

DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED CHANGE AND SAFETY ANALYSIS
PROPOSED CHANGE NO. 97 TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE DPR-13

This is a request to revise Appendix A Technical Specification 3.7 Auxiliary Electrical Supply.

Reason for Proposed Change

On April 22, 1980, San Onofre Unit 1 experienced a loss of all A.C. power to the site, an event which was promptly reported to the NRC. Subsequently, NRC Region V, by letter dated April 23, 1980, documented agreements with regard to electrical power systems during shutdown of San Onofre Unit 1 as follows:

1. Effective immediately you will implement requirements similar to the Standardized Technical Specification for Westinghouse PWRs (Specification 3.8.1.2, dated May 15, 1978) which requires as a minimum one source of offsite electrical power and one diesel generator (capable of automatic start) to be operable.
2. With less than the minimum required A.C. electrical power sources discussed in 1., above, all operations involving core alterations or positive reactivity changes will be suspended.

By letter dated May 15, 1980 we committed to implement revised Technical Specifications to incorporate the conditions described above.

Existing Specifications

The existing specifications are as constituted in Section 3.7 Auxiliary Electrical Supply.

Proposed Specifications

The existing specifications would be revised as indicated in the enclosure to this Proposed Change. Substantive additions are identified by a bar in the margin.

Safety Analysis

The Technical Specification Changes discussed in the enclosure are provided to ensure that A.C. electrical power sources are available in order that the station can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods. Diverse and redundant power sources are required to be operable as a precondition for core alterations or positive reactivity additions, thus providing assurance that these actions can be performed safely.

Accordingly, it is concluded that (1) the proposed change does not involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10CFR50.59, nor does it present significant hazard considerations not described or implicit in the Final Safety Analysis, and (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change.

ENCLOSURE

3.7 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SUPPLY

Applicability: Applies to the availability of electrical power for the operation of plant auxiliaries.

Objective To define those conditions of electrical power availability necessary (1) to provide for safe reactor operation, (2) to provide for the continuing availability of engineered safeguards, and (3) to ensure that the station can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods.

Specification: A. The reactor shall not be made critical or maintained critical unless the following conditions are met:

(1) As a minimum the following shall be operable:

a. Either two Southern California Edison Company or two San Diego Gas & Electric high voltage transmission lines or one Southern California Edison Company and one San Diego Gas & Electric high voltage transmission line.

b. Two separate and independent diesel generators each with:

1. A separate day tank containing a minimum of 290 gallons of fuel,

2. A separate fuel storage system containing a minimum of 37,500 gallons of fuel, and

3. A separate fuel transfer pump.

c. A.C. Distribution

1. 4160 Volt Bus 1C and 2C,

2. 480 Volt Bus No. 1, Bus No. 2, and Bus No. 3,

3. Any 3 of vital buses 1, 2, 3, and 4.

- d. D.C. Bus No. 1 and D.C. Bus No. 2 (including at least one full capacity charger and supply per bus).

(2) Action

- a. With one of the required incoming transmission lines inoperable, (Section A.(1)a.) demonstrate the operability of the remaining A.C. sources by performing periodic testing requirements A and B.1.a of Technical Specification 4.4 within one hour and at least once per eight (8) hours thereafter; restore an additional offsite circuit to operable status within 72 hours or be in cold shutdown within the next 36 hours.
- b. If one diesel generator is declared inoperable, demonstrate the operability of the two offsite transmission lines and the remaining diesel generator by performing periodic testing requirements A and B.1.a of Technical Specification 4.4 within one hour and at least once per eight (8) hours thereafter; restore the inoperable diesel generator to service within 72 hours or be in cold shutdown within the next 36 hours.
- c. With one offsite line and one diesel generator of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable (Section A.(1)a. and A(1)b.) demonstrate the operability of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Periodic Testing Requirements A and B.1.a of Technical Specification 4.4 within one hour and at least once per eight (8) hours thereafter; restore at least one of the inoperable sources to operable status within 12 hours or be in cold shutdown within the next 36 hours. Have at least two offsite circuits and two diesel generators operable within 72 hours from the time of initial loss or be in cold shutdown within the next 36 hours.

