U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION V

Report No. 50-361/80-2
50-362/80-1

Docket No. 50-361, 50-362 License No. CPPR-97, CPPR-98 Safeguards Group

Licensee: Southern California Edison Company

2244 Walnut Grove Avenue

Rosemead, California 91770

Facility Name: San Onofre Units 2 and 3

Inspection at: Construction Site, San Diego County, California

Inspection conducted: January 3, 4 and 21-28, 1980

Inspectors: R. C. Haynes 3/11/80
for R. J. Pate, ~~Resident~~ Inspector Date Signed

Date Signed

Date Signed

Approved By: R. C. Haynes 3/11/80
R. C. Haynes, ~~Chief,~~ Reactor Projects Section Date Signed
Reactor Construction & Engineering Support Branch

Summary: Inspection on January 3, 4, and 21-28, 1980 (Report Nos. 50-361/80-2 and 50-362/80-1)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of construction activities including: reactor pressure vessel and internals protection, 10CFR50.55(e) report followup, fire in fuel pool area, licensee corrective actions on previous inspection findings, and general work in progress. The inspection involved 13 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.

Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

RV Form 219 (2)

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Southern California Edison Company (SCE)

*P. A. Croy, Site Quality Assurance/Quality Control Supervisor
R. Frick, Quality Assurance Engineer
R. R. Hart, Construction Superintendent
D. E. Nunn, Manager, Quality Assurance
J. H. Pantaleo, Quality Assurance Engineer
*W. F. Rossfeld, Construction Lead QA Engineer

Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)

C. A. Blum, Quality Control Manager
J. E. Geiger, Project Quality Assurance Supervisor
*L. W. Hurst, Project Field Quality Assurance Supervisor

The inspector also contacted other licensee employees during the inspection. These included construction craftsmen, engineers and foremen.

*Denotes attendees at management meeting on January 28, 1980.

2. Construction Status

The licensee reported the site construction work is 78% complete as of January 31, 1980. The licensee's project management personnel estimated that the construction of Units 2 and 3 was 89% and 66% complete, respectively.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

The inspector examined the action taken by the licensee on the following outstanding item:

(Closed) Followup Item (50-361/79-24/01): Containers marked with the following trade names were found in the Unit 2 Containment:

ENVY, Instant Cleaner by Johnson
SAFETY SOLVENT by Loctite
RAPID TAP, Cutting fluid by Relton

These items were not approved for use in the Unit 2 containment. However, a discussion with the technicians that had access to the containers disclosed that the materials had been used only to clean electronic components of automated inspection equipment. All the

unauthorized material was immediately removed from the containment. Subsequent inspections of the containment areas by SCE and the NRC inspector verified that unauthorized chemicals were no longer being used. The inspector had no further questions on this item.

4. (Closed) Followup Item (50-361/79-30/01): 10CFR50.55(e) Report on Incorrect Material for Retaining Clip of Thermal Pressure Relief Devices on WKM Gate Valves.

SCE issued a report to the NRC Regional Office dated December 12, 1979, describing the deficiency and the corrective action taken. A carbon steel retaining clip was substituted for a stainless steel clip in the thermal pressure relief valves for the gate valves supplied. Corrosion of the carbon steel clip in process fluids such as borated water could cause it to release the poppet stem of the thermal pressure relief valves. This would allow the poppet stem, a cylinder approximately 1/10 inch in diameter and 1/2 inch long, to be carried through the flow path of the associated system.

Resolution of this nonconformance was controlled under the provisions of the licensee's quality assurance program. The corrective action taken was to install a pipe plug of qualified material with a through hole small enough to retain the poppet stem, but provide a bleedoff to relieve any valve body pressure buildup in the downstream side of the bored hole provided for the pressure relief valve. The plug was staked in position after assembly to preclude it from backing out. This action was taken on all valves where a loose part the size of the poppet stem could have a detrimental effect on the associated system function or operation. All the valves to be used in the construction of San Onofre Units 2 and 3 have been modified as required. This completes the followup of this reported deficiency.

5. Fire in Unit 3 Fuel Pool

On January 22, 1980, a small fire occurred at the south end of Unit 3 fuel storage pool. Hot material from an overhead welding operation ignited the paper covering the stainless steel liner plate. The inspector observed the area where the paper had burned. There was no evidence that the liner plate had been damaged. The inspector had no further questions on this matter.

6. Reactor Vessel and Internals Installation and Storage

Site activities for storage of the Units 2 and 3 reactor pressure vessels and internals were observed. Both vessels are installed and installation of Unit 2 internals is essentially complete.

Installation of Unit 3 internals is in progress.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7. Plant Tour

The inspector toured both Units 2 and 3 several times each week during the inspection report period. Particular attention was directed to observing work in progress, availability of supervision and quality control inspectors at the work areas, housekeeping and preservation of equipment. The inspector observed that a section of W6x20 wide flange I-beam material was being held for quality control test. Followup with SCE QA personnel revealed that Bechtel had issued a nonconformance report (No. P1380) for linear indications near one end of the beam. The indications were visually identified by construction craftsmen. Subsequently, Bechtel and Peabody Testing nondestructive examination personnel confirmed the indications using the liquid penetrant test technique. The maximum depth of the indications were determined by grinding to be 0.056 inches. This was within the ASTM A-6 material specification's acceptance limits. However, the part of the beam with the indications was scrapped. The action taken by Bechtel in accordance with the nonconformance report appeared to be appropriate.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

8. Management Interview

The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on January 28, 1980. The scope of the inspections and of the inspector's findings were discussed. The licensee representatives had no additional comments.