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Docket No. 50-206

NOV 15 1979

- LICENSEE: Southern California Edison Company
 - FACILITY: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF NOVEMBER 8, 1979 PHONE CONVERSATION REGARDING LESSONS LEARNED IMPLEMENTATION

During a phone conversation on November 8, 1979, the NRC Lessons Learned Implementation Team discussed with the licensee its October 17, 1979 response to our September 13, 1979 letter.

The team informed the licensee of those lessons learned items for which the licensee's proposed schedule for implementation is unacceptable. These items, along with the proposed and required completion dates, are listed in Enclosure 1.

The team also informed the licensee of those items for which further clarification of the licensee's commitment is necessary to demonstrate compliance with the lessons learned requirements. These items and the associated team questions are listed in Enclosure 2.

By letter dated October 30, 1979, we provided additional clarification of the lessons learned requirements to all licensees. We also requested that within 15 days licensees justify proposed actions not in complete agreement with the staff's requirements and improve the implementation schedule where it differed from the staff's requirements. During this phone conversation we informed the licensee that those items listed in Enclosure 1 should be addressed in their response. In addition, the licensee agreed to provide the information requested in Enclosure 2 in its response to our October 30, 1979 letter or as soon thereafter as possible.

	Enclosures (2): As stated			Original Alfred Operat Divisi	Memo 4 49 ccp			
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ENCLOSURE 1

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ITEMS THAT DO NOT MEET LESSONS LEARNED IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE

1. Section 2.1.3.a - Direct Indication of PORV and Safety Valve Position

The installation of the direct position indication is currently scheduled for the March-April 1980 refueling outage. The installation of the direct position indication should be complete on or before the NRC-required date of January 1, 1980.

2. Section 2.1.4 - Containment Isolation Provisions

Modifications of the containment isolation signal (CIS) to provide diversity in the parameters sensed for initiation are scheduled for completion during the refueling outage currently scheduled for March-April 1980. The CIS modifications should be completed on or before the NRC-required date of January 1, 1980.

3. Section 2.1.4 - Containment Isolation Provisions

Modifications of the CIS to prevent re-opening of the containment isolation valves are scheduled to be completed during the refueling outage currently scheduled for March-April 1980. These modifications should be completed on or before the NRC-required date of January 1, 1980.

4. Section 2.1.3.b. - Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling

Our position is that the decision as to whether or not additional instrumentation needs are incorporated into the SEP Program will be delayed until additional instrumentation is identified.

5. Section 2.2.2.b - Onsite Technical Support Center

Completion of the Onsite Technical Support Center is scheduled for the September-October 1981 refueling outage. This center should be completed on or before the NRC-required date of January 1, 1981.

6. <u>Containment Pressure Indication</u>, <u>Containment Water Level Indication</u>, and Containment Hydrogen Indication

These items are presently scheduled to be completed during the September-October 1981 refueling outage. These modifications should be completed on or before the NRC-required date of January 1, 1981.

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7. Reactor Coolant System Vents

Our position is that the decision as to whether or not the reactor coolant system vents are incorporated into the SEP Program will be delayed until the description of the reactor coolant system vents is provided.

8. Section 2.1.6.a - Systems Integrity

Measurements of leakage rates should be scheduled to comply with the lessons learned implementation date of January 1, 1980. Additionally, a summary report of the leakage reduction program should be provided by January 1, 1980 as noted in the October 30, 1979 Harold R. Denton's letter to All Operating Nuclear Power Plants. Your response should include a commitment to perform necessary plant modifications by January 1, 1980.

9. Section 2.1.6.b - Shielding Review

Our position is that the decision as to whether or not shielding modifications are incorporated into the SEP Program will be delayed until the design review is completed on or before January 1, 1980.

10. Section 2.1.8.a - Post-Accident Sampling

Your schedule should be revised to coincide with the lessons learned implementation schedule. Our position is that the decision as to whether or not plant modifications required by this section are incorporated into the SEP Program will be delayed until the sampling review is completed on or before January 1, 1980.

11. Section 2.1.8.b - High Range Radiation Monitor

Your commitment should be revised to include installation of the noble gas effluent monitor, capability for sample analysis under accident conditions, and installation of high range radiation monitors inside containment by January 1, 1981.