- d. With two required offsite lines inoperable (Section A.(1)a.) demonstrate the operability of two diesel generators by performing Periodic Testing Requirement B.1.a. of Technical Specification 4.4 within one hour and at least once per eight (8) hours thereafter, unless the diesel generators are already operating; restore at least one of the inoperable sources to operable status within 24 hours or be in at least hot standby within the next 4 hours. With only one of required offsite sources restored, restore the remaining offsite source to operable status within 72 hours from the time of initial loss or be in cold shutdown within the next 36 hours.
- e. With two of the above required diesel generators inoperable (Section A.(1)b.), demonstrate the operability of two offsite lines by performing Periodic Testing Requirement A of Technical Specification 4.4 within one hour and at least once per two (2) hours thereafter restore at least one of the inoperable diesel generators to operable status within 2 hours or be in cold shutdown within the next 36 hours. Restore at least two diesel generators to operable status within 72 hours from time of initial loss or be in cold shutdown within the next 36 hours.
- f. With less than the above complement of A.C. buses operable (Section A.(1)c.) restore the inoperable bus within 8 hours or be in cold shutdown within the next 36 hours.
- g. With one 125-volt D.C. bus inoperable (Section A.(1)d.) restore the inoperable bus to operable status within 2 hours or be in cold shutdown within the next 36 hours.
- h. With a 125-volt D.C. battery and both of its chargers inoperable (Section A.(1)e.), restore the inoperable battery and one of its chargers to operable status within 2 hours or be in cold shutdown within the next 36 hours.

B. During cold shutdown or refueling conditions the following specifications shall apply:

(1) As a minimum, the following shall be operable:

- a. One source of offsite electrical power from the available high voltage transmission lines, and
- b. One diesel generator (capable of automatic start) with:
 - 1. A day tank containing a minimum of 290 gallons of fuel,
 - 2. A fuel storage system containing a minimum of 37,500 gallons of fuel,
 - 3. A fuel transfer pump.
- c. The associated 4,160 Volt A.C. Bus, 480 Volt A.C. Bus and D.C. Bus.

(2) With less than the minimum required A.C. electrical sources specified in B.(1) above, suspend all operations involving core alterations or positive reactivity changes.

Basis

The station is connected electrically to the Southern California Edison Company and San Diego Gas & Electric Company systems via either of two independent high voltage transmission routes composed of two Southern California Edison Company high voltage lines and of four San Diego Gas & Electric Company high voltage lines.

Of the two Southern California Edison Company lines, either one can serve as a source of power to the station auxiliaries at any time. Similarly, any of the four San Diego Gas & Electric Company lines can serve as a source of power to the station auxiliaries at any time. By specifying two out of these six lines, redundancy of sources of auxiliary power for an orderly shutdown is provided.

Similarly, either transformer A or B, along with transformer C provide redundancy of 4160 volt power to the auxiliary equipment, and in particular to the safety injection trains. In addition, each 4160 volt bus has an onsite diesel generator as backup.

Two diesel generators are provided primarily to give redundancy for maintenance, to preclude the necessity for reactor shutdown if one diesel requires maintenance, and to provide protection against a failure of one of the diesel generator systems. This also eliminates the necessity for depending on one diesel generator to operate for extended periods without shutdown if it were required for post-accident conditions.

The requirement for one source of offsite power and one diesel generator to be operable during cold shutdown or refueling conditions will provide diverse and redundant electrical power sources in order that the station can be maintained in the cold shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods. Additionally, this requirement will assure that operations involving core alterations or positive reactivity changes can be conducted safely.

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This is a request to revise Appendix A Technical Specification 3.3 Safety Injection and Containment Spray Systems.

Reason for Proposed Change

San Onofre Unit 1 experienced a failure of the Salt Water Cooling System on March 10, 1980, which was described in a letter dated March 24, 1980, addressed to NRC Region V Office of Inspection and Enforcement. By letter dated April 4, 1980, NRC Region V directed, among other actions, an interpretation of the Technical Specifications which prohibited consideration of the Auxiliary Salt Water Cooling Pump in determining operability of the Salt Water Cooling System. Further, NRC Region V directed a review of the limiting conditions for operation as defined in the Technical Specifications. This proposed change is in compliance with that direction.

Existing Specifications

Technical Specification 3.3.1.A.(1)h presently reads: "Two saltwater cooling pumps are operable, or one saltwater cooling pump and the auxiliary saltwater cooling pump are operable."

Technical Specification 3.3.1.B.(6) presently reads: "One of the two required saltwater cooling pumps or auxiliary saltwater cooling pump for a period of time not longer than 72 consecutive hours."

Proposed Specifications

Technical Specification 3.3.1.A.(1)h would be revised to read: "Two saltwater cooling pumps (the North pump and South pump) are operable."

Technical Specification 3.3.1.B.(6) would be revised to read: "One of the two saltwater cooling pumps (the North pump or the South pump) for a period of time not longer than 72 consecutive hours."

