



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SUPPLEMENT TO SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 116 TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-13

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY

SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-206

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Amendment No. 116 to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-13 was issued on December 2, 1988. This amendment authorized transshipment of spent fuel from Unit No. 1 spent fuel pool to San Onofre Units 2 and 3. Following issuance of Amendment No. 116, the licensee advised that its report, "Transshipment of San Onofre Unit 1 Spent Fuel" contained an error. Because our safety evaluation that supported issuance of Amendment No. 116 relied on information contained in that report, our safety evaluation was in error also. By letters dated December 2 and 3, 1988, the licensee provided information to correct the error and clarify its submittal.

2.0 EVALUATION

In our safety evaluation of December 2, 1988 we stated that cable trays containing circuits for equipment used for shutdown are located beneath the cask path of travel at the north end of the turbine building, and that safe shutdown can be maintained without this equipment because redundant equipment is available away from the cask path of travel. This was based on licensee's letter of April 25, 1988.

In its letters of December 2 and 3, the licensee stated that, because failure mechanisms could not be predicted accurately in the event of a cask drop, redundant electrical equipment could potentially be affected if a dropped cask should penetrate the turbine deck, thereby revising its previous submittal. Therefore, the impact limiter used in this area to ensure the structural integrity of the north turbine deck extension and decontamination pad will protect safe shutdown cables located beneath the deck, without reliance on redundant equipment located elsewhere.

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The NRC staff included a review of the impact limiter in its safety evaluation of December 2, 1988 which concluded that the impact limiter provides the necessary safety guard to prevent a postulated cask drop from penetrating the turbine deck. In addition, the licensee has installed a chain-link fencing material under this section of the deck to protect shutdown equipment should spalling occur.

3.0 CONCLUSION

Since following a cask drop, at least one train of safe shutdown equipment will remain available, we conclude that the guidelines of NUREG-0612 for safe load handling continue to be satisfied.