ENCLOSURE 2

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CLARIFICATION OF PROPOSED ACTIONS ARE NEEDED IN ORDER TO VERIFY CONFORMANCE TO LESSONS LEARNED REQUIREMENTS

1. Section 2.1.1 - Emergency Power Supply Requirements

Clarification of the existing station instrument air supply for the PORV block valves is required:

- a. State whether the instrument air supply for the PORV block valves satisfy the single failure criterion.
- b. State how many cycles of the PORV block valves are accommodated by the instrument air system accumulators.

2. Section 2.1.4 - Containment Isolation Provisions

In the San Onofre submittal dated June 25, 1979, systems determined to be essential were identified. Further clarification is needed before the NRC-required date of January 1, 1980. Specifically, all "lines associated with engineered safety features" and all "lines which are normally closed during operating modes requiring containment integrity and remain closed following an accident" should be identified. Further, the bases for identifying these lines as essential should be provided.

3. Section 2.1.5.a - Dedicated Containment Penetrations

With regards to the existing San Onofre Unit 1 purge system to meet the requirements of Section 2.1.5.a, a complete description of the planned system should be provided on or before the required January 1, 1980 implementation date.

4. Section 2.1.3.b - Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling

The additional information for the subcooling meter as detailed in the Harold R. Denton letter of October 30, 1979, should be submitted.

5. Section 2.2.1.b - Shift Technical Advisor

Your proposal to select one of the alternatives to the shift technical advisor as listed in the September 13, 1979 letter to operating reactors is noted. It should be recognized, however, that the listed alternatives were those previously reviewed by the staff and were found to be unacceptable for the reasons indicated in the September 13, 1979 letter. A clarification is therefore requested of the method by which you intend to implement the staff's requirement on the shift technical advisor. - 2 -

6. Section 2.2.2.b - Onsite Technical Support Center

Additional clarification is requested which addresses communication links (how many), access of engineering records (distance, time), and the visual display of station technical data. The current proposal of a data "pass-through" window does not address the type of data that can be transmitted in this fashion, the timelines of the data, nor the possible distraction to and burden on the control room watchstanders from such a system.

7. Section 2.1.8.a - Post-Accident Sampling

Your commitment should include the commitment to provide the capability to conduct sample analysis of dissolved gases (H_2, O_2) in the reactor coolant and hydrogen in the containment atmosphere.

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Licensee: Southern California Edison Company

Facility: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1

Summary of November 8, 1979 Phone Conversation Regarding Subject: 480V Switchgear Fault in 4 KV Switchgear Room

A conference telephone call was held on November 8, 1979, between J. Curran, San Onofre Unit 1 Plant Manager, R. Krieger, Senior Engineer of Southern California Edison Company (SCEC, the licensee), A. Burger, J. Burdoin, L. Derderian of the DOR staff and G. Klingler, B. Faulkenberry of I&E, to obtain more detailed information on the subject event. The switchgear failure required shutdown of the plant. The licensee had promptly reported the event to the NRC. SCEC provided the following details.

On November 7, 1979, at 12:37 Pacific Time the operators in the control room heard a loud noise followed by several annunciator alarms which indicated loss of 480 bus voltage and fire (set off by smoke detectors) in the 4 KV switchgear room located below the control room. The operator immediately tripped the reactor, all control rods dropped into the core, boration was started and a normal shutdown proceeded. The Unit 1 fire brigade assembled and arrived inside the 4 KV switchgear room within 4 minutes from the receipt of the control room alarms. The Camp Pendleton fire brigade which had been promptly notified arrived on-the-scene within eleven minutes from receipt of the control room alarms. The fire brigade established that an electrical fault had occurred in the No. 1 480V switchgear. There was no fire but only a great deal of smoke from the electrical fault. There were no injuries to personnel.

When the back of the switchgear was removed, it was found that the center "B" phase of the bus tap (the bus bars between the main bus and the circuit breakers) for a containment sump recirculating pump had faulted to ground (phase to ground fault). This pump was not operable at the time and the circuit breaker was open. (Another redundant sump recirculating pump which is powered from a separate 480V bus located in the 480V switchgear room was operable). The circuit breaker which energizes the 480V bus in the 4 KV switchgear room operated on instantaneous overcurrent to clear the fault. The damage was limited to the "B" phase bus bar and control wiring. The debris was removed and the switchgear unit #1 was returned to service before noon on November 8, 1979.

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