

<b>NRC FORM 366</b> (MMM-YYYY)	<b>U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION</b>	<b>APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES MM/DD/YYYY</b> <small>Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Information and Records Management Branch (T-6 F33) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20655-0001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a document used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, information collection.</small>
<b>LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)</b>		
<small>(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)</small>		

<b>FACILITY NAME (1)</b> San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Unit 1	<b>Docket Number (2)</b> 50-206	<b>Page (3)</b> 1 of 3
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**TITLE (4): Unattended Security Weapon Inside Protected Area**

EVENT DATE			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MON	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
12	07	1998	1998	-- 006	-- 00	1	6	1999	SONGS UNIT 2	05000-361
									SONGS UNIT 3	05000-362

<b>OPER. MODE</b>	N/A	<b>THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check One or More) (11)</b>								
		20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)	
<b>POWER LEVEL</b>	N/A	20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	
(10)		20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)		73.71	
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER Voluntary	
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)			

<b>LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)</b>	
<b>NAME</b> R.W. Krieger, Vice President, Nuclear Generation	<b>TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area)</b> 949-368-6255

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

<b>SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)</b>				<b>EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)</b>		<b>MONTH</b>	<b>DAY</b>	<b>YEAR</b>
Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)		X	No					

**ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-spaced typewritten lines.)**

On 12/7/1998, at 0007 PST, a Security officer, assigned armed responder duties inside the Protected Area (PA), was found inattentive inside a Vital Area (VA). This event was logged within 24 hours.

On 12/8/1998, an NRC Security Inspector, noting the inattentive officer's response weapon was removed by another Security officer without the inattentive officer's knowledge, questioned the need for a 1-hour report in accordance with San Onofre Security Procedure. Southern California Edison (SCE) made a 1-hour report to the NRC Operations Center for an "unattended weapon" inside the PA. Upon further consideration, SCE has concluded the 1-hour notification was not required by regulation, and this report is being submitted voluntarily.

Immediate corrective actions included relieving the officer of all duties, removing his PA access, and placing him on investigatory suspension.

The cause of the officer's inattention is being investigated. The officer was given a For-Cause Fitness-For-Duty Test, and the results were negative. Appropriate corrective actions, if any, to prevent recurrence have not been determined.

Only Security personnel were inside the affected VA while the officer was inattentive. Therefore, this event had no actual safety significance. SCE has not reported any similar events in the past 3 years.

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Plant: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2 and 3  
 Reactor Vendor: Westinghouse (Unit 1), Combustion Engineering (Units 2 and 3)  
 Event Date: December 7, 1998  
 Event Time: 0002 PST

	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 3
Mode:	Permanently	1, Power operation	1, Power operation
Power:	Defueled	99.9 percent	99.9 percent
Temperature:		548 degrees F	546 degrees F
Pressure:		2250 psia	2250 psia

#### Description of the Event:

On December 7, 1998, at 0002 PST during routine security communication checks, a Security officer, assigned armed responder duties inside the Protected Area (PA), did not respond to radio transmissions. Another Security officer was dispatched and at 0007 PST found the posted officer inattentive inside the post's security booth within a Vital Area (VA). The responding officer assumed custody of the response weapon, and awakened the inattentive Security officer. This event was logged within 24 hours.

On December 8, 1998, an NRC Security Inspector, noting the inattentive officer's response weapon was removed by another Security officer without the inattentive officer's knowledge, questioned the need for a 1-hour report in accordance with SONGS Security Procedure SO123-IV-11.2, "Reporting Safeguards Events." On December 8, 1998, at 1345 PST, SCE made a 1-hour report to the NRC Operations Center (NRC Log Event Number 35123) for an "unattended weapon" inside the PA.

Upon further consideration, SCE has concluded the inattentive officer's weapon should not have been reported as a lost or unattended weapon because:

- Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.62, Section 2.2, Item 24, requires the loss of a security weapon be reported within 1 hour of discovery that a weapon has been lost. However, the weapon in question was next to the inattentive officer inside his security post's booth. Even though the officer was inattentive, the location of his weapon was always known. Also note the guidance provided in draft RG DG-5008, Section 2.4, Example 13, indicates the loss of a security weapon which is retrieved within 1 hour of the discovery of the loss should be logged only. For this event, the officer's weapon was retrieved by another Security officer at the time of discovery.
- 10CFR73, Appendix G, Section II(a) and the guidance provided by Generic Letter (GL) 91-03, under the heading "Examples of Safeguards Events That Do Not Need To Be Reported To The NRC Within 1 Hour of Discovery," require the discovery of a sleeping or inattentive Security guard performing "compensatory measures" to be logged. Under the assumption that a security officer is armed, the NRC's guidance does not require a separate log entry or report for an "unattended" weapon as well. The Security officer in this report was at a post not considered a compensatory post for a degraded security system. Therefore, this would not be reportable or loggable under 10CFR73, Appendix G, Section II(a) or GL 91-03. Nevertheless, SONGS Security Procedure SO123-IV-11.2 does require logging the event as a failure to meet a Physical Security Plan (PSP)/Security Contingency Plan (SCP) provisions. The event was logged at 1036 PST on December 7, 1998.

Accordingly, the 1-hour notification made on December 8, 1998, was not required by regulation, and this 30 day follow-up report is being submitted voluntarily.

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TEXT CONTINUATION						
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**Cause of the Condition:**

The cause of the officer's inattention is being investigated. The officer was given a For-Cause Fitness-For-Duty Test, and the results were negative.

**Corrective Action:**

**As immediate corrective actions:**

1. The inattentive officer was relieved of all duties.
2. The officer's PA access was removed.
3. The officer was placed on investigatory suspension.
4. All PA and VA alarms during the period the officer was inattentive to duty were assessed. A Security Computer history log confirmed only Security personnel were inside the affected VA while the officer was inattentive.

The investigation of the cause of the officer's inattention is on-going. Appropriate corrective actions, if any, to prevent recurrence have not been determined.

**Safety Significance:**

Because only Security personnel were inside the affected VA during the time the inattentive officer was at that post, and the officer's weapon was retrieved by another Security officer, this event had no actual safety significance.

**Additional Information:**

LER 1-1997-004 reported two occurrences of unattended weapons. However, these events were the result of weapon containers being left unlocked. The corrective actions for those events were not expected to prevent an officer from being inattentive.