V

Report No. 50-206/78-17

Docket No. 50-206 License No. DPR-13 Safeguards Group _____

Licensee: Southern California Edison Company

2244 Walnut Grove Avenue

Rosemead, California 91770

Facility Name: San Onofre Unit 1

Inspection at: Camp Pendleton, California

Inspection Conducted: December 19-21, 1978

Inspectors: J. R. Curtis 1/9/79
J. R. Curtis, Radiation Specialist Date Signed

Date Signed

Approved By: H. E. Book 1/9/79
H. E. Book, Chief, Fuel Facility and Date Signed
Materials Safety Branch

Summary:

Inspection on December 19-21, 1978 (Report No. 50-206/78-17)

Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection of emergency planning, including observation of an emergency drill and drill critique, review of status of revisions to plans, practices and procedures in the emergency response plan; collection of comparative measurement samples and review of reported results of recent samples; discussion with licensee representatives with regard to revisions and improvements to selected radiological control procedures. The inspection involved 23 hours onsite by one inspector.

Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

J. Curran, Plant Manager
R. Brunet, Superintendent, Unit 1
M. Sullivan, Chemical-Radiation Protection Supervisor
J. Mortensen, Chemical-Radiation Protection Engineer
G. Peckham, Chemical-Radiation Protection Engineer
D. Bihl, Chemical-Radiation Protection Engineer
Other members of the SONGS Staff

2. General Operations

The inspector discussed the operations status of the station with licensee representatives responsible for the radiation protection program. The reactor was at full power at the beginning of the inspection with a planned schedule of reducing power to shut-down condition for the dual purpose of (1) allowing for operator licensing training and qualification and (2) to conduct a planned containment sphere entry for a general quality assurance and maintenance check on equipment worked on during the recent refueling outage. The sphere entry and work performed within the containment was performed according to station procedures using pre-entry radiological condition assessment, issuance of Radiological Exposure Permits and Job Tickets for work to be performed. Airborne activity in the sphere was assayed.

One inspection/maintenance team worked in the area above the reactor vessel adjacent to the vessel head. The personnel exposures reported for persons involved in the sphere entry were in the range of 30 to 450 mRem.

The inspector discussed the status of licensee action regarding handling and documentation of instances involving personnel contamination. Licensee efforts include establishing and formalizing a procedure for documenting these instances, taking protective and preventative action when specific residual contamination levels exist after decontamination attempts, and a management notification system for significant cases.

Licensee plans and proposals for increasing awareness and limiting access to high radiation areas were discussed (Ref. 50-206/78-16). Possible action and proposals involving increased use of barriers,

entry annunciating devices, and or extensive formalized administrative access control methods were being discussed and considered. Continued consideration of proposals would be made, but no formal procedural changes will be made to existing controls until the next major outage.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

3. Emergency Planning - Tests and Drills

The licensee conducts drills of portions of the emergency response plan on a quarterly schedule. The last drill was reviewed with the licensee. The exercise was held in the early morning hours in the latter part of September 1978 and involved perimeter alarm signal tests and a controlled area evacuation and muster drill. A critique was held and the drill was documented, action was taken to overcome deficiencies.

The inspector discussed preplanning efforts for the current (December 21st) drill with Mr. G. Peckham, Chemical-Radiation Protection Engineer who was responsible for preparing the drill scenario. Preplanning effort included generation of a scenerio, projected flow chart for the drill, drill messages, and instruction to persons responding to submit response time information for communication channels and response effort.

The December 21st drill was initiated at approximately 9:45 AM when the Chemical-Radiation Protection Engineer notified the Operations Watch Engineer-in-Charge that the emergency exercise was about to begin. The inspector observed the initial response activities from the control room and adjacent visitor viewing area. The visitor viewing area is designated as the onsite control center and evacuation assembly area.

The scenario called for the evaluation of emergency radiation monitoring readout information to establish the radiological conditions and to decide on the amount of involvement by local offsite agencies. The local agencies were put on "alert" status as part of the drill, for a communication link check. The proposed radiological conditions and the actual meteorological conditions were used by the Watch Engineer (W.E.) and Plant Superintendent to establish that no additional offsite action or evacuation was necessary.

The drill scenerio called for an "unaccounted for" person at the muster. The W.E./Emergency Coordinator mobilized a search/rescue party who found the "victim" with a "contaminated burn injury." Rescue, using a litter, was effected and the ambulance service and the agreement hospital were alerted to participate in the exercise. Response by the ambulance was slow, as was anticipated - the ambulance dispatcher had been advised that the call was a drill.

The "victim" was transported to the SCE first aid room by station personnel and to the hospital via ambulance using the SCE special purpose personnel carrier. Some difficulties were encountered in manipulation and transfer of the carrier in and out of the ambulance.

At the hospital, emergency room and nuclear accident response personnel did not actively participate in the medical emergency response exercise. The channels of communication within the hospital that would effect coordination of response for the exercise evidently broke down. Active hospital participation in a nuclear emergency response was being planned by the hospital at a later date.

4. Emergency Drill - Critique of Exercise

Licensee representatives held a critique meeting following the exercise. The inspector attended the meeting attended by the Plant Supervisor and Chemical-Radiation Protection personnel who were observers or participants in the drill. Individuals reported on their general observations and any specific problem areas that were made apparent by the exercise. Suggestions for solutions to problems were discussed. The time relationship between the beginning of the drill and receipt of notification by SCE and offsite response groups is to be submitted to the Radiation Chemical Engineer for response time tabulation and evaluation. Some areas needing attention were noted, e.g., coordination of the hospital nuclear accident response team with SCE, training sessions for security personnel regarding priorities for access/egress for injured personnel, and additional training for operations personnel in use of dose and cloud projection using equations and overlays.

A written report is being generated reflecting the response time information and reporting on significant items discussed at the critique with proposed action to improve the station's emergency response capability.

No items of noncompliance or deficiencies were identified.

5. Confirmatory Measurements

Two categories of samples in the confirmatory measurements were found acceptable by comparison with HSL results. The categories acceptable for the 1978 series were Particulate Filter and Halogen Charcoal Cartridge. During this inspection a liquid sample, (VSL-8) from a waste tank and a gaseous sample (VSG-10) were collected, counted for preliminary evaluation and submitted to HSL to complete the 1978 series of confirmatory measurement samples. Analytical results will be corrected to the collection date of 12/20/78, 11:00 AM for decay correction and gross beta analysis (VSG-10) will be performed by SCE and HSL on 1/17/79, 11:00 AM. Results will be compared when received by both analytical groups.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Exit Interview

A brief exit interview was conducted summarizing the inspection. No items of noncompliance or deficiencies were identified.