## REGULATORY DO Southern California Edison Company



2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE

ROSEMEAD, CALIFORNIA 91770

J. T. HEAD, JR. VICE PRESIDENT

September 7, 1977

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V Office of Inspection and Enforcement Suite 202, Walnut Creek Plaza 1990 North California Boulevard Walnut Creek, California 94596

Attention: Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director



TELEPHONE

213-572-1472

Docket No. 50-206 San Onofre Unit 1

Dear Sir:

References:

(1) Letter from SCE (H. L. Ottoson) to USNRC, Region V dated August 24, 1977

(2) Letter from SCE (K. P. Baskin) to NRC (A. Schwencer) dated March 25, 1977 re: Plant Modifications to Eliminate Postulated Single Failure Effects

(3) Letter from SCE (K. P. Baskin) to NRC (A. Schwencer) dated December 21, 1976 re: Single Failure Analysis

Reference (1) provided notification to the Regional Office of a deficiency in the charging pump circuitry as recently revised in order to eliminate undesirable single failure effects. This letter is the followup report to Reference (1) and is submitted in accordance with the provisions of Section 6.9.2a of Appendix A to the Provisional Operating License No. DPR-13.



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Reference (2) indicated our intention to remove one charging pump from equipment automatically started by the sequencer as an interim measure to eliminate undesirable single failure effects discussed in the single failure analysis submitted by Reference (3). Removal of one charging pump from equipment automatically started by the sequencer eliminates the potential failure of both charging pumps (one of which is needed during recirculation) as a result of the postulated failure, in an open position, of MOV/LCV 1100C. MOV/LCV 1100C isolates the hydrogen pressurized Volume Control Tank from the suction of the charging pumps. Without such isolation, hydrogen from the Volume Control Tank could cause the cavitation of the charging pumps.

The interim measure identified above was completed as part of Design Change 77-05 prior to return to operation of San Onofre Unit 1 in April 1977. Subsequent to the completion of Design Change 77-05 and the return to operation of San Onofre Unit 1, it was discovered that Design Change 77-05 did not eliminate the automatic starting of both charging pumps in the event of a loss of the 480V power supply to MOV/LCV 1100C. Loss of the MOV/LCV 1100C 480V power supply results in the deenergizing of a relay which normally isolates the standby\* charging pump from the auto start signal from the sequencer. Deenergization of this relay enables the automatic starting of the standby charging pump with a start signal from the sequencer. Design Change 77-05 did not, therefore, effect the desired interim measure, namely, the removal of one charging pump from equipment automatically started by the sequencer.

As indicated in Reference (1), redesign of the charging pump circuitry to correct the above-described deficiency has been initiated. The redesign consists of replacing the isolating capability of the above-identified relay with a manual alignment switch for each charging pump control circuitry. This redesign eliminates the automatic starting of both charging pumps by the sequencer and satisfies the requirements of the interim measure identified in Reference (2). Additional details of the deficiency and the redesign will be provided by separate cover.

The redesign has been reviewed and approved by the On-Site Review Committee (OSRC) as Design Change 77-10 in accordance with the Appendix A Technical Specifications. The redesign will be implemented during the next plant outage which is now scheduled to begin September 8, 1977. Until this redesign is implemented, administrative procedures have been implemented to assure that one charging pump will be available for recirculation service. A temporary operating memorandum has been put into effect which provides for operator action to prevent the loss of one charging pump in the event MOV/LCV 1100C loses its 480V power supply during a LOCA.

\*As indicated in Reference (2) the standby charging pump is that pump not automatically started by the sequencer and therefore made available for subsequent recirculation service.

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Enclosed is a completed Licensee Event Report form designated LER 77-11. If you have any questions concerning this matter please let me know.

-3-

Sincerely,

Enclosure

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cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (40 copies) Director, Office of Management Information & Program Control (3 copies) REGULATORY DECKET FILE COPY

## Southern California Edison Company

P. O. BOX 800 2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE ROSEMEAD, CALIFORNIA 91770

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Reference (1) provided notification to the Regional Office of a deficiency in the charging pump circuitry as recently revised in order to eliminate undesirable single failure effects. This letter is the followup report to Reference (1) and is submitted in accordance with the provisions of Section 6.9.2a of Appendix A to the Provisional Operating License No. DPR-13.

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TELEPHONE

213-572-1472

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-2-

The interim measure identified above was completed as part of Design Change 77-05 prior to return to operation of San Onofre Unit 1 in April 1977. Subsequent to the completion of Design Change 77-05 and the return to operation of San Onofre Unit 1, it was discovered that Design Change 77-05 did not eliminate the automatic starting of both charging pumps in the event of a loss of the 480V power supply to MOV/LCV 1100C. Loss of the MOV/LCV 1100C 480V power supply results in the deenergizing of a relay which normally isolates the standby\* charging pump from the auto start signal from the sequencer. Deenergization of this relay enables the automatic starting of the standby charging pump with a start signal from the sequencer. Design Change 77-05 did not, therefore, effect the desired interim measure, namely, the removal of one charging pump from equipment automatically started by the sequencer.

As indicated in Reference (1), redesign of the charging pump circuitry to correct the above-described deficiency has been initiated. The redesign consists of replacing the isolating capability of the above-identified relay with a manual alignment switch for each charging pump control circuitry. This redesign eliminates the automatic starting of both charging pumps by the sequencer and satisfies the requirements of the interim measure identified in Reference (2). Additional details of the deficiency and the redesign will be provided by separate cover.

The redesign has been reviewed and approved by the On-Site Review Committee (OSRC) as Design Change 77-10 in accordance with the Appendix A Technical Specifications. The redesign will be implemented during the next plant outage which is now scheduled to begin September 8, 1977. Until this redesign is implemented, administrative procedures have been implemented to assure that one charging pump will be available for recirculation service. A temporary operating memorandum has been put into effect which provides for operator action to prevent the loss of one charging pump in the event MOV/LCV 1100C loses its 480V power supply during a LOCA.

\*As indicated in Reference (2) the standby charging pump is that pump not automatically started by the sequencer and therefore made available for subsequent recirculation service.



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Sincerely, Bead

Enclosure

cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (40 copies) Director, Office of Management Information & Program Control (3 copies)

•• • •-	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
•	CONTROL BLOCK
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	EVENT DESCRIPTION During normal operation, a deficiency was discovered in the charging pump circuitry, as recently revised by Design Change 77-05, to eliminate undesirable single failure effects. Design Change 77-05 was intended to remove one charging pump from equipment automatically started by the sequencer, however postulated loss of power continues to fresult in the auto start of both pumps control to the detect of DC 37 05. D to the dete
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	starting of both numme by the sequencers
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15	OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES
7 8 16 7 8	9 LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION Z NA 9 10
	PUBLICITY BO
/ 8 18 7 8	BO ADDITIONAL FACTORS of the charging pump control circuitry to eliminate starting of both pumps has been 9
19	so initiated (77-11).
, 0;	NAME: <u>H. L. Ottoson</u> PHONE: (213) 572-1989

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