Safety Analysis

The proposed Technical Specification changes discussed above will consider only the North and South Salt Water Cooling Pumps in determining the operability of the Salt Water Cooling System in Technical Specification 3.3.1. By eliminating the Auxiliary Salt Water Cooling Pump from consideration, a non-safety component is removed from consideration of the operability of the Safety Injection System.

Accordingly, it is concluded that (1) the proposed change does not involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10CFR50.59, nor does it present significant hazard considerations not described or implicit in the Final Safety Analysis, and (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change.

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This is a request to revise Technical Specification 6.0 of Appendix A, and Environmental Technical Specification 5.0 of Appendix B.

REASON FOR PROPOSED CHANGE

This proposed change would incorporate corporate reorganization changes into the appropriate Administrative Controls Sections of the Appendix A Technical Specifications and Appendix B Environmental Technical Specifications.

EXISTING SPECIFICATIONS

The existing sections within Technical Specifications 6.0 and Environmental Technical Specifications 5.0 are as constituted in the Appendices A and B Technical Specifications, respectively, for San Onofre Unit 1.

PROPOSED SPECIFICATIONS

Appendix A Section 6.0 would be revised as follows:

- (1) "6.5.1.7 The OSRC shall:
 - c. Provide immediate written notification to the Manager of Nuclear Operations and the Chairman of Nuclear Audit and Review Committee of disagreement between the OSRC and the Plant Manager; however, the Plant Manager shall have responsibility for resolution of such disagreements pursuant to 6.1.1 above."
- (2) "6.5.1.8 The OSRC shall maintain written minutes of each meeting and copies shall be provided to the Manager of Nuclear Operations and Chairman of the Nuclear Audit and Review Committee."
- (3) "6.5.2.2 The NARC shall be composed of the:

Manager of Engineering Design
Manager of Environmental Affairs
Manager of Nuclear Engineering, Safety & Licensing
Manager, Quality Assurance
Manager of Nuclear Operations
Manager, Nuclear Engineering & Safety
Manager, Biological Systems Research and Development
San Diego Gas & Electric Representative

Chairmanship shall be designated by the Nuclear Control Board."

Revised Figure 6.2.1.1, Offsite Organization is attached.

The balance of Technical Specification 6.0 would remain unchanged.

Appendix B Section 5.0 would be revised as follows:

"5.3.2 a. Membership (Chairman designated by the Nuclear Control Board)

- (1) Manager of Engineering Design
- (2) Manager of Environmental Affairs
- (3) Manager of Nuclear Engineering, Safety & Licensing
- (4) Manager, Nuclear Engineering & Safety
- (5) Manager, Biological Systems Research and Development
- (6) Manager, Quality Assurance
- (7) Manager of Nuclear Operations
- (8) San Diego Gas & Electric Representative"

Revised Figure 5.2-1 is attached.

The balance of Technical Specification 5.0 would remain unchanged.

SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL FINDING

The proposed change to the Technical Specifications described herein are administrative in nature and will have no detrimental impact on the environment, nor do they involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10CFR50.59.

CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

PRESIDENT

SENIOR
VICE PRESIDENT

VICE PRESIDENT
(FUEL SUPPLY)

VICE PRESIDENT
(NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
AND OPERATIONS)

VICE PRESIDENT
(POWER SUPPLY)

VICE PRESIDENT
(SYSTEM
DEVELOPMENT)

VICE PRESIDENT
(ENGINEERING &
CONSTRUCTION)

VICE PRESIDENT
(ADVANCED
ENGINEERING)

NUCLEAR
CONTROL
BOARD

NUCLEAR
AUDIT AND
REVIEW
COMMITTEE

MANAGER OF
NUCLEAR ENGINEERING,
SAFETY & LICENSING

MANAGER OF
NUCLEAR
OPERATIONS

MANAGER OF
ENVIRONMENTAL
AFFAIRS

MANAGER OF
ENGINEERING
DESIGN

DIRECTOR OF
RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT

MANAGER,
QUALITY
ASSURANCE

MANAGER, NUCLEAR
ENGINEERING &
SAFETY

PROJECT MANAGER
SAN ONOFRE UNIT 1
RETROFIT PROJECTS

MANAGER,
BIOLOGICAL
SYSTEMS R&D

HEADQUARTERS
STAFF

STATION
STAFF

PLANT
MANAGER

ON-SITE
REVIEW
COMMITTEE

6.2.1.1 OFFSITE ORGANIZATION




Figure 5.2-1 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY CORPORATE ORGANIZATION